

Central Mail



**Consumers
Power
Company**

General Offices: 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, Michigan 49201 • Area Code 517 788-0550

December 2, 1977

Mr James G Keppler
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region III
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR-20 -
PALISADES PLANT - RESPONSE
TO IE BULLETIN 77-06

IE Bulletin 77-06 is not applicable to the Palisades Plant since the containment electrical penetrations cited are not utilized. Thus, no additional response is required.


David P Hoffman
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David P Hoffman
Assistant Nuclear Licensing Administrator

CC: ASchwencer, USNRC
EVolgenau, USNRC

DEC 5 1977

AG. 2



Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


Mr. H. E. Yaeger, Plant Manager
Turkey Point Plant - DPR 31 & 41
Florida Power & Light Company
Miami, Florida

MEMO FOR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION TO CONFIRM
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 251-77-12


This memo confirms our telephone notification of the subject prompt notification reportable occurrence made today to Mr. M. V. Sinkule of your office as follows:

OCCURRENCE - On Monday, October 24, 1977 at 7:50 pm it was determined that a flow path from the boric acid tanks to the Unit 4 Reactor Coolant System was not operable as required by technical specification 3.6.b.4. This determination was based on inability to establish boric acid flow through the blender or MOV-4-350, apparently due to boric acid crystallization in the line between the boric acid filter and Unit 4 charging pump room. The boric acid flow path from the refueling water storage tank to the reactor coolant system was operable throughout this occurrence.

CORRECTIVE ACTION - Immediate corrective action consisted of initiating a unit shutdown from 695Mw (100% power) in accordance with our administrative procedure covering deviation from a limiting condition for operation. In conjunction with the shutdown operation investigation of the problem continued. No abnormal conditions were detected but heat tracing set points were raised. At 10:40 pm boric acid flow was established and verified through the blender and MOV-4-350. At 10:45 pm the unit shutdown was terminated at 350Mw and the unit was returned to full power operation. The precise cause of the flow path obstruction could not be conclusively determined. Preliminary plans are to install additional temperature sensors on the line to ascertain whether a temperature gradient may exist on this circuit.


H. E. Yaeger
Plant Manager

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FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
Turkey Point Plant
October 3, 1977

Central Files
50-251

TO: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

FM: Mr. H. E. Yaeger, Plant Manager
Turkey Point Plant - DPR 31 & 41
Florida Power & Light Company
Miami, Florida

RE: MEMO FOR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION TO CONFIRM
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 251-77-10

This memo confirms our telephone notification of the subject prompt notification reportable occurrence made today to Mr. M. V. Sinkule of your office as follows:

OCCURRENCE - On Saturday, October 1, 1977 at 9:25 am the 4B component cooling water heat exchanger had been out of service for a period of 24 hours, the maximum allowable in accordance with technical specification 3.4.4.b.2 with the unit in power operation. The heat exchanger was in the process of being returned to service following routine pre-planned preventive maintenance (cleaning), but several unanticipated problems combined to cause a delay in restoration to operable status. The problems (closure head gasket joint leak and drain valve leak) were corrected and the heat exchanger was returned to service at 9:53 am or 28 minutes beyond the allowable 24 hours.

It was not immediately recognized by the Duty Call Supervisor reviewing this event that telephone notification to your office was required prior to the next working day following the event. Consequently, our initial notification to your office was made subsequent to the 24 hour period following the occurrence as required by technical specifications.

CORRECTIVE ACTION - Immediate corrective action consisted of initiating a unit shutdown in accordance with our administrative procedure covering deviation from a limiting condition for operation requirement. This was done in conjunction with completing installation of a new head gasket and replacing the drain valve. The heat exchanger was returned to service, the shutdown operation was terminated, and the unit was returned to full power. The problems experienced are of a random nature and would not be expected to recur in a manner that would cause exceeding the allowable out of service period during future preventive maintenance clearances on these heat exchangers.

Occurrence notification requirements will be reviewed with all personnel who function as Duty Call Supervisor to reduce the likelihood of a future misinterpretation.

H. E. Yaeger
Plant Manager



FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

July 23, 1975

L-75-372

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region II
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
230 Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 818
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Re: IE:II:NCM - 50-250, 50-251, 50-335
IE Bulletin No. 75-06
Defective Westinghouse Type
OT-2 control switches

The referenced IE Bulletin requested that FPL review its facilities to determine if the switches described were in use, or planned for use, in any safety-related systems. My letter to you of June 26, 1975, provided that information for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. Since that time we have completed our review for St. Lucie Unit No. 1 and have determined that the Westinghouse Type OT-2 control switches are not planned for use in any of its class IE equipment.

Yours very truly,

J. A. De Mastroy
for

Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President

REU:nch

cc: Jack R. Newman, Esquire

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