



L-76-192

*Central Files*

*50-250*

*50-251*

May 17, 1976


Mr. F. J. Long, Chief,  
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch  
Region II - Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
230 Peachtree Street, N. W., Suite 818  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Long:

Re: IE:II:AKH  
50-250/76-4  
50-251/76-4

Florida Power & Light Company has reviewed the subject inspection report. No proprietary information has been identified in the report.

Very truly yours,

  
Robert E. Uhrig  
Vice President

REU/GDW/hlc

cc: Jack R. Newman, Esq.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION II  
230 PEACHTREE STREET, N. W. SUITE 818  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303  
APR 16 1976

*Ksacta Facilities  
Br.*

In Reply Refer To:  
IE:II:AKH  
~~50-250/76-4~~  
50-251/76-4

Florida Power and Light Company  
Attn: Dr. R. E. Uhrig, Vice President  
of Nuclear Affairs  
P. O. Box 013100  
9250 West Flagler Street  
Miami, Florida 33101

Gentlemen:

This refers to the inspection conducted by Mr. A. K. Hardin of this office on March 30 to April 2, 1976, of activities authorized by NRC Operating License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41 for the Turkey Point 3 and 4 facilities, and to the discussion of our findings held with Mr. Yaeger at the conclusion of the inspection.

Areas examined during the inspection and our findings are discussed in the enclosed inspection report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examination of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations by the inspector.

Within the scope of this inspection, no items of noncompliance were disclosed.

We have also examined actions you have taken with regard to previously identified unresolved items and deviation. The status of these items is identified in Sections IV and VI of the summary of the enclosed report.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosed inspection report will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room. If this report contains any information that you believe to be proprietary, it is necessary that you submit a written application to this office requesting that such information be withheld from public disclosure. If no proprietary information is identified, a written statement to that effect should be submitted. If an application is

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APR 16 1976

Florida Power and Light Co.

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submitted, it must fully identify the bases for which information is claimed to be proprietary. The application should be prepared so that information sought to be withheld is incorporated in a separate paper and referenced in the application since the application will be placed in the Public Document Room. Your application, or written statement, should be submitted to us within 20 days. If we are not contacted as specified, the enclosed report and this letter may then be placed in the Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, we will be glad to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours,



F. J. Long, Chief  
Reactor Operations and  
Nuclear Support Branch

Enclosure:  
IE Inspection Report Nos.  
50-250/76-4 and 50-251/76-4



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION II  
230 PEACHTREE STREET, N. W. SUITE 818  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-250/76-4 and 50-251/76-4

Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company  
9250 West Flagler Street  
P. O. Box 013100  
Miami, Florida 33101

Facility Name: Turkey Point 3 and 4  
Docket Nos.: 50-250 and 50-251  
License Nos.: DPR-31 and DPR-41  
Category: C/C

Location: Dade County, Florida

Type of License: W PWR-760 Mwe, 2200 Mwt

Type of Inspection: Routine, Unannounced

Dates of Inspection: March 30 - April 2, 1976

Dates of Previous Inspection: February 18-20, 1976

Principal Inspector: A. K. Hardin, Reactor Inspector  
Reactor Projects Section - 2  
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch

Accompanying Inspector: None

Other Accompanying Personnel: None

Principal Inspector: A. K. Hardin  
A. K. Hardin, Reactor Inspector  
Reactor Projects Section - 2  
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support  
Branch

4/15/76  
Date

Reviewed by: R. C. Lewis  
R. C. Lewis, Chief  
Reactor Projects Section - 2  
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch

4/15/76  
Date

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

### I. Enforcement Action

None

### II. Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Matters

Followup of previously identified enforcement matters was not accomplished on this inspection.

### III. New Unresolved Items

None

### IV. Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items

The following unresolved items are current but were not reviewed during the inspection and remain open.

- 76-3/1 - Plant Nuclear Safety Committee Reviews
- 75-17/1 - Liquid Effluent Control Monitor
- 75-17/2 - Containment Air System - Equipment
- 75-17/3 - Containment Air System - Procedure
- 75-17/6 - Non-Shift Licensee on Watch Duty
- 75-10/3 - Valve Replacement

### V. Unusual Occurrences

None

### VI. Other Significant Findings

#### A. Plant Status

Both Turkey Point (TP) 3 and 4 were operating at 100% power. Preparation for shutdown of Unit 4 on April 19 for refueling was in progress.

#### B. Spent Fuel Pit Liner Leak


The licensee has recently initiated added emphasis to investigating potential methods of repairing the liner leaks in both TP 3 and 4 spent fuel pit basin. (Details I, paragraph 3)

- #### C.
- IE Rpt. No. 50-250/76-1 identified a deviation involving failure to update safety related plant drawings. The licensee's responses dated March 8 and March 29, 1976, described the program they intend to follow until drawings are updated. Item remains open. (Details I, paragraph 2)

VII. Management Interview

The results of the inspection were discussed with the FP&L Management personnel listed in Details I, paragraph 1. The following items were discussed.

- A. Findings relative to inspection of Plant Operations. (Details I, paragraph 5)
- B. Findings relative to inspection of Licensee Event Reports. (Details I, paragraph 4)
- C. Status of licensees' studies on spent fuel pit liner leak. (Details I, paragraph 3)
- D. Status of plant drawing update. (Details I, paragraph 2)



## DETAILS I

Prepared by:

A. K. Hardin  
A. K. Hardin, Reactor Inspector  
Reactor Projects Section No. 2  
Reactor Operations and Nuclear  
Support Branch

4/15/76

Date

Dates of Inspection: March 30, to April 2, 1976

Reviewed by:

R. C. Lewis  
R. C. Lewis, Chief  
Reactor Projects Section No. 2  
Reactor Operations and Nuclear  
Support Branch

4/15/76

Date

All information in the details applies equally to Turkey Point (TP) 3 and 4, except where information is identified with a specific reactor.

1. Individuals Contacted\*

H. E. Yaeger - Plant Manager  
J. K. Hays - Plant Superintendent, Nuclear  
J. E. Moore - Superintendent, Nuclear Operations  
V. B. Wager - Operations Supervisor, Nuclear  
J. A. Olsonoski - QC Compliance Engineer  
D. W. Jones - QC Supervisor  
R. B. Wallace - QA Engineer  
A. E. Siebe - Assistant Manager of QA - Operations  
L. L. Leskovjan - Nuclear Licensing Engineer  
N. F. Ajluni - Nuclear Staff Coordinator  
C. D. Ward - Plant Supervisor, Electrical  
C. C. Yates - Operations Superintendent (Fossil)  
D. D. Brady - Nuclear Plant Supervisor  
J. P. Mendieta - I&C Supervisor  
G. G. Jones - Nuclear Plant Supervisor

\*Listed personnel were present at exit interview.

2. Plant Drawing Update

IE Report No. 50-250/76-1 identified a deviation involving failure to update plant drawings, following modifications. The licensee response to the deviation on March 8 and 29, stated that four technicians would be assigned full-time by May 1, 1976, to review and revise the plant drawings. Also, that the technicians would not be assigned any other duties until the drawing update program has been completed. The safety related systems are to be given first attention. In addition, periodic updates would be provided describing the progress of the program.



The licensee informed the inspector at the site on 3/31/76 that the four technicians were already assigned to the work. This had been accomplished by hiring one technician and reassigning three others from the plant staff. Activities to bring plant drawings up-to-date are proceeding as described in the licensee's commitment; however, pending completion of the program, the item will remain open.

### 3. Spent Fuel Pit Leaks

In Unusual Event Report Nos. UE-250-74-6 and UE-251-75-3 and IE Report Nos. 50-250 and 251/74-10, 74-12 and 75-1, leaks through the liners on the Spent Fuel Pits (SFP) were reported and discussed. On the current inspection, the SFP leak and repair status were reviewed.

Part of FPL's investigation of the SFP leakage involved draining of the SFP transfer canal and key way and varying the SFP water level to observe the leakage as a function of water level. A review of the leakage data on Unit 3 revealed that when the level was reduced from 12.5" (as measured from the top of the SFP) to 13", the measured leakage decreased from about 0.45 gpm to 0.23 gpm. Of this leakage the licensee reports that about 0.02 gpm is leaking through the liner and out the leak chase system and the remainder is leaking past the key way gate and into the drained transfer canal; thence, to the waste hold up tank for processing. The data shows that as the SFP water level was decreased in Unit 4 SFP, that the leakage rate did not always decrease, but in some instances an increased leakage was noted. Management stated that the increased leakage with a decrease in SFP level was believed to be as a result of a decrease in the sealing pressure (caused by decrease in water head) on the key way gate; resulting in increased leakage past the seal of the gate. The water leaking past the gate flowed into the drained transfer canal and thence to the waste hold up tank for processing. Management stated that a visual inspection of the leakage rate past the gate corroborates this conclusion. Management stated that, in addition, a daily boron analysis of the waste holdup tank and water inventory balance correlates closely with the reduced SFP levels. The licensee reported that no leakage is coming from the leak trace system of Unit 4.

A visual inspection of the areas adjacent to both Units 3 and 4 spent fuel pits, with particular attention to the areas where previous leakage was noted, indicated that spent fuel pit water is not leaking to the outside of the buildings.

The licensee further stated they are investigating potential repair methods. Of the methods being reviewed, most require transferring spent fuel from one SFP to the sister reactor SFP and draining the

pool. This task was estimated as requiring as much as six months or more to transfer spent fuel and process the SFP water before liner repair or replacement could be started. The licensee informed Region II by telecon on April 14, 1976, that repair of the weld defects in the stainless steel liner of Unit 4 SFP transfer canal were commenced on April 13, 1976. Following completion of the weld repair, the key way and transfer canal will be refilled with water and leak tested.

The licensee has submitted a request to Nuclear Reactor Regulation for increasing the fuel storage capacity of the SFPs. Tentative plans are to coincide the SFP leak repair with the installation of new high capacity spent fuel racks in the basin, if additional storage capacity is approved. This item remains open.

#### 4. Licensee Event Reports

The inspector reviewed four events which the licensee reported during the first quarter 1976.

##### a. Reportable Occurrence 250-76-1

On February 19, 1976, during normal steady state operation of Unit 3, water was found leaking from the casing of the 3A charging pump. The licensee made a weld repair on the pump and operated the pump to test for leakage. No leakage was observed and the pump has been returned to service. The licensee stated a new casing has been ordered and when received the pump will be rebuilt. No further direct inspection of this event is anticipated, as operability of the pump has been demonstrated.

##### b. Reportable Occurrence 250-76-2

On March 6, 1976, during normal steady state power operation, the licensee observed that power to the 3B emergency diesel generator breaker closing spring charging motor was not available. Inspection indicated that a worn bushing had rendered the motor inoperable. The inspector reviewed the occurrence at the site and examined the faulty parts. The charging spring pawl has a plastic bushing, which the licensee believes allowed sufficient wear to cause the event. The licensee has replaced the circuit breaker with an identical breaker and tested the breaker.

The licensee stated that further corrective action will include reviewing the feasibility of replacing the plastic bushing charging spring drive pawl with a pawl containing a bronze bushing. This item remains open pending final corrective action.

c. Reportable Occurrence 251-76-1

On January 30, 1976, the licensee found during a periodic test, that one channel of overtemperature  $\Delta T$  setpoint was about one degree higher than the Technical Specification limit. The licensee determined that failure of two 500 MFD filter capacitors permitted the setpoint to be raised above the required value. The licensee's review of this occurrence concluded the failure of the capacitors was not generic.

d. Reportable Occurrence 251-76-2

On February 14, 1976, the licensee determined, during a periodic test, that the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) contained about one percent less water than specified in Technical Specifications. The licensee proposes to install a narrow range gauge as a backup to the wide range gauge and to install test gauges on each RWST as a backup to control room gauges. The licensee's design review had not been completed at the time of the inspection. This item remains open pending completion of corrective action.

5. Plant Operationsa. Log Books

Control room log books for Units 3 and 4 were reviewed for the period March 19 thru March 30, 1976. At the exit interview, the inspector discussed with the licensee the lack of detail in log books. The inspector described an example of inadequate detail in which the log entries showed the condensate storage tank to be less than minimum level five times during the 10 day period and no reason was given in the console log. The licensee stated problems were being experienced at the water treatment plant. The Technical Specification for the condensate storage tank allows 48 hours to return a tank to the correct level should the tank be found below minimum level. The inspector verified that log entries showed that Technical Specifications were met within the required time period. The licensee agreed log entries could be improved.

b. Reactor Trips

A review of the reactor trip logs showed Unit 4 had made five shutdowns since 1/1/76. Three of the shutdowns were reactor trips. The three trips were due to Steam Generator (SG) low level, SG high level and a generator lock out due to loss of field.

On Unit 3 there were five shutdowns, one of which was a reactor trip due to a loss of SG level control.

c. Control Room Instrumentation

A review and discussion of control room annunciators in the alarm condition was conducted with control room operators. A review of valve and switch positions on selected equipment was made and discussed with operators. No areas of noncompliance with regulations were observed.