APR1400

APPLICANT'S ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT – STANDARD DESIGN CERTIFICATION

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Korea Electric Power Corporation Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., Ltd

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

The following is a list of acronyms and abbreviations used in this report. These abbreviations may be used in the chapter without an opening declaration of their meaning in the text of their definition (although one is usually provided).

AC	alternating current
AFW	auxiliary feedwater
AFWST	auxiliary feedwater storage tank
AMSAC	ATWS mitigation system actuation circuitry
AOC	averted offsite property damage costs
AOE	averted occupational exposures
AOSC	averted onsite costs
AOV	air-operated valve
APE	averted public exposure
APR	advanced power reactor
APR1400	Advanced Power Reactor 1400
ATWS	anticipated transient without scram
CDF	core damage frequency
СЕ	Combustion Engineering
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CO ₂	carbon dioxide
COE	cost of enhancement
CST	condensate storage tank
dc	direct current
DC	Design Certification
ECCS	emergency core cooling system
ECW	essential chilled water
EDG	emergency diesel generator
EOP	emergency operating procedure
ESRP	environmental standard review plan
ESW	essential service water

FV	Fussell-Vesely
GSI	generic safety issue
H ₂	hydrogen
HP/LP	high pressure/low pressure
HVAC	heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
HVT	holdup volume tank
IRWST	in-containment refueling water storage tank
ISLOCA	interfacing system loss-of-coolant accident
КЕРСО	Korea Electric Power Corporation
KHNP	Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power, Inc.
LOCA	loss-of-coolant accident
LOOP	loss-of-offsite power
LPSD	low power and shutdown
MCR	main control room
MSIV	main steam isolation valve
NEI	Nuclear Energy Institute
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act
NPV	net present value
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NUREG	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulation
P&ID	piping and instrument diagram
POSRV	pilot-operated safety relief valve
PRA	probabilistic risk assessment
PV	present value
PW	present worth
RCP	reactor coolant pump
REM	roentgen equivalent man
RHR	residual heat removal
RPV	reactor pressure vessel
SAMA	severe accident mitigation alternative

SAMDA	severe accident mitigation design alternative
SBO	station blackout
SG	steam generator
SGTR	steam generator tube rupture
SI	safety injection
SLC	secondary liquid control
SRV	safety relief valve
SSC	structure, system, or component
STC	source term category
SW	service water
U.S.C.	U.S. Code

1 INTRODUCTION

This report provides an evaluation of severe accident mitigation design alternatives (SAMDA) for the APR1400 design. This evaluation is performed to address the potential costs and benefits of SAMDAs for the APR1400 design. Consideration of SAMDAs included identifying a broad range of potential alternatives and then determining whether implementation of the alternative would be feasible and beneficial on a cost-risk reduction basis.

The methods used to identify, screen, and evaluate SAMDAs for the APR1400 Design Certification are described.

This report also describes the calculation of the monetary value of unmitigated base risk and the results of an evaluation of the maximum risk reduction that would be expected from implementing a risk reduction strategy.

This report was developed to conform with the following regulations:

• Section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended (42 U.S.C. § 4332), which requires in part that:

all agencies of the Federal Government shall ... (C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on ... (iii) alternatives to the proposed action.

- 10 CFR 52.47(b)(2), which requires that the application include an environmental report as required by 10 CFR 51.55.
- 10 CFR 51.55(a), which states that:

[e]ach applicant for a standard design certification ... shall submit with its application a separate document entitled, "Applicant's Environmental Report— Standard Design Certification." The environmental report must address the costs and benefits of severe accident mitigation design alternatives and the bases for not incorporating severe accident mitigation design alternatives in the design to be certified.

2 <u>METHODOLOGY</u>

The acceptance criterion for severe accident mitigation alternatives (SAMAs) is provided in Section 7.3 of NUREG-1555, "Environmental Standard Review Plan – Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives" (Reference 4), as follows:

Completeness and reasonableness, also with respect to the following: (1) the identification of SAMAs applicable to the plant or design under consideration, (2) the estimation of core damage frequency reduction and averted person-rem for each SAMA, (3) the estimation of cost for each SAMA, (4) the ranking of value-impact screening criteria to identify SAMAs for further consideration, and (5) the final disposition of promising SAMAs.

The evaluation of SAMDAs for the APR1400 design certification consists of the steps listed below in conformance with the acceptance criterion described above. The sections of this report where the steps are described are also provided. Consideration of alternatives to mitigate severe accidents involves the following steps.

- 1. Determine the base risk presented to the surrounding population and environment from plant operation (Section 3).
- 2. Calculate the monetary value of the unmitigated base risk (Section 4).
- 3. Identify potential SAMDAs (Section 5).
- 4. Screen the identified potential SAMDAs for applicability to APR1400 and the feasibility of implementing them (Section 6).
- 5. Evaluate the SAMDAs not screened out in Step #4 to determine the expected benefits of implementing them (Section 7).
- 6. Estimate the cost of implementing the SAMDAs that were evaluated in Step #5 (Section 8).
- 7. Compare the estimated costs to the expected benefits to determine whether implementing any potential SAMDA would be cost-beneficial (Section 9).
- 8. Evaluate how uncertainties could affect the cost-benefit analyses.

9. Perform a sensitivity analysis of the results (Section 10).

3 <u>BASE RISK</u>

Base risk is defined as the maximum possible averted risk. Determination of base risk, as well as the overall SAMDA evaluation process, is detailed in Reference 3 and described below. The first step to determine base risk is to develop and quantify the risk that could be presented by operation of an APR1400 reactor. Risk is calculated using a Level 1 and Level 2 probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model. The results of that model provide overall risk measured by core damage frequency (CDF) and the characteristics of any expected radionuclide release following a severe accident.

The APR1400 Level 1 PRA model quantified at-power internal events, at-power internal fire, at-power internal flooding, and low-power and shutdown (LPSD) internal events, LPSD fire event, and LPSD internal flooding events. Risk from other external events, for example, high winds, seismic events, etc., was determined to be negligible.

From Table 19.1-30 of the DCD, total CDF from the at-power internal events PRA is 1.0×10^{-6} per year and is calculated as the sum of the 21 source term categories (STCs) calculated from the Level 2 PRA model.

From Table 19.1-30b of the DCD, total CDF from internal flooding events is 3.8×10^{-7} per year.

From Table 19.1-30a of the DCD, fire-induced accident sequences had a calculated CDF of 2.8×10^{-6} per year.

LPSD internal event accident sequences had a calculated CDF of 1.9×10^{-6} per year (Reference 3)

LPSD internal flood events had a CDF of 8.1×10^{-8} per year (Reference 3)

LPSD internal fire events had a CDF of 1.5×10^{-6} per year (Reference 3).

Summing the previous values gives a total CDF of 7.7×10^{-6} per year.

Using the results of the Level 1 PRA, the second step in determining base risk is to identify the characteristics of any expected radionuclide release following a severe accident and then to quantify the expected frequency of release. The APR1400 Level 2 PRA model characterizes releases into 21 STCs. Each of the STCs is distinguished by the magnitude of

fission products released, the timing of the fission product release, and the pathway for the release. The STC definitions and contributions to risk are presented in Tables 1a and 1b.

A subset of the STCs is considered to result in "large" releases. DCD Section 19.1.4.2.1.3 presents the definition of a "large" release and Table 19.1-29 delineates the STCs that are considered "large" release. All fission product releases are included in the SAMDA analysis regardless of whether the release is large or not. Therefore, the definition of "large" is not germane to this analysis. Details of how accident sequences are binned into each STC are provided in that section of the DCD as well as the criteria used to select the accident sequence used to represent each STC. The representative accident sequence for each STC, taken from Reference 3, are presented in Table 2.

The principal phenomena considered in WinMACCS are atmospheric transport, mitigative actions based on dose projections, dose accumulation by a number of pathways including food and water ingestion, early and latent health effects, and economic costs. The specific atmospheric, surface water and groundwater pathways inputs to the model for this representative site location are those specified in the Surry site data file documented in the Level 3 analysis (Appendix A of Reference 3) and provided with WinMACCS.

The results with respect to the above pathways are documented in the WinMACCS analysis output files (Appendix A of Reference 3).

For each STC, representative releases are determined and timing and release characteristic information for representative fission product groups are developed. The representative sequences for each STC are summarized in Table 2 of Reference 3. This information is then used to approximate the radiological release plumes used in the Level 3 analysis. The Level 3 analysis uses the MACCS code while the Level 2 PRA used the MAAP code to develop fission product releases. Mapping of the MAAP fission product release categories to the MACCS fission product release categories is shown in Reference 6. Also shown in Reference 6 is the basis and development of the plume segments for input to the MACCS code.

Offsite consequences are calculated from the Level 3 PRA analysis. The Level 3 (WinMACCS) model has been prepared for a representative year when the APR1400 design could be operated. If the design certification (DC) is received in 2020, a combined operating license application (COLA) could be received within several years of the DC. To be conservative, however, this analysis assumes that any licensing action with respect to

a COLA would not occur for ten years after the date that the DC is received thus allowing for larger population growth. The year 2030 is considered reasonable for being within five years of any licensing action with respect to the APR1400 design.

Thus, the Level 3 PRA model was prepared using projected year 2030 demographic data from the 2010 US Census and 2007 Agricultural Census for the area around the Surry site and APR1400-DC source term results from the Level 2 MAAP analysis.

The Level 3 PRA is based on the Surry site model documented in NUREG-1150 as a representative site. The model uses the following meteorological, population, and land use data inputs to represent the reference site location for the analysis:

- The meteorological data file used was the sample meteorological data file provided with the WinMACCS software NRC sample problems. The data describes one year's (1988) worth of hourly meteorological data for the site as recorded at the site meteorological tower. The data is considered representative of any year for the Surry reference site.
- This analysis uses the Surry 80.47 km (50 mile) population data projected for year 2030, which were obtained from the 2010 Census data for the region surrounding the site.
- SECPOP was used to calculate the land fraction for each rosette section as explained in the manual for the code. The code contains a county-level database with the land fractions for each county obtained from the 2010 Census data files. The calculated values are used directly in these analyses. Due to the way in which SECPOP allocates population from the census blocks, certain radial blocks near the plant are shown as all water. These segments have zero population so that the effect on the results is not significant.
- The region indexes were selected to allow unique region numbers for the sectors with large areas, that is, the very small regions of the rosette near the plant were assigned to similar regions.
- For the representative site at Surry, the original watershed indexes for the Surry site were used directly in this analysis. These values were chosen to more accurately model the landmass and bodies of water surrounding the site up to the 50-mile radius of this analysis.

- The crop season data was taken from the NUREG-1150 analysis for the Surry reference site. Agricultural data available in the 1997 Census of Agriculture was used to produce the land fraction used for each crop.
- The watershed definition data was assumed to be the same as for the Surry site and is taken from the NUREG-1150 analysis for Surry.
- The regional economic data was calculated by SECPOP from data provided to it in a data file named County1997RG.dat. This file was updated (a preprocessing step) to 2007 for the 45 counties and independent cities that are all or in part within 50 miles of the Surry site. The other some 3000 county data sets in the file for the rest of the US were left unchanged.
- The selected SECPOP regional economic values were updated to 2007 using data from the Bureau of the Census and the Department of Agriculture 2007 Census of Agriculture.

For each STC, the Level 3 PRA provides values for the conditional offsite dose and conditional offsite property damage that would result given that a fission product release with the plume characteristics used to represent the source term occurred. The total expected dose consequence is obtained by multiplying the conditional offsite dose by the expected frequency for each STC, then summing the expected doses for all STCs. The conditional dose and expected dose for each STC along with the total expected dose are shown in Tables 3a through 3f. Similarly, the total expected frequency for each STC, then summing the expected frequency for each streach property damage value by the expected frequency for each streach property damage values for all STCs. The conditional property costs and expected property costs for each STC along with the total expected property costs are shown in Tables 4a through 4f.

Details of the socioeconomic, individual, and population health risks attributed to the postulated APR1400-DC severe accident analysis are documented in the WinMACCS output files.

4 <u>UNMITIGATED RISK MONETARY VALUE</u>

The unmitigated risk monetary value is calculated using the methodology given in NEI 05-01 (Reference 1) for the performance of cost-benefit analyses. The value of unmitigated risk can be used to represent the maximum benefit that could be achieved if all risk was eliminated for at-power events. The methodology of NEI 05-01 determines the present worth net value of public risk according to the following formula:

$$NPV = (APE + AOC + AOE + AOSC) - COE$$
(1)

Where:

NPV =	present value of current risk (\$),
APE =	present value of averted public exposure (\$),
AOC =	present value of averted offsite property damage costs (\$),
AOE =	present value of averted occupational exposure (\$),
AOSC =	present value of averted onsite costs (\$),
COE =	cost of any enhancement implemented to reduce risk (\$).

The derivation of each of these costs is described in the subsections below. All equations used in the subsections below are taken from NUREG/BR-0184 (Reference 2), which is the basis for the equations given in NEI 05-01 (Reference 1).

The following specific values were used for various terms in the analyses:

Present Worth

• The present worth (PW) was determined by:

$$PW = \frac{1 - e^{-rt}}{r} \tag{2}$$

Where:

r is the discount rate = 7% per year (assumed throughout these analyses)

t is the plant life = 60 years

PW is the present worth of a string of annual payments of one dollar = \$14.07 Dollars per REM

The conversion factor used for assigning a monetary value to averted onsite and offsite exposures is \$2,000/person-rem averted. This is consistent with the NRC's regulatory analysis guidelines presented in and used throughout NEI 05-01.

4.1 <u>Averted Public Exposure (APE)</u>

Expected offsite doses from the internal events PRA accident sequences are presented in Tables 3a through 3f. Costs associated with these doses were calculated using the following equation:

$$APE = (F_{S}D_{PS} - F_{A}D_{PA})R\frac{1 - e^{-rt_{f}}}{r}$$
(3)

Where:

APE	=	present value of averted public exposure (\$),
R	=	monetary equivalent of unit dose (\$2,000/person-rem),
F_{S}	=	baseline accident frequency
		(events per year from Tables 3a through 3f),
$\mathbf{F}_{\mathbf{A}}$	=	accident frequency after mitigation (0 events per year),
$F_{S}D_{PS} \\$	=	baseline accident offsite dose frequency
		(person-rem per year from Tables 3a through 3f),
$F_A D_{PA}$	=	accident offsite dose frequency after mitigation
		(0 person-rem per year),
r	=	real discount rate (7% per year),
t_{f}	=	years remaining until end of plant life (60 years).

Using the values given above, APE is calculated for at-power internal events, internal flooding events, and internal fire events, along with LPSD internal events, internal flooding events, and internal fire events. Each of these calculations is detailed below.

4.1.1 <u>APE for At-Power Internal Events</u>

$$APE_{(IE)} = (5.33 \times 10^{-1} \text{ person-rem per year} - 0) \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times ((1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)})/(0.07 \text{ per year}))$$

= \$15,000

 $APE_{(Fld)} = (5.51 \times 10^{-2} \text{ person-rem per year} - 0) \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times ((1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)})/(0.07 \text{ per year}))$

= \$1,551

4.1.3 <u>APE for At-Power Internal Fire Events</u>

$$APE_{(Fire)} = (5.79 \times 10^{-1} \text{ person-rem per year} - 0) \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \\ \times ((1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)})/(0.07 \text{ per year}))$$

= \$16,294

4.1.4 <u>APE for LPSD Internal Events</u>

 $APE_{(SDIE)} = (3.34 \times 10^{-1} \text{ person-rem per year} - 0) \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times ((1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)})/(0.07 \text{ per year}))$

= \$9,399

4.1.5 <u>APE for LPSD Flooding Events</u>

 $APE_{(SDFld)} = (1.40 \times 10^{-1} \text{ person-rem per year} - 0) \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times ((1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)})/(0.07 \text{ per year}))$

= \$3,946

4.1.6 <u>APE for LPSD Fire Events</u>

APE_(SDFire)= $(1.31 \times 10^{-1} \text{ person-rem per year} - 0) \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times ((1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)})/(0.07 \text{ per year}))$

= \$3,687

4.1.7 <u>Total APE</u>

 $APE_{Tot} = APE_{(IE)} + APE_{(Fld)} + APE_{(Fire)} + APE_{(SDIE)} + APE_{(SDFld)} + APE_{(SDFire)}$

4.2 <u>Averted Offsite Property Damage Costs (AOC)</u>

Annual expected offsite economic risk is shown in Tables 4a through 4f. The costs associated with AOC were calculated using the following equation:

$$AOC = \left(F_S P_{DS} - F_A P_{DA}\right) \frac{1 - e^{-rt_f}}{r}$$
(4)

Where:

AOC =	=	present value of averted offsite property damage costs (\$),
$F_{S}P_{DS} =$	=	baseline accident frequency * property damage
		(cost per year from Tables 4a through 4f),
$F_A P_{DA} =$	=	accident frequency * property damage after mitigation
		(0 events per year),
r =	=	real discount rate (7% per year),
t _f =	=	years remaining until end of plant life (60 years).

Using the values given above, AOC is calculated for at-power internal events, internal flooding events, and internal fire events, along with LPSD internal events, internal flooding events, and internal fire events. Each of these calculations is detailed below.

4.2.1 AOC for At-Power Internal Events
AOC_(IE) =
$$($1,534 \text{ per year} - 0) \times (1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)}) / (0.07 \text{ per year})$$

= \$21,580

4.2.2 AOC for At-Power Internal Flooding Events

AOC_(Fld) =
$$(\$142 \text{ per year} - 0) \times (1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)}) / (0.07 \text{ per year})$$

= \$1,992

4.2.3 AOC for At-Power Internal Fire Events

AOC_(Fire) =
$$(\$1,355 \text{ per year} - 0) \times (1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)}) / (0.07 \text{ per year})$$

= \$19,070

4.2.4 <u>AOC for LPSD Internal Events</u>

AOC_(SDIE) = (\$883 per year - 0) × $(1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)}) / (0.07 per year)$

= \$12,422

4.2.5 <u>AOC for LPSD Flooding Events</u>

AOC_(SDFld) = (314 per year - 0) × (1 - e^{-(0.07 × 60)}) / (0.07 per year)

= \$4,423

4.2.6 AOC for LPSD Fire Events

AOC_(SDFire) = (
$$316$$
 per year – 0) × (1 – e^{-(0.07 × 60)}) / (0.07 per year)

= \$4,446

4.2.7 <u>Total AOC</u>

$$AOC_{Tot} = AOC_{(IE)} + AOC_{(Fld)} + AOC_{(Fire)} + AOC_{(SDIE)} + AOC_{(SDFld)} + AOC_{(SDFire)}$$
$$= \$21,580 + \$1,992 + \$19,070 + \$12,422 + \$4,423 + \$4,446$$
$$= \$63,933$$

4.3 <u>Averted Occupational Exposure (AOE)</u>

There are two types of occupational exposure due to accidents: immediate and long-term. Immediate exposure occurs at the time of the accident and during the management of the emergency. Long-term exposure is associated with the cleanup and refurbishment or decommissioning of the damaged facility. The value of avoiding both types of exposure is considered when evaluating risk.

The occupational exposure associated with severe accidents is assumed to be 23,300 person-rem/accident. This value includes a short-term component of 3,300 person-rem/accident and a long-term component of 20,000 person-rem/accident. These estimates are consistent with the "best estimate" values presented in Section 5.7.3 of NUREG/BR-0184 (Reference 2). In calculating base risk, the accident-related onsite exposures were calculated using the best estimate exposure components applied over the onsite cleanup period. For onsite cleanup, the accident-related onsite exposures were calculated over a 10-year cleanup period. Costs associated with immediate dose, long-term dose and total dose are calculated below for at-power internal events, internal flooding events, and internal fire events, along with LPSD internal events, internal flooding events, and internal fire events.

4.3.1 <u>Averted Immediate Occupational Exposure Costs</u>

Per the guidance of NEI 05-01, costs associated with immediate occupational doses from an accident were calculated using the following equation:

$$W_{IO} = (F_{S}D_{IOS} - F_{A}D_{IOA})R\frac{1 - e^{-rt_{f}}}{r}$$
(5)

Where:

W _{IO}	=	present value of averted immediate occupational exposure (\$),
F_{S}	=	baseline accident frequency (events per year from Tables 1a and 1b),
F_{A}	=	accident frequency after mitigation (0 events per year),
D _{IOS}	=	baseline expected immediate onsite dose (3,300 person-rem/event),
D _{IOA}	=	expected occupational exposure after mitigation
		(3,300 person-rem/event),
R	=	monetary equivalent of unit dose (\$2,000/person-rem),
r	=	real discount rate (7% per year),
t_{f}	=	years remaining until end of plant life (60 years).

Using the values given above, W_{IO} is calculated for at-power internal events, internal flooding events, and internal fire events, along with LPSD internal events, internal flooding events, and internal fire events. Each of these calculations is detailed below.

$$W_{IO(IE)} = ((1.00 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year}) \times (3300 \text{ person-rem/event}) - 0) \\ \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)}) / (0.07 \text{ per year})$$

= \$93

4.3.1.2 W_{IO} for At-Power Internal Flooding Events

$$W_{IO(Fld)} = ((3.82 \times 10^{-7} \text{ events per year}) \times (3300 \text{ person-rem/event}) - 0) \\ \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)}) / (0.07 \text{ per year})$$

= \$35

4.3.1.3 W_{IO} for At-Power Internal Fire Events

 $W_{IO(Fire)} = ((2.79 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year}) \times (3300 \text{ person-rem/event}) - 0) \\ \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)}) / (0.07 \text{ per year})$

= \$259

4.3.1.4 <u>W_{IO} for LPSD Internal Events</u>

 $W_{IO(SDIE)} = ((1.94 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year}) \times (3300 \text{ person-rem/event}) - 0) \\ \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)}) / (0.07 \text{ per year})$

= \$180

4.3.1.5 W_{IO} for LPSD Flooding Events

 $W_{IO(SDFld)} = ((8.06 \times 10^{-8} \text{ events per year}) \times (3300 \text{ person-rem/event}) - 0) \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)}) / (0.07 \text{ per year})$

= \$7

4.3.1.6 <u>W_{IO} for LPSD Fire Events</u>

 $W_{IO(SDFire)} = ((1.48 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year}) \times (3300 \text{ person-rem/event}) - 0) \\ \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)}) / (0.07 \text{ per year})$

= \$137

4.3.2 <u>Averted Long-Term Occupational Exposure Costs</u>

Per the guidance of NUREG/BR-0184, costs associated with long-term occupational doses from an accident were calculated using the following equation:

$$W_{LTO} = (F_{S}D_{LTOS} - F_{A}D_{LTOA})R * \frac{1 - e^{-rt_{f}}}{r} * \frac{1 - e^{-rm}}{rm}$$
(6)

Where:

W_{LTO}	=	present value of averted long-term occupational exposure (\$),
F_{S}	=	baseline accident frequency (events per year from Tables 1a and 1b),
F_A	=	accident frequency after mitigation (0 events per year),
D _{LTOS}	=	baseline expected long-term onsite dose (20,000 person-rem/event),
D _{LTOA}	=	expected occupational exposure after mitigation
		(20,000 person-rem/event),
R	=	monetary equivalent of unit dose (\$2,000/person-rem),
r	=	real discount rate (7% per year),
m	=	years over which long-term doses accrue
		(10 years from Reference 2),
t _f	=	years remaining until end of plant life (60 years).

Using the values given above, W_{LTO} is calculated for at-power internal events, internal flooding events, and internal fire events, along with LPSD internal events, internal flooding events, and internal fire events. Each of these calculations is detailed below.

4.3.2.1 <u>W_{LTO} for At-Power Internal Events</u>

$$W_{\text{LTO(IE)}} = ((1.00 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year}) \times (20,000 \text{ person-rem/event}) - 0) \\ \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times ((1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)}) / (0.07 \text{ per year}) \\ \times ((1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 10)}) / ((0.07 \text{ per year}) \times (10 \text{ years}))$$

$$W_{\text{LTO(Fld)}} = ((3.82 \times 10^{-7} \text{ events per year}) \times (20,000 \text{ person-rem/event}) - 0) \\ \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times ((1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)}) / (0.07 \text{ per year}) \\ \times ((1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 10)}) / ((0.07 \text{ per year}) \times (10 \text{ years})) \\ = \$155$$

ψ100

$$W_{\text{LTO(Fire)}} = ((2.79 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year}) \times (20,000 \text{ person-rem/event}) - 0) \\ \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times ((1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)}) / (0.07 \text{ per year}) \\ \times ((1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 10)}) / ((0.07 \text{ per year}) \times (10 \text{ years}))$$

= \$1,129

4.3.2.4 <u>W_{LTO} for LPSD Internal Events</u>

$$W_{\text{LTO(SDIE)}} = ((1.94 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year}) \times (20,000 \text{ person-rem/event}) - 0) \\ \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times ((1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)}) / (0.07 \text{ per year}) \\ \times ((1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 10)}) / ((0.07 \text{ per year}) \times (10 \text{ years}))$$

= \$785

4.3.2.5 <u>W_{LTO} for LPSD Flooding Events</u>

$$W_{\text{LTO(SDFld)}} = ((8.06 \times 10^{-8} \text{ events per year}) \times (20,000 \text{ person-rem/event}) - 0) \\ \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times ((1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)}) / (0.07 \text{ per year}) \\ \times ((1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 10)}) / ((0.07 \text{ per year}) \times (10 \text{ years}))$$

= \$33

4.3.2.6 <u>W_{LTO} for LPSD Fire Events</u>

$$W_{\text{LTO(SDFire)}} = ((1.48 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year}) \times (20,000 \text{ person-rem/event}) - 0) \\ \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times ((1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)}) / (0.07 \text{ per year}) \\ \times ((1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 10)}) / ((0.07 \text{ per year}) \times (10 \text{ years}))$$

= \$599

4.3.3 Total Averted Occupational Exposure Costs

As described in Section 4.3, the total cost associated with averted occupational exposure (AOE) is the sum of the costs associated with averted immediate exposure and the costs associated with the averted long-term exposure:

$$AOE = W_{IO +} W_{LTO}$$
(7)

Total averted onsite exposure costs are calculated for at-power internal events, internal flooding events, and internal fire events, along with LPSD internal events, internal flooding events, and internal fire events. Each of these calculations is detailed below.

4.3.3.1 <u>AOE for At-Power Internal Events</u>

 $AOE_{(IE)} = \$ 93 + \$ 405 = \498

 $AOE_{(Fld)} = $35 + $155 = 190

4.3.3.3 <u>AOE for At-Power Internal Fire Events</u>

 $AOE_{(Fire)} = $259 + $1,129 = $1,388$

4.3.3.4 AOE for LPSD Internal Events

 $AOE_{(SDIE)} =$ \$ 180 + \$ 785 = \$965

4.3.3.5 <u>AOE for LPSD Flooding Events</u>

 $AOE_{(SDFld)} = \$7 + \$33 = \$40$

4.3.3.6 <u>AOE for LPSD Fire Events</u>

 $AOE_{(SDFire)} =$ 137 + \$ 599 = \$736

4.3.3.7 <u>Total AOE</u>

AOE Tot = $AOE_{(IE)} + AOE_{(Fld)} + AOE_{(Fire)} + AOE_{(SDIE)} + AOE_{(SDFld)} + AOE_{(SDFire)}$

= \$498 + \$190 + \$1,388 + \$965 + \$40 + \$736

= \$3,817

4.4 <u>Averted Onsite Costs (AOSC)</u>

NUREG/BR-0184 defines three types of costs associated with onsite property damage from an accident: cleanup and decontamination, long-term replacement power, and repair and refurbishment. The value of avoiding each of these type of costs is considered when evaluating risk. Total averted onsite property damage costs are the sum of these three types of costs. Calculation of onsite property damage costs is detailed in the sections that follow.

4.4.1 Averted Cleanup and Decontamination Costs

The estimated cleanup cost for severe accidents is defined in NUREG/BR-0184, Section 5.7.6.1, to be 1.5×10^{9} /accident (undiscounted). Using the value of 1.5×10^{9} /event and assuming, as in NUREG/BR-0184, that the total sum is paid in equal installments over a 10 year period, the present value of those ten payments for cleanup and decontamination costs can be calculated as follows:

$$PV_{CD} = \left(\frac{C_{CD}}{m}\right) \left(\frac{1 - e^{-rm}}{r}\right)$$
(8)

Where:

PV _{CD}	=	present value of averted onsite cleanup costs exposure over
		cleanup period (\$),
C _{CD}	=	total value of averted onsite cleanup costs (\$),
r	=	real discount rate (7% per year),
m	=	years over which long-term doses accrue (10 years),
PV _{CD}	=	$((\$1.5 \times 10^{9}/\text{event}) / (10 \text{ years})) \ast ((1 - e^{-(0.07*10)}) / 0.07),$
PV _{CD}	=	1.08×10^{9} .

The present value of the costs over the cleanup period is considered over the period of the plant life. The net present value of averted cleanup costs over the plant life can be calculated using the following equation:

$$U_{CD} = (F_{S} - F_{A}) P V_{CD} \frac{1 - e^{-rt_{f}}}{r}$$
(9)

Where:

U_{CD}	=	present value of averted onsite cleanup costs (\$),
F_{S}	=	baseline accident frequency (events per year from Tables 1a and 1b),
$\mathbf{F}_{\mathbf{A}}$	=	accident frequency after mitigation (0 events per year),
$\mathrm{PV}_{\mathrm{CD}}$	=	present value of averted onsite cleanup costs exposure over
		cleanup period (\$),
r	=	real discount rate (7% per year),
$t_{\rm f}$	=	years remaining until end of plant life (60 years).

Using the values given above, U_{CD} is calculated for at-power internal events, internal flooding events, and internal fire events, along with LPSD internal events, internal flooding events, and internal fire events. Each of these calculations is detailed below.

4.4.1.1 U_{CD} for At-Power Internal Events

 $U_{CD(IE)} = (1.00 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year} - 0) \times (\$1.0787 \times 10^{9}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)}) / (0.07 \text{ per year})$

= \$15,178

 $U_{CD (Fld)} = (3.82 \times 10^{-7} \text{ events per year} - 0) \times (\$1.0787 \times 10^{9}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)}) / (0.07 \text{ per year})$

= \$5,798

4.4.1.3 <u>U_{CD} for At-Power Internal Fire Events</u>

 $U_{CD (Fire)} = (2.79 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year} - 0) \times (\$1.0787 \times 10^{9}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)}) / (0.07 \text{ per year})$

= \$42,348

4.4.1.4 <u>U_{CD} for LPSD Internal Events</u>

 $U_{CD (SDIE)} = (1.94 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year} - 0) \times (\$1.0787 \times 10^{9}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)}) / (0.07 \text{ per year})$
= \$29,446

4.4.1.5 <u>U_{CD} for LPSD Flooding Events</u>

 $U_{CD (SDFld)} = (8.06 \times 10^{-8} \text{ events per year} - 0) \times (\$1.0787 \times 10^{9}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)}) / (0.07 \text{ per year})$

= \$1,223

4.4.1.6 <u>U_{CD} for LPSD Fire Events</u>

 $U_{CD (SDFire)} = (1.48 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year} - 0) \times (\$1.0787 \times 10^{9}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)}) / (0.07 \text{ per year})$

= \$22,464

4.4.2 Averted Replacement Power Costs

Replacement power costs, U_{RP} , are an additional contributor to onsite costs and can be calculated in accordance with NUREG/BR-0184, Section 5.7.6.2. Since replacement power will be needed for that time period following a severe accident until the end of the expected generating plant life, long-term power replacement calculations have been used. APR1400 is expected to have a net electrical output of 1,400 MWe.

Replacement power cost calculations performed in NUREG/BR-0184 are based on the 910 MWe reference plant. In applying the methodology used in NUREG/BR-0184 to the APR1400 design, the equation was scaled for the 1,400 MWe output of the APR1400 design. For discount rates between 5 percent and 10 percent, NUREG/BR-0184 recommends that the present value of replacement power be calculated as follows:

$$PV_{RP} = \left(\frac{(\$1.2E+8)\frac{(Rated power)}{(910MWe)}}{r}\right) \left(1-e^{-rt_f}\right)^2$$
(10)

Where:

 PV_{RP} = present value of replacement power for a single event (\$), r = real discount rate (7% per year),

 t_f = years remaining until end of plant life (60 years), Rated power = 1,400 MWe.

Using the values given above:

$$PV_{RP} = ((1.2 \text{ x } 10^8 \text{ x } (1,400 \text{ MWe} / 910 \text{ MWe})) / (0.07 \text{ per year})\text{x } (1 - e^{-(0.0 \text{ PV}_{RP})^2})^2$$
$$PV_{RP} = \$2.56 \text{ x } 10^9$$

The replacement power costs " PV_{RP} " (\$2.56 x 10⁹) was adjusted to 2016 dollars by applying a ratio of the average BLS Producer Price Index for Electric Power from years 1993 and 2013. The Producer Price Index for Electric Power for 2016 is 201.4, and the Producer Price Index for Electric Power for 1993 is 128.6 (Reference 3). The 2016 dollars scaling factor is calculated as 201.4/128.6, which equals 1.57.

The replacement power costs " PV_{RP} " was also adjusted to reflect the true need for replacement capacity availability based on current operations. A more realistic capacity factor of 95% is used in lieu of the suggested 60% - 65% range reported in NUREG/BR-0184 (Reference 2). This adjustment was applied as a simple multiplier derived by dividing 95% by 60% to get a value of 1.58.

$$PV_{RP} = $2.56 \times 10^9 * (1.57) * (1.58) = $6.35 \times 10^9$$

To obtain the expected costs of a single event over the plant life, the following equation is used:

$$U_{RP} = (F_{S} - F_{A}) \frac{PV_{RP}}{r} (1 - e^{-rt_{f}})^{2}$$
(11)

Where:

U _{RP}	=	net present value of replacement power over life of facility (dollars),
F_{S}	=	baseline accident frequency (events per year from Tables 1a and 1b),
$\mathbf{F}_{\mathbf{A}}$	=	accident frequency after mitigation (0 events per year),
$\mathrm{PV}_{\mathrm{RP}}$	=	net present value of replacement power for a single event (\$),
r	=	real discount rate (7% per year),
t_{f}	=	years remaining until end of plant life (60 years).

Using the values given above, U_{RP} is calculated for at-power internal events, internal flooding events, and internal fire events, along with LPSD internal events, internal flooding events, and internal fire events. Each of these calculations is detailed below.

4.4.2.1 <u>U_{RP} for At-Power Internal Events</u>

 $U_{\text{RP(IE)}} = (1.00 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year} - 0) \times (\$6.348 \times 10^{9}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)})^{2} / (0.07 \text{ per year})$

= \$87,986

4.4.2.2 <u>U_{RP} for At-Power Internal Flooding Events</u>

 $U_{\text{RP (Fld)}} = (3.82 \times 10^{-7} \text{ events per year} - 0) \times (\$6.348 \times 10^{9}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)})^{2} / (0.07 \text{ per year})$

= \$33,611

 $U_{\text{RP (Fire)}} = (2.79 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year} - 0) \times (\$6.348 \times 10^{9}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)})^{2} / (0.07 \text{ per year})$

= \$245,482

4.4.2.4 <u>U_{RP} for LPSD Internal Events</u>

 $U_{\text{RP (SDIE)}} = (1.96 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year} - 0) \times (\$6.348 \times 10^{9}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)})^{2} / (0.07 \text{ per year})$

= \$170,693

4.4.2.5 <u>U_{RP} for LPSD Flooding Events</u>

 $U_{\text{RP (SDFld)}} = (8.06 \times 10^{-8} \text{ events per year} - 0) \times (\$6.348 \times 10^{9}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)})^{2} / (0.07 \text{ per year})$

= \$7,092

4.4.2.6 <u>U_{RP} for LPSD Fire Events</u>

 $U_{\text{RP (SDFire)}} = (1.48 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year} - 0) \times (\$6.348 \times 10^{9}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.07 \times 60)})^{2} / (0.07 \text{ per year})$

= \$130,220

4.4.3 Averted Repair and Refurbishment Costs

It is assumed that the plant would not be repaired or refurbished; therefore, these costs are zero.

4.4.4 Total Averted Onsite Costs (AOSC)

Total averted onsite cost is the sum of cleanup and decontamination costs, replacement power costs, and the repair and refurbishment costs. Total averted onsite costs are calculated as follows:

$$AOSC = U_{CD} + U_{RP} + 0 \tag{12}$$

Total averted onsite costs are calculated for at-power internal events, internal flooding events, and internal fire events, along with LPSD internal events, internal flooding events, and internal fire events. Each of these calculations is detailed below.

4.4.4.1 <u>AOSC for At-Power Internal Events</u>

 $AOSC_{(IE)} = $15,178 + $87,986 = $103,164$

4.4.4.2 <u>AOSC for At-Power Internal Flooding Events</u>

 $AOSC_{(Fld)} = $5,798 + $33,611 = $39,409$

4.4.4.3 <u>AOSC for At-Power Internal Fire Events</u>

 $AOSC_{(Fire)} =$ \$42,348 + \$245,482 = \$287,830

4.4.4.4 AOSC for LPSD Internal Events

 $AOSC_{(SDIE)} = $29,446 + $170,693 = $200,139$

4.4.4.5 AOSC for LPSD Flooding Events

 $AOSC_{(SDFld)} =$ \$1,223 + \$7,092 = \$8,315

4.4.4.6 <u>AOSC for LPSD Fire Events</u>

 $AOSC_{(SDFire)} =$ \$22,464 + \$130,220 = \$152,684

$$AOSC_{Tot} = AOSC_{(IE)} + AOSC_{(Fld)} + AOSC_{(Fire)} + AOSC_{(SDIE)} + AOSC_{(SDFld)} + AOSC_{(SDFire)}$$

= 103,164 + 39,409 + 287,830 + 200,139 + 8,315 + 152,684

= \$791,541

4.5 <u>Cost of Enhancement (COE)</u>

The cost of enhancement is used when measures are taken to reduce risk. By definition, such measures are taken at the beginning of any period considered, therefore no discounting is performed for the COE. For baseline risk, no measures have been taken to reduce risk; therefore:

COE = \$0

4.6 <u>Total Unmitigated Baseline Risk</u>

As described in Section 4, the total present worth net value of public risk is calculated according to the following formula:

$$NPV = (APE + AOC + AOE + AOSC) - COE$$
(13)

Using the values calculated in Sections 4.1 to 4.5, total baseline risk is calculated:

$$NPV = (\$49,877 + \$63,933 + \$3,817 + \$791,541) - \$0 = \$909,168$$

This value can be viewed as the maximum risk benefit attainable if all core damage scenarios are eliminated over the 60-years plant life.

5 IDENTIFICATION OF SAMDAS

The list of SAMDA items evaluated for the APR1400 design is given in Table 5.

The first source used to identify SAMDA items is NEI 05-01 (Reference 1). Generic industry SAMDAs that were considered are the 153 items listed in Table 14 of NEI 05-01.

The second source used to identify SAMDA items is the result of PRA for APR1400 documented in DCD Chapter 19 (Reference 8). Evaluation of APR1400 specific items began with an importance analysis of the core damage cutsets documented in Reference 8.

The ASME PRA Standard (ASME/ANS RA-Sb-2009) defines a significant basic event as a basic event that contributes significantly to the computed risks for a specific hazard group. This definition includes any basic event that has a FV importance greater than 0.005 (0.5%) or a RAW importance greater than 2. The purpose of the SAMDA analysis is to consider ways to reduce risk. The RAW importance parameter does not provide indication of potential risk reduction and is not germane to a SAMDA analysis for risk reduction. Therefore, the RAW importance measure is not used.

Each basic event with a Fussell-Vesely importance of greater than 0.5%, a total of 126 basic events for at-power internal events (Table 19.1-21 in Reference 8), 110 for at-power internal flooding events (Table 19.1-69 in Reference 8), 120 for at-power internal fire events (Table 19.1-52 in Reference 8), 79 for LPSD internal events (Table 19.1-100 in Reference 8), 75 for LPSD internal flooding events (Table 19.1-113 in Reference 8), and 98 for LPSD internal fire events (Table 19.1-126 in Reference 8), were reviewed to identify any potential SAMDAs. Basic events, such as complement events and constants, that have no physical meaning are identified and can be excluded as having no impact on the SAMDA analysis. A listing of the basic events, their importance, and their disposition with respect to SAMDA items is given in Tables 6a through 6f.

In addition to the basic event importance review, the top 100 cutsets for each analysis were reviewed to identify any basic events that were not included as part of the importance analysis review. Basic events identified in the top 100 cutsets that are not included as part of the importance analysis review are shown in Tables 7a through 7f. The top 100 cutsets for at-power internal events are taken from Table 19.1-19 in Reference 8. The top 100 cutsets for at-power internal flooding events are taken from Table 19.1-66 in Reference 8. The top 100 cutsets for at-power internal flooding events are taken from Table 19.1-66 in Reference 8. The top 100 cutsets for at-power internal fire events are taken from Table 19.1-49 in Reference 8. The top 100 cutsets for LPSD internal events are taken from Table 19.1-96

in Reference 8. The top 100 cutsets for LPSD internal flooding events are taken from Table 19.1-109 in Reference 8. The top 100 cutsets for LPSD internal fires events are taken from Table 19.1-122 in Reference 8.

6 <u>SAMDA SCREENING</u>

The initial list of potential SAMDAs was developed from a generic list of sources related to many plant designs. Some of the items on the list were identified relatively recently, while others were identified some time ago. Given the wide diversity in age and sources of the potential SAMDAs, an initial screening is performed to identify the subset of potential SAMDAs that warranted a detailed evaluation.

Potential SAMDAs to be examined in detail are identified by exception. That is, a screening process is used to remove potential SAMDAs from consideration. Any potential SAMDAs not screened will undergo more detailed evaluation.

As described in Reference 1, SAMDA items can be screened for several reasons. First, items were screened that were not applicable to the APR1400. For example, some items are associated with specific equipment that is not present in the APR1400 design. Items screened as not applicable are indicated as "Not Applicable" in the "Qualitative Screening" column of Table 5.

Next, items were identified that were effectively implemented in the APR1400-DC design. Items screened as effectively implemented are indicated with the letter "Already Implemented" in the "Qualitative Screening" column of Table 5. The reason for screening as "Already Implemented" is provided in Table 5.

Other SAMDA items were screened because they would not be feasible to implement. An item would not be feasible if the cost to implement the SAMDA clearly would exceed the maximum benefit possible (calculated in Section 4.6). Items screened as infeasible to implement are indicated with "Excessive Imp. Cost" in the "Qualitative Screening" column of Table 5.

Reference 1 allows items to be screened if they would be of low benefit. An item is of low benefit if it is from a non-risk-significant system and a change in reliability would have negligible impact on the risk profile. As this analysis is for the APR1400 design certification, any item listed as potentially being of low benefit are indicated as "Needs Further Evaluation / Potentially Very Low Benefit" in the "Qualitative Screening" column of Table 5. This assumption is based on engineering judgment and experience with other SAMDA analyses. The reason for screening as "Very Low Benefit" is provided in Table 5.

Finally, one SAMDA can be "Combined" with others, per the guidelines of Reference 1. SAMDA ID 151 is described as "Increase training and operating experience feedback to improve operator response." As this analysis is for the APR1400 design certification, SAMDAs regarding operator actions are designated as "N/A - Enhancement due to procedures/training are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development." For this analysis, all other items not screened as above were retained in Table 5. The benefit and cost evaluations in the sections that follow then examine the impacts of the items. If appropriate, the items are combined during the benefit or cost evaluations. When items were combined as providing the same benefit, a note indicating which were analyzed together is provided in Table 5.

7 <u>SAMDA BENEFIT EVALUATION</u>

Each of the potential SAMDAs not screened was evaluated to determine the potential benefits that could be achieved if implemented. In evaluating the benefits, a precisely described modification was not necessarily considered because exact design details would only be defined once an option is chosen. Rather, SAMDA benefit evaluation was performed using bounding techniques to estimate any risk reduction that would be possible. For example, evaluation of the SAMDA to install an additional component cooling water pump bounded the risk reduction possible by assuming that implementation of the SAMDA would entirely eliminate the unavailability of component cooling water pumps.

Evaluation of potential benefits would be performed using the methodology described in Reference 1 and, in general, would be performed as follows. First the potential reduction in CDF, if any, was estimated. Next, the reduction in source term release was estimated. Finally, the potential benefit to offsite consequences was determined and presented in monetary terms.

Based on the information provided in Sections 4 and Tables 5, 6a through 6f, and 7a through 7f, the total maximum cost reduction calculated for any of the important basic events (FV > 0.5%) would be much lower than described in Tables 4, 6a through 6f, and 7a through 7f, because in reality, all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. Therefore, a design change would be expected to cost more than this amount and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.

The following sections describe the cost benefit of the important basic events and why no further SAMDA cost benefit evaluation is needed. The important basic events are grouped by the associated component to contribute to an overall maximum benefit. For components that can be considered identical, like EDGs or identical system pumps, a total of the components benefits are evaluated for overall maximum benefit.

7.1 <u>Emergency Diesel Generator Events</u>

The generic SAMDA items evaluated for the APR1400 design related to emergency diesel generators are listed in Table 5 and include items 9, 19, 20, and 29.

7.1.1 EDG DG001A Events

Basic events for the unavailability of EDG A are present in nearly all of the cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Items 14, 30, 56, 61, and 80), Table 6b (Items 70 and 96), Table 6c (Items 18, 36, 37, and 115), Table 6d (Items 14, 54, 67, and 73), Table 6e (Items 2, 17, 19, and 64), and Table 7d (Item 60). A maximum of 16% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG A unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$16,400. A maximum of 1.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG A unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$670. A maximum of 9.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG A unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$27,200.

A maximum of 7.6% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG A unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$15,200. A maximum of 42% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG A unavailability in the LPSD flooding events analysis, or approximately \$3,500.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$46,190) and AOC (\$59,487), total only \$105,677 or the hazards affected. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the EDG, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$168,700 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$168,700 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of an EDG would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.1.2 EDG DG001B Events

Basic events for the unavailability of EDG B are present in all of the cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Items 15, 35, 56, 62, and 86), Table 6b (Items 63 and 78), Table 6c (Items 15, 32, 36, and 106), Table 6d (Items 15, 55, 68, and 73), Table

6e (Items 26 and 64), Table 6f (Item 57), Table 7d (Item 60). A maximum of 15% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG B unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$15,000. A maximum of 1.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$8600. A maximum of 9.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG B unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$8600. A maximum of 9.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG B unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$30,400.

A maximum of 7.6% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG B unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$15,200. A maximum of 2.9% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG B unavailability in the LPSD flooding events analysis, or approximately \$240. A maximum of 1.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG B unavailability in the LPSD flooding events analysis, or approximately \$240. A maximum of 1.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG B unavailability in the LPSD fire events analysis, or approximately \$240.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$49,877) and AOC (\$63,933), total only \$113,810 or the hazards affected. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the EDG, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$177,700 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$177,700 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of an EDG would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.1.3 EDG DG001C Events

Basic events for the unavailability of EDG C are present in all of the cutset file FV importance analyses except LPSD internal fire events and include: Table 6a (Items 31, 37, 56, 105, and 124), Table 6b (Items 45 and 66), Table 6c (Items 37, 51, and 93), Table 6d (Item 73), and Table 6e (Item 64). A maximum of 9.8% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG C unavailability in the At-Power internal

events analysis, or approximately \$10,200. A maximum of 3.8% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG C unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$1,500. A maximum of 4.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG C unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$13,600.

A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG C unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,100. A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG C unavailability in the LPSD flooding events analysis, or approximately \$40.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$46,190) and AOC (\$59,487), total only \$105,677 or the hazards affected. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the EDG, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$132,000 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$132,000 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of an EDG would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.1.4 EDG DG001D Events

Basic events for the unavailability of EDG D are present in all of the cutset file FV importance analyses except LPSD internal fire events and include: Table 6a (Items 32, 43, 56, and 110), Table 6b (Items 43 and 59), Table 6c (Items 35, 42, and 74), Table 6d (Item 73), Table 6e (Items 8, 34, 43, and 64). A maximum of 8.9% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG D unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$9,200. A maximum of 4.0% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG D unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$1,600. A maximum of 5.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG D unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$1,600. A maximum of 5.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG D unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$1,600. A maximum of 5.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG D.

A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG D unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,100. A maximum of 12.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of EDG D unavailability in the LPSD flooding events analysis, or approximately \$1,100.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$46,190) and AOC (\$59,487), total only \$105,677 or the hazards affected. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the EDG, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$133,600 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$133,600 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of an EDG would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.1.5 Load Sequencer Events

Basic events for the unavailability of diesel generator load sequencer are present in the At-Power internal events and At-Power internal events, At-Power internal fire and LPSD internal events, LPSD internal flood cutset file FV importance analysis and include: Table 6a (Items 68, 72, 116, and 120), Table 6c (Item 113), Table 6d (Items 63 and 64), Table 6e (Items 18 and 36). And Table 7c (Items 1 and 11). A maximum of 3.8% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of load sequencer unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$4,000. A maximum of 1.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of load sequencer unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$4,300.

A maximum of 1.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of load sequencer unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$2,800. A maximum of 5.6% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of load sequencer unavailability in the LPSD flooding events analysis, or approximately \$470.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$44,639) and AOC (\$57,495), total only \$102,134 for the hazards affected. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the load sequencer, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$34,600 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$34,600 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of a load sequencer would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.1.6 <u>Total EDG Event Summary</u>

Evaluating all four EDGs above together, the maximum reduction in AOE and AOSC costs possible by eliminating the effects of all EDG unavailability is approximately \$181,200. Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE and AOC, total only \$113,800. Therefore, an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$295,000 is achievable.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$295,000 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of an EDG would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.2 <u>AAC Combustion Turbine Generator Events</u>

The generic SAMDA items evaluated for the APR1400 design related to CTG are listed in Table 5 and include item 15.

7.2.1 <u>AAC CTG Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of the AAC CTG are present in all of the cutset file FV importance analyses for At-Power internal events, At-Power internal fire, LPSD flooding events and include: Table 6a (Items 20 and 59), Table 6c (Items 13 and 57), and Table 6d

(Items 38 and 66). A maximum of 7.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of AAC CTG unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$7,800. A maximum of 6.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of AAC CTG unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$18,600.

A maximum of 2.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of the AAC CTG unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$5,500.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$40,693) and AOC (\$53,072), total only \$93,765 for the hazards affected. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the AAC CTG, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$125,600 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$193,400 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the AAC CTG would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.3 <u>Auxiliary Feedwater Events</u>

The generic SAMDA items evaluated for the APR1400 design related to auxiliary feedwater are listed in Table 5 and include items 66, 67, 71, 75, 77, and 78.

7.3.1 <u>AFW Isolation Valve MOV-45 Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of AFW isolation valve MOV-45 are present in the At-Power internal events, At-Power internal fire, and At-Power internal flooding cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Items 24 and 25), Table 6b (Items 9 and 10), and Table 6c (Items 10 and 11). A maximum of 10.3% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of MOV-45 unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$10,600. A maximum of 19.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of MOV-45 unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$7,600. A maximum of 10.2%

reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of MOV-45 unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$29,600.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$32,845) and AOC (\$42,642), total only \$75,487 for the hazards affected. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the AFW MOV, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$123,400 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$123,400 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of MOV-45 would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.3.2 <u>AFW Isolation Valve MOV-46 Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of AFW isolation valve MOV-46 are present in the At-Power internal events, At-Power internal flooding events, and At-Power internal events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Items 22 and 23), Table 6b (Items 12 and 13), and Table 6c (Items 26 and 27). A maximum of 10.6% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of MOV-46 unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$11,100. A maximum of 17.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of MOV-46 unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$6,800. A maximum of 16.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of MOV-46 unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$17,600.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$32,845) and AOC (\$42,642), total only \$75,487 for the hazards affected. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the AFW MOV, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$111,000 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$111,000 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the

majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of MOV-46 would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.3.3 <u>AFW Turbine Driven Pump PP01A Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of AFW turbine driven pump PP01A are present in At-Power cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Items 8, 10, 55, 58, 67, and 83), Table 6b (Items 18, 72, 75, 83, and 86), Table 6c (Items 17, 69, 100, and 109), and Table 7a (Item 12). A maximum of 26.8% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of AFW TDP A unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$27,800. A maximum of 9.3% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of AFW TDP A unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$3,700. A maximum of 6.8% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of AFW TDP A unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$19,500.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$32,845) and AOC (\$42,642), total only \$75,487 for the hazards affected. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the TDAFP, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$126,500 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$126,500 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the TDAFP would affect only induced SGTR events.

7.3.4 <u>AFW Turbine Driven Pump PP01B Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of AFW turbine driven pump PP01B are present in the At-Power cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Items 10, 11, 55, 66, 81, 93), Table 6b (Items 20, 73, 79, 83, and 97), Table 6c (Items 31 and 69), and Table 7a (Item 12). A maximum of 24.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of AFW TDP B unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$25,400. A maximum of 8.6% reduction in AOE and AOSC

costs is possible by eliminating the effect of AFW TDP B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$3,400. A maximum of 3.9% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of AFW TDP B unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$11,400.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$32,845) and AOC (\$42,642), total only \$75,487 for the hazards affected. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the TDAFP, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$115,700 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$115,700 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the TDAFP would affect only induced SGTR events.

7.3.5 <u>AFW Motor Driven Pump PP02A Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of AFW motor driven pump PP02A are present in n in the At-Power cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Items 10 and 57), Table 6b (Item 30 and 83), Table 6c (Items 19 and 69), Table 7a (Item 12). A maximum of 12.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of AFW MDP A unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$12,600. A maximum of 4.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of AFW MDP A unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$1,800. A maximum of 5.3% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of AFW MDP A unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$1,800. A maximum of 5.3% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of AFW MDP A unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$15,400.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$32,845) and AOC (\$42,642), total only \$75,487 for the hazards affected. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the MDAFP, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$105,400 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$105,400 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the

majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the MDAFP would affect only induced SGTR events.

7.3.6 AFW Motor Driven Pump PP02B Events

Basic events for the unavailability of AFW motor driven pump PP02B are present in the At-Power cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Item 10 and 99), Table 6b (Items 37 and 83), and Table 6c (Items 43 and 69), and Table 7a (Item 12). A maximum of 11.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of AFW MDP B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$11,600. A maximum of 3.9% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of AFW MDP B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$1,600. A maximum of 3.9% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of AFW MDP B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$1,600. A maximum of 3.0% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of AFW MDP B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$1,600. A maximum of 3.0% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of AFW MDP B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$1,600. A maximum of 3.0% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of AFW MDP B unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$8,700.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$32,845) and AOC (\$42,642), total only \$75,487 for the hazards affected. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the MDAFP, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$97,300 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$97,300 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the MDAFP would affect only induced SGTR events.

7.3.7 <u>Startup FW Pump PP07 Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of startup FW pump PP07 are present in only the At-Power internal events cutset file FV importance analysis and include: Table 6a (Item 73). A maximum of 1.3% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of startup FW pump PP07 unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,300.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$15,000) and AOC (\$21,580), total only \$36,580 for the hazards affected. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the MDAFP, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$37,900 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$37,900 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the startup FW pump would affect only induced SGTR events.

7.3.8 <u>Total AFW Isolation Valve Event Summary</u>

Evaluating all AFW isolation valve events above together, the maximum reduction in AOE and AOSC costs possible by eliminating the effects of all AFW isolation valve unavailability is approximately \$83,400. Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$32,845) and AOC (\$42,642) for the hazards affected. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the AFW MOVs, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$158,900 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$158,900 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 3a through 3f. Improved performance of the AFW MOVs would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.3.9 <u>Total AFW Turbine Driven Pump Event Summary</u>

Evaluating all AFW turbine driven pump events above together, the maximum reduction in AOE and AOSC costs possible by eliminating the effects of all AFW turbine driven pump unavailability is approximately \$91,300. Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$32,845) and AOC (\$42,642) for the hazards affected. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the TDAFPs, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$166,800 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$166,800 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the TDAFPs would affect only induced SGTR events.

7.3.10 <u>Total AFW Motor Driven Pump Event Summary</u>

Evaluating all AFW motor driven pump events above together, the maximum reduction in AOE and AOSC costs possible by eliminating the effects of all AFW motor driven pump unavailability is approximately \$51,700. Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$32,845) and AOC (\$42,642) for the hazards affected. Therefore, an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$127,100 is achievable.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$127,100 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the MDAFP would affect only induced SGTR events.

7.4 <u>Fire Barrier Failure Events</u>

The generic SAMDA items evaluated for the APR1400 design related to barrier failure are listed in Table 5 and includes item 143.

7.4.1 <u>Fire Barrier Unavailability</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of fire barriers are present in the At-Power and LPSD fire event cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6c (Items 41, 83, and 119), Table 6f (Item 87), Table 7c (Items 7, 19, and 21), and Table 7f (Items 1, 2, 7, 8, 15, and 20). A maximum of 3.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of all barrier unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$10,700. A maximum of 2.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of all barrier unavailability in the LPSD fire events analysis, or approximately \$3,800.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$19,981) and AOC (\$23,516), total only \$43,497 for all fire events. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any offsite risk contribution from failure of fire barriers, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$58,000 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$58,000 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the fire barrier would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.5 <u>Component Cooling Water (CCW) Events</u>

The generic SAMDA items evaluated for the APR1400 design related to CCW are listed in Table 5 and includes item 59.

7.5.1 <u>CCW Pump PP02A Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of CCW pump PP02A are present in the At-Power internal events, At-Power internal flooding, and At-Power internal fire cutset file FV importance analysis and include: Table 6a (Item 102), Table 6b (Item 58), and Table 7c (Item 23). A maximum of 0.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CCW pump A unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$730. A maximum of 1.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CCW pump A unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$730. A maximum of 1.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CCW pump A unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$590. A maximum of 0.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CCW pump A unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$520.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$32,845) and AOC (\$42,642), total only \$75,487 for the hazards affected. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the CCW pump, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$77,300 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$77,300 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the

majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the CCW pump would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.5.2 <u>CCW Pump PP02B Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of CCW pump PP02B are present in the At-Power internal events, At-Power internal flooding, At-Power internal fire, and LPSD internal flood cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Item 109), Table 6b (Item 62), and Table 6e (Item 66), and Table 7c (Item 23). A maximum of 0.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CCW pump B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$670. A maximum of 1.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CCW pump B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$670. A maximum of 0.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CCW pump B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$570. A maximum of 0.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CCW pump B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$570.

A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CCW pump B unavailability in the LPSD internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$40.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$36,791) and AOC (\$47,065), total only \$83,856 for the hazards affected. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the CCW pump, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$85,700 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$85,700 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the CCW pump would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.5.3 <u>CS Heat Exchanger HE01A CCW Inlet Valve MOV-97</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of CS heat exchanger HE01A CCW inlet valve MOV-97 are present only in the At-Power internal events cutset file FV importance analysis and include: Table 6a (Item 97) and Table 7a (Item 22). A maximum of 1.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CS heat exchanger HE01A CCW inlet valve MOV-97 unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,200.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$15,000) and AOC (\$21,580), total only \$36,580 for the hazards affected. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the valve, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$37,800 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$37,800 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the CCW valve would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.5.4 <u>CS Heat Exchanger HE01B CCW Inlet Valve MOV-98</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of CS heat exchanger HE01B CCW inlet valve MOV-98 are present in only the At-Power internal events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Item 97) and Table 7a (Item 22). A maximum of 1.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CS heat exchanger HE01A CCW inlet valve MOV-97 unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,200.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$15,000) and AOC (\$21,580), total only \$36,580 for the hazards affected. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the valve, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$37,800 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$37,800 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the CCW valve would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.5.5 DG001A CCW Inlet Valve MOV-191

Basic events for the unavailability of DG001A CCW inlet valve MOV-191 are present in only the LPSD internal flooding cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6e (Item 37). A maximum of 1.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of MOV-191 unavailability in the LPSD internal flooding analysis, or approximately \$100.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$3,946) and AOC (\$4,423), total only \$8,369 for the hazards affected. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the valve, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$8,500 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$8,500 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the CCW valve would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.5.6 <u>Total CCW Pump Event Summary</u>

Evaluating all CCW pump events above together, the maximum reduction in AOE and AOSC costs possible by eliminating the effects of all CCW pump unavailability is approximately \$3,600. Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$36,791) and AOC (\$47,065), total only \$83,856 for the hazards impacted. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the CCW pump, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$87,500 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$87,500 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the CCW pumps would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.5.7 <u>Total CS Heat Exchanger CCW Inlet Valve Event Summary</u>

Evaluating all CS heat exchanger CCW inlet valve events above together, the maximum reduction in AOE and AOSC costs possible by eliminating the effects of all CCW pump unavailability is approximately \$2,400. Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$15,000) and AOC (\$21,580), total only \$36,580 for the impacted hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the CCW pump, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$40,000 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$40,000 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the CCW valves would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.6 <u>Containment Spray (CS) Events</u>

7.6.1 <u>Containment Spray Pump PP01A Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of containment spray pump PP01A are present in the At-Power internal events, At-Power internal flooding, and LPSD internal events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Item 71), Table 6b (Item 92), Table 6d (Item 72), Table 7a (Item 10), Table 7d (Items 28 and 30). A maximum of 1.6% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CS pump A unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,600. A maximum of 0.6% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CS pump A unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$250. A maximum of 0.8% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the

effect of CS pump A unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,700.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$25,950) and AOC (\$35,994), total only \$61,944 for the hazards affected. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the CCW pump, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$65,400 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$65,400 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the CS pumps would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.6.2 <u>Containment Spray Pump PP01B Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of containment spray pump PP01B are present in the At-Power internal events and LPSD internal events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Item 65), Table 6d (Item 72), Table 7a (Item 10), and Table 7d (Items 28 and 30). A maximum of 1.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CS pump B unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,700. A maximum of 0.8% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CS pump B unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,700.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$24,399) and AOC (\$34,002), total only \$58,401 for the hazards affected. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the CCW pump, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$361,800 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$361,800 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved

performance of the CS pumps would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.6.3 <u>Containment Spray Isolation Valve MOV-003 Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of containment spray isolation valve MOV-003 are present in only the At-Power internal events cutset file FV importance analysis and include: Table 6a (Item 111). A maximum of 0.6% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of MOV-003 unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$660.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$15,000) and AOC (\$21,580), total only \$36,580 for at-power internal events. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the CS valve, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$37,200 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$35,300 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the CS valves would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.6.4 <u>Containment Spray Isolation Valve MOV-004 Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of containment spray isolation valve MOV-004 are present in only the At-Power internal events cutset file FV importance analysis and include: Table 6a (Item 111) and Table 7a (Item 24). A maximum of 1.0% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of MOV-004 unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,100.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$15,000) and AOC (\$21,580), total only \$36,580 for at-power internal events. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the CS valve, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$37,700 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$37,700 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the

majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 3a through 4f. Improved performance of the CS valves would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.6.5 Containment Spray Heat Exchanger HE-01B Events

Basic events for the unavailability of containment spray heat exchanger HE-01B are present in only the At-Power internal events cutset file FV importance analysis and include: Table 6a (Item 82). A maximum of 1.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of HE-01B unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,200.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$15,000) and AOC (\$21,580), total only \$36,580 for at-power internal events. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the CS heat exchanger, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$37,800 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$37,800 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the CS valves would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.6.6 Containment Spray Heat Exchanger HE-01A Events

Basic events for the unavailability of containment spray heat exchanger HE-01A are present in only the At-Power internal events cutset file FV importance analysis and include: Table 6a (Item 84). A maximum of 1.12% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of HE-01A unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,500.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$15,000) and AOC (\$21,580), total only \$36,580 for at-power internal events. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the CS heat exchanger, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$37,800 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$37,800 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the CS valves would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.6.7 <u>Total Containment Spray Pump Event Summary</u>

Evaluating all CS pump events above together, the maximum reduction in AOE and AOSC costs possible by eliminating the effects of all CS pump unavailability is approximately \$6,900. Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$25,950) and AOC (\$35,994), total only \$61,944 for the hazards impacted. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the CS pumps, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$68,900 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$68,900 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the CS pumps would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.6.8 <u>Total Containment Spray Isolation Valve Event Summary</u>

Evaluating both CS isolation valve events above together, the maximum reduction in AOE and AOSC costs possible by eliminating the effects of all CS isolation valve unavailability is approximately \$1,700. Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$15,000) and AOC (\$21,580), total only \$36,580 for at-power internal events. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the CS valves, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$38,300 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$38,300 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved

performance of the CS valves would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.6.9 <u>Total Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Event Summary</u>

Evaluating both CS heat exchanger events above together, the maximum reduction in AOE and AOSC costs possible by eliminating the effects of all CS heat exchanger unavailability is approximately \$2,300. Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$15,000) and AOC (\$21,580), total only \$36,580 for at-power internal events. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the CS heat exchangers, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$38,900 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$39,300 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the CS heat exchangers would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.7 <u>125 VDC Power Events</u>

The generic SAMDA items evaluated for the APR1400 design related to DC power are listed in Table 4 and include items 1, 2, 3, 5, and 74.

7.7.1 <u>125 VDC Power Battery BT01A Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of 125 VDC battery BT01A are present in the At-Power internal events, At-Power internal flooding, and At-Power internal fire cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Item 21), Table 6b (Item 55), and Table 6c (Item 61). A maximum of 5.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of battery BT01A unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$6,200. A maximum of 1.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of battery BT01A unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$6,800. A maximum of 1.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of battery BT01A unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$680. A maximum of 1.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of battery BT01A unavailability in the At-Power internal fire analysis, or approximately \$680.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$32,845) and AOC (\$42,642), total only \$75,487 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the battery, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$85,800 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$85,800 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the battery would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.7.2 <u>125 VDC Power Battery BT01B Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of 125 VDC battery BT01B are present in the At-Power internal events, At-Power internal flooding, and At-Power internal fire cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Item 17), Table 6b (Item 56), and Table 6c (Item 39). A maximum of 6.0% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of battery BT01B unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$6,200. A maximum of 1.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of battery BT01B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$6,200. A maximum of 1.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of battery BT01B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$680. A maximum of 1.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of battery BT01B unavailability in the At-Power internal fire events analysis, or approximately \$680.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$32,845) and AOC (\$42,642), total only \$75,487 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the battery, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$85,400 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$85,400 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved

performance of the battery would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.7.3 <u>125 VDC Power Battery BT01C Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of 125 VDC battery BT01C are present in only the At-Power internal events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Item 74). A maximum of 1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of battery BT01C unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,300.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$15,000) and AOC (\$21,580), total only \$36,580 for at-power internal events. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the battery, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$37,900 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$37,900 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the battery would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.7.4 <u>125 VDC Power Battery BT01D Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of 125 VDC battery BT01D are present in only the At-Power internal events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Item 74). A maximum of 1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of battery BT01D unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,300.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$15,000) and AOC (\$21,580), total only \$36,580 for at-power internal events. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the battery, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$37,900 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$37,900 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the

majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the battery would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.7.5 <u>Total 125 VDC Power Battery Event Summary</u>

Evaluating all 125 VDC power battery events above together, the maximum reduction in AOE and AOSC costs possible by eliminating the effects of all battery unavailability is approximately \$10,300. Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$32,845) and AOC (\$42,642), total only \$75,487 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the batteries, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$101,200 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$101,200 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the battery would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.8 <u>120 VAC Power Events</u>

The generic SAMDA items evaluated for the APR1400 design related to 120V AC power are listed in Table 5 and include items 6, 7, and 16).

7.8.1 <u>120V Inverter IN01A</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of 120V inverter IN01A are present in the At-Power internal events, At-Power internal flooding events, and At-Power internal fire cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Item 36), Table 6b (Item 76), Table 6c (Item 110). A maximum of 3.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of inverter IN01A unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$3,200. A maximum of 0.8% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of inverter IN01A unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$3,200. A maximum of 0.8% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of inverter IN01A unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$320. A maximum of 0.6% reduction in AOE

and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of inverter IN01A unavailability in the At-Power internal fire analysis, or approximately \$1,700.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$32,845) and AOC (\$42,642), total only \$75,487 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the inverter, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$80,700 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$80,700 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the inverter would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.8.2 <u>120V Inverter IN01B</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of 120V inverter IN01B are present in the At-Power internal events, At-Power internal flooding events, and At-Power internal fire events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Item 33), Table 6b (Item 81), Table 6c (Item 107). A maximum of 3.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of inverter IN01B unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$3,600. A maximum of 0.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of inverter IN01B unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$3,600. A maximum of 0.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of inverter IN01B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$1,600. A maximum of 0.6% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of inverter IN01B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$1,600. A maximum of 0.6% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of inverter IN01B unavailability in the At-Power internal fire analysis, or approximately \$1,700.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$32,845) and AOC (\$42,642), total only \$75,487 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the inverter, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$80,700 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$95,600 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events
also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the inverter would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.8.3 <u>120V Inverter IN01C</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of 120V inverter IN01C are present in the At-Power internal events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Item 98). A maximum of 0.8% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of inverter IN01C unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$780.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$15,000) and AOC (\$21,580), total only \$36,580 for at-power internal events, at-power internal flooding, and LPSD fire events. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the inverter, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$37,400 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$37,400 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the inverter would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.8.4 <u>120V Inverter IN01D</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of 120V inverter IN01D are present in the At-Power internal events and LPSD fire events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Item 101). A maximum of 0.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of inverter IN01D unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$750.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$15,000) and AOC (\$21,580), total only \$36,580 for at-power internal events, at-power internal flooding, and LPSD fire events. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the inverter, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$37,400 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$37,400 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the inverter would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.8.5 <u>Total 120V inverter Event Summary</u>

Evaluating all 120V inverter events above together, the maximum reduction in AOE and AOSC costs possible by eliminating the effects of all 120V inverter unavailability is approximately \$12,500. Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$32,845) and AOC (\$42,642), total only \$75,487 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the inverter, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$88,000 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$106,900 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 2a through 2f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 3a through 3f. Improved performance of the inverter would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events. Therefore, a design change to improve performance of the inverters would have a negligible benefit.

7.9 <u>AC Power Events</u>

The generic SAMDA items evaluated for the APR1400 design related to AC power are listed in Table 5 and include item 16.

7.9.1 <u>SAT Transformer 2M Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of SAT transformer 2M are present in the At-Power internal flooding events and At-Power internal fire cutset file FV importance analysis and include: Table 6b (Item 61), and Table 6c (Item 50). A maximum of 1.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of SAT transformer 2M in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$570. A maximum of 1.6%

reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of SAT transformer 2M in the At-Power internal fire events analysis, or approximately \$4,700.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$17,845) and AOC (\$21,062), total only \$38,907 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the transformer, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$44,200 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$44,200 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 2a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the transformer would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.9.2 <u>SAT Transformer 2N Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of SAT transformer 2N are present in the At-Power internal flooding events and At-Power internal fire events cutset files FV importance analysis and include: Table 6b (Item 64) and Table 6c (Item 20). A maximum of 1.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of SAT transformer 2N in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$540. A maximum of 3.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of SAT transformer 2M in the At-Power internal fire events analysis, or approximately \$10,200.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$17,845) and AOC (\$21,062), total only \$38,907 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the transformer, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$49,700 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$49,700 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved

performance of the transformer would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.9.3 PCB SW01A-A2 To 4.16KV Switchgear SW01A Events

Basic events for the unavailability of PCB SW01A-A2 To 4.16KV Switchgear SW01A are present in only the At-Power internal flooding and At-Power internal fire events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6b (Item 57) and Table 6c (Item 55). A maximum of 1.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01A-A2 in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$540. A maximum of 1.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01A-A2 in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$4,300.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$17,845) and AOC (\$21,062), total only \$38,907 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the circuit breaker, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$43,800 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$43,800 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the circuit breaker would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.9.4 PCB SW01B-A2 To 4.16KV Switchgear SW01B Events

Basic events for the unavailability of PCB SW01B-A2 To 4.16KV Switchgear SW01B are present in the At-Power internal flooding events, At-Power internal fire, and LPSD internal events cutset file FV importance analysis and include: Table 6b (Item 65), Table 6c (Item 70), and Table 7d (Item 35). A maximum of 1.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01B-A2 in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$540. A maximum of 1.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01B-A2 in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$540. A maximum of 1.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01B-A2 in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$3,300. A maximum of 0.4%

reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01B-A2 in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$720.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$27,244) and AOC (\$33,484), total only \$60,728 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the circuit breaker, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$65,300 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$65,300 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the circuit breaker would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.9.5 PCB SW01C-A2 To 4.16KV Switchgear SW01C Events

Basic events for the unavailability of PCB SW01C-A2 To 4.16KV Switchgear SW01A are present in only the At-Power and LPSD internal flooding events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6b (Item 99). A maximum of 0.6% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01C-A2 in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$230.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$1,551) and AOC (\$1,992), total only \$3,543 for internal flooding events. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the circuit breaker, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$3,800 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$3,800 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the circuit breaker would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.9.6 PCB SW01A-H2 To 4.16KV Switchgear SW01A From UAT Events

Basic events for the unavailability of PCB SW01A-H2 To 4.16KV Switchgear SW01A from the UAT are present in the At-Power internal events, At-Power internal flooding, LPSD internal events, and LPSD internal flooding cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Items 40 and 103), Table 6b (Items 2, 8, 34, 35, 54, 58, 71, and 109), Table 6e (Items 9 and 73), and Table 7d (Items 25 and 41). A maximum of 3.6% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01A-H2 in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$3,800. A maximum of 41% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01A-H2 in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$16,300. A maximum of 0.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01A-H2 in LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,300. A maximum of 9.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01A-H2 in LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,300. A maximum of 9.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01A-H2 in LPSD internal flooding analysis, or approximately \$1,300. A maximum of 9.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01A-H2 in LPSD internal flooding analysis, or approximately \$1,300. A maximum of 9.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01A-H2 in LPSD internal flooding analysis, or approximately \$1,300. A maximum of 9.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01A-H2 in LPSD internal flooding analysis, or approximately \$770.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$29,896) and AOC (\$40,417), total only \$70,313 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the circuit breaker, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$92,600 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$92,600 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the circuit breaker would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.9.7 PCB SW01B-H2 To 4.16KV Switchgear SW01B From UAT Events

Basic events for the unavailability of PCB SW01B-H2 To 4.16KV Switchgear SW01B from the UAT are present in only the At-Power internal events, At-Power internal flood, LPSD internal events, and LPSD internal flood cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Items 42 and 103), Table 6b (Items 5, 8, 35, 38, 41, 54, 71, and 110), Table 6e (Items 61 and 73), and Table 7d (Items 25 and 41). A maximum of 3.6% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01B-H2

in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$3,700. A maximum of 41% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01B-H2 in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$16,300. A maximum of 0.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01B-H2 in LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,300. A maximum of 1.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01B-H2 in LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,300. A maximum of SW01A-H2 in LPSD internal flooding analysis, or approximately \$90.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$29,896) and AOC (\$40,417), total only \$70,313 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the circuit breaker, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$91,800 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$91,800 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the circuit breaker would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.9.8 PCB SW01C-C2 To 4.16KV Switchgear SW01C From UAT Events

Basic events for the unavailability of PCB SW01C-C2 To 4.16KV Switchgear SW01C from the UAT are present in only the At-Power internal events, At-Power internal flood, LPSD internal events, and LPSD internal flood cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Items 77 and 103), Table 6b (Items 8, 23, 34, 35, 38, 54, and 110), Table 6e (Item 73), and Table 7d (Items 25 and 41). A maximum of 1.9% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01C-C2 in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$2,000. A maximum of 29% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01C-C2 in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$11,300. A maximum of 0.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01C-C2 in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,300. A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01C-C2 in LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,300. A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01C-C2 in LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,300. A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01C-C2 in LPSD internal flooding analysis, or approximately \$40.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$29,896) and AOC (\$40,417), total only \$70,313 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the circuit breaker, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$85,000 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$85,000 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the circuit breaker would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.9.9 PCB SW01D-G2 To 4.16KV Switchgear SW01D From UAT Events

Basic events for the unavailability of PCB SW01D-G2 To 4.16KV Switchgear SW01D from the UAT are present in the At-Power internal events, At-Power internal flooding, LPSD internal events, and LPSD internal flood cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Items 78 and 103), Table 6b (Items 8, 31, 35, 38, 41, 71, and 109), Table 6e (Items 25 and 73), and Table 7d (Items 25 and 41). A maximum of 1.9% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01D-G2 in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$2,000. A maximum of 26% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01D-G2 in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$10,200. A maximum of 0.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01D-G2 in LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,300. A maximum of 3.0% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01D-G2 in LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,300. A maximum of 3.0% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of PCB SW01D-G2 in LPSD internal flooding analysis, or approximately \$2,000.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$29,896) and AOC (\$40,417), total only \$70,313 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the circuit breaker, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$84,100 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$84,100 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the

majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the circuit breaker would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.9.10 <u>SAT Transformer Event Summary</u>

Evaluating both SAT transformer events above together, the maximum reduction in AOE and AOSC costs possible by eliminating the effects of all SAT transformer unavailability is approximately \$16,100. Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$17,845) and AOC (\$21,062), total only \$38,907 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the transformer, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$55,000 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$55,000 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the transformer would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.9.11 <u>4.16KV Circuit Breaker Event Summary</u>

Evaluating all 4.16KV circuit breaker events above together, the maximum reduction in AOE and AOSC costs possible by eliminating the effects of all 4.16KV circuit breakers unavailability is approximately \$81,900. Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$46,190) and AOC (\$59,487), total only \$105,677. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from 4.16kV breakers, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$187,500 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$187,500 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the circuit breaker would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from

SGTR and ISLOCA events. Furthermore, the change would need to be applied to all seven circuit breakers considered in this estimate.

7.10 <u>POSRV Events</u>

7.10.1 POSRV V200 Events

Basic events for the unavailability of POSRV V200 are present in the At-Power internal flooding events, At-Power internal fire events, and LPSD internal event cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6b (Item 84), Table 6c (Item 90), and Table 7d (Item 61). A maximum of 0.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of POSRV V200 unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$270. A maximum of 0.8% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of POSRV V200 unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$2,400. A maximum of 0.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of POSRV V200 unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$2,400. A maximum of 0.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of POSRV V200 unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$2,400. A maximum of 0.2% reduction in AOE and AOSE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of POSRV V200 unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$2,400. A maximum of 0.2% reduction in AOE and AOSE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of POSRV V200 unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$2,400.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$27,244) and AOC (\$33,484), total only \$60,728 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the POSRV, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$63,800 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$63,800 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of a POSRV would affect only induced SGTR events.

7.10.2 <u>POSRV V201 Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of POSRV V201 are present in the At-Power internal flooding events, at-power internal fire events, and LPSD internal events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6b (Item 85), Table 6c (Item 91), and Table 7d (Item 61). A maximum of 0.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of POSRV V201 unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$270. A maximum of 0.8% reduction in AOE and

AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of POSRV V201 unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$2,400. A maximum of 0.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of POSRV V201 unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$360.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$27,244) and AOC (\$33,484), total only \$60,728 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the POSRV, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$63,800 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$63,800 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of a POSRV would affect only induced SGTR events.

7.10.3 <u>POSRV V202 Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of POSRV V202 are present in the At-Power internal flooding events and LPSD internal events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6b (Item 88) and Table 7d (Item 61). A maximum of 0.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of POSRV V202 unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$260. A maximum of 0.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of POSRV V202 unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$260. A maximum of 0.2% unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$360.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$10,950) and AOC (\$14,414), total only \$25,364 for the affected hazrds. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the POSRV, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$26,000 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$26,000 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of a POSRV would affect only induced SGTR events.

7.10.4 POSRV V203 Events

Basic events for the unavailability of POSRV V203 are present in the At-Power internal flooding events and LPSD internal events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6b (Item 88) and Table 7d (Item 61). A maximum of 0.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of POSRV V203 unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$260. A maximum of 0.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of POSRV V203 unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$260. A maximum of 0.2% unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$360.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$10,950) and AOC (\$14,414), total only \$25,364 for the affected hazrds. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the POSRV, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$26,000 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$26,000 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of a POSRV would affect only induced SGTR events.

7.10.5 <u>Total POSRV Event Summary</u>

Evaluating all four POSRV above together, the maximum reduction in AOE and AOSC costs possible by eliminating the effects of all POSRV unavailability is approximately \$7,400. Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$27,244) and AOC (\$33,484), total only \$60,728 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the POSRVs, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$68,100 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$68,100 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of a POSRVs would affect only induced SGTR events.

7.11 <u>Chiller/Cooler Events</u>

The generic SAMDA items evaluated for the APR1400 design related to chillers/coolers are listed in Table 5 and include items 80, 81, and 82.

7.11.1 ECW Chiller CH01A Events

Basic events for the unavailability of ECW chiller CH01A are present in At-Power internal events, At-Power internal flooding, At-Power internal fire events, LPSD internal events, and LPSD internal flood cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Items 46, 60, and 96), Table 6b (Item 74), Table 6c (Items 56, 62, 81, and 118), Table 6d (Item 61), and Table 6e (Item 50). A maximum of 5.0% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW chiller CH01A unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$5,200. A maximum of 0.9% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW chiller CH01A unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding analysis, or approximately \$360. A maximum of 4.3% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW chiller CH01A unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$12,600.

A maximum of 0.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW chiller CH01A unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,500. A maximum of 0.9% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW chiller CH01A unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$80.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$46,190) and AOC (\$59,487), total only \$105,677 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the transformer, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$125,400 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$125,400 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of an ECW chiller would have a minimal effect of SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.11.2 ECW Chiller CH01B Events

Basic events for the unavailability of ECW chiller CH01B are present in At-Power internal events, At-Power internal flood, At-Power internal fire, LPSD internal events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Items 47, 60, 96), Table 6b (Item 101), Table 6c (Items 56, 75 and 118), and Table 6d (Item 61). A maximum of 4.8% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW chiller CH01B unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$5,000. A maximum of 0.6% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW chiller CH01B unavailability in the At-Power internal AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW chiller CH01B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding analysis, or approximately \$230. A maximum of 3.0% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW chiller CH01B unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$230. A maximum of 3.0% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW chiller CH01B unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$230. A maximum of 3.0% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW chiller CH01B unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$8,700.

A maximum of 0.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW chiller CH01B unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,500.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$42,244) and AOC (\$55,064), total only \$97,308 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the transformer, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$112,700 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$112,700 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of an ECW chiller would have a minimal effect of SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.11.3 ECW Chiller CH02A Events

Basic events for the unavailability of ECW chiller CH03a are present in nearly all of the cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Items 28, 60, 79, and 96), Table 6b (Items 16, and 48), Table 6c (Items 24, 56, 77, and 118), and Table 6d (Item 61). A maximum of 7.8% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW chiller CH02A unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$8,100. A maximum of 9.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is

possible by eliminating the effect of ECW chiller CH02A unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$3,600. A maximum of 6.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW chiller CH02A unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$18,200.

A maximum of 0.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW chiller CH02A unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,500.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$42,244) and AOC (\$55,064), total only \$97,308 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the transformer, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$128,600 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$128,600 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of an ECW chiller would have a minimal effect of SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.11.4 ECW Chiller CH02B Events

Basic events for the unavailability of ECW chiller CH02B are present in nearly all of the cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Items 29, 60, 85, and 96), Table 6b (Items 17 and 50), Table 6c (Items 30, 56, 87, and 118), Table 6d (Item 61), and Table 6e (Item 16). A maximum of 7.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW chiller CH02B unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$7,800. A maximum of 8.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW chiller CH02B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$3,400. A maximum of 5.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW chiller CH02B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$3,400. A maximum of 5.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW chiller CH02B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$3,400. A maximum of 5.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW chiller CH02B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$3,400. A maximum of 5.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW chiller CH02B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$3,400.

A maximum of 0.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW chiller CH02B unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,500. A maximum of 5.0% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is

possible by eliminating the effect of ECW chiller CH02B unavailability in the LPSD internal flooding analysis, or approximately \$420.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$46,190) and AOC (\$59,487), total only \$105,677 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the chiller, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$135,200 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$135,200 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of an ECW chiller would have a minimal effect of SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.11.5 EDG Room Cubical Cooler HV12A Events

Basic events for the unavailability of EDG room cubical cooler HV12A are present in the At-Power internal events, At-Power internal fire, LPSD internal events, and LPSD internal flood cutset file FV importance analysis and include: Table 6a (Items 118), Table 6e (Items 23 and 46), Table 7c (Items 10), and Table 7d (Item 51). A maximum of 0.6% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV12A unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$580. A maximum of 0.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler distribution of 0.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV12A unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$580.

A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV12A unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$920. A maximum of 4.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV12A unavailability in the LPSD internal flooding analysis, or approximately \$340.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$44,639) and AOC (\$57,495), total only \$102,134 for the at-power events. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the EDG room cooler, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$105,100 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$105,100 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the EDG room cooler would have a minimal effect of SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.11.6 EDG Room Cubical Cooler HV12B Events

Basic events for the unavailability of EDG room cubical cooler HV12B are present in the At-Power internal event, At-Power internal fire, and LPSD internal events cutset file FV importance analysis and include: Table 6a (Items 122), Table 7c (Item 10), and Table 7d (Item 49). A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV12B unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$540. A maximum of 0.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV12B unavailability in the At-Power internal fire analysis, or approximately \$1,100. A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV12B unavailability in the At-Power internal fire analysis, or approximately \$1,100. A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV12B unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$920.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$40,693) and AOC (\$53,072), total only \$93,765 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the EDG room cooler, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$96,300 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$96,300 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the EDG room cooler would have a minimal effect of SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.11.7 EDG Room Cubical Cooler HV12D Events

Basic events for the unavailability of EDG room cubical cooler HV12D are present in only the LPSD internal flooding cutset file FV importance analysis and include: Table 6e (Item 55). A maximum of 0.9% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating

the effect of cubical cooler HV12D unavailability in the LPSD internal floodinig analysis, or approximately \$80.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$3,946) and AOC (\$4,423), total only \$8,369 for the LPSD internal events. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the EDG room cooler, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$8,400 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$8,400 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the EDG room cooler would have a minimal effect of SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.11.8 EDG Room Cubical Cooler HV13A Events

Basic events for the unavailability of EDG room cubical cooler HV13A are present in the At-Power internal event, at-power internal fire, LPSD internal events, and LPSD internal flood cutset file FV importance analysis and include: Table 6a (Items 119) Table 6e (Items 24 and 47), Table 7c (Item 10), and Table 7d (Item 52). A maximum of 0.6% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV13A unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$580. A maximum of 0.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler defined and an analysis is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler states and the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$580. A maximum of 0.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV13A unavailability in the At-Power internal fire analysis, or approximately \$1,100.

A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV13A unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$920. A maximum of 4.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV13A unavailability in the LPSD internal flood analysis, or approximately \$340.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$44,639) and AOC (\$57,495), total only \$102,134 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the EDG room cooler, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$105,100 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$105,100 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the EDG room cooler would have a minimal effect of SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.11.9 EDG Room Cubical Cooler HV13B Events

Basic events for the unavailability of EDG room cubical cooler HV13B are present in the At-Power internal events, At-Power internal fire, and LPSD internal events cutset file FV importance analysis and include: Table 6a (Items 123), Table 7c (Item 10), and Table 7d (Item 50). A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV13B unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$540. A maximum of 0.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV13B unavailability in the At-Power internal fire analysis, or approximately \$1,100. A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV13B unavailability in the At-Power internal fire analysis, or approximately \$1,100. A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV13B unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$930.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$40,693) and AOC (\$53,072), total only \$93,765 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the EDG room cooler, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$96,300 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$96,300 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the EDG room cooler would have a minimal effect of SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.11.10 EDG Room Cubical Cooler HV13D Events

Basic events for the unavailability of EDG room cubical cooler HV13D are present in only the LPSD internal flood cutset file FV importance analysis and include: Table 6e (Item 56). A maximum of 0.9% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating

the effect of cubical cooler HV13D unavailability in the LPSD internal flood analysis, or approximately \$80.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$3,946) and AOC (\$4,423), total only \$8,369 for the LPSD flooding events. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the EDG room cooler, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$8,400 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$8,400 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the EDG room cooler would have a minimal effect of SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.11.11 Motor Driven AFW Pump Room A Cubical Cooler HV33A Events

Basic events for the unavailability of motor driven AFW pump room A cubical cooler HV33A are present in the At-Power internal events, At-Power internal flood, At-Power internal fire, and LPSD internal events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Item 89), Table 6b (Items 46 and 82), Table 6c (Items 33 and 89) and Table 7d (Item 44). A maximum of 1.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV33A unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,100. A maximum of 3.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV33A unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$1,400. A maximum of 3.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV33A unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$1,400. A maximum of 3.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV33A unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$1,400. A maximum of 3.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV33A unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$1,400. A maximum of 3.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV33A1 unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$10,000.

A maximum of 0.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV33A unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$180.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$42,244) and AOC (\$55,064), total only \$97,308 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk

contribution from the MDAFW pump room cooler, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$110,000 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$110,000 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the MDAFW pump room cooler would have a minimal effect only induced SGTR events by increasing availability of the associated AFW pump.

7.11.12 Motor Driven AFW Pump Room B Cubical Cooler HV33B Events

Basic events for the unavailability of motor driven AFW pump room B cubical cooler HV33B are present in the At-Power internal flooding, at-power internal fire, and LPSD internal events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6b (Items 51 and 94), Table 6c (Items 71), and Table 7d (Item 44). A maximum of 2.6% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV33B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$1,000. A maximum of 1.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV33B unavailability in the At-Power fire events analysis, or approximately \$3,300. A maximum of 0.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV33B unavailability in the LPSD events analysis, or approximately \$180.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$27,244) and AOC (\$33,484), total only \$60,728 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the MDAFW pump room cooler, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$65,200 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$65,200 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the MDAFW pump room cooler would have a minimal effect only induced SGTR events by increasing availability of the associated AFW pump.

7.11.13 ECW Chiller B Cubical Cooler HV32B Events

Basic events for the unavailability of ECW Chiller room cubical cooler HV32B are present in the LPSD internal events and LPSD internal flooding cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6e (Item 49), and Table 7d (Item 44). A maximum of 0.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV32B unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$180. A maximum of 0.9% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV32B unavailability in the LPSD internal flood events analysis, or approximately \$80.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$13,345) and AOC (\$16,845), total only \$30,190 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the ECW chiller cubical cooler, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$30,400 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$30,400 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the ECW chiller cubical cooler would have a minimal effect on SGTR and ISLOCA events

7.11.14 <u>Air Handling Unit AH02A Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of air handling unit AH02A are present in the At-Power internal flooding and LPSD internal events FV importance analyses and include: Table 6b (Items 102 and 105) and Table 7d (Item 42). A maximum of 1.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV33B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$460. A maximum of 0.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV33B unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$180.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$10,950) and AOC (\$14,414), total only \$25,364 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk

contribution from the ECW chiller cubical cooler, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$26,000 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$26,000 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the ECW chiller cubical cooler would have a minimal effect only induced SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.11.15 <u>Air Handling Unit AH02B Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of air handling unit AH02B are present in the At-Power internal flooding, LPSD internal events, and LPSD internal flood FV importance analyses and include: Table 6b (Items 104 and 106), Table 6e (Item 33), and Table 7d (Item 42). A maximum of 1.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV33B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$460. A maximum of 0.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of cubical cooler HV33B unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$180.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$14,896) and AOC (\$18,837), total only \$33,733 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the ECW chiller cubical cooler, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$34,500 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$34,5000 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the ECW chiller cubical cooler would have a minimal effect only induced SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.11.16 <u>Total ECW Chiller Event Summary</u>

Evaluating all four ECW chillers above together, the maximum reduction in AOE and AOSC costs possible by eliminating the effects of all ECW chiller unavailability is

approximately \$95,900. Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$46,190) and AOC (\$59,487), total only \$105,677 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the ECW chillers, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$201,600 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$201,600 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the ECW chillers would have a minimal effect of SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.11.17 <u>Total EDG Room Cubical Cooler Event Summary</u>

Evaluating all six EDG room cubical coolers above together, the maximum reduction in AOE and AOSC costs possible by eliminating the effects of all EDG room cooler unavailability is approximately \$8,600. Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$44,639) and AOC (\$57,495), total only \$102,134 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the EDG room coolers, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$110,700 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$110,700 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the EDG room coolers would have a minimal effect of SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.11.18 <u>Total Motor Driven AFW Pump Room Cubical Cooler Event Summary</u>

Evaluating both motor-driven AFW pump room cubical coolers above together, the maximum reduction in AOE and AOSC costs possible by eliminating the effects of all MDAFW pump room cooler unavailability is approximately \$17,200. Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$42,244) and AOC (\$55,064), total only \$97,308. If all offsite consequences were abated by

eliminating any risk contribution from the MDAFW pump room coolers, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$114,500 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$114,500 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the MDAFW pump room coolers would affect only induced SGTR events by increasing availability of the associated AFW pump.

7.11.19 <u>Total Air Handling Unit Event Summary</u>

Evaluating the two air handling units above together, the maximum reduction in AOE and AOSC costs possible by eliminating the effects of all AHU unavailability is approximately \$1,400. Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$14,896) and AOC (\$18,837), total only \$33,733 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the EDG room coolers, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$35,100 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$35,100 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the air handling units would have a minimal effect of SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.12 <u>Safety Injection (SI) Events</u>

The generic SAMDA items evaluated for the APR1400 design related to safety injection are listed in Table 4 and include items 26, 29, 37, 38, and 39.

7.12.1 SI Pump PP02A Events

Basic events for the unavailability of SI pump PP02A are present only the LPSD internal flooding cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6e (Item 48). A maximum of 1.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect

of SI pump PP02A unavailability in the LPSD internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$90.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$3,946) and AOC (\$4,423), total only \$8,369 for LPSD flooding events. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the SI pump, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$8,500 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$8,500 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the SI pump would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.12.2 <u>SI Pump PP02B Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of SI pump PP02B are present only the At-Power internal events, At-Power internal fire, and LPSD internal flooding cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Item 106), Table 6c (Item 114), and Table 6e (Item 48). A maximum of 0.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of SI pump PP02B unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$700. A maximum of 0.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of SI pump PP02B unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$700. A maximum of 0.6% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of SI pump PP02B unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$700. A maximum of 0.6% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of SI pump PP02B unavailability in the At-Power internal fire analysis, or approximately \$1,600. A maximum of 1.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of SI pump PP02B unavailability in the LPSD internal flooding analysis, or approximately \$90.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$35,240) and AOC (\$45,073), total only \$80,313 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the SI pump, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$82,800 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$82,800 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the

majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the SI pump would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.12.3 <u>SI Pump PP02C Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of SI pump PP02C are present in only the At-Power internal events, At-power internal fire, and LPSD internal events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Items 95 and 121), Table 6c (Item 108), and Table 6d (Item 74). A maximum of 1.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of SI pump PP02C unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,400. A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of SI pump PP02C unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,400.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$24,399) and AOC (\$34,002), total only \$58,401 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the SI pump, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$60,900 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$60,900 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the SI pump would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.12.4 <u>SI Pump PP02D Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of SI pump PP02D are present only the At-Power internal fire cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6c (Item 108). A maximum of 0.6% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of SI pump PP02D unavailability in the At-Power internal fire events analysis, or approximately \$1,800.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$16,294) and AOC (\$19,070), total only \$35,364 for At-Power internal fire. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the SI pump, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$37,200 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$37,200 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the SI pump would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.12.5 <u>Total SI Pump Event Summary</u>

Evaluating all four SI pumps above together, the maximum reduction in AOE and AOSC costs possible by eliminating the effects of all SI pump unavailability is approximately \$6,800. Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$35,240) and AOC (\$45,073), total only \$80,313. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the SI pumps, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$87,100 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$87,100 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the SI pumps would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.12.6 IRWST Strainer Events

Basic events for the unavailability of IRWST sump are present in only the At-Power and LPSD internal events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Item 34) and Table 6d (Item 13). A maximum of 3.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of IRWST sump unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$3,500.

A maximum of 5.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of IRWST sump unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$10,900.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$24,399) and AOC (\$34,002), total only \$58,401 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the IRWST sump, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$72,800 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$72,800 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the IRWST sump would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.12.7 <u>SI Valve V-959 Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of SI pump min-flow recirculation valve V-959 are present only the At-Power fire cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6c (Item 68). A maximum of 1.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of the recirculation valve unavailability in the At-Power internal fire events analysis, or approximately \$3,400.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$16,294) and AOC (\$19,070), total only \$35,364 for the At-Power fire events. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the valve, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$38,700 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$38,700 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the recirculation valve would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.13 <u>ESW Events</u>

The generic SAMDA items evaluated for the APR1400 design related to the ESW system are listed in Table 5 and include items 43, 46, and 47.

7.13.1 ESW Pump PP02A Events

Basic events for the unavailability of ESW pump PP02A are present in the At-Power internal events, At-Power internal flooding events, At-Power internal fire, and LPSD internal events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Item 49), Table 6b (Item 28), Table 6c (Item 64), and Table 7d (Item 63). A maximum of 2.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ESW pump PP02A unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$2,300. A maximum of 4.3% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ESW pump PP02A unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$1,700. A maximum of 1.3% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ESW pump PP02A unavailability in the effect of ESW pump PP02A unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$1,700. A maximum of 1.3% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ESW pump PP02A unavailability in the At-Power internal fire events analysis, or approximately \$3,700. A maximum of 0.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ESW pump PP02A unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$140.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$42,244) and AOC (\$55,064), total only \$97,308 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the ECW pump, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$105,100 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$105,100 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the ESW pump would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.13.2 ESW Pump PP02B Events

Basic events for the unavailability of ESW pump PP02B are present in the At-Power internal events, At-Power internal flooding events, At-Power internal fire, LPSD internal

events, and LPSD internal flood cutset file FV importance analyses and include: 6a (Item 53), Table 6b (Item 29), Table 6c (Item 60), Table 6e (Item 67), and Table 7d (Item 63). A maximum of 2.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ESW pump PP02B unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$2,100. A maximum of 4.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ESW pump PP02B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$1,600. A maximum of 1.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ESW pump PP02B unavailability in the At-Power internal fire analysis, or approximately \$4,000. A maximum of 0.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ESW pump PP02B unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$140. A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ESW pump PP02B unavailability in the LPSD internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$40.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$46,190) and AOC (\$59,487), total only \$105,677 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the ESW pump, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$113,700 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$113,700 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the ESW pump would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.13.3 <u>ESW Filter Plugging Events</u>

Basic events for plugging of all ESW filters are present in the At-Power internal events, At-Power internal fire, and LPSD internal flood cutset file FV importance analysis and include: Table 6a (Item 48), Table 6c (Item 35), and Table 6e (Item 69). A maximum of 2.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ESW filter unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$2,400. A maximum of 2.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ESW filter unavailability in the At-Power internal fire analysis, or approximately \$7,000.

A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ESW filter unavailability in the LPSD internal flooding analysis, or approximately \$40.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$35,240) and AOC (\$45,073), total only \$80,313 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the ESW filters, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$89,800 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$89,800 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the ESW filters would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.13.4 ESW CT01A Events

Basic events for the unavailability of ESW Cooling Tower CT01A are present in the At-Power internal fire and LPSD internal events cutset file FV importance analysis and include: Table 7c (Item 15) and Table 7d (Item 27). A maximum of 0.3% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CT01A unavailability in the At-Power internal fire analysis, or approximately \$750. A maximum of 0.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CT01A unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$320.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$25,693) and AOC (\$31,492), total only \$57,185 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from CT01A, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$58,300 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$58,300 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved

performance of CT01A would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.13.5 ESW CT01B Events

Basic events for the unavailability of ESW Cooling Tower CT01B are present in the At-Power internal fire and LPSD internal events cutset file FV importance analysis and include: Table 7c (Item 15) and Table 7d (Item 27). A maximum of 0.3% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CT01B unavailability in the At-Power internal fire analysis, or approximately \$750. A maximum of 0.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CT01B unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$320.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$25,693) and AOC (\$31,492), total only \$57,185 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from CT01B, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$58,300 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$58,300 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of CT01B would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.13.6 ESW CT02A Events

Basic events for the unavailability of ESW Cooling Tower CT02A are present in the At-Power internal flooding, At-Power internal fire, and LPSD internal events cutset file FV importance analysis and include: Table 6b (Item 100), Table 7c (Item 15), and Table 7d (Item 27). A maximum of 0.6% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CT02A unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding analysis, or approximately \$230. A maximum of 0.3% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CT02A unavailability in the At-Power internal fire analysis, or approximately \$750. A maximum of 0.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CT02A unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$320.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$27,244) and AOC (\$33,484), total only \$60,728 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from CT02A, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$62,000 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$62,000 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of CT02A would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.13.7 ESW CT02B Events

Basic events for the unavailability of ESW Cooling Tower CT02B are present in the At-Power internal flooding, At-Power internal fire, LPSD internal events, and LPSD internal flooding cutset file FV importance analysis and include: Table 6b (Item 103), Table 6e (Items 30 and 53), Table 7c (Item 15), and Table 7d (Item 27). A maximum of 0.6% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CT02B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding analysis, or approximately \$230. A maximum of 0.3% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CT02B unavailability in the At-Power internal fire analysis, or approximately \$750. A maximum of 0.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CT02B unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$320. A maximum of 0.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of CT02B unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$320. A

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$31,190) and AOC (\$37,907), total only \$69,097 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from CT02B, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$70,600 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$70,600 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events

also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of CT02B would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.13.8 ESW HOV-074 Events

Basic events for the unavailability of ESW Hydraulic-operated valve HOV-074 are present in the LPSD internal flooding cutset file FV importance analysis and include: Table 6e (Item 76). A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of HOV-074 unavailability in the LPSD internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$40.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$3,946) and AOC (\$4,423), total only \$8,369 for LPSD flooding events. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from HOV-074, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$8,400 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$8,400 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of HOV-074 would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.13.9 <u>Total ESW Pump Events Summary</u>

Evaluating all both ESW pumps above together, the maximum reduction in AOE and AOSC costs possible by eliminating the effects of all ESW pump unavailability is approximately \$15,800. Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$46,190) and AOC (\$59,487), total only \$105,677. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the ESW pumps, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$121,500 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$121,500 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the ESW pumps would have a minimal effect of SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.13.10 <u>Total ESW Cooling Tower Events Summary</u>

Evaluating all four ESW cooling towers above together, the maximum reduction in AOE and AOSC costs possible by eliminating the effects of all ESW cooling tower unavailability is approximately \$5,000. Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$31,190) and AOC (\$37,907), total only \$69,097. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the ESW pumps, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$74,000 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$74,000 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the ESW cooling towers would have a minimal effect of SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.14 ECW Events

7.14.1 ECW Pump PP02A Events

Basic events for the unavailability of ECW pump PP02A are present in the At-Power internal events, At-Power internal flooding, and At-Power internal fire event cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Item 70), Table 6b (Item 44), Table 6c (Item 82), and Table 7c (Item 24). A maximum of 1.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW pump PP02A unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,100. A maximum of 2.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW pump PP02A unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$1,100. A maximum of 1.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW pump PP02A unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$1,000. A maximum of 1.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW pump PP02A unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$1,000. A maximum of 1.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW pump PP02A unavailability in the At-Power internal fire analysis, or approximately \$3,200.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$32,845) and AOC (\$42,642), total only \$75,487 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the ECW pump, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$80,800 would occur.
The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$80,800 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the ECW pump would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.14.2 <u>ECW Pump PP02B Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of ECW pump PP02B are present in the At-Power internal events, At-Power internal flooding, and At-Power internal fire, and LPSD internal flood event cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Item 76) Table 6b (Item 47), Table 6c (Item 92), Table 6e (Item 68), and Table 7c (Item 24). A maximum of 1.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW pump PP02B unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,300. A maximum of 2.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW pump PP02B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$880. A maximum of 1.0% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW pump PP02B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$880. A maximum of 1.0% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW pump PP02B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$880. A maximum of 1.0% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW pump PP02B unavailability in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$3,000. A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of ECW pump PP02B unavailability in the LPSD internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$40.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$36,791) and AOC (\$47,065), total only \$83,856 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences from the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the ECW pump, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$89,000 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$89,000 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the ECW pump would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.14.3 <u>Total ECW Pump Event Summary</u>

Evaluating all both ECW pumps above together, the maximum reduction in AOE and AOSC costs possible by eliminating the effects of all ECW pump unavailability is approximately \$10,400. Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$36,791) and AOC (\$47,065), total only \$83,856 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences from the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the ECW pumps, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$94,300 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$94,300 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the ECW pumps would have a minimal effect of SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.15 SCRAM Due To Mechanical Failure Events

The generic SAMDA items evaluated for the APR1400 design related to the ATWS system are listed in Table 5 and include items 130, 131, 132, and 136.

Basic events for SCRAM failure caused by mechanical failures are present in only the At-Power internal events cutset file FV importance analysis and include: Table 6a (Item 50). A maximum of 2.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the mechanical SCRAM failures in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$2,200.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$15,000) and AOC (\$21,580), total only \$36,580 for At-Power internal events. If all offsite consequences were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the mechanical failures that prevent a SCRAM, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$38,900 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$38,900 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved

performance of the ECW pump would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.16 <u>Control Software Events</u>

7.16.1 <u>PPS Loop Controller Application Software Events</u>

Basic events for the common cause failure of PPS loop controller application software are present in the At-Power internal events, At-Power internal flooding, At-Power internal fire event, and LPSD internal events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Item 41), Table 6b (Item 21), Table 6c (Item 12), and Table 6d (Item 21). A maximum of 2.9% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of loop controller application software failures in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$3,000. A maximum of 5.3% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of loop application controller software failures in the At-Power internal flooding events analysis, or approximately \$2,100. A maximum of 5.0% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of loop controller application software failures in the At-Power internal flood for and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of loop application controller software failures in the At-Power internal flood for and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of loop controller application software failures in the At-Power internal flood for approximately \$14,500. A maximum of 4.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of loop controller application software failures in the At-Power internal fire analysis, or approximately \$14,500. A maximum of 4.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of loop controller application software failures in the At-Power internal fire analysis, or approximately \$14,500. A maximum of 4.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of loop controller application software failures in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$8,300.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$42,244) and AOC (\$55,064), total only \$97,308 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from loop controller application software failures, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$125,300 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$125,300 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the loop controller application software would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.16.2 <u>PPS Group Controller Application Software Events</u>

Basic events for the common cause failure of PPS group controller application software are present in the At-Power internal events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Item 92). A maximum of 0.9% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of group controller application software failures in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$1,000.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$15,000) and AOC (\$21,580), total only \$36,580 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from group controller application software failures, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$37,500 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$37,500 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the group controller application software would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.16.3 <u>PPS Loop Controller Operating System Software Events</u>

Basic events for the common cause failure of PPS loop controller operating system software are present in the At-Power internal fire event and LPSD internal events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6c (Item 120) and Table 7d (Item 29). A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of loop controller operating system software failures in the At-Power internal fire analysis, or approximately \$1,400. A maximum of 0.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of loop controller operating system software failures in the At-Power internal fire analysis, or approximately \$1,400. A maximum of 0.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of loop controller operating system software failures in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$800.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$25,693) and AOC (\$31,492), total only \$57,185 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from loop controller operating system software failures, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$59,500 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$59,500 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the loop controller operating system software would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.17 <u>Main Steam Events</u>

The generic SAMDA items evaluated for the APR1400 design related to main steam are listed in Table 5 and include item 89.

7.17.1 Main Steam Atmospheric Dump Valve (V-102)

Basic events for the unavailability of MS ADV V-102 are present in the At-Power internal events and LPSD internal fire event cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 7a (Item 9) and Table 7f (Item 17). A maximum of 0.3% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of MS ADV V-102 unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$300. A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of MS ADV V-102 unavailability in the At-Power internal events is possible by eliminating the effect of MS ADV V-102 unavailability in the At-Power internal events is possible by eliminating the effect of MS ADV V-102 unavailability in the LPSD internal fire analysis, or approximately \$780.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$18,687) and AOC (\$26,026), total only \$44,713 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences from the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the ADV, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$45,800 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$45,800 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated.

7.17.2 <u>Main Steam Isolation Valves</u>

Basic events for the common cause failure of all MSIVs to close are present in the At-Power internal events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6a (Items112, 113, 114, and 115) and Table 7a (Items 5, 6, 7, 8, and 11). A maximum of 4.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of MSIVs in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$4,300.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$15,000) and AOC (\$21,580), total only \$36,580 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences from the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the MSIVs, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$40,900 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$40,900 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated.

7.17.3 <u>Main Steam Safety Valves</u>

Basic events for the common cause failure of all MSSVs to open are present in the At-Power internal events and At-Power internal flooding cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 7a (Item 3) and Table 7b (Item 2). A maximum of 0.4% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of MSSVs in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$430. A maximum of 0.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of MSSVs in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$430. A maximum of 0.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of MSSVs in the At-Power internal flooding analysis, or approximately \$60.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$16,551) and AOC (\$23,572), total only \$40,123 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences from the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the MSSVs, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$40,600 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$40,600 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the MSSVs to open would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.18 <u>TGBCCW Events</u>

7.18.1 <u>TGBCCW Pump Train 2 Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of TGB CCW pump PP02 are present in the At-Power internal fire event cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6c (Item 105).

A maximum of 0.7% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of TGBCW pump PP02 unavailability in the At-Power internal fire analysis, or approximately \$1,900.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$16,294) and AOC (\$19,070), total only \$35,364 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the TGBCCW pump, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$37,300 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$37,300 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the TGBCW pump would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.19 Shutdown Cooling System (SDC) Events

7.19.1 <u>SDC Pump PP01A Events</u>

Basic events for the unavailability of SDC PP01A are present in the At-Power and LPSD internal events cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6d (Item 72), Table 7a (Item 10), and Table 7d (Items 28, 30, and 37). A maximum of 0.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of SDC PP01A unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$240. A maximum of 1.0% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of SDC PP01A unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$240. A maximum of 1.0% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of SDC PP01A unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$2,100.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$24,399) and AOC (\$34,002), total only \$58,401 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the SDC pump, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$60,700 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$60,700 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events

also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the SDC pumps would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.19.2 SDC Pump PP01B Events

Basic events for the unavailability of SDC PP01B are present in the At-Power internal events, LPSD internal events, and LPSD internal flooding cutset file FV importance analyses and include: Table 6d (Item 72), Table 6e (Item 65), Table 7a (Item 10), and Table 7d (Items 28, 30, and 37). A maximum of 0.2% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of SDC PP01B unavailability in the At-Power internal events analysis, or approximately \$240. A maximum of 1.1% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of SDC PP01B unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$2,200. A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of SDC PP01B unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$2,200. A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of SDC PP01B unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$2,200. A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of SDC PP01B unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$2,200. A maximum of 0.5% reduction in AOE and AOSC costs is possible by eliminating the effect of SDC PP01B unavailability in the LPSD internal events analysis, or approximately \$2,200.

Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$28,345) and AOC (\$38,425), total only \$66,770 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences for the affected hazards were abated by eliminating any risk contribution from the SDC pump, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$69,300 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$69,300 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the SDC pumps would have a negligible effect on reducing risk from SGTR and ISLOCA events.

7.19.3 <u>Total SDC Pump Event Summary</u>

Evaluating all both SDC pumps above together, the maximum reduction in AOE and AOSC costs possible by eliminating the effects of all SDC pump unavailability is approximately \$4,800. Although the benefit of the change to offsite risks is not calculated explicitly, these costs, APE (\$28,345) and AOC (\$38,425), total only \$66,770 for the affected hazards. If all offsite consequences from the affected hazards were abated by

eliminating any risk contribution from the ECW pumps, then an estimated maximum total benefit of approximately \$71,600 would occur.

The total maximum benefit would be much lower than \$71,600 because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. As can be seen from Tables 3a through 3f, the majority of APE is caused by SGTR and ISLOCA events. SGTR and ISLOCA events also cause the majority of AOC, as shown in Tables 4a through 4f. Improved performance of the SDC pumps would have a minimal effect of SGTR and ISLOCA events.

8 <u>SAMDA COST EVALUATION</u>

For each of the potential SAMDAs discussed in Section 7, an estimate of the minimum costs associated with implementation was made. These cost estimates were based on publicly available information related to nuclear power plant design. Detailed cost estimates are not performed for SAMDA items that show only a small potential benefit. Rather, once the cost estimates show that a change would exceed the calculated benefit, the evaluations were stopped. Therefore, the costs below may underestimate, greatly, the actual costs of implementing the related modification.

8.1 <u>Emergency Diesel Generator Events</u>

The contribution to risk from diesel generator unavailability is related either to station blackout (SBO) scenarios or from the inability to cross-tie containment cooling systems between trains. Much of the risk from these scenarios could be reduced if an alternate means was available to supply power to 480 VAC buses.

As shown in the Palo Verde SAMA analysis (Reference 10), the cost of implementing a 480V portable generator for SBO scenarios would be \$1,832,954. Assuming that engineering and procedure updates make up 50% of the cost, such a change would cost at least \$900,000.

8.2 <u>AAC CTG Events</u>

The costs identified estimated the SAMDAs related to the EDGs in Section 8.1 would apply to SAMDA items for the AAC CTG. Therefore, the minimum costs to eliminate risk from the CTG would be at least \$900,000.

8.3 <u>Auxiliary Feedwater Events</u>

SAMDA items for the AFW system relate to two types of improvements, isolation valves and pumps. Each of these two types is described below.

8.3.1 <u>AFW Isolation Valve Events</u>

The AFW isolation valves are needed for level control when their associated modulating valves become unavailable. The dominant scenarios where this occurs are SBO scenarios where offsite power is not recovered and batteries deplete. Provision of a long-term

power supply for the AFW modulating valves would obviate the need for the AFW isolation valves to cycle for level control.

Operation of an AFW modulating valve requires power for the control signal as well as power for valve operation. Both the control signal as well as the valve operator rely on the same DC power supply. Therefore, provision of the ability to supply DC power to the train supporting each TDAFPs would eliminate the need for the isolation valves to cycle. The Vermont Yankee SAMA analysis (Reference 11) estimated the cost for implementing a portable 125V DC generator would be \$712,000. Assuming engineering and procedure updates make up 50% of the cost, such a change would cost at least \$350,000. Estimates for providing redundant valves provide even higher costs.

8.3.2 AFW Pump Events

Mitigation of AFW pump failure requires that an additional means of steam generator makeup, other than the startup feedwater pump and the four AFW pumps. Feed and bleed cooling is already credited in the PRA so elimination of the risk from AFW pump failure would require either an additional diverse heat removal method or an additional AFW pump.

The Millstone SAMA analysis (Reference 12) estimates the cost of implementing an additional AFW pump to be \$12M - \$16M. Assuming engineering and procedure updates make up 50% of the cost, such a change would cost at least \$6,000,000.

8.4 <u>Fire Barrier Failure Events</u>

The PRA results show failure of fire barriers contributing to risk. The barriers of concern are all three-hour rated fire barriers. Therefore, any change to compensate for failure of these barriers would require an additional, diverse method of preventing fires from spreading between the fire areas.

One method of reducing the potential for fires spreading between two areas is to provide an additional active fire detection and suppression system for barriers between zones. For example, a water curtain or deluge system which would spray the area of failed barriers could reduce the potential for inter-area fire propagation.

Brunswick SAMA number 32 (Reference 13) specifically estimated the cost of adding additional automatic fire suppression systems. The estimated cost of implementation is

\$750,000. Assuming engineering and procedure updates make up 50% of the cost, such a change would cost at least \$350,000.

8.5 <u>CCW Events</u>

SAMDA items for the CCW system relate to two types of improvements, pumps and containment spray heat exchanger isolation valves. Each of these two types is described below.

8.5.1 <u>CCW Pump Events</u>

Mitigation of CCW pump failure requires that an additional means of providing flow through the CCW system. For this item, the simplest means of implementation would be to be to provide an additional CCW pump that could be aligned to either division of CCW thereby using much of the existing piping. For this item, only the costs of the additional pump and driver are estimated. Costs for the switchgear, circuit breakers, and any valves need to operate the pump are neglected.

The Callaway SAMA analysis (Reference 14) estimates the cost of adding an additional CCW pump to cost \$1,000,000. Assuming engineering and procedure updates make up 50% of the cost, such a change would cost at least \$500,000.

8.5.2 <u>CS Heat Exchanger Isolation Valves</u>

Isolation valves for CCW flow through the containment spray heat exchangers must open to provide long-term containment heat removal. For these scenarios, several hours would be available from the time that the need for containment heat removal has been identified until containment failure would be expected. During this time, manual actions to compensate for failure of the valves could take place.

Addition of a manual valve to provide a bypass around each of the two containment spray heat exchanger CCW isolation valves would allow operator action to compensate for failure of the motor-operated isolation valves to open.

Brunswick SAMA 27 (Reference 13) estimates the cost of a service water cross-tie modification to be \$100,000. This modification would involve similar piping and valve installation as required for the CCW heat exchanger valves. Assuming engineering and procedure updates make up 50% of the cost, such a change would cost at least \$50,000.

8.6 <u>Containment Spray Events</u>

SAMDA items for the containment spray system relate to three types of improvements, pumps, containment spray header isolation valves, and containment spray heat exchangers. Each of these three types is described below.

8.6.1 <u>Containment Spray Pump Events</u>

Mitigation of containment spray pump failure requires that an additional means of providing flow through the containment spray system. The APR1400 PRA model credits the shutdown cooling pumps as a means of providing containment spray flow. Therefore, an additional means of providing containment spray flow must be provided. For this item, the simplest means of implementation would be to be to provide an additional containment spray pump that could be aligned to either division of thereby using much of the existing piping.

The Callaway SAMA analysis (Reference 14) estimated the cost for implementing a redundant containment spray system as \$2,000,000. Assuming engineering and procedure updates make up 50% of the cost, such a change would cost at least \$1,000,000.

8.6.2 <u>Containment Spray Header Isolation Valves</u>

Containment spray header isolation valves must open to allow flow through the containment spray nozzles in order to provide long-term containment heat removal. For these scenarios, several hours would be available from the time that the need for containment heat removal has been identified until containment failure would be expected. During this time, manual actions to compensate for failure of the valves could take place.

Addition of a manual value to provide a bypass around each of the two containment spray header isolation values would allow operator action to compensate for failure of the motor-operated isolation values.

Brunswick SAMA 27 (Reference 13) estimated the cost of a service water cross-tie modification to be \$100,000. This modification would involve similar piping and valve installation as required for the CS bypass valves but would provide for only one valve, not two as would be needed to fully implement the SAMDA on each of the two CS headers. Assuming engineering and procedure updates make up 50% of the cost, such a change would cost at least \$50,000.

8.6.3 <u>Containment Spray Heat Exchangers</u>

Containment spray heat exchangers are used to provide for long-term containment heat removal. For these scenarios, several hours would be available from the time that the need for containment heat removal has been identified until containment failure would be expected. During this time, manual actions to compensate for failure of the heat exchangers could take place. The APR1400 PRA model credits the shutdown cooling system as a means of heat removal. Therefore, an additional means of providing containment spray heat removal flow must be provided. For this item, the simplest means of implementation would be to be to provide an additional containment spray heat exchanger that could be aligned to either division of thereby using much of the existing piping.

The Callaway SAMA analysis (Reference 14) estimated the cost for implementing a redundant containment spray system as \$2,000,000. Assuming engineering and procedure updates make up 50% of the cost, such a change would cost at least \$1,000,000.

8.7 <u>125 VDC Power Events</u>

Availability of the station batteries is needed to actuate equipment and maintain instrumentation when normal AC power is lost. For the APR1400 PRA, the leading cause of battery failure is maintenance unavailability. Having a maintenance battery that could be aligned to any one of the four DC trains during battery maintenance would eliminate this contribution to core damage.

As shown in the Fitzpatrick SAMA analysis (Reference 15), the cost of providing additional DC battery capacity is estimated to be \$500,000. Assuming engineering and procedure updates make up 50% of the cost, such a change would cost at least \$250,000.

8.8 <u>120 VAC Power Events</u>

The contribution to risk from the 120 VAC inverters is caused by test and maintenance unavailability of the inverters. Two ways of eliminating the maintenance unavailability were investigated. The first is to provide a separate 120 VAC regulating transformer that would bypass the existing inverters when powering the 120 VAC bus. This alternative would provide continuous power for scenarios where offsite power remains available but is lost but the EDGs repower the emergency AC buses. Power would be lost for station blackout scenarios. The second method is to provide a spare inverter that would replace

the out of service inverter through temporary connections. The spare inverter would be moved to the affected bus and connected as needed. This alternative would, ensure that 120 VAC power is available for all scenarios until station 125 VDC batteries are depleted.

Fitzpatrick SAMA analysis (Reference 15), estimated the cost of DC bus cross-ties to be \$300,000. Connections similar to those for bus cross-ties would be needed to allow for connection of a spare inverter. The cost of spare inverter is not included in the above costs so the cost of implementation is expected to be much greater.

8.9 <u>AC Power Events</u>

SAMDA items for the AC power system relate to two types of improvements, station auxiliary transformers (SATs) and operation of 4kVAC circuit breakers. Each of these two types is described below.

8.9.1 SAT Events

The contribution to risk from the SATs is caused by test and maintenance unavailability of the transformers. To compensate for that unavailability, a redundant means of providing AC power would be required. Addition of a transformer large enough to supply required loads along with the associated buses and breakers would be expected to cost several million dollars. Even neglecting engineering costs, such a plant change is estimated to cost at least \$3,000,000.

8.9.2 <u>4.16KV Circuit Breaker Events</u>

The contribution of circuit breaker failure to risk involves failure of power supply breakers to close when needed and load shed circuit breakers to open when required. To compensate for failure of circuit breakers to open when needed requires that the cause of the fault be cleared and that the load be stripped by some other means. Because such failures must be cleared quickly, it is considered impractical that any changes could be made to compensate for such failures.

Failure of power supply breaker to close could be mitigated by providing an inter-bus cross-tie which would allow one bus on a division to supply power to the other bus on that division. Implementation of this alternative would require an additional breaker on each of the two buses on each division.

The Susquehanna SAMA (Reference 16) estimated the cost of 4kV bus cross-ties to be \$656,000. Assuming engineering and procedure updates make up 50% of the cost, such a change would cost at least \$328,000.

8.10 <u>POSRV Events</u>

Failure to depressurize the RCS when needed contributes to risk by causing failure of feed and bleed cooling. Addition of one more POSRV would provide additional relief capacity thereby minimizing the impact of any single POSRV failure.

The Callaway SAMA analysis (Reference 14) estimated the cost for adding a new PORV at \$500,000. Assuming engineering and procedure updates make up 50% of the cost, such a change would cost at least \$250,000.

8.11 <u>Chiller/Cooler Events</u>

Failure to provide cooling to the pump rooms and emergency diesel rooms can result in failure of the components due to high temperatures. Addition of a redundant train of ventilation could prevent failure of a single chiller or room cooler from resulting in failure of the affected equipment pumps or diesel generator.

As shown in the Vermont Yankee SAMA (Reference 11), the estimated cost to implement a redundant train or means of ventilation is \$2,202,725. Assuming engineering and procedure updates make up 50% of the cost, such a change would cost at least \$1,100,000.

8.12 Safety Injection System Events

SAMDA items for the safety injection system relate to three types of improvements, pumps, IRWST strainers, and a manual recirculation valve. Each of these three types is described below.

8.12.1 <u>Safety Injection Pump Events</u>

Mitigation of safety injection pump failures requires an additional means of providing flow through the safety injection system. The simplest method of implementation would be to add an additional safety injection pump that could be aligned to either division of safety injection using the existing piping and valves.

The Callaway SAMA analysis (Reference 14) estimated the cost of replacing two safety injection pumps to be greater than \$1,000,000. The cost for a single pump would be greater than \$500,000. Assuming engineering and procedure updates make up 50% of the cost, such a change would cost at least \$500,000.

8.12.2 IRWST Strainer

Recent initiatives to improve reliability of ECCS strainers have been implemented throughout the US nuclear industry. These changes have cost several million dollars per plant. Costs to improve the IRWST strainer performance for the APR1400 would be similar in cost to these projects. Therefore, the cost to improve performance of IRWST strainers is taken to be at least \$1,000,000

8.12.3 <u>Safety Injection Recirculation Valve</u>

Failure of a single manual valve could cause minimum flow recirculation to fail for two pumps on a division. Addition of a separate flow path for each pump would prevent such failures. To implement this option, two additional manual valves and lines would be needed.

Brunswick SAMA 27 (Reference 13) estimates the cost of a service water cross-tie modification to be \$100,000. This modification would involve one valve and minimal piping. Assuming engineering and procedure updates make up 50% of the cost, such a change would cost at least \$50,000 for a single valve or \$100,000 for two valves and lines.

8.13 <u>ESW Events</u>

SAMDA items for the ESW system relate to three types of improvements, pumps, cooling towers, and return valve. Each of these three types is described below.

8.13.1 <u>ESW Filter Events</u>

Mitigation of common cause failure of ESW filters failure requires that an additional means of providing flow through the ESW system if the in-service filters plug. For this item, the simplest means of implementation would be to be to provide an additional ESW filter that could be aligned to either division of ESW given plugging of the in-service filters. Because the filter would need to be placed in-serice rapidly, remotely-operated valves would be required. For this item, only the costs of the additional pump and driver are

estimated. Costs for the switchgear, circuit breakers, and any valves need to operate the pump are neglected.

Brunswick SAMA 27 (Reference 13) estimated the cost of a service water cross-tie modification to be \$100,000. This modification would involve one valve and minimal piping. Providing an additional filter would be more complex. However, costs of \$100,000 are used as the minimum potential implementation costs.

8.13.2 <u>ESW Pump Events</u>

Mitigation of ESW pump failure requires that an additional means of providing flow through the ESW system. For this item, the simplest means of implementation would be to be to provide an additional ESW pump that could be aligned to either division of ESW thereby using much of the existing piping. For this item, only the costs of the additional pump and driver are estimated. Costs for the switchgear, circuit breakers, and any valves need to operate the pump are neglected.

The Callaway SAMA analysis (Reference 14) estimated the cost of adding an additional service water pump to be \$5,000,000. Assuming engineering and procedure updates make up 50% of the cost, addition of a spare ESW pump would cost at least \$2,500,000.

8.13.3 ESW Cooling Towers

Addition of a redundant cooling tower would require additional valves, piping and a cooling tower structure. Two remotely operated valves are estimated to cost at least \$100,000. This cost alone exceeds the potential benefit estimated previously. Therefore, neglecting thee tower structure, piping, and instrumentation, addition of a redundant ESW cooling tower would cost at least \$100,000.

8.13.4 ESW Cooling Tower Return Valve

ESW flow to the standby cooling tower requires that an automatic valve open to allow flow to the tower. For these scenarios, several hours would be available from the time that the need for flow has been identified until heat removal is needed. During this time, manual actions to compensate for failure of the valves could take place.

Addition of a manual valve to provide a bypass around each of the four automatic return valves would allow operator action to compensate for failure of the motor-operated isolation valves.

Brunswick SAMA 27 (Reference 13) estimated the cost of a service water cross-tie modification to be \$100,000. This modification would involve similar piping and valve installation as required for the ESW bypass valves but would provide for only one valve, not four as would be needed to fully implement the SAMDA on each of the four cooling towers. Assuming engineering and procedure updates make up 50% of the cost, such a change would cost at least \$50,000 for each of the four towers.

8.14 <u>ECW Pumps</u>

Mitigation of ECW pump failure requires that an additional means of providing flow through the ECW system. For this item, the simplest means of implementation would be to be to provide an additional ECW pump that could be aligned to either division of ECW thereby using much of the existing piping. For this item, only the costs of the additional pump and driver are estimated. Costs for the switchgear, circuit breakers, and any valves need to operate the pump are neglected.

The Callaway SAMA analysis (Reference 14) estimates the cost of adding an additional CCW pump to cost \$1,000,000. Assuming engineering and procedure updates make up 50% of the cost, such a change would cost at least \$500,000. While a CCW pump is much larger than would be required for an ECW pump, the costs for CCW provide insight into the costs of an ECW pump. Assuming that an ECW pump costs half of a CCW pump, the costs of a spare ECW pump would be about \$250,000 neglecting costs for circuit breakers, controls, piping and valves.

8.15 <u>SCRAM Due To Mechanical Failure Events</u>

The benefit for eliminating mechanical scram failures is calculated to be only Basic events for SCRAM failure caused by mechanical failures are present in only \$38,900. It is considered incredible that any change could be made to the reactor core and associated structures for less than that amount. Therefore, no specific cost estimates are performed.

8.16 <u>Control Software Events</u>

Mitigation of control software failures would require addition of a redundant and diverse control system for key plant equipment in addition to the three methods in the current design. Providing an additional diverse and redundant control system is estimated to cost at least \$1,000,000 when considering the additional circuits, panels, and displays needed.

8.17 <u>Main Steam Events</u>

SAMDA items for the main steam system relate to three types of improvements, ADVs, MSIVs, and MSSVs. Each of these three types is described below.

8.17.1 <u>ADVs</u>

Mitigation of ADV failure requires that an additional means of removing steam from a steam generator be provided. Removal of steam requires that the valve allow cooling to atmospheric pressure. For this item, the simplest means of implementation would be to be to provide an additional ADV for each steam generator.

The Callaway SAMA analysis (Reference 14) estimated the cost for adding a new PORV to be \$500,000. Such a valve would be similar in design and function to an ADV. Assuming engineering and procedure updates make up 50% of the cost, such a change would cost at least \$250,000.

8.17.2 <u>MSIVs</u>

Elimination of common cause failure of MSIVs to close would require an additional means to isolate the main steam lines. Considering the minimum costs above for a simple manual valve on the service water system, \$50,000, costs of four valves would be \$200,000. Valves that could function at main steam pressures would cost substantially more.

8.17.3 <u>MSSVs</u>

Mitigation of the common cause MSSV failure to open failure requires that a diverse means of relieving steam be provided.

The Callaway SAMA analysis (Reference 14) estimated the cost for adding a new PORV to be \$500,000. Such a valve would be similar in design and function to an ADV. Assuming engineering and procedure updates make up 50% of the cost, such a change would cost at least \$250,000.

8.18 <u>TGBCCW Pump</u>

The cost of a TGBCCW pump would be similar to the cost for an ECW pump estimated in Section 8.13 or \$250,000.

8.19 Shutdown Cooling System Pumps

Mitigation of SDC pump failure requires that an additional means of providing flow through the SDC spray system. The APR1400 PRA model credits the containment spray pumps as a means of providing SDC flow. Therefore, an additional means of providing SDC flow must be provided. For this item, the simplest means of implementation would be to be to provide an additional SDC pump that could be aligned to either division of thereby using much of the existing piping.

The Callaway SAMA analysis (Reference 14) estimated the cost for implementing a redundant containment spray system as \$2,000,000. Such a change would be similar in scope to providing a redundant SDC pump and, therefore, the costs are considered representative. Assuming engineering and procedure updates make up 50% of the cost, such a change would cost at least \$1,000,000.

9 <u>SAMDA COST-BENEFIT EVALUATION</u>

For each of the potential SAMDAs discussed in Section 7, a cost-benefit evaluation is performed. Equation 1 of Section 4.0 defines the present worth of averted public risk by implementing a plant enhancement as:

NPV = (APE + AOC + AOE + AOSC) - COE.

Total averted costs (TAC) are represented by the expression:

TAC = (APE + AOC + AOE + AOSC).

Each of the terms is defined in Sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 respectively.

For each of the potential SAMDAs evaluated, total averted costs are developed and documented in Section 7. Cost estimates that can be used to screen each of the potential SAMDAs were developed and documented in Section 8. Using those values a cost-benefit analysis is performed for each of the potential SAMDAs.

An enhancement is considered beneficial if the present worth is positive.

9.1 Emergency Diesel Generator Events

As quantified in Section 7.1.5 and 7.1.6, the total benefit of eliminating any EDG-related failures was \$295,000. From Section 8.1, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$900,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$295,000 - \$900,000. NPV = (-)\$605,000.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.2 <u>AAC Combustion Turbine Generator Events</u>

As quantified in Section 7.2, the total benefit of eliminating any AAC CTG-related failures was \$125,600. As discussed in Section 8.2, the costs for SAMDA items related to the AAC CTG would be similar to those for the EDG presented above. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$125,600 - \$900,000. NPV = (-)\$774,400.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.3 <u>Auxiliary Feedwater Events</u>

9.3.1 <u>AFW Isolation Valve Events</u>

As quantified in Section 7.3.8, the total benefit of eliminating any AFW isolation valverelated failures was \$158,900. From Section 8.3.1, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$350,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$158,900 - \$350,000. NPV = (-)\$191,100.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.3.2 <u>AFW Pumps</u>

As quantified in Section 7.3.9 and 7.3.10, the total benefit of eliminating any AFW pumprelated failures was \$166,800. From Section 8.3.2, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$6,000,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$166,800 - \$6,000,000.NPV = (-)\$5,833,200.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.3.3 <u>Startup FW Pump PP07 Events</u>

As quantified in Section 7.3.7, the total benefit of eliminating any startup FW pump-related failures was \$37,900. From Section 8.3.2, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$6,000,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$37,900 - \$6,000,000.NPV = (-)\$5,962,100.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.4 <u>Fire Barrier Failure Events</u>

As quantified in Section 7.4.1, the total benefit of eliminating any fire barrier-related failures was \$58,000. From Section 8.4, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$350,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$58,000 - \$350,000.NPV = (-)\$292,000.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.5 <u>Component Cooling Water (CCW) Events</u>

9.5.1 DG001A CCW Inlet Valve MOV-191

As quantified in Section 7.5.5, the total benefit of eliminating any DG inlet valve-related failure was \$8,500. Costs to implement an improvement for this item would be similar or more than calculated in Section 8.5.2 or a minimum of \$50,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$8,500 - \$50,000.NPV = (-)\$41,500.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.5.2 <u>CCW Pumps</u>

As quantified in Section 7.5.6, the total benefit of eliminating any CCW pump-related failure was \$87,500. From Section 8.5.1, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$500,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$87,500 - \$500,000.NPV = (-)\$412,500.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.5.3 <u>CS Heat Exchanger Isolation Valves</u>

As quantified in Section 7.5.7, the total benefit of eliminating any CS heat exchanger CCW isolation valve-related failure was \$40,500. From Section 8.5.2, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$50,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$40,500 - \$50,000. NPV = (-)\$9,500.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.6 <u>Containment Spray (CS) Events</u>

9.6.1 <u>Containment Spray Pumps</u>

As quantified in Section 7.6.7, the total benefit of eliminating any CS pump-related failure was \$68,900. From Section 8.6.1, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$1,000,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$68,900 - \$1,000,000. NPV = (-)\$931,100.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.6.2 <u>Total Containment Spray Isolation Valve Event Summary</u>

As quantified in Section 7.6.8, the total benefit of eliminating any CS header isolation valve-related failure was \$38,300. From Section 8.6.2, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$50,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$38,300 - \$50,000. NPV = (-)\$11,700.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.6.3 <u>Containment Spray Heat Exchangers</u>

As quantified in Section 7.6.9, the total benefit of eliminating any CS pump-related failure was \$39,300. From Section 8.6.3, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$1,000,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$39,300 - \$1,000,000. NPV = (-)\$960,700.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.7 <u>125 VDC Power Events</u>

As quantified in Section 7.7.5, the total benefit of eliminating any battery-related failure was \$101,200. From Section 8.7, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$250,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$101,200 - \$250,000. NPV = (-)\$148,800.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.8 <u>120 VAC Power Events</u>

As quantified in Section 7.8.5, the total benefit of eliminating any 120 VAC inverter-related failure was \$106,900. From Section 8.8, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$300,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$106,900 - \$300,000. NPV = (-)\$193,100.

9.9 <u>AC Power Events</u>

9.9.1 <u>SAT Transformers</u>

As quantified in Section 7.9.10, the total benefit of eliminating any SAT-related failure was \$55,000. From Section 8.9.1, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$3,000,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$55,000 - \$3,000,000.NPV = (-)\$2,945,000.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.9.2 <u>4.16KV Circuit Breakers</u>

As quantified in Section 7.9.11, the total benefit of eliminating any 4kV breaker-related failure was \$187,500. From Section 8.9.2, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$328,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$187,500 - \$328,000. NPV = (-)\$140,500.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.10 <u>POSRVs</u>

As quantified in Section 7.10.5, the total benefit of eliminating any POSRV-related failure was \$68,100. From Section 8.9.2, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$328,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$68.100 - \$250,000.NPV = (-)\$181,900.

9.11 <u>Chiller/Cooler Events</u>

9.11.1 <u>ECW Chiller Summary</u>

As quantified in Section 7.11.16, the total benefit of eliminating any chiller-related failure was \$201,600. From Section 8.11, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$1,100,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$201,600 - \$1,100,000. NPV = (-)\$898,400.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.11.2 EDG Room Cubical Coolers

As quantified in Section 7.11.17, the total benefit of eliminating any chiller-related failure was \$110,700. From Section 8.11, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$1,100,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$110,700 - \$1,100,000. NPV = (-)\$989,300.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.11.3 Motor Driven AFW Pump Room Cubical Coolers

As quantified in Section 7.11.18, the total benefit of eliminating any chiller-related failure was \$114,500. From Section 8.11, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$1,100,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$114,500 - \$1,100,000. NPV = (-)\$985,500.

9.11.4 <u>Air Handling Units</u>

As quantified in Section 7.11.19, the total benefit of eliminating any air handling unitrelated failure was \$35,100. From Section 8.11, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$1,100,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$35,100 - \$1,100,000. NPV = (-)\$1,064,900.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.12 Safety Injection (SI) Events

9.12.1 SI Pumps PP02D Events

As quantified in Section 7.12.5, the total benefit of eliminating any SI pump-related failure was \$87,100. From Section 8.12.1, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$500,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$87,100 - \$500,000. NPV = (-)\$412,900.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.12.2 IRWST Strainer Events

As quantified in Section 7.12.6, the total benefit of eliminating any IRWST strainer-related failure was \$72,800. From Section 8.12.2, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$1,000,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$72,800 - \$1,000,000. NPV = (-)\$927,200.

9.12.3 <u>SI Valve V-959 Events</u>

As quantified in Section 7.12.7, the total benefit of eliminating any SI pump recirculation valve-related failure was \$38,700. From Section 8.12.3, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$50,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$38,700 - \$50,000. NPV = (-)\$11,300.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.13 <u>ESW Events</u>

The generic SAMDA items evaluated for the APR1400 design related to the ESW system are listed in Table 5 and include items 42 and 47.

9.13.1 <u>ESW Filter Plugging Events</u>

As quantified in Section 7.13.3, the total benefit of eliminating any ESW filter pluggingrelated failure was \$89,800. From Section 8.13.1, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$100,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$89,800 - \$100,000. NPV = (-)\$10,200.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.13.2 <u>ESW HOV-074</u>

As quantified in Section 7.13.8, the total benefit of eliminating any ESW return valverelated failure was \$8,400. From Section 8.13.4, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$200,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$8,400 - \$200,000.NPV = (-)\$191,600.

9.13.3 <u>ESW Pumps</u>

As quantified in Section 7.13.9, the total benefit of eliminating any ESW pump-related failure was \$121,500. From Section 8.13.2, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$2,500,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$121,500 - \$2,500,000. NPV = (-)\$2,378,500.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.13.4 <u>Total ESW Cooling Tower Events Summary</u>

As quantified in Section 7.13.10, the total benefit of eliminating any ESW cooling towerrelated failure was \$74,000. From Section 8.13.3, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$100,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$74,000 - \$100,000.NPV = (-)\$26,000.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.14 <u>ECW Pumps</u>

As quantified in Section 7.14.3, the total benefit of eliminating any ECW pump-related failure was \$94,300. From Section 8.14, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$250,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$94,300 - \$250,000.NPV = (-)\$155,700.

9.15 SCRAM Due To Mechanical Failure

As discussed in Section 8.15, the costs to improve the mechanical scram system are considered much greater than the potential benefit and no specific costs are estimated. However, improvements are considered to show a negative cost-benefit.

9.16 <u>Control Software</u>

9.16.1 <u>PPS Loop Controller Application Software</u>

As quantified in Section 7.16.1, the total benefit of eliminating any loop controller application software-related failure was \$125,300. From Section 8.16, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$1,000,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$125,300 - \$1,000,000. NPV = (-)\$874,700.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.16.2 <u>PPS Group Controller Application Software</u>

As quantified in Section 7.16.2, the total benefit of eliminating any group controller application software-related failure was \$37,500. From Section 8.16, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$1,000,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$37,500 - \$1,000,000.NPV = (-)\$962,500.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.16.3 <u>PPS Loop Controller Operating System Software</u>

As quantified in Section 7.16.3, the total benefit of eliminating any PPS loop controller application software-related failure was \$59,500. From Section 8.16, implementation of

this alternative would cost a minimum of \$1,000,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$59,500 - \$1,000,000. NPV = (-)\$940,500.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.17 <u>Main Steam Events</u>

9.17.1 Main Steam Atmospheric Dump Valve (V-102)

As quantified in Section 7.17.1, the total benefit of eliminating any MS ADV-related failure was \$45,800. From Section 8.17.1, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$250,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$48,500 - \$250,000. NPV = (-)\$201,500.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.17.2 <u>Main Steam Isolation Valves</u>

As quantified in Section 7.17.2, the total benefit of eliminating any MSIV-related failure was \$40,900. From Section 8.17.2, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$200,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$40,900 - \$200,000. NPV = (-)\$159,100.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.17.3 <u>Main Steam Safety Valves</u>

As quantified in Section 7.17.3, the total benefit of eliminating any MSSV-related failure was \$40,600. From Section 8.17.3, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$250,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$40,600 - \$250,000. NPV = (-)\$209,400.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.18 <u>TGBCCW Events</u>

9.18.1 <u>TGBCCW Pump Train 2 Events</u>

As quantified in Section 7.18, the total benefit of eliminating any TGBCCW pump-related failure was \$37,300. From Section 8.18, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$250,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$37,300 - \$250,000. NPV = (-)\$212,700.

Since the present worth is negative, implementation of a SAMDA for this item would not be cost beneficial.

9.19 Shutdown Cooling System (SDC) Events

9.19.1 <u>SDC Pumps</u>

As quantified in Section 7.19.3, the total benefit of eliminating any SDC pump-related failure was \$71,600. From Section 8.19, implementation of this alternative would cost a minimum of \$1,000,000. Therefore, the present worth can be calculated as:

NPV = \$71,600 - \$1,000,000.NPV = (-)\$928,400.

10 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS (THREE-PERCENT DISCOUNT RATE)

The parameters that influence the cost-benefit analyses of the SAMDA evaluations were examined to determine if a change in value for one of the parameters would change the conclusions of the evaluation. Equations for each of the four types of averted costs contain a term for the real discount rate and evaluation period (see Sections 4.1 to 4.4) where each contain a term for the real discount rate and evaluation period. Therefore, a change in either of those terms would have a direct impact on the averted costs calculated.

NEI 05-01 (Reference 1) recommends using a 7 percent discount rate for cost-benefit analyses and suggests that a 3 percent discount rate should be used for sensitivity analyses on the maximum benefit and the unscreened SAMDAs to indicate the sensitivity of the results to the choice of discount rate. This sensitivity case is discussed below.

The methodology of Reference 1 determines the present worth net value of public risk according to the following formula:

$$NPV = (APE + AOC + AOE + AOSC) - COE$$
(14)

Where

NPV =	present value of current risk (\$),
APE =	present value of averted public exposure (\$),
AOC =	present value of averted offsite property damage costs (\$),
AOE =	present value of averted occupational exposure (\$),
AOSC	= present value of averted onsite costs (\$),
COE =	cost of any enhancement implemented to reduce risk (\$).

The derivation of each of these costs is described in the subsections below. All equations used in the subsections below are taken from Reference 2 which is the basis for the equations given in Reference 1.

The following specific values were used for various terms in the analyses:

Present Worth

The present worth was determined by:

$$PW = [1 - e^{(-rt)}]/r$$
(15)

Where,

r is the discount rate = 3% per year (assumed throughout these analyses) t is the years remaining until end of plant life = 60 years PW is the present worth of a string of annual payments of one dollar = \$27.823

Dollars per REM

The conversion factor used for assigning a monetary value to on-site and off-site exposures was \$2,000/person-rem averted. This is consistent with the NRC's regulatory analysis guidelines presented in and used throughout Reference 1.

10.1 <u>Averted Public Exposure (APE)</u>

Expected offsite doses from the internal events PRA accident sequences are presented in Tables 2a through 2f. Costs associated with these doses were calculated using the following equation:

$$APE = (F_S D_{PS} - F_A D_{PA}) \times R \times [1 - e^{(-rt_f)}]/r$$
(16)

Where

APE	=	present value of averted public exposure (\$),
R	=	monetary equivalent of unit dose, (\$2000/person-rem),
Fs	=	baseline accident frequency
		(events per year from Tables 3a through 3f),
FA	=	accident frequency after mitigation (0 events per year),
F _S D _{PS}	=	baseline accident offsite frequency
		(person-rem per year from Tables 3a through 3f),
F _A D _{PA}	=	accident offsite dose frequency after mitigation
		(0 person-rem per year),
r	=	real discount rate (3% per year),
t _f	=	years remaining until end of plant life (60 years).

Using the values given above, APE is calculated for At-Power internal events, internal flooding events, and fires, along with LPSD internal events, internal flooding events, and fires events. Each of these calculations is detailed below.
APE_(IE) =
$$(5.33 \times 10^{-1} \text{ person-rem per year} - 0) \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times ((1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year}))$$

= \$29,659

10.1.2 <u>APE for At-Power Internal Flooding Events</u>

APE_(Fld) =
$$(5,51 \times 10^{-2} \text{ person-rem per year} - 0) \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times ((1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year}))$$

= \$3,066

10.1.3 APE for At-Power Internal Fire Events

APE_(Fire) = $(5.79 \times 10^{-1} \text{ person-rem per year} - 0) \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times ((1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year}))$

= \$32,219

10.1.4 <u>APE for LPSD Internal Events</u>

 $APE_{(SDIE)} = (3.34 \times 10^{-1} \text{ person-rem per year} - 0) \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times ((1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year}))$

= \$18,586

10.1.5 <u>APE for LPSD Flooding Events</u>

 $APE_{(SDFld)} = (1.40 \times 10^{-1} \text{ person-rem per year} - 0) \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times ((1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year}))$

= \$7,802

10.1.6 <u>APE for LPSD Fire Events</u>

 $APE_{(SDFire)} = (1.31 \times 10^{-1} \text{ person-rem per year} - 0) \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \\ \times ((1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year}))$

= \$7,290

10.1.7 Total APE

$$APE_{Tot} = APE_{(IE)} + APE_{(Fld)} + APE_{(Fire)} + APE_{(SDIE)} + APE_{(SDFld)} + APE_{(SDFire)}$$

$$= \$29,659 + \$3,066 + \$32,219 + \$18,586 + \$7,802 + \$7,290$$

$$= \$98,622$$

10.2 <u>Averted Public Offsite Property Damage Costs (AOC)</u>

Annual expected offsite economic risk is shown in Tables 4a through 4f. The costs associated with AOC were calculated using the following equation:

$$AOC = (F_S D_{DS} - F_A D_{DA}) \times [1 - e^{(-rt_f)}]/r$$
(17)

Where,

AOC =	present value of averted offsite property damage costs (\$),
$F_{S}D_{DS} =$	baseline accident frequency x property damage
	(cost per year from Tables 4a through 4f),
$F_A D_{DA} =$	accident frequency x property damage after mitigation
	(0 event per year),
r =	real discount rate (3% per year),
t _f =	years remaining until end of plant life (60 years).

Using the values given above, AOC is calculated for At-Power internal events, internal flooding events, and fires, along with LPSD internal events, internal flooding events, and fires events. Each of these calculations is detailed below.

AOC_(IE) =
$$($1,534 \text{ per year} - 0) \times (1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year})$$

10.2.2 AOC for At-Power Internal Flooding Events

AOC_(Fld) =
$$(\$142 \text{ per year} - 0) \times (1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year})$$

= $\$3,938$

AOC_(Fire) =
$$(\$1,355 \text{ per year} - 0) \times (1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year})$$

= \$37,707

10.2.4 AOC for LPSD Internal Events

AOC_(SDIE) = (\$883 per year -0) × (1 - e^{-(0.03 × 60)}) / (0.03 per year)

= \$24,563

10.2.5 AOC for LPSD Flooding Events

AOC_(SDFld)= (314 per year - 0) × (1 - e^{-(0.03 × 60)}) / (0.03 per year)

= \$8,746

10.2.6 <u>AOC for LPSD Fire Events</u>

AOC_(SDFire)= (316 per year - 0) × (1 - e^{-(0.03 × 60)}) / (0.03 per year)

= \$8,792

10.2.7 <u>Total AOC</u>

$$AOC_{Tot} = AOC_{(IE)} + AOC_{(Fld)} + AOC_{(Fire)} + AOC_{(SDIE)} + AOC_{(SDFld)} + AOC_{(SDFire)}$$
$$= $42,671 + $3,938 + $37,707 + $24,563 + $8,746 + $8,792$$
$$= $126,417$$

10.3 <u>Averted Occupational Exposure (AOE)</u>

There are two types of occupational exposure due to accidents: immediate and long-term. Immediate exposure occurs at the time of the accident and during the immediate management of the emergency. Long-term exposure is associated with the cleanup and refurbishment or decommissioning of the damaged facility. The value of avoiding both types of exposure must be considered when evaluating risk.

The occupational exposure associated with severe accidents was assumed to be 23,300 person-rem/accident. This value includes a short-term component of 3,300 person-rem/accident and a long-term component of 20,000 person-rem/accident. These estimates are consistent with the "best estimate" values presented in Reference 2. In calculating base risk, the accident-related onsite exposures were calculated using the best estimate exposure components applied over the on-site cleanup period. For onsite cleanup, the accident-related on-site exposures were calculated over a 10-year cleanup period. Costs associated with immediate dose, long-term dose and total dose are calculated below for At-Power internal events, internal flooding events, and fires, along with LPSD internal events, internal flooding events.

10.3.1 Averted Immediate Occupational Exposure Costs

Per the guidance of Reference 1, costs associated with immediate occupational doses from an accident were calculated using the following equation:

$$W_{IO} = (F_S D_{IOS} - F_A D_{IOA}) \times R \times [1 - e^{(-rt_f)}]/r$$
(18)

Where,

 W_{IO} = present value of averted immediate occupational exposure (\$),

 F_s = baseline accident frequency (events per year from Tables 1a and 1b),

 F_A = accident frequency after mitigation (0 events per year),

D_{IOS} = baseline expected immediate onsite dose (3300 person-rem/event),

D_{IOA} = expected occupational exposure after mitigation (3300 person-rem/event),

- R = monetary equivalent of unit dose, (\$2000/person-rem),
- r = real discount rate (3% per year),
- t_f = years remaining until end of plant life (60 years).

Using the values given above, W_{IO} is calculated for At-Power internal events, internal flooding events, and fires, along with LPSD internal events, internal flooding events, and fires events. Each of these calculations is detailed below.

10.3.1.1 <u>W_{IO} for At-Power Internal Events</u>

$$W_{IO(IE)} = ((1.00 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year}) \times (3300 \text{ person-rem/event}) - 0) \\ \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year})$$

= \$184

10.3.1.2 W_{IO} for At-Power Internal Flooding Events

 $W_{IO (Fld)} = ((3.82 \times 10^{-7} \text{ events per year}) \times (3300 \text{ person-rem/event}) - 0) \\ \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year})$

= \$70

10.3.1.3 W_{IO} for At-Power Internal Fire Events

$$W_{IO (Fire)} = ((2.79 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year}) \times (3300 \text{ person-rem/event}) - 0) \\ \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year})$$

= \$512

10.3.1.4 <u>W_{IO} for LPSD Internal Events</u>

 $W_{IO (SDIE)} = ((1.94 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year}) \times (3300 \text{ person-rem/event}) - 0) \\ \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year})$

= \$356

10.3.1.5 W_{IO} for LPSD Flooding Events

 $W_{IO (SDFld)} = ((8.06 \times 10^{-8} \text{ events per year}) \times (3300 \text{ person-rem/event}) - 0) \\ \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year})$

= \$15

10.3.1.6 <u>W_{IO} for LPSD Fire Events</u>

 $W_{IO (SDFire)} = ((1.48 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year}) \times (3300 \text{ person-rem/event}) - 0) \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year})$

= \$272

10.3.2 Averted Long-Term Occupational Exposure Costs

Per the guidance of Reference 1, costs associated with long-term occupational doses from an accident were calculated using the following equation:

$$W_{LTO} = (F_S D_{LTOS} - F_A D_{LTOS}) \times R \times [1 - e^{(-rt_f)}]/r \times [1 - e^{(-rm)}]/r m$$
(19)

Where,

W _{LTO}	=	present value of averted long-term occupational exposure (\$),
F_{S}	=	baseline accident frequency (events per year from Tables 1a and 1b),
F_{A}	=	accident frequency after mitigation (0 events per year),
D_{LTOS}	=	baseline expected long-term onsite dose (20,000 person-rem/event),
D _{LTOA}	=	expected occupational exposure after mitigation
		(20,000 person-rem/event),
R	=	monetary equivalent of unit dose, (\$2000/person-rem),
r	=	real discount rate (3% per year),
m	=	years over which long-term doses accrue
		(10 years from Reference 2),
t_{f}	=	years remaining until end of plant life (60 years).

Using the values given above, W_{LTO} is calculated for At-Power internal events, internal flooding events, and fires, along with LPSD internal events, internal flooding events, and fires events. Each of these calculations is detailed below.

10.3.2.1 <u>W_{LTO} for At-Power Internal Events</u>

$$W_{\text{LTO(IE)}} = ((1.00 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year}) \times (20,000 \text{ person-rem/event}) - 0) \\ \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times ((1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year}) \\ \times ((1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 10)}) / ((0.03 \text{ per year}) \times (10 \text{ years})) \\ = \$962$$

10.3.2.2 <u>W_{LTO} for At-Power Internal Flooding Events</u>

$$W_{\text{LTO (Fld)}} = ((3.82 \times 10^{-7} \text{ events per year}) \times (20,000 \text{ person-rem/event}) - 0) \\ \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times ((1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year}) \\ \times ((1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 10)}) / ((0.03 \text{ per year}) \times (10 \text{ years}))$$

10.3.2.3 <u>W_{LTO} for At-Power Internal Fire Events</u>

$$W_{\text{LTO (Fire)}} = ((2.79 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year}) \times (20,000 \text{ person-rem/event}) - 0) \\ \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times ((1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year}) \\ \times ((1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 10)}) / ((0.03 \text{ per year}) \times (10 \text{ years})) \\ = \$2,683$$

10.3.2.4 W_{LTO} for LPSD Internal Events

$$\begin{split} W_{\text{LTO (SDIE)}} &= ((1.94 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year}) \times (20,000 \text{ person-rem/event}) - 0) \\ &\times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times ((1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year}) \\ &\times ((1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 10)}) / ((0.03 \text{ per year}) \times (10 \text{ years})) \end{split}$$

= \$1,865

10.3.2.5 W_{LTO} for LPSD Flooding Events

$$W_{\text{LTO (SDFld)}} = ((8.06 \times 10^{-8} \text{ events per year}) \times (20,000 \text{ person-rem/event}) - 0) \\ \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times ((1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year}) \\ \times ((1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 10)}) / ((0.03 \text{ per year}) \times (10 \text{ years}))$$

= \$78

10.3.2.6 <u>W_{LTO} for LPSD Fire Events</u>

$$W_{\text{LTO(SDFire)}} = ((1.48 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year}) \times (20,000 \text{ person-rem/event}) - 0) \\ \times (\$2000/\text{person-rem}) \times ((1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year}) \\ \times ((1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 10)}) / ((0.03 \text{ per year}) \times (10 \text{ years}))$$

= \$1,423

10.3.3 <u>Total Averted Occupational Exposure Costs</u>

As described in Section 4.3.3, the total cost associated with averted occupational exposure, AOE, is the sum of the costs associated with averted immediate exposure and the costs associated with the averted long-term exposure, or:

$$AOE = W_{IO} + W_{LTO}$$
(20)

Total averted onsite exposure costs are calculated below.

10.3.3.1 AOE for At-Power Internal Events

 $AOE_{(IE)} = $184 + $962 = $1,146$

10.3.3.2 AOE for At-Power Internal Flooding Events

 $AOE_{(Fld)} = \$70 + \$367 = \$437$

10.3.3.3 AOE for At-Power Internal Fire Events

AOE (Fire) = \$512 + \$2,683 = \$3,195

10.3.3.4 AOE for LPSD Internal Events

AOE_(SDIE) = \$356 + \$1,865 = \$2,221

10.3.3.5 <u>AOE for LPSD Flooding Events</u>

 $AOE_{(SDFld)} =$ \$ 15 + \$ 78 = \$93

10.3.3.6 AOE for LPSD Fire Events

 $AOE_{(SDFire)} =$ 272 + 1,423 = 1,695

10.3.3.7 <u>Total AOE</u>

Total averted occupational exposure costs are the sum of the four individual costs calculated above or:

AOE
$$_{Tot}$$
 = AOE $_{(IE)}$ + AOE $_{(Fld)}$ + AOE $_{(Fire)}$ + AOE $_{(SDIE)}$ + AOE $_{(SDFld)}$ + AOE $_{(SDFire)}$
= \$1,146 + \$437 + \$3,195 + \$2,221 + \$93 + \$1,695
= \$8,787

10.4 Averted Onsite Costs (AOSC)

Reference 2 defines three types of costs associated with onsite property damage from an accident: cleanup and decontamination, long-term replacement power, and repair and refurbishment. The value of avoiding each of these types of costs must be considered when

evaluating risk. Total averted onsite property damage costs are the sum of the three types of costs. Calculation of onsite property damage costs is detailed in the sections that follow.

10.4.1 Averted Cleanup and Decontamination Costs

The estimated cleanup cost for severe accidents was defined in Reference 2, to be $1. \times 10^9$ /accident (undiscounted). Using the value of 1.5×10^9 /event and assuming, as in Reference 2, that the total sum is paid in equal installments over a ten year period, the present value of those ten payments for cleanup and decontamination costs for the cleanup period can be calculated as follows:

$$PV_{CD} = C_{CD}/m \times \{ [1 - e^{(-rm)}]/r \}$$
(21)

Where,

PV _{CD}	=	net present value of cleanup and decontamination for a single event
		(dollars)
C _{CD}	=	total undiscounted cost for single accident with constant year basis
		(dollars)
r	=	real discount rate (3% per year),
m	=	years over which long-term doses accrue (10 years)
PV _{CD}	=	$((\$1.5 \times 10^9 \text{/event}) \text{/} (10 \text{ years})) \times ((1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 10)}) \text{/} 0.03)$
	=	1.2959×10^{9}

The present value of the costs over the cleanup period must be considered over the period of plant life. The net present value of averted cleanup costs over the plant life can be calculated using the following equation:

$$U_{CD} = (F_A - F_S) \times PV_{CD} \times [1 - e^{(-rt_f)}]/r$$
(22)

Where,

 U_{CD} = present value of averted onsite cleanup costs (dollars) F_S = baseline accident frequency (events per year from Tables 1a and 1b), F_A = accident frequency after mitigation (0 events per year), r = real discount rate (3% per year), t_f = years remaining until end of plant life (60 years).

Using the values given above, U_{CD} is calculated for At-Power internal events, internal flooding events, and fires, along with LPSD internal events, internal flooding events, and fires events. Each of these calculations is detailed below.

10.4.1.1 <u>U_{CD} for At-Power Internal Events</u>

 $U_{CD(IE)} = (1.00 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year} - 0) \times (\$1.2959 \times 10^{9}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year})$

= \$36,056

10.4.1.2 UCD for At-Power Internal Flooding Events

 $U_{CD (Fld)} = (3.82 \times 10^{-7} \text{ events per year} - 0) \times (\$1.2959 \times 10^{9}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year})$

= \$13,773

10.4.1.3 <u>U_{CD} for At-Power Internal Fire Events</u>

 $U_{CD (Fire)} = (2.79 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year} - 0) \times (\$1.2959 \times 10^{9}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year})$

= \$100,596

10.4.1.4 <u>U_{CD} for LPSD Internal Events</u>

 $U_{CD (SDIE)} = (1.94 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year} - 0) \times (\$1.2959 \times 10^{9}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year})$

= \$69,948

10.4.1.5 U_{CD} for LPSD Flooding Events

 $U_{CD(SDFld)} = (8.06 \times 10^{-8} \text{ events per year} - 0) \times (\$1.2959 \times 10^{9}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year})$

= \$2,906

10.4.1.6 U_{CD} for LPSD Fire Events

 $U_{CD(SDFire)} = (1.48 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year} - 0) \times (\$1.2959 \times 10^{9}) \times (1 - e^{-(0.03 \times 60)}) / (0.03 \text{ per year})$ = \\$53.363

10.4.2 Averted Replacement Power Costs

Calculation of replacement power costs, however, requires a change in the equation in Section 4.4.2. Instead of using the equations shown in Section 4.4.2 to calculate U_{RP} , Reference 2 recommends using a linear interpolation between 1.9×10^{10} for a discount rate of one percent and 1.2×10^{10} for a discount rate of five percent. These values are based on a 24 year average remaining life and need to be adjusted to be applicable to the APR1400 design. The averted replacement power cost (U_{RP}) was adjusted for the average reactor years remaining. The replacement power cost must also be adjusted to 2013 dollars and again for the more realistic capacity factor of 95%. As detailed in Section 4.4.2, two multiplies are added to account for these adjustments:

2016 Dollars Scaling Factor Multiplier:	1.57
95% Capacity Factor Multiplier:	1.58

For this 3% discounted rate sensitivity case, the U_{RP} was adjusted to average reactor years remaining:

These multipliers are applied to equations documented in Sections 10.4.2.1 through 10.4.2.6.

Replacement power costs are calculated as detailed below.

10.4.2.1 <u>U_{RP} for At-Power Internal Events</u>

$$U_{\text{RP(IE)}} = \{\$1.9 \times 10^{10} - [(\$1.9 \times 10^{10} - 1.2 \times 10^{10}) / (1\% - 5\%)] \times (1\% - 3\%)\} \\ \times (1400 \text{ MWe} / 910 \text{ MWe}) \times (1.00 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year - 0}) \times (1.57) \\ \times (1.58) \times (2.50) \\ = \$147,883$$

10.4.2.2 <u>U_{RP} for At-Power Internal Flooding Events</u>

$$U_{\text{RP (Fld)}} = \{\$1.9 \times 10^{10} - [(\$1.9 \times 10^{10} - 1.2 \times 10^{10})/(1\% - 5\%)] \times (1\% - 3\%)\} \times (1400 \text{ MWe} / 910 \text{ MWe}) \times (3.82 \times 10^{-7} \text{ events per year} - 0) \times (1.57) \times (1.58) \times (2.50)$$
$$= \$56,490$$

10.4.2.3 U_{RP} for At-Power Internal Fire Events

$$U_{\text{RP (Fire)}} = \{ \$1.9 \times 10^{10} - [(\$1.9 \times 10^{10} - 1.2 \times 10^{10})/(1\% - 5\%)] \times (1\% - 3\%) \} \\ \times (1400 \text{ MWe} / 910 \text{ MWe}) \times (2.79 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year} - 0) \times (1.57) \\ \times (1.58) \times (2.50) \}$$

= \$412,590

10.4.2.4 <u>U_{RP} for LPSD Internal Events</u>

$$U_{\text{RP (SDIE)}} = \{ \$1.9 \times 10^{10} - [(\$1.9 \times 10^{10} - 1.2 \times 10^{10})/(1\% - 5\%)] \times (1\% - 3\%) \} \\ \times (1400 \text{ MWe}/910 \text{ MWe}) \times (1.94 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year} - 0) \times (1.57) \\ \times (1.58) \times (2.50) \}$$

= \$286,890

10.4.2.5 <u>U_{RP} for LPSD Flooding Events</u>

 $U_{\text{RP (SDFld)}} = \{\$1.9x10^{10} - [(\$1.9x10^{10} - 1.2x10^{10})/(1\% - 5\%)] \times (1\% - 3\%)\} \\ \times (1400 \text{ MWe}/910 \text{ MWe}) \times (8.06 \times 10^{-8} \text{ events per year} - 0) \times (1.57) \\ \times (1.58) \times (2.50)$

= \$11,920

10.4.2.6 <u>U_{RP} for LPSD Fire Events</u>

$$U_{\text{RP (SDFire)}} = \{\$1.9x10^{10} - [(\$1.9x10^{10} - 1.2x10^{10})/(1\% - 5\%)] \times (1\% - 3\%)\} \times (1400 \text{ MWe}/910 \text{ MWe}) \times (1.48 \times 10^{-6} \text{ events per year} - 0) \times (1.57) \times (1.58) \times (2.50)$$

= \$218,865

10.4.3 Averted Repair and Refurbishment Costs

It is assumed that the plant would not be repaired or refurbished; therefore, these costs are zero.

10.4.4 <u>Total Averted Onsite Costs (AOSC)</u>

Total averted onsite cost is the sum of cleanup and decontamination costs, replacement power costs, and the repair and refurbishment costs. Total averted onsite costs are calculated as follows:

$$AOSC = U_{CD} + U_{RP} + 0$$
⁽²³⁾

Total averted onsite costs are calculated for At-Power internal events, internal flooding events, and fires, along with LPSD internal events, internal flooding events, and fires events. Each of these calculations is detailed below.

10.4.4.1 AOSC for At-Power Internal Events

 $AOSC_{(IE)} = $36,056 + $147,883$

= \$183,939

10.4.4.2 AOSC for At-Power Internal Flooding Events

AOSC (Fld) = \$13,773 + \$56,490

= \$70,263

10.4.4.3 AOSC for At-Power Internal Fire Events

AOSC (Fire) = \$100,596 + \$412,590

= \$513,186

10.4.4.4 <u>AOSC for LPSD Internal Events</u>

 $AOSC_{(SDIE)} = $69,948 + $286,890$

= \$356,838

10.4.4.5 AOSC for LPSD Flooding Events

 $AOSC_{(SDFld)} = $2,906 + $11,920$

= \$14,826

10.4.4.6 AOSC for LPSD Fire Events

AOSC_(SDFire)=\$53,363 + \$218,865

= \$272,228

10.4.4.7 <u>Total AOSC</u>

$$AOSC_{Tot} = AOSC_{(IE)} + AOSC_{(Fld)} + AOSC_{(Fire)} + AOSC_{(SDIE)} + AOSC_{(SDFld)} + AOSC_{(SDFire)}$$

= \$183,939 + \$70,263 + \$513,186 + \$356,838 + \$14,826 + \$272,228

= \$1,411,280

10.5 <u>Cost Enhancement (COE)</u>

The cost of enhancement is used when measures are taken to reduce risk. By definition, such measures are taken at the beginning of any period considered, so no discounting is performed for the COE. For baseline risk, no measures have been taken to reduce risk, so:

COE = \$0

10.6 <u>Total Unmitigated Baseline Risk</u>

As described in Section 10, the total present worth net value of public risk is calculated according to the following formula:

$$NPV = (APE + AOC + AOE + AOSC) - COE$$
(24)

Using the values calculated in Sections 10.1 to 10.5, total baseline risk is calculated:

NPV =
$$(\$98,622 + \$126,417 + \$8,787 + \$1,411,280) - \$0$$

= $\$1,645,106$

This value can be viewed as the maximum risk benefit attainable if all core damage scenarios from internal events are eliminated over the 60-year plant life.

11 <u>CONCLUSIONS</u>

The analyses described in the Sections 4 through 9 analyzed the base case for the costbenefit analyses at a 7% discounted rate along with the benefit associated with important contributors to risk for the APR1400 plant design. Preliminary screening eliminated SAMDA candidates from further consideration, based on inapplicability to APR1400 design features, design features that have already been incorporated into the APR1400 design, or extremely high cost of the alternatives considered.

The analysis using a 7 percent discount rate showed that no design changes to reduce risk associated with contributors to plant risk would be cost-beneficial to implement. A second baseline maximum benefit calculation using a 3 percent discount rate showed an approximate \$736,000 increase in the calculated benefits if all core damage scenarios from internal events are eliminated over the 60-year plant life. Therefore, it is concluded that no design changes would provide a positive cost-benefit.

12 <u>REFERENCES</u>

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- 2. NUREG/BR-0184, "Regulatory Analysis Technical Evaluation Handbook," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1997.
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- 4. NUREG-1555, "Standard Review Plans for Environmental Reviews for Nuclear Power Plants: Environmental Standard Review Plan," Section 7.3, "Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives," Rev. 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 2007.
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- Bureau of Labor Statistics' Producer Price Index for the commodity of "Electric Power" (BLS 2016| Producer Price Index-Commodities: Series Id: WPU054 Electric Power| 2016/1993), Year 2016 Annual PPI, https://www.bls.gov/data/
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- 9. Not Used.
- Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Applicant's Environmental Report; Operating License Renewal Stage, Supplement 1, April 10, 2009
- Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Applicant's Environmental Report, Operating License Renewal Stage, Attachment E - Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Analysis.
- 12. Millstone Power Station, Units 2 and 3, Application for Renewed Operating Licenses, Appendix F MPS2 Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Analysis.
- 13. Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, License Renewal Application, Environmental Report, Appendix F Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives.

- 14. Callaway Plant Unit 1, Environmental Report for License Renewal, Appendix F Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives.
- James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Applicant's Environmental Report, Operating License Renewal Stage, Appendix E Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives.
- 16. Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Units 1 & 2, License Renewal Application, Environmental Report, Appendix E Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives.

Table 1a (1 of 1)

Base Case - Source Term Category Summary for At-Power Events

STC	Description		STC Frequency (per year			
SIC	Description	Internal	Flood	Fire		
1	Steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) bypass of containment without fission product scrubbing	7.13E-08	2.32E-09	2.59E-08		
2	SGTR bypass of containment with fission product scrubbing	3.79E-08	0.00E+00	0.00E+00		
3	ISLOCAs without fission product scrubbing	5.31E-11	0.00E+00	0.00E+00		
4	ISLOCAs with fission product scrubbing	6.49E-11	0.00E+00	0.00E+00		
5	Containment isolation failure with containment spray (CS)	1.82E-09	4.39E-09	1.15E-08		
6	Containment isolation failure without CS	8.73E-10	2.95E-09	6.22E-08		
7	Containment failure before core damage with small (leak) failure of containment	7.51E-09	2.47E-09	6.61E-09		
8	Containment failure before core damage with large (rupture failure of containment	8.24E-09	2.84E-09	7.37E-09		
9	Core melt arrested in the reactor vessel	5.43E-07	1.76E-07	5.36E-07		
10	No containment failure after core melt	2.90E-07	1.52E-07	1.92E-06		
11	Containment basemat failure	1.94E-08	2.50E-08	1.14E-07		
12	Early containment failure with small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	0.00E+00		
13	Early containment failure with large (rupture) failure of containment	5.20E-10	1.87E-10	6.42E-08		
14	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	5.14E-11	6.87E-11	2.73E-10		
15	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	0.00E+00		
16	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	7.31E-12	3.82E-12	2.73E-11		
17	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	9.01E-09	5.78E-09	1.57E-08		
18	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	5.53E-10	8.29E-10	3.34E-09		
19	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	1.63E-09	9.96E-10	2.11E-09		
20	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	1.68E-11	1.15E-11	1.25E-10		
21	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and large (rupture) failure of containment	1.17E-08	6.38E-09	2.36E-08		
	Total	1.00E-06	3.82E-07	2.79E-06		

Table 1b (1 of 1)

Base Case – Source Term Category Summary for Low Power Shutdown Events

STC	Description		STC Frequency (per year)			
SIC	Description	Internal	Flood	Fire		
1	Steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) bypass of containment without fission product scrubbing	2.89E-08	0.00E+00	3.74E-10		
2	SGTR bypass of containment with fission product scrubbing	1.54E-08	0.00E+00	0.00E+00		
3	ISLOCAs without fission product scrubbing	2.01E-09	0.00E+00	1.90E-09		
4	ISLOCAs with fission product scrubbing	2.63E-11	0.00E+00	0.00E+00		
5	Containment isolation failure with containment spray (CS)	7.38E-10	0.00E+00	1.66E-10		
6	Containment isolation failure without CS	1.69E-08	8.06E-08	4.73E-08		
7	Containment failure before core damage with small (leak) failure of containment	3.05E-09	0.00E+00	9.55E-11		
8	Containment failure before core damage with large (rupture failure of containment	7.14E-09	0.00E+00	3.66E-10		
9	Core melt arrested in the reactor vessel	2.20E-07	0.00E+00	7.74E-09		
10	No containment failure after core melt	1.49E-06	0.00E+00	1.34E-06		
11	Containment basemat failure	9.65E-08	0.00E+00	5.16E-08		
12	Early containment failure with small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	0.00E+00		
13	Early containment failure with large (rupture) failure of containment	2.11E-10	0.00E+00	9.28E-10		
14	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	2.08E-11	0.00E+00	3.94E-12		
15	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	0.00E+00		
16	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	2.96E-12	0.00E+00	3.94E-13		
17	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	3.65E-09	0.00E+00	2.27E-10		
18	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	2.24E-10	0.00E+00	4.83E-11		
19	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	6.61E-10	0.00E+00	3.05E-11		
20	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	5.37E-08	0.00E+00	2.15E-08		
21	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and large (rupture) failure of containment	4.74E-09	0.00E+00	3.41E-10		
	Total	1.94E-06	8.06E-08	1.48E-06		

Table 2 (1 of 1)

STC	Frequency for Internal Events	Percent	Representative CET Sequence
	(/ry)	(%)	
1	7.13E-08	7.1%	SGIR CEI-02
			(PDS-02)
2	3.79E-08	3.8%	(PDS 01)
3	5.31E-11	0.0%	(PDS 03)
4	6.49E-11	0.0%	(PDS_{-03})
			CONISOF CET-01
5	1.82E-09	0.2%	(PDS-05)
			CONISOF CET-02
6	8.73E-10	0.1%	(PDS-06)
			RBCM CET-01
7	7.51E-09	0.7%	(PDS-07)
			RBCM CET-02
8	8.24E-09	0.8%	(PDS-07)
			GEN CET-04
9	5.43E-07	54.1	(PDS-04)
1.0		• • •	GEN CET-34
10	2.90E-07	28.9	(PDS-14)
11	1.045.00	1.00/	GEN CET-41
11	1.94E-08	1.9%	(PDS 33)
12			
12	-	-	-
13	5 20E-10	0.1	GEN CET-05/07
			(PDS-14)
14	5.14E-11	0.0%	GEN CET-39
			(PDS-33)
15	-	-	-
16	721E12	0.09/	GEN CET-29
10	/.31E-12	0.070	(PDS-33)
17	9.01E-09	0.9	GEN CET-27/25
1 /	9:012-09	0.9	(PDS-14)
18	5 53E-10	0.1	GEN CET-40
10	5.551-10	0.1	(PDS-33)
19	1.63E-09	0.2	GEN CET-33/36
	1.052 07	0.4	(PDS-14)
20	1.68E-11	0.0%	GEN CET-30
		0.070	(PDS-33)
21	1 17E-08	12	GEN CET-26/28
- 1	1.1, 2 00	1,4	(PDS-14)

Representative Accident Sequences for each STC

Table 3a (1 of 1)

Offsite Exposure By Source Term Category for At-Power Internal Events

STC	Description	STC Frequency (per year)	Conditional Person-Sv O ffsite	Conditional Person-REM Offsite	Expected Pe rson- REM/yr Off site
1	Steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) bypass of containment without fission product scrubbing	7.13E-08	6.12E+04	6.12E+06	4.36E-01
2	SGTR bypass of containment with fission product scrubbing	3.79E-08	3.03E+02	3.03E+04	1.15E-03
3	ISLOCAs without fission product scrubbing	5.31E-11	9.16E+04	9.16E+06	4.86E-04
4	ISLOCAs with fission product scrubbing	6.49E-11	7.80E+04	7.80E+06	5.06E-04
5	Containment isolation failure with containment spray (CS)	1.82E-09	3.45E+03	3.45E+05	6.28E-04
6	Containment isolation failure without CS	8.73E-10	1.74E+04	1.74E+06	1.52E-03
7	Containment failure before core damage with small (leak) failure of containment	7.51E-09	4.35E+04	4.35E+06	3.27E-02
8	Containment failure before core damage with large (rupture failure of containment	8.24E-09	5.59E+04	5.59E+06	4.61E-02
9	Core melt arrested in the reactor vessel	5.43E-07	1.71E+01	1.71E+03	9.29E-04
10	No containment failure after core melt	2.90E-07	4.12E+01	4.12E+03	1.19E-03
11	Containment basemat failure	1.94E-08	1.87E+02	1.87E+04	3.63E-04
12	Early containment failure with small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	-	-
13	Early containment failure with large (rupture) failure of containment	5.20E-10	3.22E+04	3.22E+06	1.67E-03
14	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	5.14E-11	1.75E+03	1.75E+05	9.00E-06
15	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	-	-
16	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	7.31E-12	4.95E+03	4.95E+05	3.62E-06
17	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	9.01E-09	1.19E+02	1.19E+04	1.07E-04
18	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	5.53E-10	2.84E+03	2.84E+05	1.57E-04
19	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	1.63E-09	4.30E+03	4.30E+05	7.01E-04
20	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	1.68E-11	7.81E+03	7.81E+05	1.31E-05
21	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and large (rupture) failure of containment	1.17E-08	7.66E+03	7.66E+05	8.96E-03
	Total	1.00E-06		·	5.33E-01

Table 3b (1 of 1)

Offsite Exposure By Source Term Category for At-Power Internal Flooding

STC	Description	STC Frequency (per year)	Conditional Person-Sv Offsite	Conditional Person-REM Offsite	Expected Person- REM/yr Offsite
1	Steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) bypass of containment without fission product scrubbing	2.32E-09	6.12E+04	6.12E+06	1.42E-02
2	SGTR bypass of containment with fission product scrubbing	0.00E+00	3.03E+02	3.03E+04	0.00E+00
3	ISLOCAs without fission product scrubbing	0.00E+00	9.16E+04	9.16E+06	0.00E+00
4	ISLOCAs with fission product scrubbing	0.00E+00	7.80E+04	7.80E+06	0.00E+00
5	Containment isolation failure with containment spray (CS)	4.39E-09	3.45E+03	3.45E+05	1.51E-03
6	Containment isolation failure without CS	2.95E-09	1.74E+04	1.74E+06	5.13E-03
7	Containment failure before core damage with small (leak) failure of containment	2.47E-09	4.35E+04	4.35E+06	1.07E-02
8	Containment failure before core damage with large (rupture failure of containment	2.84E-09	5.59E+04	5.59E+06	1.59E-02
9	Core melt arrested in the reactor vessel	1.76E-07	1.71E+01	1.71E+03	3.01E-04
10	No containment failure after core melt	1.52E-07	4.12E+01	4.12E+03	6.26E-04
11	Containment basemat failure	2.50E-08	1.87E+02	1.87E+04	4.68E-04
12	Early containment failure with small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	-	-
13	Early containment failure with large (rupture) failure of containment	1.87E-10	3.22E+04	3.22E+06	6.02E-04
14	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	6.87E-11	1.75E+03	1.75E+05	1.20E-05
15	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	-	-
16	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	3.82E-12	4.95E+03	4.95E+05	1.89E-06
17	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	5.78E-09	1.19E+02	1.19E+04	6.88E-05
18	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	8.29E-10	2.84E+03	2.84E+05	2.35E-04
19	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	9.96E-10	4.30E+03	4.30E+05	4.28E-04
20	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	1.15E-11	7.81E+03	7.81E+05	8.98E-06
21	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and large (rupture) failure of containment	6.38E-09	7.66E+03	7.66E+05	4.89E-03
	Total	3.82E-07			5.51E-02

Table 3c (1 of 1)

Offsite Exposure By Source Term Category for At-Power Internal Fire

STC	Description	STC Frequency (per year)	Conditional Person-Sv Offsite	Conditional Person-REM Offsite	Expected Person- REM/yr Offsite
1	Steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) bypass of containment without fission product scrubbing	2.59E-08	6.12E+04	6.12E+06	1.59E-01
2	SGTR bypass of containment with fission product scrubbing	0.00E+00	3.03E+02	3.03E+04	0.00E+00
3	ISLOCAs without fission product scrubbing	0.00E+00	9.16E+04	9.16E+06	0.00E+00
4	ISLOCAs with fission product scrubbing	0.00E+00	7.80E+04	7.80E+06	0.00E+00
5	Containment isolation failure with containment spray (CS)	1.15E-08	3.45E+03	3.45E+05	3.97E-03
6	Containment isolation failure without CS	6.22E-08	1.74E+04	1.74E+06	1.08E-01
7	Containment failure before core damage with small (leak) failure of containment	6.61E-09	4.35E+04	4.35E+06	2.88E-02
8	Containment failure before core damage with large (rupture failure of containment	7.37E-09	5.59E+04	5.59E+06	4.12E-02
9	Core melt arrested in the reactor vessel	5.36E-07	1.71E+01	1.71E+03	9.17E-04
10	No containment failure after core melt	1.92E-06	4.12E+01	4.12E+03	7.91E-03
11	Containment basemat failure	1.14E-07	1.87E+02	1.87E+04	2.13E-03
12	Early containment failure with small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	-	-
13	Early containment failure with large (rupture) failure of containment	6.42E-08	3.22E+04	3.22E+06	2.07E-01
14	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	2.73E-10	1.75E+03	1.75E+05	4.78E-05
15	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	-	-
16	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	2.73E-11	4.95E+03	4.95E+05	1.35E-05
17	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	1.57E-08	1.19E+02	1.19E+04	1.87E-04
18	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	3.34E-09	2.84E+03	2.84E+05	9.49E-04
19	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	2.11E-09	4.30E+03	4.30E+05	9.07E-04
20	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	1.25E-10	7.81E+03	7.81E+05	9.76E-05
21	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and large (rupture) failure of containment	2.36E-08	7.66E+03	7.66E+05	1.81E-02
	Total	2.79E-06			5.79E-01

Table 3d (1 of 1)

Offsite Exposure By Source Term Category for Low Power Shutdown Internal Events

STC	Description	STC Frequency (per year)	Conditional Person-Sv Offsite	Conditional Person-REM Offsite	Expected Person- REM/yr Offsite
1	Steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) bypass of containment without fission product scrubbing	2.89E-08	6.12E+04	6.12E+06	1.77E-01
2	SGTR bypass of containment with fission product scrubbing	1.54E-08	3.03E+02	3.03E+04	4.66E-04
3	ISLOCAs without fission product scrubbing	2.01E-09	9.16E+04	9.16E+06	1.84E-02
4	ISLOCAs with fission product scrubbing	2.63E-11	7.80E+04	7.80E+06	2.05E-04
5	Containment isolation failure with containment spray (CS)	7.38E-10	3.45E+03	3.45E+05	2.55E-04
6	Containment isolation failure without CS	1.69E-08	1.74E+04	1.74E+06	2.93E-02
7	Containment failure before core damage with small (leak) failure of containment	3.05E-09	4.35E+04	4.35E+06	1.32E-02
8	Containment failure before core damage with large (rupture failure of containment	7.14E-09	5.59E+04	5.59E+06	3.99E-02
9	Core melt arrested in the reactor vessel	2.20E-07	1.71E+01	1.71E+03	3.76E-04
10	No containment failure after core melt	1.49E-06	4.12E+01	4.12E+03	6.13E-03
11	Containment basemat failure	9.65E-08	1.87E+02	1.87E+04	1.80E-03
12	Early containment failure with small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	-	-
13	Early containment failure with large (rupture) failure of containment	2.11E-10	3.22E+04	3.22E+06	6.79E-04
14	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	2.08E-11	1.75E+03	1.75E+05	3.65E-06
15	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	-	-
16	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	2.96E-12	4.95E+03	4.95E+05	1.47E-06
17	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	3.65E-09	1.19E+02	1.19E+04	4.35E-05
18	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	2.24E-10	2.84E+03	2.84E+05	6.37E-05
19	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	6.61E-10	4.30E+03	4.30E+05	2.84E-04
20	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	5.37E-08	7.81E+03	7.81E+05	4.19E-02
21	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and large (rupture) failure of containment	4.74E-09	7.66E+03	7.66E+05	3.63E-03
	Total	1.94E-06			3.34E-01

Table 3e (1 of 1)

Offsite Exposure By Source Term Category for Low Power Shutdown Internal Flooding

STC	Description	STC Frequency (per year)	Conditional Person-Sv Offsite	Conditional Person-REM Offsite	Expected Person- REM/yr Offsite
1	Steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) bypass of containment without fission product scrubbing	0.00E+00	-	-	-
2	SGTR bypass of containment with fission product scrubbing	0.00E+00	-	-	-
3	ISLOCAs without fission product scrubbing	0.00E+00	-	-	-
4	ISLOCAs with fission product scrubbing	0.00E+00	-	-	-
5	Containment isolation failure with containment spray (CS)	0.00E+00	-	-	-
6	Containment isolation failure without CS	8.06E-08	1.74E+04	1.74E+06	1.40E-01
7	Containment failure before core damage with small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	-	-	-
8	Containment failure before core damage with large (rupture failure of containment	0.00E+00	-	-	-
9	Core melt arrested in the reactor vessel	0.00E+00	-	-	-
10	No containment failure after core melt	0.00E+00	-	-	-
11	Containment basemat failure	0.00E+00	-	-	-
12	Early containment failure with small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	-	-	-
13	Early containment failure with large (rupture) failure of containment	0.00E+00	-	-	-
14	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	-	-	-
15	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	-	-	-
16	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	-	-	-
17	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	-	-	-
18	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	0.00E+00	-	-	-
19	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	0.00E+00	-	-	-
20	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	0.00E+00	-	-	-
21	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and large (rupture) failure of containment	0.00E+00	-	-	-
	Total	8.06E-08			1.40E-01

Table 3f (1 of 1)

Offsite Exposure By Source Term Category for Low Power Shutdown Internal Fire

STC	Description	STC Frequency (per year)	Conditional Person-Sv Offsite	Conditional Person-REM Offsite	Expected Person- REM/yr Offsite
1	Steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) bypass of containment without fission product scrubbing	3.74E-10	6.12E+04	6.12E+06	2.29E-03
2	SGTR bypass of containment with fission product scrubbing	0.00E+00	3.03E+02	3.03E+04	0.00E+00
3	ISLOCAs without fission product scrubbing	1.90E-09	9.16E+04	9.16E+06	1.74E-02
4	ISLOCAs with fission product scrubbing	0.00E+00	7.80E+04	7.80E+06	0.00E+00
5	Containment isolation failure with containment spray (CS)	1.66E-10	3.45E+03	3.45E+05	5.73E-05
6	Containment isolation failure without CS	4.73E-08	1.74E+04	1.74E+06	8.24E-02
7	Containment failure before core damage with small (leak) failure of containment	9.55E-11	4.35E+04	4.35E+06	4.15E-04
8	Containment failure before core damage with large (rupture failure of containment	3.66E-10	5.59E+04	5.59E+06	2.05E-03
9	Core melt arrested in the reactor vessel	7.74E-09	1.71E+01	1.71E+03	1.32E-05
10	No containment failure after core melt	1.34E-06	4.12E+01	4.12E+03	5.53E-03
11	Containment basemat failure	5.16E-08	1.87E+02	1.87E+04	9.65E-04
12	Early containment failure with small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	-	-
13	Early containment failure with large (rupture) failure of containment	9.28E-10	3.22E+04	3.22E+06	2.99E-03
14	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	3.94E-12	1.75E+03	1.75E+05	6.90E-07
15	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	-	-
16	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	3.94E-13	4.95E+03	4.95E+05	1.95E-07
17	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	2.27E-10	1.19E+02	1.19E+04	2.70E-06
18	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	4.83E-11	2.84E+03	2.84E+05	1.37E-05
19	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	3.05E-11	4.30E+03	4.30E+05	1.31E-05
20	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	2.15E-08	7.81E+03	7.81E+05	1.68E-02
21	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and large (rupture) failure of containment	3.41E-10	7.66E+03	7.66E+05	2.61E-04
	Total	1.48E-06			1.31E-01

Table 4a (1 of 1)

Offsite Property Damage Costs By Source Term Category for At-Power Internal Events

STC	Description	STC Frequency (per year)	Conditional Property Costs (\$)	Expected Property Costs (\$)
1	Steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) bypass of containment without fission product scrubbing	7.13E-08	1.80E+10	1283
2	SGTR bypass of containment with fission product scrubbing	3.79E-08	5.26E+07	2
3	ISLOCAs without fission product scrubbing	5.31E-11	2.68E+10	1
4	ISLOCAs with fission product scrubbing	6.49E-11	2.02E+10	1
5	Containment isolation failure with containment spray (CS)	1.82E-09	3.91E+08	1
6	Containment isolation failure without CS	8.73E-10	3.90E+09	3
7	Containment failure before core damage with small (leak) failure of containment	7.51E-09	9.82E+09	74
8	Containment failure before core damage with large (rupture failure of	8.24E-09	1.51E+10	124
9	Core melt arrested in the reactor vessel	5.43E-07	3.50E+07	19
10	No containment failure after core melt	2.90E-07	3.32E+07	10
11	Containment basemat failure	1.94E-08	4.68E+07	1
12	Early containment failure with small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	-
13	Early containment failure with large (rupture) failure of containment	5.20E-10	5.55E+09	3
14	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	5.14E-11	6.19E+07	0
15	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	-
16	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	7.31E-12	3.52E+08	0
17	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	9.01E-09	3.69E+07	0
18	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	5.53E-10	1.07E+08	0
19	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	1.63E-09	3.26E+08	1
20	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	1.68E-11	6.78E+08	0
21	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and large (rupture) failure of containment	1.17E-08	8.43E+08	10
	Total			1534

Table 4b (1 of 1)

Offsite Property Damage Costs By Source Term Category for At-Power Internal Flooding

STC	Description	STC Frequency	Conditional Property	Expected Property
		(per year)	Costs (\$)	Costs (\$)
1	Steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) bypass of containment without fission product scrubbing	2.32E-09	1.80E+10	42
2	SGTR bypass of containment with fission product scrubbing	0.00E+00	5.26E+07	0
3	ISLOCAs without fission product scrubbing	0.00E+00	2.68E+10	0
4	ISLOCAs with fission product scrubbing	0.00E+00	2.02E+10	0
5	Containment isolation failure with containment spray (CS)	4.39E-09	3.91E+08	2
6	Containment isolation failure without CS	2.95E-09	3.90E+09	12
7	Containment failure before core damage with small (leak) failure of containment	2.47E-09	9.82E+09	24
8	Containment failure before core damage with large (rupture failure of	2.84E-09	1.51E+10	43
9	Core melt arrested in the reactor vessel	1.76E-07	3.50E+07	6
10	No containment failure after core melt	1.52E-07	3.32E+07	5
11	Containment basemat failure	2.50E-08	4.68E+07	1
12	Early containment failure with small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	-
13	Early containment failure with large (rupture) failure of containment	1.87E-10	5.55E+09	1
14	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	6.87E-11	6.19E+07	0
15	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	-
16	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	3.82E-12	3.52E+08	0
17	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	5.78E-09	3.69E+07	0
18	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	8.29E-10	1.07E+08	0
19	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	9.96E-10	3.26E+08	0
20	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	1.15E-11	6.78E+08	0
21	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and large (rupture) failure of containment	6.38E-09	8.43E+08	5
	Total			142

Table 4c (1 of 1)

Offsite Property Damage Costs By Source Term Category for At-Power Internal Fire

STC	Description	STC Frequency	Conditional Property	Expected Property
1	Steam generator tube muture (SCTD) hymoga of containment without figgion product complaing	(per year)	$\frac{\text{Costs}(\$)}{1.80\pm10}$	<u>Costs (\$)</u>
2	Steam generator tube rupture (SOTR) bypass of containment without itssion product scrubbing	2.39E-08	$1.80E \pm 10$	400
2	SGTR bypass of containment with fission product scrubbing	0.00E+00	3.20E+07	0
3	ISLOCAS without fission product scrubbing	0.00E+00	2.68E+10	0
4	ISLOCAs with fission product scrubbing	0.00E+00	2.02E+10	0
5	Containment isolation failure with containment spray (CS)	1.15E-08	3.91E+08	4
6	Containment isolation failure without CS	6.22E-08	3.90E+09	243
7	Containment failure before core damage with small (leak) failure of containment	6.61E-09	9.82E+09	65
8	Containment failure before core damage with large (rupture failure of	7.37E-09	1.51E+10	111
9	Core melt arrested in the reactor vessel	5.36E-07	3.50E+07	19
10	No containment failure after core melt	1.92E-06	3.32E+07	64
11	Containment basemat failure	1.14E-07	4.68E+07	5
12	Early containment failure with small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	-
13	Early containment failure with large (rupture) failure of containment	6.42E-08	5.55E+09	356
14	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	2.73E-10	6.19E+07	0
15	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	-
16	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	2.73E-11	3.52E+08	0
17	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	1.57E-08	3.69E+07	1
18	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	3.34E-09	1.07E+08	0
19	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	2.11E-09	3.26E+08	1
20	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	1.25E-10	6.78E+08	0
21	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and large (rupture) failure of containment	2.36E-08	8.43E+08	20
	Total			1355

Table 4d (1 of 1)

Offsite Property Damage Costs By Source Term Category for Low Power Shutdown Internal Events

STC	Description	STC Frequency (per year)	Conditional Property Costs (\$)	Expected Property Costs (\$)
1	Steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) bypass of containment without fission product scrubbing	2.89E-08	1.80E+10	520
2	SGTR bypass of containment with fission product scrubbing	1.54E-08	5.26E+07	1
3	ISLOCAs without fission product scrubbing	2.01E-09	2.68E+10	54
4	ISLOCAs with fission product scrubbing	2.63E-11	2.02E+10	1
5	Containment isolation failure with containment spray (CS)	7.38E-10	3.91E+08	0
6	Containment isolation failure without CS	1.69E-08	3.90E+09	66
7	Containment failure before core damage with small (leak) failure of containment	3.05E-09	9.82E+09	30
8	Containment failure before core damage with large (rupture failure of	7.14E-09	1.51E+10	108
9	Core melt arrested in the reactor vessel	2.20E-07	3.50E+07	8
10	No containment failure after core melt	1.49E-06	3.32E+07	49
11	Containment basemat failure	9.65E-08	4.68E+07	5
12	Early containment failure with small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	-
13	Early containment failure with large (rupture) failure of containment	2.11E-10	5.55E+09	1
14	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	2.08E-11	6.19E+07	0
15	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	-
16	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	2.96E-12	3.52E+08	0
17	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	3.65E-09	3.69E+07	0
18	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	2.24E-10	1.07E+08	0
19	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	6.61E-10	3.26E+08	0
20	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	5.37E-08	6.78E+08	36
21	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and large (rupture) failure of containment	4.74E-09	8.43E+08	4
	Total			883

Table 4e (1 of 1)

Offsite Property Damage Costs By Source Term Category for Low Power Shutdown Internal Flooding

STC	Description	STC Frequency (per year)	Conditional Property Costs (\$)	Expected Property Costs (\$)
1	Steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) bypass of containment without fission product scrubbing	0.00E+00	-	-
2	SGTR bypass of containment with fission product scrubbing	0.00E+00	-	-
3	ISLOCAs without fission product scrubbing	0.00E+00	-	-
4	ISLOCAs with fission product scrubbing	0.00E+00	-	-
5	Containment isolation failure with containment spray (CS)	0.00E+00	-	-
6	Containment isolation failure without CS	8.06E-08	3.90E+09	314
7	Containment failure before core damage with small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	-	-
8	Containment failure before core damage with large (rupture failure of	0.00E+00	-	-
9	Core melt arrested in the reactor vessel	0.00E+00	-	-
10	No containment failure after core melt	0.00E+00	-	-
11	Containment basemat failure	0.00E+00	-	-
12	Early containment failure with small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	-	-
13	Early containment failure with large (rupture) failure of containment	0.00E+00	-	-
14	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	-	-
15	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	-	-
16	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	-	-
17	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	-	-
18	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	0.00E+00	-	-
19	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	0.00E+00	-	-
20	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	0.00E+00	-	-
21	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and large (rupture) failure of containment	0.00E+00	-	-
	Total			314

Table 4f(1 of 1)

Offsite Property Damage Costs By Source Term Category for Low Power Shutdown Internal Fire

STC	Description	STC Frequency	Conditional Property	Expected Property
1	Characteristic (CCTD) have a Construction of State Construction of the state of the	(per year)	Costs (\$)	<u>Costs (\$)</u>
1	Steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) bypass of containment without fission product scrubbing	3.74E-10	1.80E+10	/
2	SGTR bypass of containment with fission product scrubbing	0.00E+00	5.26E+07	0
3	ISLOCAs without fission product scrubbing	1.90E-09	2.68E+10	51
4	ISLOCAs with fission product scrubbing	0.00E+00	2.02E+10	0
5	Containment isolation failure with containment spray (CS)	1.66E-10	3.91E+08	0
6	Containment isolation failure without CS	4.73E-08	3.90E+09	185
7	Containment failure before core damage with small (leak) failure of containment	9.55E-11	9.82E+09	1
8	Containment failure before core damage with large (rupture failure of	3.66E-10	1.51E+10	6
9	Core melt arrested in the reactor vessel	7.74E-09	3.50E+07	0
10	No containment failure after core melt	1.34E-06	3.32E+07	45
11	Containment basemat failure	5.16E-08	4.68E+07	2
12	Early containment failure with small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	-
13	Early containment failure with large (rupture) failure of containment	9.28E-10	5.55E+09	5
14	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	3.94E-12	6.19E+07	0
15	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a small (leak) failure of containment	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	-
16	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	3.94E-13	3.52E+08	0
17	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and a small (leak) failure of containment	2.27E-10	3.69E+07	0
18	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	4.83E-11	1.07E+08	0
19	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, CS operation, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	3.05E-11	3.26E+08	0
20	Late containment failure with a dry cavity, no CS, and a large (rupture) failure of containment	2.15E-08	6.78E+08	15
21	Late containment failure with a wet cavity, no CS, and large (rupture) failure of containment	3.41E-10	8.43E+08	0
	Total			316

Table 5 (1 of 19)

Initial List of Candidate Improvements for the APR1400 SAMDA Analysis

SAMA ID (NEI-05-01)	Potential Enhancement (SAMA Title)	Result of Potential Enhancement	Qualitative Screening				
Improvemen	Improvements Related to AC and DC Power						
1	Provide additional DC battery +capacity.	Extended DC power availability during an SBO.	Sections 7.7, 8.7, and 9.7 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for 125 VDC power events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.				
2	Replace lead-acid batteries with fuel cells	Extended DC Power availability during an SBO	Sections 7.7, 8.7, and 9.7 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for 125 VDC power events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.				
3	Add additional battery charger or portable diesel-driven battery charger to existing DC system	Improved availability of DC power system	Sections 7.7, 8.7, and 9.7 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for 125 VDC power events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.				
5	Provide DC bus cross-ties.	Improved availability of DC power system.	Sections 7.7, 8.7, and 9.7 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for 125 VDC power events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.				
6	Provide additional DC power to the 120/240V vital AC system.	Increased availability of the 120 V vital AC bus.	Sections 7.8, 8.8, and 9.8 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for 120V power events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.				
7	Add an automatic feature to transfer the 120V vital AC bus from normal to standby power.	Increased availability of the 120 V vital AC bus.	Sections 7.8, 8.8, and 9.8 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for 120V power events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.				
8	Increase training on response to loss of two 120V AC buses which causes inadvertent actuation signals.	Improved chances of successful response to loss of two 120V AC buses.	N/A - Enhancement due to training is not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development SAMDA.				
9	Provide an additional diesel generator.	Increased availability of on-site emergency AC power.	Sections 7.1, 8.1, and 9.1 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for EDG power events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.				

Table 5 (2 of 19)

SAMA ID (NEI-05-01)	Potential Enhancement (SAMA Title)	Result of Potential Enhancement	Qualitative Screening
10	Revise procedure to allow bypass of diesel generator trips.	Extended diesel generator operation.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
11	Improve 4.16-kV bus cross-tie ability.	Increased availability of on-site AC power.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
12	Create AC power cross-tie capability with other unit (multi-unit site)	Increased availability of on-site AC power.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development. Also, Design Certification does not consider duel unit capability
13	Install an additional, buried off-site power source.	Reduced probability of loss of off-site power.	N/A – This is a site-specific issue and not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
14	Install a gas turbine generator.	Increased availability of on-site AC power.	Already Implemented In Design. The alternate AC power source is a gas turbine generator.
15	Install tornado protection on gas turbine generator.	Increased availability of on-site AC power.	Sections 7.2, 8.2, and 9.2 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for CTG events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
16	Improve uninterruptible power supplies.	Increased availability of power supplies supporting front-line equipment.	Sections 7.8, 8.8, and 9.8 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for 120V power events. Sections 7.9, 8.9, and 9.9 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for 4.16kV power events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
17	Create a cross-tie for diesel fuel oil (multiunit site).	Increased diesel generator availability.	N/A - Design Certification does not consider duel unit capability
18	Develop procedures for replenishing diesel fuel oil.	Increased diesel generator availability.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
19	Use fire water system as a backup source for diesel cooling.	Increased diesel generator availability.	Sections 7.1, 8.1, and 9.1 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for EDG power events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.

Table 5 (3 of 19)

SAMA ID (NEI-05-01)	Potential Enhancement (SAMA Title)	Result of Potential Enhancement	Qualitative Screening
20	Add a new backup source of diesel cooling.	Increased diesel generator availability.	Sections 7.1, 8.1, and 9.1 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for EDG power events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
21	Develop procedures to repair or replace failed 4 KV breakers.	Increased probability of recovery from failure of breakers that transfer 4.16 kV nonemergency buses from unit station service transformers.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
22	In training, emphasize steps in recovery of off-site power after an SBO.	Reduced human error probability during off-site power recovery.	N/A - Enhancement due to training is not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development SAMDA.
23	Develop a severe weather conditions procedure.	Improved off-site power recovery following external weather-related events.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
24	Bury off-site power lines.	Improved off-site power reliability during severe weather.	N/A – This is a site-specific issue and not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
Improvemen	nts Related to Core Cooling System	S	
25	Install an independent active or passive high pressure injection system.	Improved prevention of core melt sequences.	Already Implemented In Design. The plant design has four trains of safety injection along with two charging pumps and an alternate charging pump.
26	Provide an additional high pressure injection pump with independent diesel.	Reduced frequency of core melt from small LOCA and SBO sequences.	Sections 7.12, 8.12, and 9.12 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for high-pressure injection events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
27	Revise procedure to allow operators to inhibit automatic vessel depressurization in non-ATWS scenarios.	Extended HPCI and RCIC operation.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
28	Add a diverse low pressure injection system.	Improved injection capability.	Already Implemented In Design. Plant design has two trains of SDC pumps that can be used for injection and two containment spray pumps that can be aligned to the SDC system for injection. Therefore, four pumps are available for low-pressure injection.
Table 5 (4 of 19)

SAMA ID	Potential Enhancement	Docult of Dotontial Exhangement	Qualitative Severaina
(NEI-05-01)	(SAMA Title)	Result of Potential Enhancement	Quantative Screening
29	Provide capability for alternate injection via diesel-driven fire pump.	Improved injection capability.	Sections 7.1, 8.1, and 9.1 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for EDG power events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit. Sections 7.12, 8.12, and 9.12 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for high-pressure injection events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
30	Improve ECCS suction strainers.	Enhanced reliability of ECCS suction.	Already Implemented In Design. Insights from GSI-191 considered in the APR1400 design, the strainers are designed to minimize a potential plugging, and the trash rack located at the ingress of the holdup volume tank (HVT) pre-screens any larger size debris entering the in-containment refueling water storage tank.
31	Add the ability to manually align emergency core cooling system recirculation.	Enhanced reliability of ECCS suction.	Already Implemented In Design. The IRWST eliminates the need to switch to recirculation.
32	Add the ability to automatically align emergency core cooling system to recirculation mode upon refueling water storage tank depletion.	Enhanced reliability of ECCS suction.	Already Implemented In Design. The IRWST eliminates the need to switch to recirculation.
33	Provide hardware and procedure to refill the reactor water storage tank once it reaches a specified low level.	Extended reactor water storage tank capacity in the event of a steam generator tube rupture.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
34	Provide an in-containment reactor water storage tank.	Continuous source of water to the safety injection pumps during a LOCA event, since water released from a breach of the primary system collects in the in-containment reactor water storage tank, and thereby eliminates the need to realign the safety injection pumps for long-term post-LOCA recirculation.	Already Implemented In Design. The design includes an in- containment reactor water storage tank

Table 5 (5 of 19)

SAMA ID (NEI-05-01)	Potential Enhancement (SAMA Title)	Result of Potential Enhancement	Qualitative Screening
35	Throttle low pressure injection pumps earlier in medium or large-break LOCAs to maintain reactor water storage tank inventory.	Extended reactor water storage tank capacity.	Already Implemented – The discharged water through the break collects in the holdup volume tank (HVT) which is then transferred to the in-containment reactor water storage tank which eliminates the need to throttle low pressure injection pumps.
36	Emphasize timely recirculation alignment in operator training.	Reduced human error probability associated with recirculation failure.	N/A - Enhancement due to training is not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development SAMDA.
37	Upgrade the chemical and volume control system to mitigate small LOCAs.	For a plant like the Westinghouse AP600, where the chemical and volume control system cannot mitigate a small LOCA, an upgrade would decrease the frequency of core damage.	Sections 7.12, 8.12, and 9.12 evaluate the potential maximum enefit for high-pressure injection events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
38	Change the in-containment reactor water storage tank suction from four check valves to two check and two air-operated valves.	Reduced common mode failure of injection paths.	Sections 7.12, 8.12, and 9.12 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for high-pressure injection events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
39	Replace two of the four electric safety injection pumps with diesel-powered pumps.	Reduced common cause failure of the safety injection system. This SAMA was originally intended for the Westinghouse-CE System 80+, which has four trains of safety injection. However, the intent of this SAMA is to provide diversity within the high- and low-pressure safety injection systems.	Sections 7.12, 8.12, and 9.12evaluate the potential maximum benefit for high-pressure injection events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
40	Provide capability for remote, manual operation of secondary side pilot-operated relief valves in a station blackout.	Improved chance of successful operation during station blackout events in which high area temperatures may be encountered (no ventilation to main steam areas).	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
41	Create a reactor coolant depressurization system.	Allows low pressure emergency core cooling system injection in the event of small LOCA and high-pressure safety injection failure.	Already Implemented In Design - Safety Depressurization and Vent System (CDM 3.4.1)
42	Make procedure changes for reactor coolant system depressurization.	Allows low pressure emergency core cooling system injection in the event of small LOCA and high-pressure safety injection failure.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.

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SAMA ID (NEI-05-01)	Potential Enhancement (SAMA Title)	Result of Potential Enhancement	Qualitative Screening
Improvemen	nts Related to Cooling Water		
43	Add redundant DC control power for SW pumps.	Increased availability of SW.	Sections 7.13, 8.13, and 9.13 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for ESW events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
44	Replace ECCS pump motors with air- cooled motors.	Elimination of ECCS dependency on component cooling system.	Already Implemented / SI Pump Motors are air cooled by room coolers
45	Enhance procedural guidance for use of cross-tied component cooling or service water pumps.	Reduced frequency of loss of component cooling water and service water.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
46	Add a service water pump.	Increased availability of cooling water.	Sections 7.13, 8.13, and 9.13 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for ESW events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
47	Enhance the screen wash system.	Reduced potential for loss of SW due to clogging of screens.	Sections 7.13, 8.13, and 9.13 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for ESW events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
48	Cap downstream piping of normally closed component cooling water drain and vent valves.	Reduced frequency of loss of component cooling water initiating events, some of which can be attributed to catastrophic failure of one of the many single isolation valves.	Already Implemented – The design includes the caps for downstream piping of normally closed component cooling water drain and vent valves. See 1-461 series drawings.
49	Enhance loss of component cooling water (or loss of service water) procedures to facilitate stopping the reactor coolant pumps.	Reduced potential for reactor coolant pump seal damage due to pump bearing failure.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
50	Enhance loss of component cooling water procedure to underscore the desirability of cooling down the reactor coolant system prior to seal LOCA.	Reduced probability of reactor coolant pump seal failure.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
51	Additional training on loss of component cooling water.	Improved success of operator actions after a loss of component cooling water.	N/A - Enhancement due to training is not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development SAMDA.

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SAMA ID (NEI-05-01)	Potential Enhancement (SAMA Title)	Result of Potential Enhancement	Qualitative Screening
52	Provide hardware connections to allow another essential raw cooling water system to cool charging pump seals.	Reduced effect of loss of component cooling water by providing a means to maintain the charging pump seal injection following a loss of normal cooling water.	N/A - 2 Charging Pumps are Air Cooled. Additional Aux Charging Pump is a positive displacement type and requires no external cooling.
53	On loss of essential raw cooling water, proceduralize shedding component cooling water loads to extend the component cooling water heat-up time.	Increased time before loss of component cooling water (and reactor coolant pump seal failure) during loss of essential raw cooling water sequences.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
54	Increase charging pump lube oil capacity.	Increased time before charging pump failure due to lube oil overheating in loss of cooling water sequences.	Excessive Implementation Cost – Basic events related to charging pump failure do not appear in the cutset importance analysis shown in Tables 6a through 6f or 7a through 7f. Therefore, failure of a charging pump has minimal effect on plant risk and, as a result, negligible potential for improvement to risk.
55	Install an independent reactor coolant pump seal injection system, with dedicated diesel.	Reduced frequency of core damage from loss of component cooling water, service water, or station blackout.	Excessive Implementation Cost – Basic events related to RCP seal failure do not appear in the cutset importance analysis shown in Tables 6a through 6f or 7a through 7f. Therefore, failure of a charging pump has minimal effect on plant risk and, as a result, negligible potential for improvement to risk.
56	Install an independent reactor coolant pump seal injection system, without dedicated diesel.	Reduced frequency of core damage from loss of component cooling water or service water, but not a station blackout.	Already implemented in design – an alternate charging pump is provided that can be aligned for seal injection in the event that the two normal charging pumps fail.
57	Use existing hydro test pump for reactor coolant pump seal injection.	Reduced frequency of core damage from loss of component cooling water or service water, but not a station blackout.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
58	Install improved reactor coolant pump seals.	Reduced likelihood of reactor coolant pump seal LOCA.	Already Implemented /The APR1400 will use advanced RCP seal design
59	Install an additional component cooling water pump.	Reduced likelihood of loss of component cooling water leading to a reactor coolant pump seal LOCA.	Sections 7.5, 8.5, and 9.5 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for CCW events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.

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SAMA ID	Potential Enhancement	Decult of Detential Extension and	Qualitating Samoaning		
(NEI-05-01)	(SAMA Title)	Result of Potential Enhancement	Quantative Screening		
60	Prevent makeup pump flow diversion through the relief valves.	Reduced frequency of loss of reactor coolant pump seal cooling if spurious high pressure injection relief valve opening creates a flow diversion large enough to prevent reactor coolant pump seal injection.	Excessive Implementation Cost – Basic events related to RCP seal failure do not appear in the cutset importance analysis shown in Tables 6a through 6f or 7a through 7f. Therefore, failure of a charging pump has minimal effect on plant risk and, as a result, negligible potential for improvement to risk.		
61	Change procedures to isolate reactor coolant pump seal return flow on loss of component cooling water, and provide (or enhance) guidance on loss of injection during seal LOCA.	Reduced frequency of core damage due to loss of seal cooling.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.		
62	Implement procedures to stagger high pressure safety injection pump use after a loss of service water.	Extended high pressure injection prior to overheating following a loss of service water.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.		
63	Use fire prevention system pumps as a backup seal injection and high pressure makeup source.	Reduced frequency of reactor coolant pump seal LOCA.	Excessive Implementation Cost – Basic events related to RCP seal failure do not appear in the cutset importance analysis shown in Tables 6a through 6f or 7a through 7f. Therefore, failure of a charging pump has minimal effect on plant risk and, as a result, negligible potential for improvement to risk.		
64	Implement procedure and hardware modifications to allow manual alignment of the fire water system to the component cooling water system, or install a component cooling water header cross- tie.	Improved ability to cool residual heat removal heat exchangers.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.		
Improvements Related to Feedwater and Condensate					
65	Install a digital feed water upgrade.	Reduced chance of loss of main feed water following a plant trip.	Very Low Benefit		
66	Create ability for emergency connection of existing or new water sources to feedwater and condensate systems.	Increased availability of feedwater.	Sections 7.3, 8.3, and 9.3 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for AFW events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.		

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SAMA ID	Potential Enhancement		
(NEI-05-01)	(SAMA Title)	Result of Potential Enhancement	Quantative Screening
67	Install an independent diesel for the condensate storage tank makeup pumps.	Extended inventory in CST during an SBO.	Sections 7.3, 8.3, and 9.3 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for AFW events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
68	Add a motor-driven feedwater pump.	Increased availability of feedwater.	Already Implemented / APR1400 has 2 TDAFWP and 2 MDAFWP
69	Install manual isolation valves around auxiliary feedwater turbine-driven steam admission valves.	Reduced dual turbine-driven pump maintenance unavailability.	Already Implemented / See 1-526 series P&IDs, manual valves installed up and downstream of Steam Inlet Stop Valve (HP/LP)
70	Install accumulators for turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump flow control valves.	Eliminates the need for local manual action to align nitrogen bottles for control air following a loss of off-site power.	N/A - Steam Control Valves are Electro-Hydraulic operated
71	Install a new condensate storage tank (auxiliary feedwater storage tank).	Increased availability of the auxiliary feedwater system.	Sections 7.3, 8.3, and 9.3 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for AFW events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
72	Modify the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump to be self-cooled.	Improved success probability during a station blackout.	Already Implemented / TDAFWPs are designed to operate in severe environments
73	Proceduralize local manual operation of auxiliary feedwater system when control power is lost.	Extended auxiliary feedwater availability during a station blackout. Also provides a success path should auxiliary feedwater control power be lost in non-station blackout sequences.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
74	Provide hookup for portable generators to power the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump after station batteries are depleted.	Extended auxiliary feedwater availability.	Sections 7.7, 8.7, and 9.7 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for 125 VDC power events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
75	Use fire water system as a backup for steam generator inventory.	Increased availability of steam generator water supply.	Sections 7.3, 8.3, and 9.3 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for AFW events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
76	Change failure position of condenser makeup valve if the condenser makeup valve fails open on loss of air or power.	Allows greater inventory for the auxiliary feedwater pumps by preventing condensate storage tank flow diversion to the condenser.	Already Implemented / Condensate Storage Tank Makeup to Condenser AOVs Fail Closed (1-531 (1/5) P&ID)

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SAMA ID (NEI-05-01)	Potential Enhancement (SAMA Title)	Result of Potential Enhancement	Qualitative Screening
77	Provide a passive, secondary-side heat rejection loop consisting of a condenser and heat sink.	Reduced potential for core damage due to loss-of- feedwater events.	Sections 7.3, 8.3, and 9.3 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for AFW events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
78	Modify the startup feedwater pump so that it can be used as a backup to the emergency feedwater system, including during a station blackout scenario.	Increased reliability of decay heat removal.	Sections 7.3, 8.3, and 9.3 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for AFW events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
79	Replace existing pilot-operated relief valves with larger ones, such that only one is required for successful feed and bleed.	Increased probability of successful feed and bleed.	Already Implemented / Success criteria for feed and bleed cooling is 1 POSRV
Improvemen	nts Related to Heating, Ventilation,	and Air Conditioning	
80	Provide a redundant train or means of ventilation.	Increased availability of components dependent on room cooling.	Sections 7.11, 8.11, and 9.11 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for HVAC events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
81	Add a diesel building high temperature alarm or redundant louver and thermostat.	Improved diagnosis of a loss of diesel building HVAC.	Sections 7.11, 8.11, and 9.11 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for HVAC events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
82	Stage backup fans in switchgear rooms.	Increased availability of ventilation in the event of a loss of switchgear ventilation.	Sections 7.11, 8.11, and 9.11 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for HVAC events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
83	Add a switchgear room high temperature alarm.	Improved diagnosis of a loss of switchgear HVAC.	Already implemented – The temperature switch is provided in the switchgear room. The cubicle cooler in the switchgear room operates automatically by the temperature switch to provide additional cooling as needed. The temperature in the switchgear room is indicated and high-high temperature is announced in the MCR and RSR.N/A – HVAC

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SAMA ID	Potential Enhancement	Result of Potential Enhancement	Qualitative Screening
(NEI-05-01)	(SAMA Title)	Result of 1 otential Enhancement	Quantative Screening
84	Create ability to switch emergency feedwater room fan power supply to station batteries in a station blackout.	Continued fan operation in a station blackout.	Already Implemented / TDAFWPs are designed to operate in severe environments
Improvemen	nts Related to Instrument Air and N	Nitrogen Supply	
85	Provide cross-unit connection of uninterruptible compressed air supply.	Increased ability to vent containment using the hardened vent.	N/A – The submitted design is a single-unit design and enhancement due to a cross-unit connection is not a part of the design certification design.
86	Modify procedure to provide ability to align diesel power to more air compressors.	Increased availability of instrument air after a LOOP.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
87	Replace service and instrument air compressors with more reliable compressors which have self-contained air cooling by shaft driven fans.	Elimination of instrument air system dependence on service water cooling.	Instrument air is a negligible contribution to plant risk. Therefore, any design change related to instrument air would provide a negligible benefit.
88	Install nitrogen bottles as backup gas supply for safety relief valves.	Extended SRV operation time.	Not applicable – the APR1400 uses pilot operated safety relief valves that do not require air to operate.
89	Improve SRV and MSIV pneumatic components.	Improved availability of SRVs and MSIVs.	Sections 7.17, 8.17, and 9.17 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for main steam events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
Improvemen	nts Related to Containment Phenon	nena	
90	Create a reactor cavity flooding system.	Enhanced debris cool ability, reduced core concrete interaction, and increased fission product scrubbing.	Already Implemented / Cavity Flooding System
91	Install a passive containment spray system.	Improved containment spray capability.	Implementation of this SAMDA does not affect CDF and would only cause a reduction in offsite risk costs, which limits potential benefit, or a maximum of \$113,810.
			In reality, the total maximum benefit would be much lower because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. Therefore, this design change would be expected to cost more than this amount and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.

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SAMA ID	Potential Enhancement	Desult of Detential Enhancement	Qualitativa Sanaaning
(NEI-05-01)	(SAMA Title)	Result of Potential Enhancement	Quantative Screening
92	Use the fire water system as a backup source for the containment spray system.	Improved containment spray capability.	Already Implemented / ESBCS.
93	Install an unfiltered, hardened containment vent.	Increased decay heat removal capability for non- ATWS events, without scrubbing released fission products.	Excessive Implementation Cost
94	Install a filtered containment vent to remove decay heat Option 1: Gravel Bed Filter Option 2: Multiple Venturi Scrubber	Increased decay heat removal capability for non- ATWS events, with scrubbing of released fission products.	Excessive Implementation Cost
95	Enhance fire protection system and standby gas treatment system hardware and procedures.	Improved fission product scrubbing in severe accidents.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
96	Provide post-accident containment inerting capability.	Reduced likelihood of hydrogen and carbon monoxide gas combustion.	Excessive Implementation Cost
97	Create a large concrete crucible with heat removal potential to contain molten core debris.	Increased cooling and containment of molten core debris. Molten core debris escaping from the vessel is contained within the crucible and a water cooling mechanism cools the molten core in the crucible, preventing melt-through of the base mat.	Excessive Implementation Cost
98	Create a core melt source reduction system.	Increased cooling and containment of molten core debris. Refractory material would be placed underneath the reactor vessel such that a molten core falling on the material would melt and combine with the material. Subsequent spreading and heat removal from the vitrified compound would be facilitated, and concrete attack would not occur.	Excessive Implementation Cost
99	Strengthen primary/secondary containment (e.g., add ribbing to containment shell).	Reduced probability of containment over- pressurization.	Excessive Implementation Cost
100	Increase depth of the concrete base mat or use an alternate concrete material to ensure melt-through does not occur.	Reduced probability of base mat melt-through.	Excessive Implementation Cost

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SAMA ID (NEI-05-01)	Potential Enhancement (SAMA Title)	Result of Potential Enhancement	Qualitative Screening
101	Provide a reactor vessel exterior cooling system.	Increased potential to cool a molten core before it causes vessel failure, by submerging the lower head in water.	Excessive Implementation Cost
102	Construct a building to be connected to primary/secondary containment and maintained at a vacuum.	Reduced probability of containment over- pressurization.	Excessive Implementation Cost
103	Institute simulator training for severe accident scenarios.	Improved arrest of core melt progress and prevention of containment failure.	N/A - Enhancement due to training is not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development SAMDA.
104	Improve leak detection procedures.	Increased piping surveillance to identify leaks prior to complete failure. Improved leak detection would reduce LOCA frequency.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
105	Delay containment spray actuation after a large LOCA.	Extended reactor water storage tank availability.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
106	Install automatic containment spray pump header throttle valves.	Extended time over which water remains in the reactor water storage tank, when full containment spray flow is not needed.	Already Implemented / All ECCS pumps tanks suction from the IRWST
107	Install a redundant containment spray system.	Increased containment heat removal ability.	Sections 7.6, 8.6, and 9.6 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for containment spray events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
108	Install an independent power supply to the hydrogen control system using either new batteries, a non-safety grade portable generator, existing station batteries, or existing AC/DC independent power supplies, such as the security system diesel.	Reduced hydrogen detonation potential.	Already Implemented / H2 Control System includes 2 redundant passive autocatalytic recombiners system.
109	Install a passive hydrogen control system.	Reduced hydrogen detonation potential.	Already Implemented / H2 Control System includes 2 redundant passive autocatalytic recombiners system.

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SAMA ID (NEI-05-01)	Potential Enhancement (SAMA Title)	Result of Potential Enhancement	Qualitative Screening
110	Erect a barrier that would provide enhanced protection of the containment walls (shell) from ejected core debris	Reduced probability of containment failure.	Implementation of this SAMDA does not affect CDF and would only cause a reduction in offsite risk costs, which limits potential benefit, or a maximum of \$113,810.
	following a core melt scenario at high pressure.		In reality, the total maximum benefit would be much lower because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. Therefore, this design change would be expected to cost more than this amount and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
Improvemen	nts Related to Containment Bypass		
111	Install additional pressure or leak monitoring instruments for detection of ISLOCAs.	Reduced ISLOCA frequency.	Already implemented. Refer to 441-series P&ID.
112	Add redundant and diverse limit switches to each containment isolation valve.	Reduced frequency of containment isolation failure and ISLOCAs.	Already implemented. Refer to 441-series P&ID.
113	Increase leak testing of valves in ISLOCA paths.	Reduced ISLOCA frequency.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
114	Install self-actuating containment isolation valves.	Reduced frequency of isolation failure.	Already Implemented / Containment Isolation System provides automatic and leak tight closure of those valves required to close for containment integrity
115	Locate residual heat removal (RHR) inside containment	Reduced frequency of ISLOCA outside containment.	Excessive Implementation Cost
116	Ensure ISLOCA releases are scrubbed. One method is to plug drains in potential break areas so that break point will be covered with water.	Scrubbed ISLOCA releases.	Implementation of this SAMDA does not affect CDF and would only cause a reduction in offsite risk costs, which limits potential benefit, or a maximum of \$113,810. In reality, the total maximum benefit would be much lower because all offsite consequences would not be eliminated. Therefore, this design change would be expected to cost more than this amount and, as a result, not provide a positive because the second secon

Table 5 (15 of 19)

SAMA ID	Potential Enhancement	Result of Potential Enhancement	Qualitative Screening
(NEI-05-01)	(SAMA Title)	Result of 1 otential Enhancement	Quantative Screening
117	Revise EOPs to improve ISLOCA identification.	Increased likelihood that LOCAs outside containment are identified as such. A plant had a scenario in which an RHR ISLOCA could direct initial leakage back to the pressurizer relief tank, giving indication that the LOCA was inside containment.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
118	Improve operator training on ISLOCA coping.	Decreased ISLOCA consequences.	N/A - Enhancement due to training is not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development SAMDA.
119	Institute a maintenance practice to perform a 100% inspection of steam generator tubes during each refueling outage.	Reduced frequency of steam generator tube ruptures.	Excessive Implementation Cost
120	Replace steam generators with a new design.	Reduced frequency of steam generator tube ruptures.	Excessive Implementation Cost
121	Increase the pressure capacity of the secondary side so that a steam generator tube rupture would not cause the relief valves to lift.	Eliminates release pathway to the environment following a steam generator tube rupture.	Excessive Implementation Cost
122	Install a spray system to depressurize the primary system during a steam generator tube rupture	Enhanced depressurization capabilities during steam generator tube rupture.	Excessive Implementation Cost
123	Proceduralize use of pressurizer vent valves during steam generator tube rupture sequences.	Backup method to using pressurizer sprays to reduce primary system pressure following a steam generator tube rupture.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
124	Provide improved instrumentation to detect steam generator tube ruptures, such as Nitrogen-16 monitors).	Improved mitigation of steam generator tube ruptures.	Already Implemented / H2 Control System includes 2 redundant passive autocatalytic recombiners system.
125	Route the discharge from the main steam safety valves through a structure where a water spray would condense the steam and remove most of the fission products.	Reduced consequences of a steam generator tube rupture.	Already Implemented / See APR1400-CDM Table 3.8.2-2 #11

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SAMA ID (NEI-05-01)	Potential Enhancement (SAMA Title)	Result of Potential Enhancement	Qualitative Screening
126	Install a highly reliable (closed loop) steam generator shell-side heat removal system that relies on natural circulation and stored water sources	Reduced consequences of a steam generator tube rupture.	Excessive Implementation Cost
127	Revise emergency operating procedures to direct isolation of a faulted steam generator.	Reduced consequences of a steam generator tube rupture.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
128	Direct steam generator flooding after a steam generator tube rupture, prior to core damage.	Improved scrubbing of steam generator tube rupture releases.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
129	Vent main steam safety valves in containment.	Reduced consequences of a steam generator tube rupture.	Excessive Implementation Cost
Improvemen	nts Related to ATWS		
130	Add an independent boron injection system.	Improved availability of boron injection during ATWS.	Sections 7.15, 8.15, and 9.15 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for ATWS events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
131	Add a system of relief valves to prevent equipment damage from pressure spikes during an ATWS.	Improved equipment availability after an ATWS.	Sections 7.15, 8.15, and 9.15 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for ATWS events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
132	Provide an additional control system for rod insertion (e.g., AMSAC).	Improved redundancy and reduced ATWS frequency.	Sections 7.15, 8.15, and 9.15 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for ATWS events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
133	Install an ATWS sized filtered containment vent to remove decay heat.	Increased ability to remove reactor heat from ATWS events.	Excessive Implementation Cost

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SAMA ID	Potential Enhancement						
(NEI-05-01)	(SAMA Title)	Result of Potential Enhancement	Qualitative Screening				
134	Revise procedure to bypass MSIV isolation in turbine trip ATWS scenarios.	Affords operators more time to perform actions. Discharge of a substantial fraction of steam to the main condenser (i.e., as opposed to into the primary containment) affords the operator more time to perform actions (e.g., SLC injection, lower water level, depressurize RPV) than if the main condenser was unavailable, resulting in lower human error probabilities.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.				
135	Revise procedure to allow override of low pressure core injection during an ATWS event.	Allows immediate control of low pressure core injection. On failure of high pressure core injection and condensate, some plants direct reactor depressurization followed by five minutes of automatic low pressure core injection.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.				
136	Install motor generator set trip breakers in control room.	Reduced frequency of core damage due to an ATWS.	Sections 7.15, 8.15, and 9.15 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for ATWS events. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.				
137	Provide capability to remove power from the bus powering the control rods.	Decreased time required to insert control rods if the reactor trip breakers fail (during a loss of feedwater ATWS which has rapid pressure excursion).	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.				
Improvemen	nts Related to Internal Flooding						
138	Improve inspection of rubber expansion joints on main condenser.	Reduced frequency of internal flooding due to failure of circulating water system expansion joints.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.				
139	Modify swing direction of doors separating turbine building basement from areas containing safeguards equipment.	Prevents flood propagation.	N/A - This item relates to a specific vulnerability at one station.				
Improvemen	Improvements to Reduce Seismic Risk						
140	Increase seismic ruggedness of plant components.	Increased availability of necessary plant equipment during and after seismic events.	Seismic risk is considered negligible to the APR1400 plant design.				
141	Provide additional restraints for CO2 tanks.	Increased availability of fire protection given a seismic event.	Seismic risk is considered negligible to the APR1400 plant design.				

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SAMA ID (NEI-05-01)	Potential Enhancement (SAMA Title)	Result of Potential Enhancement	Qualitative Screening
Improvemen	ats to Reduce Fire Risk		
142	Replace mercury switches in fire protection system.	Decreased probability of spurious fire suppression system actuation.	N/A – No mercury switches are identified in the APR1400 design.
143	Upgrade fire compartment barriers.	Decreased consequences of a fire.	Sections 7.4, 8.4, and 9.4 evaluate the potential maximum benefit for fire barriers. A design change would be expected to cost more than any potential benefit and, as a result, would not provide a positive benefit.
144	Install additional transfer and isolation switches.	Reduced number of spurious actuations during a fire.	Implementation of this SAMDA would only affect fire risk (at-power and LPSD) which limits potential benefit, or a maximum of \$486,000. Because multiple switches would need to be added, the potential costs are considered excessive.
145	Enhance fire brigade awareness.	Decreased consequences of a fire.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedures/training are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
146	Enhance control of combustibles and ignition sources.	Decreased fire frequency and consequences.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedures/training are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
Other Impro	ovements		
147	Install digital large break LOCA protection system.	Reduced probability of a large break LOCA (a leak before break).	Large break LOCAs are a negligible contribution to plant risk. Therefore, any design change related to instrument air would provide a negligible benefit.
148	Enhance procedures to mitigate large break LOCA.	Reduced consequences of a large break LOCA.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
149	Install computer aided instrumentation system to assist the operator in assessing post-accident plant status.	Improved prevention of core melt sequences by making operator actions more reliable.	N/A – Enhancements to improve procedural compliance are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
150	Improve maintenance procedures.	Improved prevention of core melt sequences by increasing reliability of important equipment.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.

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SAMA ID (NEI-05-01)	Potential Enhancement (SAMA Title)	Result of Potential Enhancement	Qualitative Screening
151	Increase training and operating experience feedback to improve operator response.	Improved likelihood of success of operator actions taken in response to abnormal conditions.	N/A - Enhancement due to training is not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development SAMDA. (Combined into the specific operator action SAMDAs)
152	Develop procedures for transportation and nearby facility accidents.	Reduced consequences of transportation and nearby facility accidents.	N/A - Enhancement due to procedure revisions are not applicable to the design certification stage of plant development.
153	Install secondary side guard pipes up to the main steam isolation valves.	Prevents secondary side depressurization should a steam line break occur upstream of the main steam isolation valves. Also guards against or prevents consequential multiple steam generator tube ruptures following a main steam line break event.	Secondary line breaks are a negligible contribution to plant risk. Therefore, any design change related to instrument air would provide a negligible benefit.

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List of Basic Events from APR1400 PRA CDF Importance Analysis (At-Power Internal Events)

Item No.	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely Importance	Description	Disposition
1	RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW	1.41E-02	28.76%	Operator Fails to Open POSRVs in Early Phase for F&B Operation	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
2	PFLOOP-SI	2.00E-02	19.93%	CONDITIONAL LOOP AFTER INITIATORS WHICH INITIATE AN SI SIGNAL	Conditional LOOP event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
3	%LOOP-GR	1.16E-02	13.38%	GRID-RELATED LOOP	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
4	FWOPH-S-ERY	2.11E-02	11.97%	Operate Fails to Align Startup Feedwater pump PP07 (Early Phase)	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
5	%MLOCA	4.85E-04	11.61%	MEDIUM LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
6	%GTRN	6.56E-01	11.35%	GENERAL TRANSIENT	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
7	%LOOP-SW	9.88E-03	10.73%	SWITCHYARD-CENTERED LOOP	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
8	AFTPR1A-TDP01A	3.52E-02	10.22%	AFW TDP PP01A FAILS TO RUN FOR > 1HR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
9	%LOOP-WE	3.71E-03	9.89%	WEATHER-RELATED LOOP	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
10	AFPVKQ4-TP01A/B/MP02A/B	1.11E-05	9.72%	4/4 CCF OF AFW TDP01A/B/MDP02A/B FAIL TO RUN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.3.3 through 7.3.6. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
11	AFTPR1B-TDP01B	3.52E-02	8.64%	AFW TDP PP01B FAILS TO RUN FOR > 1HR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
12	COMBINATION_130	3.60E+01	8.41%	HEP dependency factor for FWOPH-S-ERY, RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
13	%LSSB-D	7.32E-03	7.59%	LARGE SECONDARY SIDE BREAK (MSIV DOWNDSTREAM)	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
14	DGDGM-A-DGA	1.44E-02	7.27%	DG 01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
15	DGDGM-B-DGB	1.44E-02	6.87%	DG 01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.

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Item	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely	Description	Disposition
110.			Importance		
16	%SGTR	1.31E-03	6.81%	STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
17	DCBTM-B-BT01B	2.72E-03	5.97%	CLASS 1E 125V DC BATTERY BT01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.8.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
18	RAC-16H-WE	1.59E-01	5.89%	NON-RECOVERY PROBABILITY OF OFFSITE POWER WITHIN 16HR (WEATHER RELATED)	This event represents characteristics of the site at which the plant will be located and the probability is based on generic industry data. Design changes to affect the risk from site characteristics are not applicable to the SAMDA analysis and this event is not considered further.
19	%SLOCA	2.40E-03	5.83%	SMALL LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
20	DATGR-S-AACTG	1.57E-01	5.83%	FAILS TO RUN AAC GAS TURBINE GENERATOR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.2.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
21	DCBTM-A-BT01A	2.72E-03	5.43%	CLASS 1E 125V DC BATTERY BT01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.8.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
22	AFMVC1B-046	5.78E-02	5.32%	AFW ISOL. MOV V046 FAILS TO CLOSE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
23	AFMVO1B-046	5.78E-02	5.32%	AFW ISOL. MOV V046 FAILS TO OPEN	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
24	AFMVC1A-045	5.78E-02	5.14%	AFW ISOL. MOV V045 FAILS TO CLOSE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
25	AFMVO1A-045	5.78E-02	5.14%	AFW ISOL. MOV V045 FAILS TO OPEN	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
26	%FWLB	1.74E-03	4.80%	FEEDWATER LINE BREAK	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
27	PI-SGTR	2.70E-02	4.40%	PRESSURE INDUECD SGTR PROBABILITY UNDER LSSB, ATWS, FWLB	This event would affect a portion of offsite consequences only. The benefit of eliminating this failure mode would be negligible.

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Item			Fussell-		
No.	Event Name	Probability	Vesely Importance	Description	Disposition
28	WOCHM2A-CH02A	4.00E-02	4.16%	ECW CHILLER 02A TRAIN UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
29	WOCHM2B-CH02B	4.00E-02	3.90%	ECW CHILLER 02B TRAIN UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.6. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
30	DGDGR-A-DGA	2.50E-02	3.83%	FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
31	DGDGR-C-DGC	2.50E-02	3.76%	FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01C	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
32	DGDGR-D-DGD	2.50E-02	3.49%	FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01D	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
33	IPINM-B-IN01B	2.00E-03	3.48%	CLASS 1E 120V AC INVERTER IN01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.9.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
34	SISPP-S-IRWST	1.22E-05	3.36%	CCF OF IRWST SUMPS DUE TO PLUGGING	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.16.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
35	DGDGR-B-DGB	2.50E-02	3.12%	FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
36	IPINM-A-IN01A	2.00E-03	3.08%	CLASS 1E 120V AC INVERTER IN01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.9.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
37	DGDGM-C-DGC	1.44E-02	2.97%	DG 01C UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.

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Item			Fussell-		
No.	Event Name	Probability	Vesely Importance	Description	Disposition
38	%TLOCCW	2.34E-04	2.95%	TOTAL LOSS OF COMPONANT COOLING WATER	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
39	%TLOESW	2.34E-04	2.95%	TOTAL LOSS OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
40	PFHBO1A-SW01A-H2	6.66E-03	2.94%	PCB SW01A-H2 4.16KV SWGR SW01A FROM UAT FAILS TO OPEN	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.11.6. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit
41	PPSO-AP-LC	1.20E-05	2.92%	CCF OF PPS LC APPLICATION SOFTWARE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.21.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
42	PFHBO1B-SW01B-H2	6.66E-03	2.91%	PCB SW01B-H2 4.16KV SWGR SW01B FROM UAT FAILS TO OPEN	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.11.7. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
43	DGDGM-D-DGD	1.44E-02	2.81%	DG 01D UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
44	%RVR	3.06E-08	2.79%	REACTOR VESSEL RUPTURE	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
45	PFLOOP-NO-SI	2.00E-03	2.62%	CONDITIONAL LOOP AFTER INITIATORS WHICH DO NOT INITIATE AN SI SIGNAL	Conditional LOOP event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
46	WOCHS1A-CH01A	1.30E-02	2.61%	FAILS TO START ECW CHILLER CH01A	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
47	WOCHS1B-CH01B	1.30E-02	2.38%	FAILS TO START ECW CHILLER CH01B	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
48	SXFLP-S-FT0123AB	5.57E-05	2.35%	CCF OF ALL ESW DERIS FILTERS DUE TO PLUGGING	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.17.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
49	SXMPM2A-PP02A	2.64E-02	2.18%	ESW PUMP PP02A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T/M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.17.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.

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Item	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Veselv	Description	Disposition
No.			Importance	ľ	I.
50	I-ATWS-RPMCF	2.98E-07	2.17%	CCF TO SCRAM DUE TO MECHANICAL FAILURES (1HR MT)	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.20. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
51	MSOPV-S-MSIS	1.00E-01	2.13%	OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVERY FOR MSIS	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
52	%LOCV	5.57E-02	2.08%	LOSS OF CONDENCER VACCUM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
53	SXMPM2B-PP02B	2.64E-02	2.05%	ESW PUMP PP02B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T/M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.17.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
54	%LOFW	6.55E-02	2.00%	LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
55	AFTPKD2-TDP01A/B	6.89E-04	1.95%	2/2 CCF OF AFW TDP PP01/A/B FAILS TO RUN > 1 HR	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.3.3 and 7.3.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
56	DGDGKQ4-DG01ABCD	5.95E-05	1.90%	4/4 CCF OF EDG 01A/01B/01C/01D FAIL TO RUN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.1.1 through 7.1.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
57	AFMPM2A-MDP02A	3.98E-03	1.72%	AFW MDP PP02A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T/M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
58	AFTPS1A-TDP01A	6.49E-03	1.70%	AFW TDP PP01A FAILS TO START	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
59	DATGM-S-AACTG	5.00E-02	1.70%	AAC DG UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.2.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
60	WOCHWQ4-CH01A/2A/1B/2B	3.86E-05	1.63%	4/4 CCF OF ECW CHILLERS 1A/2A/1B/2B FAIL TO START	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.15.3 through 7.15.6. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
61	DGDGL-A-DGA	3.78E-03	1.61%	DG A FAILS TO LOAD AND RUN DURING 1ST 1HR OF OPERATION	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.

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Item	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Veselv	Description	Disposition
No.	Event runne	Trobubling	Importance	Description	Disposition
62	DGDGL-B-DGB	3.78E-03	1.51%	DG B FAILS TO LOAD AND RUN DURING 1ST 1HR OF OPERATION	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
63	%LOOP-PL	1.83E-03	1.49%	PLANT-CENTERED LOOP	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
64	MSOPH-S-SGADV-HW	7.45E-02	1.47%	OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN ADVS USING HAND WHEEL	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
65	CSMPM2B-PP01B	7.12E-03	1.42%	CS PUMP PP01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.6.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
66	AFTPS1B-TDP01B	6.49E-03	1.41%	AFW TDP PP01B FAILS TO START	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
67	AFTPM1A-TDP01A	5.39E-03	1.40%	AFW TDP PP01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T/M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
68	DGSQA-A-LOADSQ	3.33E-03	1.39%	LOAD SEQUNCER A FAILS TO OPERATE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
69	RAC-16H-GR	1.01E-02	1.37%	NON-RECOVERY PROBABILITY OF OFFSITE POWER WITHIN 16HR (GRID RELATED)	This event represents characteristics of the site at which the plant will be located and the probability is based on generic industry data. Design changes to affect the risk from site characteristics are not applicable to the SAMDA analysis and this event is not considered further.
70	WOMPM2A-PP02A	1.42E-02	1.36%	ECW PP02A TRAIN UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.18.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
71	CSMPM2A-PP01A	7.12E-03	1.33%	CS PUMP 1 PP01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.6.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
72	DGSQA-B-LOADSQ	3.33E-03	1.29%	LOAD SEQUNCER A FAILS TO OPERATE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.

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Item No.	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely Importance	Description	Disposition
73	FWMPM-S-PP07	7.12E-03	1.26%	START-UP FW PUMP PP07 UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.7. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
74	DCBTM-C-BT01C	2.72E-03	1.24%	CLASS 1E 125V DC BATTERY BT01C UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.8.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
75	DCBTM-D-BT01D	2.72E-03	1.24%	CLASS 1E 125V DC BATTERY BT01D UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.8.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
76	WOMPM2B-PP02B	1.42E-02	1.23%	ECW PP02B TRAIN UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.18.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
77	PFHBO2A-SW01C-C2	6.66E-03	1.23%	PCB SW01C-C2 4.16KV SWGR SW01C FROM UAT FAILS TO OPEN	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.11.7. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
78	PFHBO2B-SW01D-G2	6.66E-03	1.21%	PCB SW01D-G2 4.16KV SWGR SW01D FROM UAT FAILS TO OPEN	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.11.7. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
79	WOCHS2A-CH02A	1.30E-02	1.19%	FAILS TO START ECW CHILLER CH02A	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
80	DGDGS-A-DGA	2.89E-03	1.17%	FAILS TO START OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
81	AFTPM1B-TDP01B	5.39E-03	1.15%	AFW TDP PP01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T/M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
82	CSHEM2B-HE01B	2.50E-03	1.13%	CS HX HE01B FAILS DUE TO TEST/MAINTENANCE	The component associated with this basic event evaluated in Section 7.6.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.

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Item			Fussell-		
No.	Event Name	Probability	Vesely	Description	Disposition
83	AFTPL1A-TDP01A	4.42E-03	1.13%	AFW TDP PP01A FAILS TO RUN FOR < 1HR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide
84	CSHEM2A-HE01A	2.50E-03	1.12%	CS HX HE01A FAILS DUE TO T&M	a positive benefit. The component associated with this basic event evaluated in Section 7.6.6. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
85	WOCHS2B-CH02B	1.30E-02	1.11%	FAILS TO START ECW CHILLER CH02B	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.6. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
86	DGDGS-B-DGB	2.89E-03	1.09%	FAILS TO START OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
87	COMBINATION_2038	7.10E+01	1.08%	HEP dependency factor for MSOPV-S-MSIS, RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
88	%LSSB-U	3.49E-04	1.05%	LARGE SECONDARY SIDE BREAK (MSIV UPSTREAM)	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
89	VOHVM2A-HV33A	2.50E-03	1.05%	CUBICLE COOLER HV33A UAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.21. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
90	AFOPH-S-ALT-LT	7.10E-04	0.96%	Operator Fails to Transfer AFW Source From AFWST to RWT/CST	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
91	RCOPH-S-SDSL	8.10E-03	0.95%	OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN 1 OF 4 SDS VALVE LATE PHASE	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
92	PPSO-AP-GC	1.20E-05	0.93%	CCF OF PPS GC APPLICATION SOFTWARE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.21.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
93	AFTPL1B-TDP01B	4.42E-03	0.93%	AFW TDP PP01B FAILS TO RUN FOR < 1HR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
94	COMBINATION_7	7.12E+00	0.81%	HEP dependency factor for AFOPH-S-ALT- LT, RCOPH-S-SDSL	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
95	SIMPM2A-PP02C	3.88E-03	0.81%	SI PUMP PP02C UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.16.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.

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Item			Fussell-		
No.	Event Name	Probability	Vesely Importance	Description	Disposition
96	WOCHKQ4-CH01A/1B/2A/2B	4.86E-06	0.80%	4/4 CCF OF ECW CHILLERS 1A/2A/1B/2B FAIL TO RUN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Section 7.15.3 through 7.15.6. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
97	CCMVWD2-097/8	1.70E-05	0.76%	2/2 CCF OF CCW MOV V097/098 FAIL TO OPEN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.5.3 and 7.5.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
98	IPINM-C-IN01C	2.00E-03	0.75%	CLASS 1E 120V AC INVERTER IN01C UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.9.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
99	AFMPM2B-MDP02B	3.98E-03	0.75%	AFW MDP PP02B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T/M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.6. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
100	%LLOCA-HL2	5.05E-07	0.73%	LARGE LOCA IN HOT LEG 2 (SDC LOOP2)	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
101	IPINM-D-IN01D	2.00E-03	0.72%	CLASS 1E 120V AC INVERTER IN01D UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.9.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
102	CCMPM2A-PP02A	9.58E-03	0.70%	CCW PUMP PP02A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T/M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.5.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
103	PFHBWQ4-SW2OUAT	2.73E-05	0.70%	4/4 CCF OF PCB BETWEEN UAT & 4.16KV SW01A/1B/1C/1D FAIL TO OPEN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.11.6 through 7.11.9. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit
104	MTC-UET-TTS-0PF	2.70E-02	0.70%	ADVERSE MTC UET PERCENTAGE GIVEN TURBINE TRIP WHEN NO POSRVS FAIL	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
105	DGDGL-C-DGC	3.78E-03	0.69%	DG 01C FAILS TO LOAD AND RUN DURING 1ST 1HR OF OPERATION	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
106	SIMPM2B-PP02D	3.88E-03	0.68%	SI PUMP 4 (PP02D) UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.16.8. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.

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Itom			Fussell-		
No	Event Name	Probability	Vesely	Description	Disposition
110.			Importance		
107	%PLOCCW	2.10E-03	0.67%	PARTIAL LOSS OF COMPONANT COOLING WATER	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
108	RAC-12H-WE	1.97E-01	0.66%	NON-RECOVERY PROBABILITY OF	This event represents characteristics of the site at which the plant
				OFFSITE POWER WITHIN 9.5HR	will be located and the probability is based on generic industry
				(WEATHER RELATED)	data. Design changes to affect the risk from site characteristics are not applicable to the SAMDA analysis and this event is not considered further.
109	CCMPM2B-PP02B	9.58E-03	0.65%	CCW PUMP PP02B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T/M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.6.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
110	DGDGL-D-DGD	3.78E-03	0.65%	DG D FAILS TO LOAD AND RUN	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in
				DURING 1ST 1HR OF OPERATION	Section 7.1.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
111	CSMVWD2-003/004	1.43E-05	0.64%	2/2 CCF OF ISOL. MOV 003/004 IN CS TRS	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in
				HX DISCH. PATH FAIL TO OPEN	Sections 7.6.3 and 7.6.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
112	MSEVY02 011/13	2.25E.05	0.63%	2/2 CCE OF 2/4 MSIV 011/013 FAIL TO	not provide a positive benefit.
112	WISE VAQ2-011/15	2.2312-03	0.0376	CLOSE	
113	MSEVXQ2-011/14	2.25E-05	0.63%	2/2 CCF OF 2/4 MSIV 011/014 FAIL TO CLOSE	
114	MSEVXQ2-012/13	2.25E-05	0.63%	2/2 CCF OF 2/4 MSIV 012/013 FAIL TO CLOSE	
115	MSEVXQ2-012/14	2.25E-05	0.63%	2/2 CCF OF 2/4 MSIV 012/014 FAIL TO CLOSE	
116	DGSQA-C-LOADSQ	3.33E-03	0.60%	LOAD SEQUNCER C FAILS TO OPERATE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
117	VKOPH-S-ECCS	1.00E-01	0.60%	OPERATOR FAILS TO ACTUATE ECCS EXHAUST FAN AH01A/B	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
118	VDHVL-A-HV12A	2.28E-03	0.56%	FAILS TO RUN EDG ROOM CUBICLE COOLER HV12A FOR 1HR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.11. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
119	VDHVL-A-HV13A	2.28E-03	0.56%	FAILS TO RUN EDG ROOM CUBICLE COOLER HV13A FOR 1HR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.16. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.

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Item No.	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely	Description	Disposition
120	DGSQA-D-LOADSQ	3.33E-03	0.56%	LOAD SEQUNCER D FAILS TO OPERATE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
121	SIMPR2A-PP02C	2.83E-03	0.56%	FAILS TO RUN SI PUMP PP02C	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.16.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
122	VDHVL-B-HV12B	2.28E-03	0.52%	FAILS TO RUN EDG ROOM CUBICLE COOLER HV12B FOR 1HR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.11. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
123	VDHVL-B-HV13B	2.28E-03	0.52%	FAILS TO RUN EDG ROOM CUBICLE COOLER HV13B FOR 1HR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.16. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
124	DGDGS-C-DGC	2.89E-03	0.51%	FAILS TO START OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01C	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
125	WOOPH-A-CROSSTIE	5.00E-01	0.50%	OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN 1025A AND ALIGN FLOW PATH	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
126	%PLOESW	1.63E-03	0.50%	PARTIAL LOSS OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis

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List of Basic Events from APR1400 PRA CDF Importance Analysis (At-Power Internal Flooding Events)

Item No.	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely Importance	Description	Disposition
1	RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW	1.41E-02	22.82%	Operator Fails to Open POSRVs in Early Phase for F&B Operation	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
2	PFHBO1A-SW01A-H2	6.66E-03	19.73%	PCB SW01A-H2 4.16KV SWGR SW01A FROM UAT FAILS TO OPEN	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.11.6. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit
3	%IE-078-19B-FP-X	3.32E-04	18.52%	MAJ BRK OF FP PIPING IN RM 078-A19B, 078-A20B, 100-A10B OR 120-A11B	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
4	%IE-100-20A-FP-X	3.18E-04	17.88%	MAJ BRK OF FP PIPING IN A QUAD 100 FT EL RM 100-A20A AND OTHERS	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
5	PFHBO1B-SW01B-H2	6.66E-03	17.25%	PCB SW01B-H2 4.16KV SWGR SW01B FROM UAT FAILS TO OPEN	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.11.7. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
6	%IE-078-19A-FP-X	2.83E-04	16.03%	MAJ BRK (VARIOUS GPM) IN FP PIPING IN 078-A19A AND OTHER A QUAD RMS	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
7	%IE-078-44B-FP-X	2.07E-04	12.03%	MAJ BRK IN FP PIPING IN B QUAD 78 FT EL RM 078-A44B AND OTHER B QUAD RMS	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
8	PFHBWQ4-SW2OUAT	2.73E-05	11.68%	4/4 CCF OF PCB BETWEEN UAT & 4.16KV SW01A/1B/1C/1D FAIL TO OPEN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.11.6 through 7.11.9. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit
9	AFMVC1A-045	5.78E-02	9.62%	AFW ISOL. MOV V045 FAILS TO CLOSE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
10	AFMVO1A-045	5.78E-02	9.62%	AFW ISOL. MOV V045 FAILS TO OPEN	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
11	FPOPH-1-ISO-FL	9.48E-03	8.83%	Operator fails to isolate FP break with less than 20 minutes available	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
12	AFMVC1B-046	5.78E-02	8.62%	AFW ISOL. MOV V046 FAILS TO CLOSE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.

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Itom			Fussell-		
No	Event Name	Probability	Vesely	Description	Disposition
110.			Importance		
13	AFMVO1B-046	5.78E-02	8.62%	AFW ISOL. MOV V046 FAILS TO OPEN	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
14	FPOPH-2-ISO-FL	8.00E-03	7.71%	Operator fails to isolate FP break with between 20 and 40 minutes available	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
15	COMBINATION_60	7.10E+01	7.24%	HEP dependency factor for FPOPH-1-ISO-FL, RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
16	WOCHM2A-CH02A	4.00E-02	6.93%	ECW CHILLER 02A TRAIN UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
17	WOCHM2B-CH02B	4.00E-02	6.62%	ECW CHILLER 02B TRAIN UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.6. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
18	AFTPR1A-TDP01A	3.52E-02	6.18%	AFW TDP PP01A FAILS TO RUN FOR > 1HR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
19	%IE-078-19B-FP-M	1.27E-04	5.88%	MOD BRK OF FP PIPING IN RM 078-A19B, 078-A20B, 100-A10B OR 120-A11B	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
20	AFTPR1B-TDP01B	3.52E-02	5.60%	AFW TDP PP01B FAILS TO RUN FOR > 1HR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
21	PPSO-AP-LC	1.20E-05	5.26%	CCF OF PPS LC APPLICATION SOFTWARE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.21.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
22	%IE-078-01D-FP-X	1.62E-04	5.18%	MAJ BRK (VARIOUS GPM) IN FP PIPING IN 078-A01D AND OTHER B QUAD RMS	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
23	PFHBO2A-SW01C-C2	6.66E-03	5.02%	PCB SW01C-C2 4.16KV SWGR SW01C FROM UAT FAILS TO OPEN	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.11.8. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
24	AFOPH-1-ISO-FL	1.00E+00	4.70%	Operator fails to isolate major break of AF piping in TDAFP room.	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
25	%IE-078-15D-AF-X	1.88E-05	4.60%	MAJ BRK (>3200 GPM) IN AF PIPING IN D QUAD 78 FT EL RM 078-A15D	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
26	%IE-078-10C-FP-X	3.33E-04	4.42%	MAJ BRK (>3700 GPM) IN FP PIPING IN C QUAD 78 FT EL RM 078-A10C	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis

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Item	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Veselv	Description	Disposition
No.			Importance	F	F
27	COMBINATION_62	7.10E+01	4.33%	HEP dependency factor for FPOPH-2-ISO-FL, RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
28	SXMPM2A-PP02A	2.64E-02	4.28%	ESW PUMP PP02A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T/M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.17.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
29	SXMPM2B-PP02B	2.64E-02	4.15%	ESW PUMP PP02B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T/M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.17.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
30	AFMPM2A-MDP02A	3.98E-03	3.78%	AFW MDP PP02A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T/M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
31	PFHBO2B-SW01D-G2	6.66E-03	3.62%	PCB SW01D-G2 4.16KV SWGR SW01D FROM UAT FAILS TO OPEN	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.11.9. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
32	%IE-078-19A-FP-M	7.89E-05	3.62%	MOD BRK (VARIOUS GPM) IN FP PIPING IN 078-A19A AND OTHER A QUAD RMS	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
33	WOOPH-B-1/2B	2.06E-02	3.42%	OPERATOR FAILS TO OPERATE ECW PUMPS PP01/2B	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
34	PFHBWQ2-SW2OUATAC	6.03E-05	3.38%	2/4 CCF OF PCB BETWEEN UAT & 4.16KV SW01A/1C FAIL TO OPEN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.11.6 through 7.11.9. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit
35	PFHBWQ3-SW2OUATACD	1.65E-05	3.26%	3/4 CCF OF PCB BETWEEN UAT & 4.16KV SW01A/1C/1D FAIL TO OPEN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.11.6 through 7.11.9. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit
36	AFOPH-S-ALT-LT	7.10E-04	3.24%	Operator Fails to Transfer AFW Source From AFWST to RWT/CST	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
37	AFMPM2B-MDP02B	3.98E-03	3.22%	AFW MDP PP02B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T/M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.6. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
38	PFHBWQ3-SW2OUATBCD	1.65E-05	2.91%	3/4 CCF OF PCB BETWEEN UAT & 4.16KV SW01B/1C/1D FAIL TO OPEN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.11.6 through 7.11.9. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit
39	WOOPH-A-1/2A	2.06E-02	2.76%	OPERATOR FAILS TO OPERATE ECW PUMPS PP01/2A	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis

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Item	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely	Description	Disposition
190.		-	Importance	_	-
40	%IE-100-10B-FP-X	5.42E-05	2.74%	MAJ BRK (>1445 GPM) IN FP PIPING IN B QUAD 100 FT EL RM 100-A10B	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
41	PFHBWQ2-SW2OUATBD	6.03E-05	2.74%	2/4 CCF OF PCB BETWEEN UAT & 4.16KV SW01B/1D FAIL TO OPEN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.11.6 through 7.11.9. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit
42	RCOPH-S-SDSL	8.10E-03	2.73%	OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN 1 OF 4 SDS VALVE LATE PHASE	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
43	DGDGR-D-DGD	2.50E-02	2.58%	FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01D	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
44	WOMPM2A-PP02A	1.42E-02	2.50%	ECW PP02A TRAIN UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.18.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
45	DGDGR-C-DGC	2.50E-02	2.40%	FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01C	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
46	VOHVM2A-HV33A	2.50E-03	2.34%	CUBICLE COOLER HV33A UAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.21. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
47	WOMPM2B-PP02B	1.42E-02	2.22%	ECW PP02B TRAIN UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.18.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
48	WOCHS2A-CH02A	1.30E-02	2.15%	FAILS TO START ECW CHILLER CH02A	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
49	COMBINATION_110	1.10E+01	2.10%	HEP dependency factor for AFOPH-1-ISO- FL, RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
50	WOCHS2B-CH02B	1.30E-02	2.05%	FAILS TO START ECW CHILLER CH02B	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.6. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
51	VOHVM1B-HV33B	2.50E-03	2.00%	CUBICLE COOLER HV33B UAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.22. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.

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Item No.	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely Importance	Description	Disposition
52	%IE-078-31A-FP-X	2.37E-04	1.97%	MAJ BRK (> 3900 GPM) IN FP PIPING IN A QUAD 78 FT EL RM 078-A31A	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
53	FPOPH-3DEP-ISO-FL	2.93E-03	1.97%	Operator fails to isolate major break of FP piping in 078-A31A before 18-inches of accumulation.	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
54	PFHBWQ3-SW2OUATABC	1.65E-05	1.86%	3/4 CCF OF PCB BETWEEN UAT & 4.16KV SW01A/1B/1C FAIL TO OPEN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.11.6 through 7.11.9. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit
55	DCBTM-A-BT01A	2.72E-03	1.71%	CLASS 1E 125V DC BATTERY BT01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.8.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
56	DCBTM-B-BT01B	2.72E-03	1.56%	CLASS 1E 125V DC BATTERY BT01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.8.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
57	PFHBC1A-SW01A-A2	6.66E-03	1.50%	PCB SW01A-A2 OF 4.16KV SWGR SW01A FAILS TO CLOSE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.11.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
58	CCMPM2A-PP02A	9.58E-03	1.49%	CCW PUMP PP02A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T/M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.5.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
59	DGDGM-D-DGD	1.44E-02	1.45%	DG 01D UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
60	COMBINATION_64	2.42E+04	1.45%	HEP dependency factor for FPOPH-2-ISO-FL, RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW, FPOPH-3DEP-ISO-FL	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
61	NPXHM-M-SAT02M	1.75E-03	1.45%	SAT TR02M UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.11.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
62	CCMPM2B-PP02B	9.58E-03	1.44%	CCW PUMP PP02B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T/M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.5.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.

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Itom			Fussell-		
No	Event Name	Probability	Vesely	Description	Disposition
110.			Importance		
63	DGDGR-B-DGB	2.50E-02	1.38%	FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in
				GENERATOR DG01B	Section 7.1.2. A design change would be expected to cost more
					than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide
()	NEWLINA N. CATOONI	1.75E.02	1 270/	CAT TRONULNIAVAILARIE DUE TO	a positive benefit.
04	NPAHM-N-SAT02N	1./5E-05	1.37%	SAT IKU2N UNAVAILABLE DUE IU T&M	Section 7.11.2 A design change would be expected to cost more
					than the total maximum cost reduction and as a result not provide
					a positive benefit.
65	PFHBC1B-SW01B-A2	6.66E-03	1.37%	PCB SW01B-A2 OF 4.16KV SWGR SW01B	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in
				FAILS TO CLOSE	Section 7.11.4. A design change would be expected to cost more
					than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide
					a positive benefit.
66	DGDGM-C-DGC	1.44E-02	1.35%	DG 01C UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in
					Section 7.1.3. A design change would be expected to cost more
					than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide
67	CDOBILS ALICN	8 60E 04	1 270/	Onereter Fails to Align the Manual Values and	a positive benefit.
07	CDOPH-S-ALION	8.00E-04	1.2/70	start CD numps for Hotwell Makeun	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
68	%IE-078-01D-FP-M	5 24E-05	1 22%	MOD BRK (VARIOUS GPM) IN FP PIPING	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
	,			IN 078-A01D AND OTHER B QUAD RMS	
69	%IE-TB-MISC	1.17E-02	1.17%	ANY TB FLOOD <400,000 GPM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
70	DGDGR-A-DGA	2 50E-02	1.07%	FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEI	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in
70	DODOR-A-DOA	2.501-02	1.0770	GENERATOR DG01A	Section 7.1.1 A design change would be expected to cost more
					than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide
					a positive benefit.
71	PFHBWQ3-SW2OUATABD	1.65E-05	1.05%	3/4 CCF OF PCB BETWEEN UAT & 4.16KV	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in
				SW01A/1B/1D FAIL TO OPEN	Sections 7.11.6 through 7.11.9. A design change would be
					expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and,
		6 405 03	1.010/		as a result, not provide a positive benefit
72	AFTPS1A-TDP01A	6.49E-03	1.01%	AFW TDP PP01A FAILS TO START	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in
					Section 7.3.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum agat reduction and aga regult, not provide
					a positive benefit
73	AFTPS1B-TDP01B	6 49E-03	0.93%	AFW TDP PP01B FAILS TO START	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in
15		0.172 05	0.9570	n wibi morbines to sinki	Section 7.3.4. A design change would be expected to cost more
					than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide
					a positive benefit.
74	WOCHR1A-CH01A	7.32E-04	0.90%	FAILS TO RUN ECW CHILLER CH01A	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in
				FOR 24 HOURS	Section 7.15.3. A design change would be expected to cost more
					than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide
					a positive benefit.

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Itom			Fussell-		
No.	Event Name	Probability	Vesely	Description	Disposition
75		5 20E 02	Importance		The community of the device basis and is made dia
/5	AF IPMIA-IDP0IA	5.39E-03	0.83%	AFW IDP PP0IA UNAVAILABLE DUE IO T/M	Section 7.3.3 A design change would be expected to cost more
				1/141	than the total maximum cost reduction and as a result not provide
					a positive benefit.
76	IPINM-A-IN01A	2.00E-03	0.81%	CLASS 1E 120V AC INVERTER IN01A	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in
				UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	Section 7.9.1. A design change would be expected to cost more
					than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide
77	0/1E 120 11D ED X	1.705.05	0.010/	MALDRY (* 1100 CDM) OF FD DIDDIC DUD	a positive benefit.
//	%IE-120-11B-FP-X	1./0E-05	0.81%	MAJ BKK (>1180 GPM) OF FP PIPING IN B	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
				A13B	
78	DGDGM-B-DGB	1.44E-02	0.79%	DG 01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in
					Section 7.1.2. A design change would be expected to cost more
					than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide
-			0 = (0/		a positive benefit.
79	AFTPM1B-TDP01B	5.39E-03	0.76%	AFW TDP PP01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO	The component associated with this basic event is
				1/M	evaluated in Section 7.3.4. A design change would be expected
					result not provide a positive benefit
80	%IE-100-37B-FP-X	944E-05	0.74%	MOD BRK OF FP PIPING IN B OUAD 100	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
00		<i></i>	01, 1,0	FT EL RM 100-A37B AND OTHERS	
81	IPINM-B-IN01B	2.00E-03	0.74%	CLASS 1E 120V AC INVERTER IN01B	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in
				UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	Section 7.9.2. A design change would be expected to cost more
					than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide
02		8 20E 04	0.740/	ΕΛΗ Ο ΤΟ ΟΤΑΡΤ ΟΕ ΜΑΕΡΡΟΟΜΑ	a positive benefit.
82	VORVSZA-RVSSA	0.29E-04	0.7470	CUBICLE COOLED HV33A	Section 7.15.21 A design change would be expected to cost
				COBICLE COOLER IIV55A	more than the total maximum cost reduction and as a result not
					provide a positive benefit.
83	AFPVKQ4-TP01A/B/MP02A/B	1.11E-05	0.70%	4/4 CCF OF AFW TDP01A/B/MDP02A/B	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in
	-			FAIL TO RUN	Sections 7.3.3 through 7.3.6. A design change would be expected
					to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a
	P. (79, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10		0.000/		result, not provide a positive benefit.
84	RCPVO-A-200	3.54E-03	0.68%	POSRV V200 FAILS TO OPEN	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in
				(HARDWARE FAIL)	Section /.12.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum post reduction and as a result, not provide
					a nositive benefit
85	RCPVO-C-201	3.54E-03	0.68%	POSRV V201 FAILS TO OPEN	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in
		2.2 .2 05	0.0070	(HARDWARE FAIL)	Section 7.12.2. A design change would be expected to cost more
				· · · ·	than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide
					a positive benefit.

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Item No.	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely Importance	Description	Disposition
86	AFTPL1A-TDP01A	4.42E-03	0.66%	AFW TDP PP01A FAILS TO RUN FOR < 1HR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
87	FWOPH-S-LNG	3.00E-03	0.66%	OPERATOR FAILS TO ALINE STARTUP FEEDWATER PUMP PP07 (LATE PHASE)	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
88	RCPVO-B-202	3.54E-03	0.66%	POSRV V202 FAILS TO OPEN (HARDWARE FAIL)	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.12.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
89	RCPVO-D-203	3.54E-03	0.66%	POSRV V203 FAILS TO OPEN (HARDWARE FAIL)	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.12.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
90	COMBINATION_61	4.50E+00	0.65%	HEP dependency factor for WOOPH-B-1/2B, RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
91	COMBINATION_7	7.12E+00	0.65%	HEP dependency factor for AFOPH-S-ALT- LT, RCOPH-S-SDSL	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
92	CSMPM2A-PP01A	7.12E-03	0.64%	CS PUMP 1 PP01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.6.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
93	FWOPH-S-ERY	2.11E-02	0.64%	Operator Fails to Align Startup Feedwater pump PP07 (Early Phase)	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
94	VOHVS2B-HV33B	8.29E-04	0.63%	FAILS TO START OF MAFP ROOM B CUBICLE COOLER HV33B	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.22. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
95	COMBINATION_1	4.21E+02	0.61%	HEP dependency factor for AFOPH-S-ALT- LT, CDOPH-S-ALIGN, RCOPH-S-SDSL	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
96	DGDGM-A-DGA	1.44E-02	0.61%	DG 01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
97	AFTPL1B-TDP01B	4.42E-03	0.61%	AFW TDP PP01B FAILS TO RUN FOR < 1HR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
98	COMBINATION_63	4.50E+00	0.61%	HEP dependency factor for WOOPH-A-1/2A, RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis

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T4			Fussell-		
Item No	Event Name	Probability	Vesely	Description	Disposition
190.			Importance		-
99	PFHBC2A-SW01C-A2	6.66E-03	0.59%	PCB SW01C-A2 OF 4.16KV SWGR SW01C FAILS TO CLOSE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.11.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
100	SXCTM-2A-CT02A	4.00E-03	0.59%	SXCT CT02A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	
101	WOCHR1B-CH01B	7.32E-04	0.59%	FAILS TO RUN ECW CHILLER 01B FOR 24 HOURS	
102	VGAHM2A-AH02A	4.00E-03	0.59%	ESW PUMP A FAN 605-VG-AH02A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	
103	SXCTM-2B-CT02B	4.00E-03	0.57%	SXCT CT02B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	
104	VGAHM2B-AH02B	4.00E-03	0.57%	ESW PUMP B FAN 605-VG-AH02B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	
105	VGAHS2A-AH02A	3.86E-03	0.56%	FAILS TO START OF EWS PUMP ROOM I. SUPPLY FAN AH02A	
106	VGAHS2B-AH02B	3.86E-03	0.54%	FAILS TO START EWS PUMP ROOM II. SUPPLY FAN AH02B	
107	PFLOOP-NO-SI	2.00E-03	0.54%	CONDITIONAL LOOP AFTER INITIATORS WHICH DO NOT INITIATE AN SI SIGNAL	Conditional LOOP event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
108	PPSO-OS-PPS	1.20E-06	0.53%	CCF OF PPS OPERATING SYSTEM SOFTWARE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.21.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
109	PFHBWQ2-SW2OUATAD	6.03E-05	0.51%	2/4 CCF OF PCB BETWEEN UAT & 4.16KV SW01A/1D FAIL TO OPEN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.11.6 through 7.11.9. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit
110	PFHBWQ2-SW2OUATBC	6.03E-05	0.50%	2/4 CCF OF PCB BETWEEN UAT & 4.16KV SW01B/1C FAIL TO OPEN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.11.6 through 7.11.9. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit
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List of Basic Events from APR1400 PRA CDF Importance Analysis (At-Power Internal Fire Events)

Item No.	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely Importance	Description	Disposition
1	ASD-CDF	1.00E-01	27.66%	FAILURE OF ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN AFTER MCR EVACUATION (CORE DAMAGE)	This event represents operator actions and procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
2	RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW	2.59E-02	13.92%	Operator Fails to Open POSRVs in Early Phase for F&B Operation	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
3	%F157-AMCR-4-4	2.36E-06	10.63%	FIRE IN F157-AMCR - TRANSIENT FIRE - UNSUPPRESSED - ASD	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
4	%F000-TB-LOOP2	3.52E-04	8.13%	FIRE IN F000-TB-LOOP2 - TB FIRES LEADING TO LOOP (SEVERE)	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
5	AFOPH-S-ALT-LT	3.86E-03	7.54%	Operator Fails to Transfer AFW Source From AFWST to RWT/CST	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
6	%F157-AMCR-3-4	1.51E-06	6.83%	FIRE IN F157-AMCR - SAFETY CONSOLE FIRE - UNSUPPRESSED - ASD	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
7	RCOPH-S-SDSL	8.99E-03	5.53%	OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN 1 OF 4 SDS VALVE LATE PHASE	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
8	RCOPH-S-RCPTRIP	5.63E-02	5.52%	Operator Fails to Trip RCPs Following Loss of Seal Cooling	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
9	%F078-A19B-U	7.27E-04	5.23%	FIRE IN F078-A19B - CORRIDOR - UNSUPPRESSED	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
10	AFMVC1A-045	5.78E-02	5.12%	AFW ISOL. MOV V045 FAILS TO CLOSE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
11	AFMVO1A-045	5.78E-02	5.12%	AFW ISOL. MOV V045 FAILS TO OPEN	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
12	PPSO-AP-LC	1.20E-05	5.03%	CCF OF PPS LC APPLICATION SOFTWARE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.21.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
13	DATGR-S-AACTG	1.57E-01	4.96%	FAILS TO RUN AAC GAS TURBINE GENERATOR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.2.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
14	%F000-ADGC	1.44E-03	4.89%	FIRE IN F000-ADGC - DG01C DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis

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Item No	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely	Description	Disposition
190.			Importance	_	
15	DGDGR-B-DGB	2.50E-02	4.83%	FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
16	%F122-T01-U	7.61E-04	4.66%	FIRE IN F122-T01-U - F122-T01 Unsuppressed Fires	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
17	AFTPR1A-TDP01A	3.52E-02	4.26%	AFW TDP PP01A FAILS TO RUN FOR > 1HR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
18	DGDGR-A-DGA	2.50E-02	4.21%	FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
19	AFMPM2A-MDP02A	3.98E-03	4.19%	AFW MDP PP02A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T/M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
20	NPXHM-N-SAT02N	1.75E-03	3.54%	SAT TR02N UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.11.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
21	%F157-AMCR-1-4	7.57E-07	3.42%	FIRE IN F157-AMCR - CCTV FIRE - UNSUPPRESSED - ASD	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
22	%F157-AMCR-2-4	7.57E-07	3.42%	FIRE IN F157-AMCR - FIRE CONTROL PANEL FIRE - UNSUPPRESSED - ASD	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
23	FWOPH-S-LNG	6.15E-03	3.28%	OPERATOR FAILS TO ALINE STARTUP FEEDWATER PUMP PP07 (LATE PHASE)	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
24	WOCHM2A-CH02A	4.00E-02	3.27%	ECW CHILLER 02A TRAIN UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
25	%F100-T15-U	5.39E-04	3.20%	FIRE IN F100-T15 - SWITCHGEAR RM - UNSUPPRESSED	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
26	AFMVC1B-046	5.78E-02	3.05%	AFW ISOL. MOV V046 FAILS TO CLOSE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
27	AFMVO1B-046	5.78E-02	3.05%	AFW ISOL. MOV V046 FAILS TO OPEN	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.

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Itom			Fussell-		
No.	Event Name	Probability	Vesely	Description	Disposition
			Importance		
28	COMBINATION_2-F	5.91E+01	2.90%	HEP dependency factor for AFOPH-S-ALT- LT, FWOPH-S-LNG, RCOPH-S-SDSL	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
29	PFLOOP-NO-SI	2.00E-03	2.83%	CONDITIONAL LOOP AFTER INITIATORS WHICH DO NOT INITIATE AN SI SIGNAL	Conditional LOOP event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
30	WOCHM2B-CH02B	4.00E-02	2.82%	ECW CHILLER 02B TRAIN UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.6. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
31	AFTPR1B-TDP01B	3.52E-02	2.78%	AFW TDP PP01B FAILS TO RUN FOR > 1HR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
32	DGDGM-B-DGB	1.44E-02	2.75%	DG 01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
33	VOHVM2A-HV33A	2.50E-03	2.62%	CUBICLE COOLER HV33A UAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.21. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
34	FWOPH-S-ERY	7.77E-03	2.54%	Operate Fails to Align Startup Feedwater pump PP07 (Early Phase)	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
35	SXFLP-S-FT0123AB	5.57E-05	2.41%	CCF OF ALL ESW DERIS FILTERS DUE TO PLUGGING	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.17.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
36	DGDGM-A-DGA	1.44E-02	2.36%	DG 01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
37	DGDGKQ4-DG01ABCD	5.95E-05	2.29%	4/4 CCF OF EDG 01A/01B/01C/01D FAIL TO RUN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.1.1 through 7.1.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
38	COMBINATION_11-F	1.98E+01	2.24%	HEP dependency factor for FWOPH-S-ERY, RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
39	DCBTM-B-BT01B	2.72E-03	2.10%	CLASS 1E 125V DC BATTERY BT01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.8.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.

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Item No.	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely Importance	Description	Disposition
40	COMBINATION_3-F	6.51E+00	2.10%	HEP dependency factor for AFOPH-S-ALT- LT, RCOPH-S-SDSL	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
41	BF_F120-AGAC_F120-AGAD	1.20E-03	1.92%	BARRIER FAILURE BETWEEN FIRE COMPS F120-AGAC & F120-AGAD	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.4.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
42	DGDGR-D-DGD	2.50E-02	1.90%	FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01D	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
43	AFMPM2B-MDP02B	3.98E-03	1.84%	AFW MDP PP02B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T/M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.6. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
44	%F157-AMCR-5-4	4.04E-07	1.82%	FIRE IN F157-AMCR - TRANSIENT W/C FIRE - UNSUPPRESSED - ASD	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
45	%F078-A19A	3.93E-04	1.81%	FIRE IN F078-A19A - CORRIDOR	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
46	%F100-A08C-U	5.02E-04	1.79%	FIRE IN F100-A08C - N1E DC & IP EQUIPMENT RM C - UNSUPPRESSED	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
47	%F000-AFHL	1.75E-03	1.76%	FIRE IN F000-AFHL - FUEL HANDLING LOWER AREA	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
48	%F120-AGAC	2.86E-04	1.71%	FIRE IN F120-AGAC - GENERAL ACCESS AREA-120' C	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
49	%F067-T02-U	7.75E-05	1.68%	FIRE IN F067-T02 - UNDERGROUND COMMON TUNNEL - UNSUPPRESSED	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
50	NPXHM-M-SAT02M	1.75E-03	1.63%	SAT TR02M UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.11.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
51	DGDGR-C-DGC	2.50E-02	1.57%	FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01C	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
52	%F157-AMCR-6-4	3.43E-07	1.55%	FIRE IN F157-AMCR - CABLE W/C FIRE - UNSUPPRESSED - ASD	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
53	%F120-A09D	2.15E-04	1.53%	FIRE IN F120-A09D - ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ROOM D	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
54	%F000-ADGD-U	3.63E-04	1.52%	FIRE IN F000-ADGD - DG01D ROOM - UNSUPPRESSED FIRES	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis

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Item No	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely	Description	Disposition
110.			Importance		
55	PFHBC1A-SW01A-A2	6.66E-03	1.48%	PCB SW01A-A2 OF 4.16KV SWGR SW01A FAILS TO CLOSE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.11.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
56	WOCHWQ4-CH01A/2A/1B/2B	3.86E-05	1.48%	4/4 CCF OF ECW CHILLERS 1A/2A/1B/2B FAIL TO START	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.15.3 through 7.15.6. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
57	DATGM-S-AACTG	5.00E-02	1.47%	AAC DG UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.2.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
58	%F078-A52D-U	3.48E-04	1.45%	FIRE IN F078-A52D - 480V N1E MCC RM - UNSUPPRESSED	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
59	%F120-A05C-U	2.98E-04	1.42%	FIRE IN F120-A05C - ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT RM C - UNSUPPRESSED	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
60	SXMPM2B-PP02B	2.64E-02	1.40%	ESW PUMP PP02B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T/M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.17.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
61	DCBTM-A-BT01A	2.72E-03	1.39%	CLASS 1E 125V DC BATTERY BT01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.8.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
62	WOCHR1A-CH01A	7.32E-04	1.37%	FAILS TO RUN ECW CHILLER CH01A FOR 24 HOURS	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
63	%F120-AGAD-U	2.42E-04	1.29%	FIRE IN F120-AGAD - GENERAL ACCESS AREA-120' D - UNSUPPRESSED	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
64	SXMPM2A-PP02A	2.64E-02	1.29%	ESW PUMP PP02A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T/M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.17.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
65	%F100-AEEB-U	3.02E-04	1.28%	FIRE IN F100-AEEB - 480V CLASS 1E MCC 01B RM - UNSUPPRESSED	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
66	%F073-T11	1.61E-03	1.21%	FIRE IN F073-T11 - SWITCHGEAR AREA	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
67	%F120-A09C-U	1.96E-05	1.18%	FIRE IN F120-A09C - ELECTRICAL PENETRATION RM C - UNSUPPRESSED	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis

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Itom			Fussell-		
No	Event Name	Probability	Vesely	Description	Disposition
110.			Importance		
68	SIVVT1B-V959	9.22E-05	1.16%	SI PUMP PP02B/D MINI. FLOW LINE MANUAL VALVE 959 FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.16.9. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
69	AFPVKQ4-TP01A/B/MP02A/B	1.11E-05	1.16%	4/4 CCF OF AFW TDP01A/B/MDP02A/B FAIL TO RUN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.3.3 through 7.3.6. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
70	PFHBC1B-SW01B-A2	6.66E-03	1.15%	PCB SW01B-A2 OF 4.16KV SWGR SW01B FAILS TO CLOSE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.11.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
71	VOHVM1B-HV33B	2.50E-03	1.14%	CUBICLE COOLER HV33B UAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.22. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
72	PFLOOP-SI	2.00E-02	1.13%	CONDITIONAL LOOP AFTER INITIATORS WHICH INITIATE AN SI SIGNAL	Conditional LOOP event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
73	%F055-AGAC-U	2.05E-04	1.04%	FIRE IN F055-AGAC - GENERAL ACCESS AREA-55' C - UNSUPPRESSED	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
74	DGDGM-D-DGD	1.44E-02	1.02%	DG 01D UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
75	WOCHS1B-CH01B	1.30E-02	1.01%	FAILS TO START ECW CHILLER CH01B	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
76	%F078-AGAC-U	1.39E-04	1.01%	FIRE IN F078-AGAC - GENERAL ACCESS AREA-78' C - UNSUPPRESSED	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
77	WOCHS2A-CH02A	1.30E-02	1.01%	FAILS TO START ECW CHILLER CH02A	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
78	%F000-ACV	6.04E-04	1.00%	FIRE IN F000-ACV - CVCS ACCESS AREA	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
79	%F100-AGAC	1.26E-04	0.97%	FIRE IN F100-AGAC - GENERAL ACCESS AREA	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
80	%F078-AEEB-U	1.36E-04	0.96%	FIRE IN F078-AEEB - CLASS 1E SWITCHGEAR 01B ROOM - UNSUPPRESSED	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis

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Item No	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely	Description	Disposition
190.		_	Importance	_	-
81	WOCHS1A-CH01A	1.30E-02	0.96%	FAILS TO START ECW CHILLER CH01A	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
82	WOMPM2A-PP02A	1.42E-02	0.91%	ECW PP02A TRAIN UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.18.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
83	BF_F078-AGAC_F078-AGAD	9.80E-03	0.90%	BARRIER FAILURE BETWEEN FIRE COMPS F078-AGAC & F078-AGAD	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.4.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
84	%F137-A05D	1.55E-04	0.90%	FIRE IN F137-A05D - PCS RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
85	ASD-CDF-MCA	1.00E-02	0.87%	FAILURE OF ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN AFTER MCR EVACUATION (CORE DAMAGE) - MC EVENT	This event represents operator actions and procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
86	%F000-TB-GTRN	3.08E-02	0.86%	FIRE IN F000-TB-GTR - TB FIRES LEADING TO GTRN	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
87	WOCHS2B-CH02B	1.30E-02	0.86%	FAILS TO START ECW CHILLER CH02B	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.6. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
88	CDOPH-S-ALIGN	9.43E-03	0.86%	Operator Fails to Align the Manual Valves and start CD pumps for Hotwell Makeup	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
89	VOHVS2A-HV33A	8.29E-04	0.85%	FAILS TO START OF MAFP ROOM A CUBICLE COOLER HV33A	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.21. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
90	RCPVO-A-200	3.54E-03	0.84%	POSRV V200 FAILS TO OPEN (HARDWARE FAIL)	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.12.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
91	RCPVO-C-201	3.54E-03	0.84%	POSRV V201 FAILS TO OPEN (HARDWARE FAIL)	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.12.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
92	WOMPM2B-PP02B	1.42E-02	0.84%	ECW PP02B TRAIN UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.18.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.

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Item	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely	Description	Disposition
INO.			Importance		×
93	DGDGM-C-DGC	1.44E-02	0.83%	DG 01C UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
94	%F120-A01D	2.62E-05	0.79%	FIRE IN F120-A01D - PIPING CABLE AREA	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
95	%F157-ACPX-U	9.36E-05	0.75%	FIRE IN F157-ACPX - COMPUTER ROOM - UNSUPPRESSED	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
96	%F000-ACVU-U	2.13E-04	0.75%	FIRE IN F000-ACVU - CVCS SYSTEM AREA - UNSUPPRESSED	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
97	COMBINATION_26-F	1.78E+01	0.74%	HEP dependency factor for CVOPH-S- RCPSEAL, RCOPH-S-RCPTRIP	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
98	CVOPH-S-RCPSEAL	5.64E-02	0.74%	Operator Fails to Operate Auxiliary Charging Pump for RCP Seal Injection	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
99	%F157-A01D-U	1.69E-04	0.74%	FIRE IN F157-A01D - I & C EQUIP. RM - UNSUPPRESSED	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
100	AFTPS1A-TDP01A	6.49E-03	0.73%	AFW TDP PP01A FAILS TO START	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
101	%F120-A15B-U	1.73E-04	0.72%	FIRE IN F120-A15B - 480V CLASS 1E MCC 03B RM - UNSUPPRESSED	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
102	%F078-A05C	3.24E-04	0.71%	FIRE IN F078-A05C - CHANNEL-C DC & IP EQUIP RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
103	PGOPH-S-LC01B	1.00E+00	0.71%	OPERATOR FAILS TO TRANSFER SOURCE FROM LC01A TO LC01B	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
104	COMBINATION_27-F	1.00E+00	0.70%	HEP dependency factor for RCOPH-S- RCPTRIP, PGOPH-S-LC01B	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
105	WTMPM-B-PP02	1.42E-02	0.66%	TGBCCW PUMP P02 TRAIN UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.13.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
106	DGDGL-B-DGB	3.78E-03	0.65%	DG B FAILS TO LOAD AND RUN DURING 1ST 1HR OF OPERATION	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
107	IPINM-B-IN01B	2.00E-03	0.62%	CLASS 1E 120V AC INVERTER IN01B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.9.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.

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Item No.	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely Importance	Description	Disposition
108	SIMPM2B-PP02D	3.88E-03	0.62%	SI PUMP 4 (PP02D) UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.16.8. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
109	AFTPM1A-TDP01A	5.39E-03	0.60%	AFW TDP PP01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T/M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.3.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
110	IPINM-A-IN01A	2.00E-03	0.60%	CLASS 1E 120V AC INVERTER IN01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.9.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
111	%F078-A02D	8.39E-05	0.58%	FIRE IN F078-A02D - CLASS 1E SWITCHGEAR 01D RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
112	%F078-A25A-U	1.27E-04	0.57%	FIRE IN F078-A25A - CLASS 1E SWITCHGEAR 01A RM - UNSUPPRESSED	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
113	DGSQA-B-LOADSQ	3.33E-03	0.56%	LOAD SEQUNCER A FAILS TO OPERATE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
114	SIMPM1B-PP02B	3.88E-03	0.56%	SI PUMP PP02B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.16.7. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
115	DGDGL-A-DGA	3.78E-03	0.55%	DG A FAILS TO LOAD AND RUN DURING 1ST 1HR OF OPERATION	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
116	%F157-A25C-U	1.69E-04	0.53%	FIRE IN F157-A25C - I & C EQUIP. RM - UNSUPPRESSED	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
117	%F137-ANEA	6.92E-04	0.53%	FIRE IN F137-ANEA - ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
118	WOCHKQ4-CH01A/1B/2A/2B	4.86E-06	0.53%	4/4 CCF OF ECW CHILLERS 1A/2A/1B/2B FAIL TO RUN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Section 7.15.3 through 7.15.6. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
119	BF_F100-A06D_F100-AGAC	9.80E-03	0.52%	BARRIER FAILURE BETWEEN FIRE COMPS F100-A06D & F100-AGAC	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.4.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
120	PPSO-OS-PPS	1.20E-06	0.50%	CCF OF PPS OPERATING SYSTEM SOFTWARE	

Table 6d (1 of 5)

List of Basic Events from APR1400 PRA CDF Importance Analysis (LPSD Internal Events)

Item No.	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely Importance	Description	Disposition
1	%SO	2.90E-03	49.10%	RCS Overdraining due to SCS	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
2	BE-RATE-OT-05	6.67E-01	43.47%	Conv. factor (Outage-yr -> Cal. yr, 1/(18mon/12mon)) for Demand Failure during POS 05	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
3	HR-FB-SOP05-01	3.49E-04	36.69%	Operator Fails to Feed during SO POS 5 w/makeup established	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
4	COMBINATION_1-LP	1.44E+02	36.46%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-SOP05, HR-FB-SOP05-01	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
5	HR-RS-SOP05	6.76E-03	36.46%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during SO POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
6	BE-RATE-P03A	3.36E-04	16.27%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS03A duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
7	BE-RATE-P05	1.23E-03	15.61%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS5 duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
8	%SL	2.90E-01	8.83%	Failure to Maintain Water Level at Reduced Inventory	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
9	HR-FB-SLP05-01	3.49E-04	6.77%	Operator Fails to Feed during SL POS 5 w/makeup established	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
10	COMBINATION_8-LP	1.44E+02	6.72%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS- SLP05,HR-FB-SLP05-01	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
11	HR-RS-SLP05	6.76E-03	6.72%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during SL POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
12	BE-RATE-OT-11	6.67E-01	5.64%	Conv. factor (Outage-yr -> Cal. yr, 1/(18mon/12mon)) for Demand Failure during POS 11	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
13	SISPP-S-IRWST	1.22E-05	5.43%	CCF OF IRWST SUMPS DUE TO PLUGGING	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.16.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
14	DGDGR-A-DGA	2.50E-02	5.40%	FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
15	DGDGR-B-DGB	2.50E-02	5.39%	FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.

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Item	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Veselv	Description	Disposition
No.		11000001109	Importance	2 compton	
16	BE-RATE-P10	6.26E-03	5.32%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS10 duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
17	%SL1	1.60E-01	4.90%	Small LOCA at Reduced Inventory	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
18	%TC	2.34E-04	4.48%	Total Loss of Component Cooling Water	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
19	%TS	2.34E-04	4.48%	Total Loss of Essential Service Water	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
20	%LPSW	6.39E-02	4.44%	Loss of offsite power of Switchyard-centered for LPSD	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
21	PPSO-AP-LC	1.20E-05	4.13%	CCF OF PPS LC APPLICATION SOFTWARE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.21.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
22	%PL	3.66E-03	4.07%	STUCK OPEN OF POSRV	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
23	BE-RATE-OT-02	6.67E-01	4.07%	Conv. factor (Outage-yr -> Cal. yr, 1/(18mon/12mon)) for Demand Failure during POS 02	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
24	COMBINATION_2-LP	1.93E+01	4.05%	HEP dependency factor for HR-MI-SOP05, HR-FB-SOP05-02	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
25	HR-FB-SOP05-02	2.72E-03	4.05%	Operator Fails to Feed during SO POS 5 w/makeup failed	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
26	HR-MI-SOP05	7.18E-04	4.05%	Operator Fails to Isolate and Makeup SO at POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
27	COMBINATION_4-LP	9.41E+01	3.89%	HEP dependency factor for HR-MI-SOP11, HR-FB-SOP11-02	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
28	HR-FB-SOP11-02	5.37E-04	3.89%	Operator Fails to Feed during SO POS 11 w/makeup failed	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
29	HR-MI-SOP11	7.18E-04	3.89%	Operator Fails to Isolate and Makeup SO at POS 11	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
30	BE-RATE-P06	4.01E-03	3.88%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS6 duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
31	HR-FB-JLP05-01	5.37E-04	3.88%	Operator Fails to Feed during JL POS 5 w/makeup established	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
32	COMBINATION_19-LP	9.41E+01	3.84%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-JLP05, HR-FB-JLP05-01	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
33	HR-RS-JLP05	6.76E-03	3.84%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during JL POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
34	%SL2	3.50E-02	3.81%	Small LOCA above Reduced Inventory	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
35	%LPWE	3.67E-02	3.74%	Loss of offsite power of Weather-related for LPSD	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis

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Item	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely	Description	Disposition
190.		-	Importance	-	_
36	%LPPL	5.28E-02	3.48%	Loss of offsite power of Plant-centered for LPSD	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
37	%S1	1.40E-01	3.46%	Loss of SCS (S1)	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
38	DATGR-S-AACTG	1.57E-01	2.08%	FAILS TO RUN AAC GAS TURBINE GENERATOR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.2.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
39	HR-FB-JLP10-01	5.37E-04	1.50%	Operator Fails to Feed during JL POS 10 w/makeup established	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
40	BE-RATE-P11	9.66E-04	1.48%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS11 duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
41	COMBINATION_16-LP	9.41E+01	1.46%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-JLP10, HR-FB-JLP10-01	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
42	HR-RS-JLP10	2.08E-03	1.46%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during JL POS 10	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
43	HR-RS-S1P05	4.18E-01	1.44%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during S1 POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
44	COMBINATION_21-LP	1.00E+00	1.39%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-S1P05, HR-FB-S1P05	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
45	HR-FB-S1P05	3.49E-04	1.39%	Operator Fails to Feed during S1 POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
46	BE-RATE-P03B	2.74E-03	1.38%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS03B duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
47	%KV	3.50E-02	1.19%	Loss of Class 1E 4.16KV	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
48	HR-FB-JLP06-01	2.72E-03	1.12%	Operator Fails to Feed during JL POS 6 w/makeup established	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
49	COMBINATION_26-LP	1.93E+01	0.97%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-JLP06, HR-FB-JLP06-01	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
50	HR-RS-JLP06	2.08E-03	0.97%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during JL POS 6	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
51	BE-RATE-P4B	1.49E-03	0.97%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS4B duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
52	RAC-LXP10-AC-WE	4.78E-01	0.93%	Recovery Offsite Power within 3.0hr at SBO POS10 AC WE	This event represents characteristics of the site at which the plant will be located and the probability is based on generic industry data. Design changes to affect the risk from site characteristics are not applicable to the SAMDA analysis and this event is not considered further.
53	%LPGR	1.15E-02	0.89%	Loss of offsite power of Grid-related for LPSD	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis

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Itom			Fussell-		
No	Event Name	Probability	Vesely	Description	Disposition
110.			Importance		
54	DGDGL-A-DGA	3.78E-03	0.79%	DG A FAILS TO LOAD AND RUN DURING 1ST 1HR OF OPERATION	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide
					a positive benefit.
55	DGDGL-B-DGB	3.78E-03	0.79%	DG B FAILS TO LOAD AND RUN DURING 1ST 1HR OF OPERATION	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
56	BE-RATE-P13	2.44E-03	0.78%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS13 duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
57	%ES	1.86E-02	0.77%	Loss of Essential Service Water	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
58	COMBINATION_9-LP	1.93E+01	0.75%	HEP dependency factor for HR-MI-SLP05, HR-FB-SLP05-02	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
59	HR-FB-SLP05-02	2.72E-03	0.75%	Operator Fails to Feed during SL POS 5 w/makeup failed	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
60	HR-MI-SLP05	7.18E-04	0.75%	Operator Fails to Isolate and Makeup SL at POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
61	WOCHKQ4-CH01A/1B/2A/2B	4.86E-06	0.73%	4/4 CCF OF ECW CHILLERS 1A/2A/1B/2B FAIL TO RUN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Section 7.15.3 through 7.15.6. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
62	%JL	5.00E-03	0.69%	Unrecoverable LOCA	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
63	DGSQA-B-LOADSQ	3.33E-03	0.69%	LOAD SEQUNCER A FAILS TO OPERATE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
64	DGSQA-A-LOADSQ	3.33E-03	0.69%	LOAD SEQUNCER A FAILS TO OPERATE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
65	%S2	2.20E-02	0.66%	Loss of SCS (S2)	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
66	DATGM-S-AACTG	5.00E-02	0.63%	AAC DG UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.2.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
67	DGDGS-A-DGA	2.89E-03	0.60%	FAILS TO START OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.

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Item	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Veselv	Description	Disposition
No.		11000000000	Importance	2 con pion	2.5000.000
68	DGDGS-B-DGB	2.89E-03	0.60%	FAILS TO START OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
69	COMBINATION_13-LP	9.41E+01	0.56%	HEP dependency factor for HR-MI-SLP11, HR-FB-SLP11-02	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
70	HR-FB-SLP11-02	5.37E-04	0.56%	Operator Fails to Feed during SL POS 11 w/makeup failed	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
71	HR-MI-SLP11	7.18E-04	0.56%	Operator Fails to Isolate and Makeup SL at POS 11	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
72	SIMPWQ4-CSP1A/B/SCP1A/B	4.14E-06	0.56%	4/4 CCF OF CSP PP01A/PP01B AND SCP PP01A/PP01B FAIL TO START	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Section 7.6.1, 7.6.2, 7.24.1, and 7.24.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
73	DGDGKQ4-DG01ABCD	5.95E-05	0.54%	4/4 CCF OF EDG 01A/01B/01C/01D FAIL TO RUN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.1.1 through 7.1.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
74	SIMPR2A-PP02C	2.83E-03	0.53%	FAILS TO RUN SI PUMP PP02C	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.16.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
75	BE-RATE-P12A	3.07E-04	0.52%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS12A duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
76	COMBINATION_17-LP	9.41E+01	0.50%	HEP dependency factor for HR-MI-JLP10, HR-FB-JLP10-02	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
77	HR-FB-JLP10-02	5.37E-04	0.50%	Operator Fails to Feed during JL POS 10 w/makeup failed	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
78	HR-MI-JLP10	7.18E-04	0.50%	Operator Fails to Isolate and Makeup JL at POS 10	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
79	RAC-LXP10-AC-SW	1.50E-01	0.50%	Recovery Offsite Power within 3.0hr at SBO POS10 AC SW	This event represents characteristics of the site at which the plant will be located and the probability is based on generic industry data. Design changes to affect the risk from site characteristics are not applicable to the SAMDA analysis and this event is not considered further.

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List of Basic Events from APR1400 PRA CDF Importance Analysis (LPSD Internal Flooding Events)

Item No.	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely Importance	Description	Disposition
1	BE-RATE-P10	6.26E-03	75.8%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS10 duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
2	DGDGR-A-DGA	2.50E-02	32.7%	FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
3	%IE-078-44B-FP-X-LP	3.42E-04	23.3%	MAJ BRK IN FP PIPING IN B QUAD 78 FT EL RM 078-A44B AND OTHER B QUAD RMS (LPSD)	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
4	%IE-078-19B-FP-X-LP	3.49E-04	19.1%	MAJ BRK (VARIOUS GPM) IN FP PIPING IN 078-A19B AND OTHER B QUAD RMS (LPSD)	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
5	%IE-055-22A-IW-S-LP	2.08E-05	16.1%	BREAK OF UNISOLABLE IW PIPING IN A QUAD 55 FT EL RM 055-A22A (LPSD)	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
6	BE-RATE-P05	1.23E-03	16.0%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS5 duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
7	HR-RS-S2P05	4.18E-01	15.1%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during S2 POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
8	DGDGR-D-DGD	2.50E-02	9.5%	FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01D	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
9	PFHBO1A-SW01A-H2	6.66E-03	8.7%	PCB SW01A-H2 4.16KV SWGR SW01A FROM UAT FAILS TO OPEN	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.11.6. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit
10	AFOPH-1-ISO-FL	1.00E+00	8.3%	Operator fails to isolate major break of AF piping in TDAFP room.	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
11	%IE-078-15D-AF-X-LP	1.98E-05	8.3%	MAJ BRK (>3200 GPM) IN AF PIPING IN D QUAD 78 FT EL RM 078-A15D (LPSD)	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
12	WOOPH-B-1/2B	2.06E-02	7.9%	OPERATOR FAILS TO OPERATE ECW PUMPS PP01/2B	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
13	%IE-137-13B-FP-X-LP	1.71E-05	7.0%	MAJ BRK (> 1180 GPM) OF FP PIPING IN B QUAD 137 FT EL RM 137-A13B & OTHERS (LPSD)	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
14	%IE-078-19B-FP-M-LP	1.34E-04	6.8%	MOD BRK (VARIOUS GPM) IN FP PIPING IN 078-A19B AND OTHER B QUAD RMS (LPSD)	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis

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Item		D 1 1 1 1 1	Fussell-		
No.	Event Name	Probability	v esely Importance	Description	Disposition
15	%IE-078-01D-FP-X-LP	1.71E-04	5.3%	MAJ BRK (VARIOUS GPM) IN FP PIPING IN 078-A01D AND OTHER B QUAD RMS (LPSD)	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
16	WOCHS2B-CH02B	1.30E-02	5.0%	FAILS TO START ECW CHILLER CH02B	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.6. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
17	DGDGL-A-DGA	3.78E-03	4.9%	DG A FAILS TO LOAD AND RUN DURING 1ST 1HR OF OPERATION	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
18	DGSQA-A-LOADSQ	3.33E-03	4.3%	LOAD SEQUNCER A FAILS TO OPERATE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
19	DGDGS-A-DGA	2.89E-03	3.8%	FAILS TO START OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
20	FPOPH-2-ISO-FL	8.00E-03	3.3%	Operator fails to isolate FP break with between 20 and 40 minutes available	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
21	BE-RATE-P06	4.01E-03	3.2%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS6 duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
22	%IE-100-10B-FP-X-LP	5.71E-05	3.0%	MAJ BRK (>1445 GPM) IN FP PIPING IN B QUAD 100 FT EL RM 100-A10B (LPSD)	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
23	VDHVL-A-HV12A	2.28E-03	3.0%	FAILS TO RUN EDG ROOM CUBICLE COOLER HV12A FOR 1HR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.11. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
24	VDHVL-A-HV13A	2.28E-03	3.0%	FAILS TO RUN EDG ROOM CUBICLE COOLER HV13A FOR 1HR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.16. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
25	PFHBO2B-SW01D-G2	6.66E-03	2.5%	PCB SW01D-G2 4.16KV SWGR SW01D FROM UAT FAILS TO OPEN	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.11.9. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
26	DGDGR-B-DGB	2.50E-02	2.4%	FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.

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Item	Event Neme	Duchability	Fussell-	Description	Disposition
No.	Event Ivame	Frobability	Importance	Description	Disposition
27	FPOPH-1-ISO-FL	9.48E-03	2.0%	Operator fails to isolate FP break with less than 20 minutes available	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
28	HR-FB-S2P05	3.49E-04	1.8%	Operator Fails to Feed during S2 POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
29	%IE-055-21B-SI-M-LP	2.05E-07	1.7%	MOD BRK (500 - 3000 GPM) OF SI PIPING IN B QUAD 55-FT EL RM 055-A21B (LPSD)	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
30	SXCTM-2B-CT02B	4.00E-03	1.5%	SXCT CT02B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	
31	%IE-078-01D-FP-M-LP	5.51E-05	1.5%	MOD BRK (VARIOUS GPM) IN FP PIPING IN 078-A01D AND OTHER B QUAD RMS (LPSD)	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
32	BE-RATE-P03A	3.36E-04	1.5%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS03A duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
33	VGAHS2B-AH02B	3.86E-03	1.5%	FAILS TO START EWS PUMP ROOM II. SUPPLY FAN AH02B	
34	DGDGL-D-DGD	3.78E-03	1.4%	DG D FAILS TO LOAD AND RUN DURING 1ST 1HR OF OPERATION	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
35	BE-RATE-P03B	2.74E-03	1.3%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS03B duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
36	DGSQA-D-LOADSQ	3.33E-03	1.3%	LOAD SEQUNCER D FAILS TO OPERATE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
37	CCMVO-A-191	9.63E-04	1.2%	CCW MOV V191 FAILS TO OPEN	
38	%IE-137-29B-FP-M-LP	2.66E-06	1.2%	MOD BRK (1690 - 2500 GPM) OF FP PIPING IN B QUAD 137 FT EL RM 137- A29B (LPSD)	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
39	BE-RATE-P4B	1.49E-03	1.2%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS4B duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
40	HR-SG-S2P03B	6.06E-04	1.2%	Operator Fails to Remove Steam during S2 at POS 3B	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
41	HR-RS-S2P03B	2.88E-01	1.2%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during S2 POS 3B	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
42	COMBINATION_150-LP	8.34E+01	1.1%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-S2P03B, HR-SG-S2P03B	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
43	DGDGS-D-DGD	2.89E-03	1.1%	FAILS TO START OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01D	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.

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Item No.	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely Importance	Description	Disposition
44	HR-FB-S2P10	3.49E-04	1.1%	Operator Fails to Feed during S2 POS 10	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
45	SIMPR2B-PP02D	2.83E-03	1.1%	FAILS TO RUN SI PUMP PP02D	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.16.8. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
46	VDHVS-A-HV12A	8.29E-04	1.1%	FAILS TO START EDG ROOM CUBICLE COOLER HV12A	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.11. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
47	VDHVS-A-HV13A	8.29E-04	1.1%	FAILS TO START EDG ROOM CUBICLE COOLER HV13A	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.15. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
48	SIMPR1A-PP02A	2.83E-03	1.1%	FAILS TO RUN SI PUMP PP02A	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.16.6. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
49	VOHVM2B-HV32B	2.50E-03	0.9%	CUBICLE COOLER HV32B UAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	
50	WOCHR1A-CH01A	7.32E-04	0.9%	FAILS TO RUN ECW CHILLER CH01A FOR 24 HOURS	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
51	%IE-120-11B-FP-X-LP	1.79E-05	0.9%	MAJ BRK (>1180 GPM) OF FP PIPING IN B QUAD 120 FT EL RM 120-A11B OR 120- A13B (LPSD)	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
52	%IE-100-20A-FP-X-LP	3.35E-04	0.9%	MAJ BRK OF FP PIPING IN A QUAD 100 FT EL RM 100-A20A AND OTHERS (LPSD)	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
53	SXCTS-2B-CT02B	2.32E-03	0.9%	SX CT02B FANS (ANY 1 OF 3) FAIL TO START	
54	HR-SG-S2P03A	6.06E-04	0.9%	Operator Fails to Remove Steam during S2 at POS 3A	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
55	VDHVL-D-HV12D	2.28E-03	0.9%	FAILS TO RUN EDG ROOM CUBICLE COOLER HV12D FOR 1HR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.14. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
56	VDHVL-D-HV13D	2.28E-03	0.9%	FAILS TO RUN EDG ROOM CUBICLE COOLER HV13D FOR 1HR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.18. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.

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Item	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely	Description	Disposition
NO.		·	Importance	× ·	, r
57	COMBINATION_354-LP	1.04E+03	0.8%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-S2P05, FPOPH-2-ISO-FL,HR-FB-S2P05	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
58	HR-RS-S2P03A	8.20E-01	0.7%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during S2 POS 3A	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
59	COMBINATION_175-LP	8.34E+01	0.7%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-S2P03A, HR-SG-S2P03A	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
60	HR-FB-S2P06	3.49E-04	0.6%	Operator Fails to Feed during S2 POS 6	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
61	PFHBO1B-SW01B-H2	6.66E-03	0.6%	PCB SW01B-H2 4.16KV SWGR SW01B FROM UAT FAILS TO OPEN	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.11.7. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
62	%IE-078-20B-AF-X-LP	1.43E-06	0.6%	MAJ BRK (>690 GPM) IN AF OR AX PIPING IN B QUAD 78 FT EL RM 078- A20B (LPSD)	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
63	%IE-055-21A-SI-X-LP	3.13E-08	0.6%	MAJ BRK (>3000 GPM) OF SI PIPING IN A QUAD 55-FT EL RM 055-A21A (LPSD)	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
64	DGDGKQ4-DG01ABCD	5.95E-05	0.5%	4/4 CCF OF EDG 01A/01B/01C/01D FAIL TO RUN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.1.1 through 7.1.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
65	SIMPR1B-SCPP01B	2.83E-03	0.5%	FAILS TO RUN SC PUMP 2 PP01B	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.24.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
66	CCMPS2B-PP02B	1.36E-03	0.5%	FAILS TO START CCW PUMP PP02B	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.5.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
67	SXMPS2B-PP02B	1.36E-03	0.5%	FAIL TO START ESW PUMP PP02B	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.17.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
68	WOMPS2B-PP02B	1.36E-03	0.5%	FAILS TO START OF ECW PUMP 02B	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.18.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
69	SXFLP-S-FT0123AB	5.57E-05	0.5%	CCF OF ALL ESW DERIS FILTERS DUE TO PLUGGING	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.17.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.

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Item			Fussell-		
No.	Event Name	Probability	Vesely	Description	Disposition
			Importance		
70	%IE-078-31A-FP-X-LP	2.49E-04	0.5%	MAJ BRK (> 3900 GPM) IN FP PIPING IN A	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
				QUAD 78 FT EL RM 078-A31A (LPSD)	
71	FPOPH-3DEP-ISO-FL	2.93E-03	0.5%	Operator fails to isolate major break of FP	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
				piping in 078-A31A before 18-inches of	
				accumulation.	
72	COMBINATION_339-LP	3.54E+05	0.5%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-S2P05,	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
				FPOPH-2-ISO-FL,FPOPH-3DEP-ISO-FL,HR-	
				FB-S2P05	
73	PFHBWQ2-SW2OUATAD	6.03E-05	0.5%	2/4 CCF OF PCB BETWEEN UAT & 4.16KV	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in
				SW01A/1D FAIL TO OPEN	Sections 7.11.6 through 7.11.9. A design change would be
					expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and,
					as a result, not provide a positive benefit
74	%IE-100-37B-FP-X-LP	9.94E-05	0.5%	MOD BRK OF FP PIPING IN B QUAD 100	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
				FT EL RM 100-A37B AND OTHERS (LPSD)	
75	%IE-055-21B-SI-X-LP	2.54E-08	0.5%	MAJ BRK (>3000 GPM) OF SI PIPING IN B	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
				QUAD 55-FT EL RM 055-A21B (LPSD)	
76	SXHVO-2B-074	1.20E-03	0.5%	LOSS OF SX CT02B DUE TO FAILURE TO	
				OPEN OF 2B SXCT SUPPLY HOV SX-074	

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List of Basic Events from APR1400 PRA CDF Importance Analysis (LPSD Internal Fire Events)

Item No.	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely Importance	Description	Disposition
1	BE-RATE-P05	1.23E-03	68.21%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS5 duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
2	HR-FB-KVP05	2.01E-03	32.56%	Operator Fails to Feed during KV POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
3	HR-RS-KVP05	8.43E-01	32.56%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during KV POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
4	COMBINATION_23-LPF	2.58E+01	32.55%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-KVP05, HR-FB-KVP05	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
5	%F000-ADGC-LP	4.65E-03	24.51%	FIRE IN DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
6	HR-FB-LPP05	2.01E-03	16.97%	Operator Fails to Feed during LP POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
7	HR-RS-LPP05	8.43E-01	16.96%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during LP POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
8	COMBINATION_24-LPF	2.58E+01	16.96%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-LPP05, HR-FB-LPP05	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
9	BE-RATE-P06	4.01E-03	14.52%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS6 duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
10	HR-FB-CCP05	2.01E-03	8.94%	Operator Fails to Feed during CC POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
11	HR-RS-CCP05	8.43E-01	8.94%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during CC POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
12	COMBINATION_47-LPF	2.58E+01	8.94%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-CCP05, HR-FB-CCP05	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
13	HR-RS-S2P05	8.43E-01	8.50%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during S2 POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
14	HR-FB-S2P05	2.01E-03	8.50%	Operator Fails to Feed during S2 POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
15	COMBINATION_43-LPF	2.58E+01	8.50%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-S2P05, HR-FB-S2P05	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
16	BE-RATE-P10	6.26E-03	6.77%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS10 duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
17	BE-RATE-P4B	1.49E-03	5.98%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS4B duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
18	%F137-ANEA-LP	7.34E-04	4.26%	FIRE IN ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
19	%F120-AGAC-LP	6.14E-04	4.17%	FIRE IN GENERAL ACCESS AREA-120' C	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
20	HR-FB-KVP06	5.96E-03	3.72%	Operator Fails to Feed during KV POS 6	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis

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Item No	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely	Description	Disposition
140.			Importance		
21	%FK-K01-LP	7.29E-04	3.70%	FIRE IN ESW STRUCTURE "A" BUILDING	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
22	COMBINATION_4-LPF	9.34E+00	3.64%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-KVP06, HR-FB-KVP06	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
23	HR-RS-KVP06	2.69E-02	3.64%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during KV POS 6	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
24	HR-FB-JLP06-01	3.03E-03	3.39%	Operator Fails to Feed during JL POS 6 w/makeup established	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
25	%F055-AGAC-LP	6.26E-04	3.18%	FIRE IN GENERAL ACCESS AREA-55' C	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
26	%F078-A04C-LP	5.26E-04	2.77%	FIRE IN MISC. ELECTRICAL EQUIP RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
27	%F078-AGAC-LP	4.94E-04	2.58%	FIRE IN GENERAL ACCESS AREA	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
28	%F078-A19A-LP	4.74E-04	2.54%	FIRE IN CORRIDOR	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
29	PROB-NON-SUPP-MCR	4.65E-02	2.43%	PROBABILITY OF NON-SUPPRESSION OF MCR FIRES RESULTING IN MCR EVACUATION	This event represents operator actions and procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
30	%F157-AMCR-LP	1.22E-04	2.36%	FIRE IN MAIN CONTROL ROOM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
31	COMBINATION_11-LPF	1.75E+01	2.29%	HEP dependency factor for HR-MI-JLP06, HR-FB-JLP06-02	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
32	HR-FB-JLP06-02	3.03E-03	2.29%	Operator Fails to Feed during JL POS 6 w/makeup failed	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
33	HR-MI-JLP06	2.29E-02	2.29%	Operator Fails to Isolate and Makeup JL at POS 6	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
34	BE-RATE-P03A	3.36E-04	2.16%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS03A duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
35	%F120-AGAD-LP	6.49E-04	2.12%	FIRE IN GENERAL ACCESS AREA-120' D	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
36	%FD-D01A-LP	4.14E-04	2.10%	FIRE IN CCW HEAT EXCHANGER "A" BUILDING	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
37	%F100-AGAC-LP	2.30E-04	2.06%	FIRE IN GENERAL ACCESS AREA	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
38	%F078-A19B-LP	9.26E-04	2.06%	FIRE IN CORRIDOR	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
39	DGDGR-A-DGA	2.50E-02	2.00%	FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01A	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
40	%F078-A05C-LP	3.92E-04	1.98%	FIRE IN CHANNEL-C DC & IP EQUIP RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
41	HR-FB-LPP06	5.96E-03	1.97%	Operator Fails to Feed during LP POS 6	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis

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Item No.	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely Importance	Description	Disposition
42	%F000-ACVU-LP	3.43E-04	1.94%	FIRE IN CVCS SYSTEM AREA	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
43	COMBINATION_5-LPF	9.34E+00	1.90%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-LPP06, HR-FB-LPP06	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
44	HR-RS-LPP06	2.69E-02	1.90%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during LP POS 6	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
45	%F078-A25A-LP	3.55E-04	1.90%	FIRE IN CLASS 1E SWITCHGEAR 01A RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
46	HR-FB-S2P04B	2.01E-03	1.88%	Operator Fails to Feed during S2 POS 4B	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
47	COMBINATION_39-LPF	2.58E+01	1.88%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-S2P04B, HR-FB-S2P04B	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
48	HR-RS-S2P04B	1.48E-01	1.88%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during S2 POS 4B	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
49	AS-CCDP-ST	5.00E-01	1.87%	SHORT TERM ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CCDP EST. (< = 1.5 HRS FOR RS OR <= 3 HRS FOR SG)	This event represents operator actions and procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
50	%F100-AEEA-LP	3.21E-04	1.83%	FIRE IN 480V CLASS 1E MCC 01A RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
51	%F120-A05C-LP	3.38E-04	1.81%	FIRE IN ELECTRICAL EQUIP. RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
52	HR-FB-KVP04B	2.01E-03	1.67%	Operator Fails to Feed during KV POS 4B	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
53	COMBINATION_21-LPF	2.58E+01	1.66%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-KVP04B, HR-FB-KVP04B	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
54	HR-RS-KVP04B	3.54E-02	1.66%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during KV POS 4B	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
55	%F078-A03C-LP	3.14E-04	1.64%	FIRE IN CLASS 1E LOADCENTER 01C RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
56	%F120-A09C-LP	2.46E-04	1.55%	FIRE IN ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ROOM (C)	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
57	DGDGR-B-DGB	2.50E-02	1.38%	FAILS TO RUN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DG01B	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
58	%F137-AEPA-LP	2.34E-04	1.36%	FIRE IN ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ROOM (A)	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
59	BF_F120-AGAC_F120-AGAD	1.20E-03	1.36%	BARRIER FAILURE BETWEEN FIRE COMPS F120-AGAC & F120-AGAD	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.4.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
60	%F137-A11C-LP	2.09E-04	1.21%	FIRE IN ELECTRICAL PENETRATION RM (C)	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis

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Item No	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely	Description	Disposition
110.			Importance		
61	%F157-A19C-LP	2.02E-04	1.16%	FIRE IN I & C EQUIP. RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
62	HR-FB-JLP10-01	6.96E-04	1.16%	Operator Fails to Feed during JL POS 10 w/makeup established	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
63	%F137-A10C-LP	1.81E-04	1.05%	FIRE IN 480V CLASS 1E MCC 03C RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
64	%F157-A25C-LP	1.81E-04	1.02%	FIRE IN I & C EQUIP. RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
65	HR-FB-CCP06	5.96E-03	1.02%	Operator Fails to Feed during CC POS 6	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
66	HR-FB-S2P06	5.96E-03	1.01%	Operator Fails to Feed during S2 POS 6	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
67	COMBINATION_20-LPF	9.34E+00	1.00%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-CCP06, HR-FB-CCP06	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
68	HR-RS-CCP06	2.69E-02	1.00%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during CC POS 6	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
69	COMBINATION_14-LPF	9.34E+00	0.99%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-S2P06, HR-FB-S2P06	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
70	HR-RS-S2P06	2.69E-02	0.99%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during S2 POS 6	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
71	%F120-AGAA-LP	1.71E-04	0.97%	FIRE IN GENERAL ACCESS AREA-120' A	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
72	HR-FB-LPP04B	4.73E-03	0.93%	Operator Fails to Feed during LP POS 4B	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
73	%F078-AEEB-LP	4.12E-04	0.91%	FIRE IN CLASS 1E SWITCHGEAR 01B ROOM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
74	COMBINATION_22-LPF	1.15E+01	0.91%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-LPP04B, HR-FB-LPP04B	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
75	HR-RS-LPP04B	3.54E-02	0.91%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during LP POS 4B	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
76	COMBINATION_9-LPF	7.28E+01	0.90%	HEP dependency factor for HR-MI-JLP10, HR-FB-JLP10-02	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
77	HR-FB-JLP10-02	6.96E-04	0.90%	Operator Fails to Feed during JL POS 10 w/makeup failed	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
78	HR-MI-JLP10	6.14E-03	0.90%	Operator Fails to Isolate and Makeup JL at POS 10	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
79	%F000-ACVL-LP	9.52E-04	0.88%	FIRE IN CVCS ACCESS AREA	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
80	%F100-A08C-LP	6.06E-04	0.85%	FIRE IN N1E DC & IP EQUIPMENT RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
81	%F000-AC-LP	7.78E-03	0.76%	FIRE IN ACCESS AREA	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
82	%F078-A11C-LP	1.48E-04	0.76%	FIRE IN ESSENTIAL CHILLER RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis

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Item No.	Event Name	Probability	Fussell- Vesely Importance	Description	Disposition
83	%F050-A04A-LP	1.48E-04	0.75%	FIRE IN SC PUMP & MINI FLOW HX RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
84	%F055-A02C-LP	1.48E-04	0.75%	FIRE IN CCW PUMP RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
85	%F055-A02A-LP	1.45E-04	0.73%	FIRE IN CCW PUMP RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
86	%F000-RW-LP	1.45E-02	0.71%	FIRE IN ACCESS AREA	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
87	BF_F000-ACVU_F000-RW	8.60E-03	0.71%	BARRIER FAILURE BETWEEN FIRE COMPS F000-ACVU & F000-RW	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.4.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
88	%F100-AEEB-LP	3.21E-04	0.70%	FIRE IN 480V CLASS 1E MCC 01B ROOM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
89	BE-RATE-P11	9.66E-04	0.69%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS11 duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
90	BE-RATE-P13	2.44E-03	0.69%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS13 duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
91	%F055-AGAA-LP	1.20E-04	0.68%	FIRE IN GENERAL ACCESS AREA-55' A	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
92	%F000-ACV-LP	1.88E-03	0.66%	FIRE IN CVCS ACCESS AREA	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
93	%F157-AMAX-LP	1.09E-04	0.63%	FIRE IN MEETING ROOM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
94	%F100-A06D-LP	1.80E-04	0.63%	FIRE IN GENERAL ACCESS AREA	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
95	AS-CCDP-LT	1.00E-01	0.56%	LONG TERM ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CCDP EST. (> 1.5 HRS FOR RS OR > 3 HRS FOR SG)	This event represents operator actions and procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
96	BE-RATE-P03B	2.74E-03	0.55%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS03B duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
97	%F000-ADGD-LP	4.65E-03	0.55%	FIRE IN DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
98	MSEVO-A-102	5.56E-03	0.51%	MS ADV 102 ON SG1 FAILS TO OPEN	

Table 7a (1 of 2)

List of Additional Basic Events from APR1400 PRA Cutset Review (At-Power Internal Events)

Item No.	Event Name	Probability	Fussell-Vesely Importance	Description	Disposition
1	PELXKD2- LX09A11B	3.37E-06	0.24%	2/2 CCF OF LOOP CONTROLLER LX09A 12/LX11B 12 FAILURE	Given the low importance of this event, very little benefit would be obtained from efforts to reduce the importance further. Therefore, no SAMA items are added.
2	MSOPH-S-SGADV	5.57E-03	0.41%	Operator Fails to Open MSADV to remove steam from SGs	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
3	MSSVWQ4- 1A1B2A2B	7.66E-06	0.41%	CCF OF MSSVS ON SG LINES 1A, 1B, 2A AND 2B	
4	COMBINATION_65	7.10E+01	0.39%	HEP dependency factor for MSOPH-S-SGADV, RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
5	MSEVXQ3-011/12/13	1.20E-05	0.34%	2/2 CCF OF 3/4 MSIV 011/012/013 FAIL TO CLOSE	
6	MSEVXQ3-011/12/14	1.20E-05	0.34%	2/2 CCF OF 3/4 MSIV 011/012/014 FAIL TO CLOSE	
7	MSEVXQ3-011/13/14	1.20E-05	0.34%	2/2 CCF OF 3/4 MSIV 011/013/014 FAIL TO CLOSE	
8	MSEVXQ3-012/13/14	1.20E-05	0.34%	2/2 CCF OF 3/4 MSIV 012/013/014 FAIL TO CLOSE	
9	MSEVWQ4-101/2/3/4	7.76E-05	0.25%	4/4 CCF OF MS ADVs 101/102/103/104 FAIL TO OPEN	
10	SIMPWQ4- CSP1A/B/SCP1A/B	4.14E-06	0.23%	4/4 CCF OF CSP PP01A/PP01B AND SCP PP01A/PP01B FAIL TO START	
11	MSEVXQ4- 011/12/13/14	1.01E-05	0.28%	2/2 CCF OF 4/4 MSIV 011/012/013/014 FAIL TO CLOSE	
12	AFPVKQ3- TP01A/MP02A/B	6.70E-06	0.37%	3/4 CCF OF AFW TDP01A/MDP02A/B FAIL TO RUN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.3.3 through 7.3.6. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
12	AFPVKQ3- TP01B/MP02A/B	6.70E-06	0.34%	3/4 CCF OF AFW TDP01B/MDP02A/B FAIL TO RUN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.3.3 through 7.3.6. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
13	WMVVT-S-V1700	5.53E-04	0.37%	WM MANUAL VALVE 1700 TRANSFER CLOSED	Given the low importance of this event, very little benefit would be obtained from efforts to reduce the importance further. Therefore, no SAMA items are added.

Table 7a (2 of 2)

Item No.	Event Name	Probability	Fussell-Vesely Importance	Description	Disposition
14	CVOPV-S-MV509	1.00E-01	0.19%	LOCAL MANUAL FTO MV-509 FOR IRWST REFILL AFTER SIGNAL FAILURE	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
15	SIMVWQ4- 616/26/36/46	2.73E-06	0.23%	4/4 CCF OF DVI LINE MOV 616/626/636/646 FAIL TO OPEN	Given the low importance of this event, very little benefit would be obtained from efforts to reduce the importance further. Therefore, no SAMA items are added.
16	CVOPH-S-IRWST	9.94E-04	0.29%	OPERATOR FAILS TO REFILL THE IRWST VIA CVCS	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
17	HR-RCSCD1-ISOL	3.72E-04	0.36%	Operator Fails to Take Action for SG Cooldown, RC Depressurization and SG Isolation	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
18	SIOPH-S-LTC-SC	5.36E-05	0.14%	Operator Fails to Align SCS For Long Term Cooling	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
19	HR-RCSCD2	1.30E-03	0.23%	Operator Fails to Take Action for SG Cooldown, RC Depressurization	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
20	COMBINATION_203 2	5.04E+04	0.14%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RCSCD1-ISOL, SIOPH-S-LTC-SC, CVOPH-S-IRWST	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
21	COMBINATION_203 1	2.08E+03	0.14%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RCSCD1-ISOL, HR-RCSCD2, CVOPH-S-IRWST	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
22	CCMVO-A-097	9.63E-04	0.40%	CCW MOV V097 FAILS TO OPEN	Given the low importance of this event, very little benefit would be obtained from efforts to reduce the importance further. Therefore, no SAMA items are added.
23	CCMVO-B-098	9.63E-04	0.40%	CCW MOV V098 FAILS TO OPEN	Given the low importance of this event, very little benefit would be obtained from efforts to reduce the importance further. Therefore, no SAMA items are added.
24	CSMVO1B-004	9.63E-04	0.40%	CS ISOL. MOV 004 IN CS TR. B HX DISCH. PATH FAILS TO OPEN	Given the low importance of this event, very little benefit would be obtained from efforts to reduce the importance further. Therefore, no SAMA items are added.

Table 7b (1 of 1)

List of Additional Basic Events from APR1400 PRA Cutset Review (At-Power Internal Flooding Events)

Item No.	Event Name	Probability	Fussell-Vesely Importance	Description	Disposition
1	MSOPH-S-SGADV	5.57E-03	0.15%	Operator Fails to Open MSADV to remove steam from SGs	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
2	MSSVWQ4- 1A1B2A2B	7.66E-06	0.15%	CCF OF MSSVS ON SG LINES 1A, 1B, 2A AND 2B	
3	COMBINATION_65	7.10E+01	0.15%	HEP dependency factor for MSOPH-S-SGADV, RCOPH-S-SDSE-FW	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
4	DCBCM-M-BC01M	2.00E-03	0.15%	NON-CLASS 1E 125V DC BATT. CHARGER BC01M UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T&M	Given the low importance of this event, very little benefit would be obtained from efforts to reduce the importance further. Therefore, no SAMA items are added.
5	DCOPH-S-NSBC- ALIGN	5.00E-01	0.16%	OPERATOR FAILS TO TRANSFER SOURCE FROM BC01M/N TO BC05N	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
6	COMBINATION_56	6.35E+04	0.13%	HEP dependency factor for DCOPH-S-NSBC- ALIGN, FPOPH-2-ISO-FL, AFOPH-S-ALT-LT, RCOPH-S-SDSL	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
7	%IE-120-11B-FP-X	1.70E-05	0.81%	MAJ BRK (>1180 GPM) OF FP PIPING IN B QUAD 120 FT EL RM 120-A11B OR 120-A13B	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis

Table 7c (1 of 2)

List of Additional Basic Events from APR1400 PRA Cutset Review (At-Power Internal Fire Events)

Item No.	Event Name	Probability	Fussell-Vesely Importance	Description	Disposition
1	DGSQA-B-LOADSQ	3.33E-03	0.56%	LOAD SEQUNCER B FAILS TO OPERATE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
2	%F000-C01-156-1	7.40E-05	0.40%	FIRE IN F000-C01 - CONTAINMENT - UNSUPPRESSED TRANS FIRES EL 156'-0" AREA 1	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
3	%F000-C01-100-1	6.73E-05	0.36%	FIRE IN F000-C01 - CONTAINMENT - UNSUPPRESSED TRANS FIRES EL 100'-0" AREA 1	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
4	%F000-C01-114-1	6.73E-05	0.36%	FIRE IN F000-C01 - CONTAINMENT - UNSUPPRESSED TRANS FIRES EL 114'-0" AREA 1	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
5	%F000-C01-136-1	6.73E-05	0.36%	FIRE IN F000-C01 - CONTAINMENT - UNSUPPRESSED TRANS FIRES EL 136'-6" AREA 1	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
6	%F137-A02D	3.64E-04	0.49%	FIRE IN F137-A02D - ELECTRICAL EQUIP. RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
7	BF_F137-A02D_F157- AMCR	1.20E-03	0.20%	BARRIER FAILURE BETWEEN FIRE COMPS F137-A02D & F157-AMCR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.4.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
8	%F000-AFHU	3.42E-04	0.32%	FIRE IN F000-AFHU - FUEL HANDLING UPPER AREA	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
9	%F120-A05D-U	3.01E-04	0.27%	FIRE IN F120-A05D - ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT RM D - UNSUPPRESSED	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
10	VDHVZO8- HV12/13ABCD	9.96E-06	0.38%	8/8 CCF OF EDG ROOM CUBICLE COOLER HV12A/12B/12C/12D 13A/13B/13C/14D FAIL TO RUN FOR 1HR	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.15.11 through 7.15.18. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
11	DGSQWQ4- LOADSQABCD	9.89E-06	0.38%	4/4 CCF OF LOAD SEQUNCER A/B/C/D FAIL TO OPERATE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.1.5. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
12	WMVVT-S-V1700	5.53E-04	0.29%	WM MANUAL VALVE 1700 TRANSFER CLOSED	Given the low importance of this event, very little benefit would be obtained from efforts to reduce the importance further. Therefore, no SAMA items are added.
13	SIMVT-B-303	3.71E-05	0.47%	SI PUMP PP02B/D MINI. FLOW LINE MOV V303 FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN	Given the low importance of this event, very little benefit would be obtained from efforts to reduce the importance further. Therefore, no SAMA items are added

Table 7c (2 of 2)

Item No.	Event Name	Probability	Fussell-Vesely Importance	Description	Disposition
14	%F100-A05C	2.06E-04	0.28%	FIRE IN F100-A05C - ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT RM C	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
15	SXCTWQ4- CT01A/02A/01B/02B	6.89E-06	0.26%	4/4 CCF OF SXCT 1A, 2A, 1B AND 2B TO START	
16	%F100-A05D-U	1.91E-04	0.24%	FIRE IN F100-A05D - ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT RM D - UNSUPPRESSED	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
17	%F120-A08D	1.87E-04	0.15%	FIRE IN F120-A08D - 480V N1E MCC RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
18	%F137-ASTD	2.37E-05	0.09%	FIRE IN F137-ASTD - STAIR	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
19	BF_F137- ASTD_F157-AMCR	8.60E-03	0.09%	BARRIER FAILURE BETWEEN FIRE COMPS F137-ASTD & F157-AMCR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.4.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
20	%F078-AGAD-U	5.05E-05	0.35%	FIRE IN F078-AGAD - GENERAL ACCESS AREA-78' D - UNSUPPRESSED	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
21	BF_F137-A05D_F157- AMCR	1.20E-03	0.08%	BARRIER FAILURE BETWEEN FIRE COMPS F137-A05D & F157-AMCR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.4.3. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
22	%F120-A08C	1.44E-04	0.18%	FIRE IN F120-A08C - 480V N1E MCC RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
23	CCMPWQ4- PP01A/2A/1B/2B	4.76E-06	0.18%	4/4 CCF OF CCW PUMPS PP01A/1B/2A/2B FAIL TO START	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.5.1 and 7.5.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit
24	WOMPWQ4- PP01A/2A/1B/2B	4.76E-06	0.18%	4/4 CCF OF ECW PUMPS 1A/2A/1B/2B FAIL TO START	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.18.1 and 7.18.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit
25	%F100-AEEA	3.14E-04	0.40%	FIRE IN F100-AEEA - 480V CLASS 1E MCC 01A RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis

Table 7d (1 of 4)

List of Additional Basic Events from APR1400 PRA Cutset Review (LPSD Internal Events)

Item	Event Name	Duchability	Fussell-Vesely	Description	Dispesition
No.	Event Name	Frodability	Importance	Description	Disposition
1	HR-FB-JLP05-02	2.72E-03	0.43%	Operator Fails to Feed during JL POS 5 w/makeup	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
1				failed	
2	HR-MI-JLP05	7.18E-04	0.43%	Operator Fails to Isolate and Makeup JL at POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
3	COMBINATION_20-	1.93E+01	0.43%	HEP dependency factor for HR-MI-JLP05, HR-FB-	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
5	LP			JLP05-02	
4	HR-FB-KVP05	3.49E-04	0.35%	Operator Fails to Feed during KV POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
5	HR-RS-KVP05	4.18E-01	0.36%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during KV POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
6	COMBINATION_52-	1.00E+00	0.35%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-KVP05, HR-	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
Ū	LP			FB-KVP05	
7	HR-FB-JLP11-02	5.37E-04	0.32%	Operator Fails to Feed during JL POS 11	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
,				w/makeup failed	
8	HR-MI-JLP11	7.18E-04	0.32%	Operator Fails to Isolate and Makeup JL at POS 11	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
9	COMBINATION_24-	9.41E+01	0.32%	HEP dependency factor for HR-MI-JLP11, HR-FB-	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
	LP			JLP11-02	
10	HR-FB-JLP06-02	2.72E-03	0.34%	Operator Fails to Feed during JL POS 6 w/makeup	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
		- 107 01	0.0.10/	failed	
11	HR-MI-JLP06	7.18E-04	0.34%	Operator Fails to Isolate and Makeup JL at POS 6	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
12	COMBINATION_27-	1.93E+01	0.34%	HEP dependency factor for HR-MI-JLP06, HR-FB-	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
	LP			JLP06-02	
13	HR-FB-S1P12A	3.49E-04	0.27%	Operator Fails to Feed during S1 POS 12A	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
14	HR-RS-S1P12A	3.23E-01	0.28%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during ST POS 12A	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
15	COMBINATION_53-	1.00E+00	0.27%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-S1P12A, HR-	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
	LP			FB-S1P12A	
16	HR-FB-S2P05	3.49E-04	0.22%	Operator Fails to Feed during S2 POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
17	HR-RS-S2P05	4.18E-01	0.23%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during S2 POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
18	COMBINATION_62-	1.00E+00	0.22%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-S2P05, HR-	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
10	LP			FB-S2P05	
19	HR-FB-SOP11-01	3.49E-04	0.06%	Operator Fails to Feed during SL POS 11	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
	UD DG GODII	5 F(F) 00	0.000/	w/makeup established	
20	HR-RS-SOP11	5.76E-03	0.22%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during SO POS 11	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
21	COMBINATION_3-	1.00E+00	0.22%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-SOP11, HR-	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
	LP		0.100/	FB-SOP11-01	
22	HR-FB-ESP05	3.49E-04	0.19%	Operator Fails to Feed during ES POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis

Table 7d (2 of 4)

Item No	Event Name	Probability	Fussell-Vesely	Description	Disposition
23	HR-RS-ESP05	4 18E-01	0.19%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during ES POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
24	COMBINATION_63- LP	1.00E+00	0.19%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-ESP05, HR- FB-ESP05	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
25	PFHBWQ4- SW2OUAT	2.73E-05	0.43%	4/4 CCF OF PCB BETWEEN UAT & 4.16KV SW01A/1B/1C/1D FAIL TO OPEN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.11.6 through 7.11.9. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit
26	VKOPH-S-ECCS	1.00E-01	0.18%	OPERATOR FAILS TO ACTUATE ECCS EXHAUST FAN AH01A/B	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
27	SXCTKQ4- CT01A/02A/01B/02B	1.10E-06	0.16%	4/4 CCF OF SXCT 1A, 2A, 1B AND 2B TO RUN	
28	SIMPZQ4- CSP1A/B/SCP1A/B	1.06E-06	0.14%	4/4 CCF OF CSP PP01A, PP01B AND SCP PP01A, PP01B TO RUN FOR 1HR	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.6.1, 7.6.2, 7.24.1, and 7.24.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit
29	PPSO-OS-PPS	1.20E-06	0.41%	CCF OF PPS OPERATING SYSTEM SOFTWARE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.21.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
30	SIMPKQ4- CSP1A/B/SCP1A/B	9.21E-07	0.13%	4/4 CCF OF CSP PP01A/PP01B AND SCP PP01A /PP01B FAIL TO RUN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.6.1, 7.6.2, 7.24.1, and 7.24.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit
31	HR-FB-S1P03B-01	3.55E-04	0.11%	Operator Fails to F&B during S1 POS 3B (LTOP re-closed)	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
32	HR-RS-S1P03B	2.88E-01	0.19%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during S1 POS 3B	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
33	HR-SG-S1P03B	6.06E-04	0.11%	Operator Fails to Remove Steam during S1 at POS 3A	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
34	COMBINATION_10- LP	8.34E+01	0.11%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-S1P03B, HR- SG-S1P03B,HR-FB-S1P03B-01	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
35	PFHBC1B-SW01B-A2	6.66E-03	0.36%	PCB SW01B-A2 OF 4.16KV SWGR SW01B FAILS TO CLOSE	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.11.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
36	SIMPR1B-SCPP01B	2.83E-03	0.28%	FAILS TO RUN SC PUMP 2 PP01B	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.24.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
37	SIMPR1A-SCPP01A	2.83E-03	0.21%	FAILS TO RUN SC PUMP PP01A	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.24.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
38	HR-FB-JLP04B-02	5.37E-04	0.12%	Operator Fails to Feed during JL POS 4B w/makeup failed	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis

Table 7d (3 of 4)

Item	Evont Namo	Probability	Fussell-Vesely	Description	Disposition
No.	Event Name	Frobability	Importance	Description	Disposition
39	HR-MI-JLP04B	7.18E-04	0.12%	Operator Fails to Isolate and Makeup JL at POS 4B	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
40	COMBINATION_49- LP	9.41E+01	0.12%	HEP dependency factor for HR-MI-JLP04B, HR- FB-JLP04B-02	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
41	PFHBWQ3- SW2OUATABD	1.65E-05	0.22%	3/4 CCF OF PCB BETWEEN UAT & 4.16KV SW01A/1B/1D FAIL TO OPEN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.11.6 through 7.11.9. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit
42	VGAHKQ4- AH01A/1B/2A/2B	6.06E-07	0.09%	4/4 CCF OF ESW PUMP ROOM FAN AH01A/B/02A/B FAIL TO RUN	Given the low importance of this event, very little benefit would be obtained from efforts to reduce the importance further. Therefore, no SAMA items are added.
43	VKHVKQ4- HV13A/13B/14A/14B	6.06E-07	0.09%	4/4 CCF OF RUN FOR CCW PUMP ROOM CUBICLE COOLER HV13A/13B/14A/14B FAIL TO RUN	Given the low importance of this event, very little benefit would be obtained from efforts to reduce the importance further. Therefore, no SAMA items are added.
44	VOHVKQ4- HV32A/32B/31A/31B	6.06E-07	0.09%	4/4 CCF OF RUN FOR CUBICLE COOLER HV32A/32B/31A/31B FAIL TO RUN	Given the low importance of this event, very little benefit would be obtained from efforts to reduce the importance further. Therefore, no SAMA items are added.
45	%TLOCCW	2.34E-04	0.16%	TOTAL LOSS OF COMPONANT COOLING WATER	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
46	BE-RATE-P14	3.12E-03	0.27%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS14 duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis
47	PFLOOP-NO-SI	2.00E-03	0.31%	CONDITIONAL LOOP AFTER INITIATORS WHICH DO NOT INITIATE AN SI SIGNAL	Conditional LOOP event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
48	%TLOESW	2.34E-04	0.16%	TOTAL LOSS OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
49	VDHVL-B-HV12B	2.28E-03	0.46%	FAILS TO RUN EDG ROOM CUBICLE COOLER HV12B FOR 1HR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.12. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
50	VDHVL-B-HV13B	2.28E-03	0.46%	FAILS TO RUN EDG ROOM CUBICLE COOLER HV13B FOR 1HR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.16. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
51	VDHVL-A-HV12A	2.28E-03	0.46%	FAILS TO RUN EDG ROOM CUBICLE COOLER HV12A FOR 1HR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.11. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
52	VDHVL-A-HV13A	2.28E-03	0.46%	FAILS TO RUN EDG ROOM CUBICLE COOLER HV13A FOR 1HR	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section 7.15.15. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
53	HR-FB-KVP12A	3.49E-04	0.07%	Operator Fails to Feed during KV POS 12A	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis

Table 7d (4 of 4)

Item No.	Event Name	Probability	Fussell-Vesely Importance	Description	Disposition
54	HR-RS-KVP12A	3.23E-01	0.07%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during KV POS 12A	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
55	COMBINATION_75- LP	1.00E+00	0.07%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-KVP12A, HR- FB-KVP12A	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
56	%CC	6.75E-03	0.28%	Loss of Component Cooling Water	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
57	HR-FB-CCP05	3.49E-04	0.07%	Operator Fails to Feed during CC POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
58	HR-RS-CCP05	4.18E-01	0.07%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during CC POS 5	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
59	COMBINATION_87- LP	1.00E+00	0.07%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-CCP05, HR- FB-CCP05	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
60	DGDGKQ2-DG01AB	5.55E-05	0.25%	2/4 CCF OF EDG 01A/01B FAIL TO RUN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
61	RCPVWQ4-200/1/2/3	2.10E-04	0.18%	4/4 CCF OF RC PV V200/201/202/203 FAIL TO OPEN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.12.1 through 7.12.4. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
62	COMBINATION_120- LP	8.34E+01	0.07%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-S1P03B, HR- SG-S1P03B	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
63	SXMPKQ4- PP01A/B/2A/B	4.63E-07	0.07%	4/4 CCF OF ESW PUMPS PP01A/2A/PP01B/2B FAIL TO RUN	The components associated with this basic event are evaluated in Sections 7.17.1 and 7.17.2. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
64	BE-RATE-P02	2.40E-03	0.21%	Conversion factor (SD-yr -> Calendar yr) for POS02 duration	Quantification factor - no impact on SAMDA analysis

Table 7e (1 of 1)

List of Additional Basic Events from APR1400 PRA Cutset Review (LPSD Internal Flooding Events)

Item No.	Event Name	Probability	Fussell-Vesely Importance	Description	Disposition
1	HR-FB-S2P04B	3.49E-04	0.24%	Operator Fails to Feed during S2 POS 4B	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
2	HR-RS-S2P06	2.04E-03	0.23%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during S2 POS 6	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
3	%IE-137-29B-FP-X-	1.22E-05	0.27%	MAJ BRK (> 2500 GPM) OF FP PIPING IN B	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
	LP			QUAD 137 FT EL RM 137-A29B (LPSD)	

Table 7f(1 of 1)

List of Additional Basic Events from APR1400 PRA Cutset Review (LPSD Internal Fire Events)

Item	E	D	Fussell-Vesely	Di 4i	Diana siti su
No.	Event Name	Probability	Importance	Description	Disposition
1	BF_F000-AC_F120-	8.60E-03	0.38%	BARRIER FAILURE BETWEEN FIRE COMPS	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section
	AGAA			F000-AC & F120-AGAA	7.4.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total
					maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
2	BF_F000-AC_F137-	8.60E-03	0.39%	BARRIER FAILURE BETWEEN FIRE COMPS	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section
	A20A			F000-AC & F137-A20A	7.4.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total
					maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
3	%F157-ATOC-LP	5.54E-05	0.31%	FIRE IN TSC EQUIP. REPAIR & MAINT ROOM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
4	%F157-A16C-LP	5.52E-05	0.32%	FIRE IN GENERAL ACCESS AREA	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
5	%F120-A15B-LP	1.85E-04	0.40%	FIRE IN 480V CLASS 1E MCC 03B RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
6	%F157-A01D-LP	1.82E-04	0.40%	FIRE IN I & C EQUIP. RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
7	BF_F000-	8.60E-03	0.21%	BARRIER FAILURE BETWEEN FIRE COMPS	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section
	ADGC_F078-A01C			F000-ADGC & F078-A01C	7.4.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total
					maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
8	BF_F000-	8.60E-03	0.21%	BARRIER FAILURE BETWEEN FIRE COMPS	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section
	ADGC_F078-A02C			F000-ADGC & F078-A02C	7.4.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total
					maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
9	HR-FB-CCP04B	2.01E-03	0.46%	Operator Fails to Feed during CC POS 4B	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
10	HR-RS-CCP04B	3.54E-02	0.46%	Operator Fails to Restore SCS during CC POS 4B	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
11	COMBINATION_44-	2.58E+01	0.46%	HEP dependency factor for HR-RS-CCP04B, HR-	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
	LPF			FB-CCP04B	
12	%F120-A14A-LP	3.65E-05	0.21%	FIRE IN SG BLOWDOWN REGEN HX RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
13	%F050-A04B-LP	1.48E-04	0.32%	FIRE IN SC PUMP & MINI FLOW HX RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
14	%F122-T01-LP	1.33E-03	0.48%	FIRE IN SWITCHGEAR RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
15	BF_F000-	2.40E-03	0.30%	BARRIER FAILURE BETWEEN FIRE COMPS	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section
	ADGD_F100-A06D			F000-ADGD & F100-A06D	7.4.1. A design change would be expected to cost more than the total
					maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
16	%FY-SAT1-LP	1.29E-03	0.33%	FIRE IN STAND-BY AUX. TRANSFORMER 1	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
				AREA	
17	MSEVO-A-102	5.56E-03	0.51%	MS ADV 102 ON SG1 FAILS TO OPEN	
18	MSOPH-S-SGADV-	1.00E+00	0.39%	OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN ADVS USING	Procedural changes are not in the scope of this SAMDA analysis
	HW			HAND WHEEL	
19	%F137-ANEC-LP	3.43E-03	0.46%	FIRE IN ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
				ROOM/CEDM M/G SET RM	
20	BF_F137-A01C_F137-	9.00E-03	0.26%	BARRIER FAILURE BETWEEN FIRE COMPS	The component associated with this basic event is evaluated in Section
	ANEC			F137-A01C & F137-ANEC	7.4.1. design change would be expected to cost more than the total
					maximum cost reduction and, as a result, not provide a positive benefit.
21	%F157-ACPX-LP	1.28E-04	0.30%	FIRE IN COMPUTER RM PACU RM	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis
22	%F120-A11B-LP	1.23E-04	0.27%	FIRE IN GENERAL ACCESS AREA-120' B	Initiating event - no impact on SAMDA analysis