



FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

July 27, 1977

L-77-237

Central File

50-250

251

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director, Region II
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
230 Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 1217
Atlanta, GA 30303

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Re: RII:JEO
50-250/77-11
50-251/77-11

Florida Power & Light Company has reviewed the subject inspection report. There is no proprietary information in the report.

Very truly yours,

J A De Mastry

for Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President

REU/MAS:pg

Attachment

cc: Robert Lowenstein, Esquire

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
230 PEACHTREE STREET, N.W. SUITE 1217
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

JUL 13 1977

In Reply Refer To:

RII:JEO

50-250/77-11

50-251/77-11

Florida Power and Light Company
Attn: Dr. R. E. Uhrig, Vice President
of Nuclear and General
Engineering

P. O. Box 013100
9250 West Flagler Street
Miami, Florida 33101

Gentlemen:

This refers to the inspection conducted by Mr. J. E. Ouzts of this office on June 8-10, 1977, of activities authorized by NRC Operating License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41 for the Turkey Point Unit 3 and 4 facilities, and to the discussion of our findings held with Mr. J. K. Hays at the conclusion of the inspection.

Areas examined during the inspection and our findings are discussed in the attached inspection report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations by the inspector.

Within the scope of this inspection, no items of noncompliance were disclosed.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the attached inspection report will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room. If this report contains any information that you believe to be proprietary, it is necessary that you submit a written application to this office requesting that such information be withheld from public disclosure. If no proprietary information is identified, a written statement to that effect should be submitted. If an application is submitted, it must fully identify the bases for which information is claimed to be proprietary. The application should be prepared so that information sought to be withheld is incorporated in a separate paper and referenced in the application since the application will be placed in the Public Document Room. Your application, or written statement, should be submitted to us within 20 days. If we are not contacted as

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JUL 13 1977


Florida Power and Light Company

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specified, the attached report and this letter may then be placed in the Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, we will be glad to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours,



F. J. Long, Chief
Reactor Operations and
Nuclear Support Branch

Attachment: RII Inspection Rpt.
Nos. 50-250/77-11 and 50-251/77-11



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
230 PEACHTREE STREET, N.W. SUITE 1217
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

APPENDIX "A"

Report Nos.: 50-250/77-11 and 50-251/77-11

Docket Nos.: 50-250 and 50-251

License No.: DPR-31 and DPR-41

Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company
9250 West Flagler Street
P. O. Box 013100
Miami, Florida 33101

Facility Name: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4

Inspection at: Turkey Point Site, Homestead, Florida

Inspection conducted: June 8-10, 1977

Inspector-in-Charge: J. E. Ouzts

Inspectors: J. E. Ouzts
P. T. Burnett
R. J. Vogt-Lowell

Reviewed by: *R. D. Martin*
R. D. Martin, Chief
Nuclear Support Section
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch

7/13/77
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on June 8-10, 1977 (Report Nos. 50-250/77-11, 50-251/77-11)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of plant surveillance program, procedures and schedule pertaining to pipe support and restraint systems; review of procedures for the removal, replacement and testing of Westinghouse Type BFD relays in protection and safeguards systems, and witnessing of Unit 4 refueling operations and review of refueling procedures. The inspection involved 48 inspector-hours on site by three NRC inspectors.

Results: Of the areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

DETAILS I

Prepared by:

J. E. Ouzts

J. E. Ouzts, Reactor Inspector
Nuclear Support Section
Reactor Operations and Nuclear
Support Branch

7/5/77
Date

Dates of Inspection: June 8-10, 1977

Reviewed by:

R. D. Martin

R. D. Martin, Chief
Nuclear Support Section
Reactor Operations and Nuclear
Support Branch

7/5/77
Date

1. Persons Contacted

Principal Licensee Employees

- Mr. H. E. Yeager, Plant Manager
- *Mr. J. K. Hays, Plant Superintendent, Nuclear
- *H. M. Ainsworth, Assistant Maintenance Superintendent
- *J. P. Medieta, I&C Supervisor
- *J. E. Moore, Nuclear Operations Superintendent
- *R. J. Spooner, QA Supervisor
- *L. L. Thomas, Maintenance Test Engineer
- R. Tucker, QA Engineer
- R. B. Wallace, QA Engineer

*Denotes those present at the exit interview.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

3. Unresolved Items

None identified.

4. Units 3 and 4 Surveillance of Pipe Support and Restraint Systems

The inspector reviewed inspection procedures, records and inspection results for pipe supports and restraint systems, and inspected accessible and inaccessible restraints for Unit 4 and accessible

restraints for Unit 3. Documentation was reviewed and restraints inspected with comments noted as follows:

- a. Maintenance Procedure 0707.2 - Seismic Restraints Inspection and Repair. (10/26/76)

This procedure requires only a visual inspection of restraints as required by Item 6.7 in Table 4.2-1 of the current Technical Specifications, which requires that 33 percent be inspected over a 5 year period and 100 percent in a 10 year period. This procedure has no requirement to verify that the reservoir vents (bleed holes) be examined to verify they are open and free from foreign material. The licensee agreed to revise this procedure to include this requirement. The revised procedure will be examined at a subsequent inspection.

- b. Inspection and repair records - inspection and repair records for 26 dates between January 1974 and June 1977 were examined. The results of these inspections indicated the following repairs had been performed:

- (1) Seals for two hydraulic restraints were replaced.
- (2) Nine restraints were replaced due to fluid leakage.
- (3) Fluid was added to thirteen restraints.
- (4) Turn buckle lock nuts were found loose on three restraints.
- (5) Restraint No. 3 for charging pump 4A was replaced and 5 additional restraints added per Bechtel's recommendation to solve vibration problem.

As a result of these records review no items remain outstanding.

- c. Restraints, supports and pipe hanger hardware inspection - The following piping support hardware were inspected:

- (1) Unit 4 nonaccessible mechanical restraints, Nos. 17, 13, 14, 12, 11, 43, 10, 16, 45, 46, 8 and 47. Turnbuckle lock nuts were found loose on Nos. 14 and 17. The licensee will tighten these lock nuts prior to startup.
- (2) Unit 4 nonaccessible hydraulic restraints, Nos. 20, 21, 23, 22, 80, 82, 6 and 7. Reservoir vents were difficult

to locate and those that could not be found were probably painted over. The licensee agreed to locate and label these vents and remove any paint or foreign material that is plugging any vent as necessary. The accomplishment of this will be examined on restraints that are accessible at subsequent inspections.

- (3) Unit 4 accessible mechanical restraint No. 84. No discrepancies were observed.
- (4) Unit 3 accessible mechanical restraint No. 78. No discrepancies were noted.
- (5) Unit 4 accessible hydraulic restraints - Nos. 86, 57, 59, 85, 46, 47, 48, 76 and 77. Vents "Bleed Holes" in a number of the reservoirs were found painted over. The licensee agreed to remove this paint and clear these closed vents. The accomplishment of this will be examined at subsequent inspections.
- (6) Unit 4 pipe supports that included hangers, brackets, clamps cradles, saddles, base supports, etc., were inspected. A cradle supporting a feedwater line was observed to be dislocated. The licensee agreed to reinstall this support correctly prior to startup.

As a result of the inspection of pipe supporting hardware no areas of noncompliance were identified, and no discrepancies other than those noted above were observed. The inspector was advised by the licensee that he was in the process of replacing hydraulic restraints with mechanical restraints, particularly those in nonaccessible areas.

5. Review of Documentation for Replacement of Westinghouse BFD Relays in Protection and Safeguard Systems

The procedures for removal, replacement and testing of the newly installed Westinghouse BFD relays in protection and safeguards systems were reviewed to verify that these relays and systems would perform normally after replacement. These procedures required that the correct installation of the existing relays be verified prior to removal and verification of installation of the newly installed relays plus a satisfactory operational test of the system be performed. As a result of this review no discrepancies were identified.

6. Exit Interview

The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on June 10, 1977. The inspector summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified at this meeting.

DETAILS II

Prepared by:

P. T. Burnett
P. T. Burnett, Reactor Inspector
Nuclear Support Section
Reactor Operations and Nuclear
Support Branch

7/13/77
Date

Dates of Inspection: June 8-10, 1977

Reviewed by:

R. D. Martin
R. D. Martin, Chief
Nuclear Support Section
Reactor Operations and Nuclear
Support Branch

7/13/77
Date

1. Persons Contacted

- H. E. Yaeger, Plant Manager
- *J. K. Hays, Plant Superintendent, Nuclear
- *J. E. Moore, Nuclear Operations Superintendent
- *H. M. Ainsworth, Assistant Maintenance Superintendent
- *V. B. Wager, Nuclear Operations Supervisor
- *C. Baker, Nuclear Plant Supervisor

*Denotes those attending the exit interview.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

In response to the item of noncompliance I.A.4 reported in inspection report 76-17, the licensee identified his proposed corrective action in his letter, L-77-132, of April 29, 1977. Timely implementation of the corrective action, modification of step 8.2.23 of OP 1407.21, was confirmed during this inspection.

3. New Unresolved Items

None

4. Exit Interview

The inspector met with those persons identified in paragraph 1 and others on June 10, 1977. The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed. There were no items of noncompliance identified. The scope of the inspection is discussed further in the paragraphs that follow.

5. Preparation for Refueling (Unit 4)

The inspector reviewed the nine completed procedures 1407.1 to 1407.9 inclusive for completeness and content. These procedures address the removal or disassembly of systems beginning with the missile shield and ending with the upper internals prerequisites to fuel movement.

Prior to lifting the upper internals, station personnel completed procedure 16900.1 to unlatch the rod drive shafts from the rod cluster control assemblies (RCCA). After removing the upper internals, one RCCA was observed to be lying on top of the fuel assemblies. Obviously that RCCA, the second to be unlatched, had been withdrawn from the core in lifting the upper internals. Review of the procedure and the record therein of shaft-plus-tool weight before and after unlatching confirmed that rod drive shaft had been unlatched. The mechanism for the apparent partial re-latching of the shaft had not been identified by the close of the inspection.

OP 1407.21 "Refueling Activities Checkoff List" was reviewed and confirmed to be completed through step 8.3.1 before fuel movement in the reactor vessel began. OP 16002.6, "Preparations and Precaution for Refueling Fuel Shuffle" was also complete at that time.

The inspector noted that MP 16701.1, "Gantry Crane Inspection and Preventative Maintenance" was completed for the Unit 4 polar crane prior to lifting the reactor vessel head. The procedure is not referenced in OP 1407.21, "Refueling Activities Checkoff List." During the exit interview the inspector recommended that the crane procedure completion be a checkoff item in 1407.21.

6. Refueling Activities (Unit 4)

Fuel handling activities were observed in the Unit 4 reactor building and spent fuel pool. All handling equipment was observed to be operable and properly manned. Directions of fuel handling activities was observed in the control room. Monitoring of core reactivity and fuel bundle accountability were carried out as appropriate to the movement being made. Boron concentrations in the spent fuel pool and refueling canal and the frequency at which they determined met the requirements of Technical Specification 3.10.6.

7. Missing Steam Generator Tube Plug (Unit 4)

The licensee had reported earlier that a tube plug installed in an earlier outage as part of an anticipatory or preventive plugging program was missing, and was believed to be lodged in the tube in

the vicinity of the tube bend. The inspector reviewed with the personnel involved the efforts made to locate the plug and to confirm that the entire plug was in the tube. Measurements of plug location using electrician's "snakes" and video-tape pictures from a small TV camera that probed the tube lacked the resolution to absolutely confirm that the entire plug was in the tube. The licensee planned to repeat the TV probe of the tube with the hope of improving resolution to absolutely confirm that the entire plug was in the tube. The licensee planned to repeat the TV probe of the tube with the hope of improving resolution to confirm that an unbroken plug end was in view.

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