P. O. BOX 013100, MIAMI, FLORIDA 33101

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

June 25, 1976

PRN-LI-76-162

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director, Region II
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
230 Peachtree Street, N. W., Suite 818
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Moseley:

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 251-76-4
TURKEY POINT UNIT 4
DATE OF OCCURRENCE: JUNE 11, 1976

LOW BORON CONCENTRATION

The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.2 to provide prompt notification of the subject occurrence.

Very truly yours,

A. D. Schmidt
Vice President
Power Resources

MAS/cpc

Attachment

cc: Jack R. Newman, Esquire
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (40)
Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [ ] (1–6) (PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

	LICENSEE NAME	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	EVENT TYPE
01	FLTPS4 (7–8 9–14)	00–00000–00 (15–25)	4111 (26–30)	01 (31–32)

	CATEGORY	REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE
01 CON'T	(57–58)	T (59)	L (60)	050–0250 (61–68)	061176 (69–74)	062576 (75–80)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 During steady state operation, routine sampling showed that the boron
03 concentration of the boron injection tank (BIT) and two of the three
04 boric acid storage tanks (BAST) was below the lower Technical Specifica-
05 tion limit of 20,000 ppm. Corrective action was to initiate a shutdown
06 in accordance with Administrative Procedure 103.8 and to commence

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE	PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	VIOLATION
07	SH (9–10)	E (11)	VALVEX (12–17)	A (43)	D025 (44–47)	Y (48)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 The exact cause of the BIT dilution was not found until the problem had
09 recurred on June 12. At that time, it was found that dilution of the
10 Unit 4 BIT was caused by inleakage from the RWST via the BIT inlet and

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
11	E (9)	100 (10–12)	N/A (13–44)	b (45)	N/A (46–80)

	FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE
12	Z (9)	Z (10)	N/A (11–44)	N/A (45–80)

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
13	000 (9–11)	Z (12)	N/A (13–80)

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
14	000 (9–11)	N/A (12–80)

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

15 N/A (9–80)

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
16	Z (9)	N/A (10–80)

PUBLICITY

17 N/A (9–80)

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 See Page 2 for continuation of Event Description and Cause Description. (9–80)

19 (9–80)

NAME: M. A. Schoppman PHONE: 305/552-3779

GPO 881-667

Event Description (Continued)

adding a concentrated boric acid solution to the tanks. The boron concentration of the tanks was returned to within specification and normal operation was resumed. A similar problem experienced by Unit 3 is reported in Reportable Occurrence 250-76-4. (251-76-4).

Cause Description (Continued)

outlet isolation valves. Since the BIT was being recirculated with the BAST system, two of the three BAST's were also diluted. Maintenance was performed on the inlet isolation valves to stop the leakage. Leakage past the outlet isolation valves was stopped by isolating the leakoff line from those valves. Several cases of BIT dilution have occurred, however, this was the first occurrence attributable directly to significant leakage past the isolation valves. Also, a situation in which cross-dilution occurred between a BIT and a BAST was previously discussed in report 251-75-12.