

August 16, 1977
L-77-253

Central File
50-250
251

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director, Region II
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
230 Peachtree Street, N. W., Suite 1217
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Re: RII:JEO
50-250/77-15
50-251/77-15

Florida Power & Light Company has reviewed the subject inspection report. There is no proprietary information in the report.

Very truly yours,

Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President

REU/MAS/cpc

cc: Robert Lowenstein, Esquire

B



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
230 PEACHTREE STREET, N.W. SUITE 1217
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

AUG 2 1977

In Reply Refer To:
RII:JEO
50-250/77-15
50-251/77-15

Florida Power and Light Company
Attn: Dr. R. E. Uhrig, Vice President
of Nuclear and General
Engineering

P. O. Box 013100
9250 West Flagler Street
Miami, Florida 33101

Gentlemen:


This refers to the inspection conducted by Mr. J. E. Ouzts of this office on July 20-22, 1977, of activities authorized by NRC Operating License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41 for the Turkey Point 3 and 4 facilities, and to the discussion of our findings held with Mr. H. E. Yaeger at the conclusion of the inspection.

Areas examined during the inspection and our findings are discussed in the attached inspection report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations by the inspector.

Within the scope of this inspection, no items of noncompliance were disclosed.

As a result of the failure of safeguards train "A" to trip during the initial Unit 4 safeguards integrated test; caused by relay (SIR-1) failure to operate due to a loose terminal contact being lodged in the operating mechanism, the licensee agreed to inspect the relays in all safeguards and protection racks for loose terminal screws and any other loose parts that may have lodged on the relays that could prevent the relays from operating. He agreed to discuss this corrective action in the Licensing Event Report (LER) to be submitted to NRC on the failure of safeguards train "A" to trip.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the attached inspection report will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room. If this report contains any information that you believe to be proprietary, it is necessary that you submit a written application



AUG 2 1977


Florida Power and
Light Company

-2-

to this office requesting that such information be withheld from public disclosure. If no proprietary information is identified, a written statement to that effect should be submitted. If an application is submitted, it must fully identify the bases for which information is claimed to be proprietary. The application should be prepared so that information sought to be withheld is incorporated in a separate paper and referenced in the application since the application will be placed in the Public Document Room. Your application, or written statement, should be submitted to us within 20 days. If we are not contacted as specified, the attached report and this letter may then be placed in the Public Document Room.


Should you have any questions concerning this letter, we will be glad to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours,



F. J. Long, Chief
Reactor Operations and Nuclear
Support Branch

Attachment:
RII Inspection Report Nos.
50-250/77-15 and 50-251/77-15





UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
230 PEACHTREE STREET, N.W. SUITE 1217
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Appendix "A"

Report Nos.: 50-250/77-15 and 50-251/77-15

Docket Nos.: 50-250 and 50-251

License Nos.: DPR-31 and DPR-41

Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company
9250 West Flagler Street
P. O. Box 013100
Miami, Florida 33101

Inspection at: Turkey Point Site, Homestead, Florida

Inspection conducted: July 20-22, 1977

Inspector: J. E. Ouzts

Reviewed by: _____

R. D. Martin
R. D. Martin, Chief
Nuclear Support Section
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch

8/1/77
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on July 20-22, 1977 (Report Nos. 50-250/77-15 and 50-251/77-15)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of performance of Unit 4 engineered safeguards and emergency power systems integrated test, review of metal impact monitoring system to be used for detecting any loose Unit 4 steam generator tube plugs and the method of verifying the status of the number and location of steam generator tubes plugged. The inspection involved 13 inspector-hours on site by one NRC inspector.

Results: Of the areas inspected no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

DETAILS I

Prepared by:

J. E. Ouzts
J. E. Ouzts, Reactor Inspector
Nuclear Support Section
Reactor Operations and Nuclear
Support Branch

8/1/77
Date

Dates of Inspection: July 20-22, 1977

Reviewed by:

R. D. Martin
R. D. Martin, Chief
Nuclear Support Section
Reactor Operations and Nuclear
Support Branch

8/1/77
Date

1. Persons Contacted

*Mr. H. E. Yaeger, Plant Manager
Mr. J. K. Hays, Plant Superintendent, Nuclear
Mr. J. D. Hardy, Engineer
Mr. J. P. Mendieta, I&C Supervisor
*Mr. J. E. Moore, Nuclear Operations Superintendent
*Mr. R. J. Spooner, QA Supervisor
*Ms. N. Ranek, Nuclear Licensing Engineer
Various Operations and Technical Personnel

*Denotes those present at the exit interview.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

3. Unresolved Items

None

4. Exit Interview

The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on July 22, 1977. The inspector summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and findings. No apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5. Witnessing of Unit 4 Engineered Safeguards and Emergency Power Systems Integrated Test

The inspector witnessed the performance of the engineered safeguards and emergency power systems integrated test per Operating Procedure 4104.2, to insure that the test was performed in accordance with sections 6 and 8 of the FSAR, section 4.1.2(b); 4.5.2.b.3; 4.5.1; 4.6.1, 4.6.2 and 4.8.1.b of the Technical Specifications. Qualifications of individuals, establishment of prerequisites, data collection and licensee evaluation of test results were also evaluated. The following observations were made during the test:

- a. During the initial performance of the test, engineered safeguards Train "A" failed to trip. An investigation showed the problem to be safety injection reset relay SIR-1 failure to operate, as a result of a loose relay terminal contact jamming the relay operating mechanism. An inspection of the Unit 4 safeguards relay racks revealed a number of spare relay contacts with loose screws that could possibly work loose and cause the same problem that was experienced. The licensee agreed to inspect all the Unit 3 and 4 safeguards and protection relay racks for loose terminal screws and loose material that could prevent relay operation. He will include a report of this inspection under corrective action of the Licensing Event Report (LER), to be submitted to NRC as a result of safeguard train "A" failure to operate.
- b. During the second performance of the test, diesel generator "B" failed to start due to being in the lockout mode. The operators failed to observe the diesel generator ready light not being on prior to initiating the test. The cause of the diesel engine being in lockout was being investigated and any findings were to be made to NRC. On the third attempt to run the test, all equipment operated satisfactorily.

As a result of witnessing this test, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. Review of Plans for Monitoring for Loose Steam Generator Tube Plugs in Unit 4 Under Reactor Coolant Flow Conditions

The inspector discussed with the licensee plans for monitoring the reactor coolant system for any loose steam generator plugs. He plans to use a Westinghouse Metal Impact Monitoring System (MIMS) with sensors located on three movable detector thimbles located 120° apart just below the reactor vessel. The sensors will be wired through preamplifiers and to signal conditioning, and audible

and recording equipment in the spreading room. Data will be taken during various flow conditions up to three pump flow. In addition to this data, additional data will be taken at points on the pumps and loop piping using a stethoscope. On July 27 the licensee reported that data taken during test runs on July 23 had been analyzed. This analysis indicated an object approximately the size of a tube plug was impacting with the reactor vessel components under flow conditions of less than three pumps. At the time of the licensee's report, the plant was at 350°F and secondary chemistry was being brought in specifications. His plans were to increase temperature to hot shutdown conditions at 557°F and perform zero power physics tests. Power will be held to less than 2 percent until the loose tube plug problem is resolved and concurrence is received from Licensing to escalate above that level.

As a result of these discussions, no additional questions remain on this subject at this time.

7. Review of Licensee's System for Verification of the Status of Steam Generator Tube Plugging

Based on discrepancies that existed between steam generator tube plugging records for Unit 4 and photographs taken of the lower tube sheet following the plugging operations that the records covered, future methods to be used to verify whether or not tube plugs had worked loose were discussed with the licensee. Records were examined and photographs of each quadrant of the lower surface of the tube sheet taken from within the channel head were viewed. From these photographs the plugged tubes could be easily detected. In the future, the licensee will take photographs prior to closing the steam generator after tube plugging and immediately upon opening the steam generator prior to starting future tube plugging operations. A comparison of these two sets of photographs will show any tube plugs that came loose and fell out during the interim operating period.

As a result of these discussions, no further questions remain on this subject at this time.

11

