

June 25, 1976

PRN-LI-76-164

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director, Region II
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
230 Peachtree Street, N. W., Suite 818
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


Dear Mr. Moseley:

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 251-76-5
TURKEY POINT UNIT 4
DATE OF OCCURRENCE: JUNE 12, 1976

LOW BORON CONCENTRATION

The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.2 to provide prompt notification of the subject occurrence.

Very truly yours,


A. D. Schmidt
Vice President
Power Resources

MAS/cpc

Attachment

cc: Jack R. Newman, Esquire
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (40)
Director, Office of Management Information and
Program Control (3)

11-11-76

9/24/76 1 02 AM

RECEIVED
FBI
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [] [] [] [] [] []

PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION

LICENSEE NAME: [01] [F] [L] [T] [P] [S] [4] LICENSE NUMBER: [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] LICENSE TYPE: [4] [1] [1] [1] [1] EVENT TYPE: [0] [1]

CATEGORY: [01] CONT REPORT TYPE: [T] REPORT SOURCE: [L] DOCKET NUMBER: [0] [5] [0] [0] [2] [5] [1] EVENT DATE: [0] [6] [1] [2] [7] [6] REPORT DATE: [0] [6] [2] [5] [7] [6]

EVENT DESCRIPTION

[02] Routine sampling showed that the boron concentration of the boron injection tank (BIT) and the "B" boric acid storage tank (BAST) were below the Technical Specification limit of 20,000 ppm. This had occurred on the previous day (June 11, 1976) and is discussed in Reportable Occurrence 251-76-4. Corrective action was to initiate a

SYSTEM CODE: [S] [H] CAUSE CODE: [E] COMPONENT CODE: [V] [A] [L] [V] [E] [X] PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER: [A] COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: [D] [0] [2] [5] VIOLATION: [Y]

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

[08] Dilution of the Unit 4 BIT was caused by inleakage from the RWST via the BIT inlet and outlet isolation valves. Since the BIT was being recirculated with the BAST system, the "B" BAST was also diluted.

FACILITY STATUS: [E] % POWER: [1] [0] [0] OTHER STATUS: [N/A] METHOD OF DISCOVERY: [b] DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: [N/A]

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED: [Z] CONTENT OF RELEASE: [Z] AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: [N/A] LOCATION OF RELEASE: [N/A]

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER: [0] [0] [0] TYPE: [Z] DESCRIPTION: [N/A]

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER: [0] [0] [0] DESCRIPTION: [N/A]

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

[15] [N/A]

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE: [Z] DESCRIPTION: [N/A]

PUBLICITY

[17] [N/A]

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

[18] See page 2 for continuation of Event Description and Cause Description.

[19] []

NAME: M. A. Schoppman

PHONE: 305/552-3779

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
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Event Description (continued)

shutdown in accordance with Administrative Procedure 103.8 and to commence adding a concentrated boric acid solution to the tanks. The boron concentration of the tanks was returned to within specification and normal operation was resumed. (251-76-5).

Cause Description (continued)

Maintenance was performed on the inlet isolation valves to stop the leakage. Leakage past the outlet isolation valves was stopped by isolating the leakoff line from those valves. Similar cases of BIT dilution have occurred, however, this was the first occurrence attributable directly to leakage past the isolation valves. Also, a situation in which cross dilution occurred between a BIT and a BAST was previously discussed in report 251-75-12.



7-11-72