

1 **DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION**

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3 **RELATED TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TASK FORCE TRAVELER**

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5 **TSTF-564, REVISION 1, "SAFETY LIMIT MCPR"**

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7 **USING THE CONSOLIDATED LINE ITEM IMPROVEMENT PROCESS**

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9 **(EPID L-2017-PMP-0007)**

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12 **1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND**

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14 By letter dated May 29, 2018 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System  
15 (ADAMS) Accession No. ML18149A320), the Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF)  
16 submitted Traveler TSTF-564, Revision 1, "Safety Limit MCPR [Minimum Critical Power Ratio]." Traveler TSTF-564, Revision 1, proposed changes to the Standard Technical Specifications (STS) for boiling-water reactor (BWR) designs.<sup>1</sup> These changes will be incorporated into future revisions of NUREG-1433 and NUREG-1434. Associated changes were also made to the technical specification (TS) Bases.

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22 The proposed changes revise the basis, calculational method, and the value of the TS safety  
23 limit (SL) 2.1.1.2, which protects against boiling transition on the fuel rods in the core. The  
24 current basis ensures that 99.9 percent of the fuel rods in the core are not susceptible to boiling  
25 transition. The revised basis will ensure that there is a 95 percent probability at a 95 percent  
26 confidence level that no fuel rods will be susceptible to boiling transition using an SL based on  
27 critical power ratio (CPR) data statistics. Technical Specification 5.6.3, "Core Operating Limits  
28 Report [(COLR)]," is also modified.

29  
30 This STS change will be made available to licensees through the consolidated line item  
31 improvement process (CLIIP) and is applicable to licensees utilizing those vendor-specific and  
32 fuel bundle types which are specified in Table 1 of the traveler.

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34 The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff transmitted requests for additional  
35 information (RAIs) to the TSTF by letter dated April 12, 2018 (ADAMS Accession  
36 No. ML18095A229). Responses to these RAIs were transmitted from the TSTF by letter dated  
37 May 29, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18149A320).

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39 **1.1 Background on Boiling Transition**

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41 During steady-state operation in a BWR, most of the coolant in the core is in a flow regime  
42 known as annular flow. In this flow regime, a thin liquid film is pushed up the surface of the fuel  
43 rod cladding by the bulk coolant flow, which is mostly water vapor with some liquid water  
44 droplets. This provides effective heat removal from the cladding surface; however, under

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric Plants BWR/4," NUREG-1433, Volume 1, "Specifications," and Volume 2, "Bases," Revision 4.0, April 2012 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML12104A192 and ML12104A193).

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric Plants BWR/6," NUREG-1434, Volume 1, "Specifications," and Volume 2, "Bases," Revision 4.0, April 2012 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML12104A195 and ML12104A196).

1 certain conditions, the annular film may dissipate, which reduces the heat transfer and results in  
2 an increase in fuel cladding surface temperature. This phenomenon is known as boiling  
3 transition or dryout. The elevated surface temperatures resulting from dryout may cause fuel  
4 cladding damage or failure.

## 5 6 1.2 Background on Critical Power Correlations 7

8 For a given set of reactor operating conditions (pressure, flow, etc.), dryout will occur on a fuel  
9 assembly at a certain power, known as the critical power. Because the phenomena associated  
10 with boiling transition are complex and difficult to model purely mechanistically,  
11 thermal-hydraulic test campaigns are undertaken using electrically heated prototypical fuel  
12 bundles to establish a comprehensive database of critical power measurements for each BWR  
13 fuel product. These data are then used to develop a critical power correlation that can be used  
14 to predict the critical power for assemblies in operating reactors. This prediction is usually  
15 expressed as the ratio of the actual assembly power to the critical power predicted using the  
16 correlation, known as the CPR.

17  
18 One measure of the correlation's predictive capability is based on its validation relative to the  
19 test data. For each point  $j$  in a correlation's test database, the experimental critical power ratio  
20 (ECPR) is defined as the ratio of the measured critical power to the calculated critical power,<sup>2</sup>  
21 or:  
22

$$23 \quad \text{ECPR}_j = \frac{\text{Measured Critical Power}_j}{\text{Calculated Critical Power}_j}$$

24  
25 For ECPR values less than or equal to 1, the calculated critical power is greater than the  
26 measured critical power and the prediction is considered to be non-conservative. Because the  
27 measured critical power includes random variations due to various uncertainties, evaluating the  
28 ECPR for all of the points in the dataset (or, ideally, a subset of points that were not used in the  
29 correlation's development) results in a probability distribution. This ECPR distribution allows the  
30 predictive uncertainty of the correlation to be determined. This uncertainty can then be used to  
31 establish a limit above which there can be assumed that boiling transition will not occur (with a  
32 certain probability and confidence level).  
33

## 34 1.3 Background on Thermal-Hydraulic Safety Limits 35

36 To protect against boiling transition, BWRs have implemented an SL on the CPR, known as the  
37 minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) SL. As discussed in NUREG-1433 and NUREG-1434 for  
38 General Electric BWR designs, the current basis of the MCPR SL is to prevent 99.9 percent of  
39 the fuel in the core from being susceptible to boiling transition. This limit is typically developed  
40 by considering various cycle-specific power distributions and uncertainties, and is highly  
41 dependent on the cycle-specific radial power distribution in the core. As such, the limit may  
42 need to be updated as frequently as every cycle.  
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<sup>2</sup> Consistent with the definition used in Section 3.1 of the revised TSTF traveler (ADAMS Accession No. ML18149A320) and associated RAI response (i.e., RAI 1) (ADAMS Accession No. ML18149A320).

1 The fuel cladding SL for pressurized-water reactor (PWR) designs, described in the STS for  
2 Babcock & Wilcox, Westinghouse, and Combustion Engineering<sup>3</sup> plants in NUREG-1430,  
3 NUREG-1431, and NUREG-1432,<sup>4</sup> respectively, correspond to a 95 percent probability at a  
4 95 percent confidence level that departure from nucleate boiling will not occur. As a result of  
5 the overall approach taken in developing the PWR limits, they are only dependent on the fuel  
6 type(s) in the reactor and the corresponding departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR)  
7 correlations. The limits are not cycle-dependent and are typically only updated when new fuel  
8 types are inserted in the reactor.  
9

10 BWRs also have a limiting condition for operation (LCO) that governs MCPR, known as the  
11 MCPR operating limit (OL). The OL on MCPR is an LCO which must be met to ensure that  
12 anticipated operational occurrences do not result in fuel damage. The current MCPR OL is  
13 calculated by combining the largest change in CPR from all analyzed transients, also known as  
14 the  $\Delta$ CPR, with the MCPR SL.  
15

## 16 **2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION**

### 17 **2.1 Description of STS Sections**

#### 18 **2.1.1 TS 2.1.1, "Reactor Core SLs"**

19  
20 Safety limits ensure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded during steady  
21 state operation, normal operational transients, and anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs).  
22  
23  
24

25 Technical Specification 2.1.1.2 currently requires that with the reactor steam dome pressure  
26 greater than or equal to ( $\geq$ ) 785 pounds per square inch gauge (psig) and core flow  $\geq$  10 percent  
27 rated core flow, MCPR shall be  $\geq$  [1.07] for two recirculation loop operation or  $\geq$  [1.08] for single  
28 recirculation loop operation. The value in brackets represents plant-specific parameters. The  
29 MCPR SL ensures that 99.9 percent of the fuel in the core is not susceptible to boiling transition.  
30

#### 31 **2.1.2 TS 5.6.3, "Core Operating Limits Report [(COLR)]"**

32  
33 Technical Specification 5.6.3 requires core operating limits to be established prior to each  
34 reload cycle, or prior to any remaining portion of a reload cycle. These limits are required to be  
35 documented in the COLR.  
36

### 37 **2.2 Proposed Changes to the STS**

38  
39 Traveler TSTF-564, Revision 1, proposed a method for determining a revised,  
40 cycle-independent MCPR SL for any BWR fuel applicable to all BWR designs. Though the  
41 process for determining a revised MCPR SL is broadly applicable to any BWR fuel, the traveler  
42 provides a table of sample limits for fuels from Global Nuclear Fuel and Westinghouse Electric

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<sup>3</sup> Denotes applicability to Combustion Engineering plants with digital control systems only.

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Standard Technical Specifications, Babcock and Wilcox Plants," NUREG-1430, Volume 1, "Specifications," and Volume 2, "Bases," Revision 4.0, April 2012 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML12100A177 and ML12100A178).

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants," NUREG-1431, Volume 1, "Specifications," and Volume 2, "Bases," Revision 4.0, April 2012 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML12100A222 and ML12100A228).

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Standard Technical Specifications, Combustion Engineering Plants," NUREG-1432, Volume 1, "Specifications," and Volume 2, "Bases," Revision 4.0, April 2012 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML12102A165 and ML12102A169).

1 Company. The original MCPR SL, referred to in traveler TSTF-564, Revision 1, as the  
2 MCPR<sub>99.9%</sub> SL, ensures that 99.9 percent of the fuel in the core is not susceptible to boiling  
3 transition. The revised MCPR SL, referred to in traveler TSTF-564, Revision 1, as the  
4 MCPR<sub>95/95</sub> SL, ensures there is a 95 percent probability at a 95 percent confidence level that no  
5 fuel rods will be susceptible to transition boiling. Additional changes to the STS and TS Bases  
6 proposed in the traveler support the revision of the SL.  
7

8 The proposed changes to the STS revise the value of the MCPR SL in TS 2.1.1.2, with  
9 corresponding changes to the associated bases. The change to TS 2.1.1.2 replaces the  
10 existing separate SLs for single- and two-recirculation loop operation with a single limit since the  
11 revised SL is no longer dependent on the number of recirculation loops in operation. In  
12 addition, the current MCPR SL is renamed MCPR<sub>99.9%</sub> and the new MCPR SL is named  
13 MCPR<sub>95/95</sub>. Corresponding changes are made to the associated TS Bases.  
14

15 The MCPR<sub>99.9%</sub> (i.e., the current MCPR SL) is an input to the MCPR operating limits (OL) in  
16 limiting condition of operation (LCO) 3.2.2, "Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR)." While the  
17 definition and method of calculation of both the MCPR<sub>99.9%</sub> and the LCO 3.2.2 MCPR OL  
18 remains unchanged, the proposed STS changes include revisions to TS 5.6.3, to require the  
19 MCPR<sub>99.9%</sub> value used in calculating the LCO 3.2.2 MCPR OL to be included in the  
20 cycle-specific COLR. Corresponding TS Bases changes for LCO 3.2.2 and TS 5.6.3 support  
21 the proposed STS changes.  
22

### 23 2.3 Applicable Regulatory Requirements and Guidance 24

25 Section IV, "The Commission Policy," of the "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications  
26 Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors," published in the *Federal Register* on July 22, 1993  
27 (58 FR 39132), states, in part:  
28

29 The purpose of Technical Specifications is to impose those  
30 conditions or limitations upon reactor operation necessary to  
31 obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event giving rise  
32 to an immediate threat to the public health and safety by  
33 identifying those features that are of controlling importance to  
34 safety and establishing on them certain conditions of operation  
35 which cannot be changed without prior Commission approval.  
36

37 ...[T]he Commission will also entertain requests to adopt portions  
38 of the improved STS [(e.g., TSTF-563)], even if the licensee does  
39 not adopt all STS improvements ...In accordance with this Policy  
40 Statement, improved STS have been developed and will be  
41 maintained for each NSSS [nuclear steam supply system] owners  
42 group. The Commission encourages licensees to use the  
43 improved STS as the basis for plant-specific Technical  
44 Specifications. ...[I]t is the Commission intent that the wording  
45 and Bases of the improved STS be used ... to the extent  
46 practicable.  
47

48 As described in the Commission's "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications  
49 Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors," NRC and industry task groups for new STS  
50 recommended that improvements include greater emphasis on human factors principles in order  
51 to add clarity and understanding to the text of the STS, and provide improvements to the Bases

1 of STS, which provides the purpose for each requirement in the specification. The improved  
2 vendor-specific STS were developed and issued by the NRC in September 1992.

3  
4 As required by 10 CFR 50.36(c), TSs will include items in the following categories: (1) *Safety*  
5 *limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings*. As required by 10 CFR  
6 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A), safety limits for nuclear reactors are “limits upon important process variables  
7 that are found to be necessary to reasonably protect the integrity of certain of the physical  
8 barriers that guard against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity. If any safety limit is  
9 exceeded, the reactor must be shut down. The licensee shall notify the Commission, review the  
10 matter, and record the results of the review, including the cause of the condition and the basis  
11 for corrective action taken to preclude recurrence. Operation must not be resumed until  
12 authorized by the Commission.”

13  
14 As required by 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(i), the TSs will include LCOs, which are the lowest functional  
15 capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. When  
16 an LCO is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action  
17 permitted by the TSs until the condition can be met.

18  
19 General Design Criterion 10 (GDC), “Reactor design,” of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A, “General  
20 Design Criteria of Nuclear Power Plants,” states:

21  
22 The reactor core and associated coolant control and protection systems shall be  
23 designed with appropriate margin to assure that specified acceptable fuel design  
24 limits are not exceeded during any condition of normal operation, including the  
25 effects of anticipated operational occurrences.

26  
27 Most plants have a plant-specific design criterion similar to GDC 10. The limit placed on the  
28 MCPR acts as a specified acceptable fuel design limit to prevent boiling transition, which has  
29 the potential to result in fuel rod cladding failure.

30  
31 The NRC staff’s guidance contained in Revision 2 of NUREG-0800, “Standard Review Plan for  
32 the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition” (SRP),  
33 Section 4.4, “Thermal and Hydraulic Design,”<sup>5</sup> provides the following two examples of  
34 acceptable approaches to meeting the SRP acceptance criteria for establishing fuel design  
35 limits (as stated in SRP Acceptance Criterion 1):

- 36  
37 A. For departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR), CHF [critical heat flux ratio]  
38 or CPR correlations, there should be a 95-percent probability at the 95-percent  
39 confidence level that the hot rod in the core does not experience a DNB or boiling  
40 transition condition during normal operation or AOOs.  
41  
42 B. The limiting (minimum) value of DNBR, CHF, or CPR correlations is to be  
43 established such that at least 99.9 percent of the fuel rods in the core will not  
44 experience a DNB or boiling transition during normal operation or AOOs.  
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<sup>5</sup> U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR [Light-Water Reactor] Edition,” NUREG-0800, Section 4.4, “Thermal and Hydraulic Design, Revision 2, March 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML070550060).

1 **3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION**

2  
3 3.1 Basis for Proposed Change

4  
5 As discussed in Section 2.3 of traveler TSTF-564, Revision 1, and Section 1.3 of this safety  
6 evaluation, the current MCPR SL (i.e., the MCPR<sub>99.9%</sub>) is affected by each plant's cycle-specific  
7 core design, especially including the core power distribution, fuel type(s) in the reactor, and the  
8 power-to-flow operating domain for the plant. As such, it is frequently necessary to change the  
9 MCPR SL to accommodate new core designs. Changes to the MCPR SL are usually  
10 determined late in the design process and necessitate an accelerated NRC review (i.e., license  
11 amendment request) to support the subsequent fuel cycle.

12  
13 Traveler TSTF-564, Revision 1, proposes to change the basis for the MCPR SL so that it is no  
14 longer cycle-dependent, reducing the frequency of revisions and eliminating the need for NRC  
15 review on an accelerated schedule. The proposed revised basis for the MCPR SL aligns it with  
16 that of the DNBR SL used in PWRs, which, as previously noted in Section 2.3 of this safety  
17 evaluation, provides a 95 percent probability at a 95 percent confidence level that no fuel rods  
18 will experience departure from nucleate boiling.

19  
20 The intent of the proposed basis for the revised MCPR SL is acceptable to the NRC staff based  
21 on the discussion in SRP Section 4.4, SRP Acceptance Criterion 1. The remainder of this  
22 safety evaluation is devoted to ensuring that the methodology for determining the revised MCPR  
23 SL provides the intended result, that the revised MCPR SL can be adequately determined in  
24 cores using various types of fuel, that the proposed SL continues to fulfill the necessary  
25 functions of an SL without unintended consequences, and that the proposed changes have  
26 been adequately implemented in the STS and associated TS Bases.

27  
28 3.2 Revised MCPR SL Definition

29  
30 As discussed in Section 1.2 of this safety evaluation, a critical power correlation's ECPR  
31 distribution quantifies the uncertainty associated with the correlation. The TSTF traveler  
32 provides a definition for a limit that bounds 95 percent of a correlation's ECPR distribution at a  
33 95 percent confidence level, according to the following formula:

34  
35 
$$\text{MCPR}_{95/95}(i) = \mu_i + \kappa_i \sigma_i$$

36  
37 where  $\mu_i$  is the correlation's mean ECPR,  $\sigma_i$  is the standard deviation of the correlation's ECPR  
38 distribution, and  $\kappa_i$  is a statistical parameter chosen to provide "95% probability at 95%  
39 confidence (95/95) for the one-sided upper tolerance limit that depends on the number of  
40 samples ( $N_i$ ) in the critical power database." This formula is commonly used to determine a  
41 95/95 one-sided upper tolerance limit for a normal distribution, which is appropriate for the  
42 situation under consideration. The factor  $\kappa$  is generally attributed to D. B. Owen<sup>6</sup> and was also  
43 reported by M. G. Natrella<sup>7</sup> as referenced in traveler TSTF-564, Revision 1. Example values of  
44  $\kappa$  are provided in Table 2 of the TSTF traveler. Table 1 of the TSTF traveler includes some  
45 reference values of the MCPR<sub>95/95</sub>.

<sup>6</sup> D. B. Owen, "Factors for One-Sided Tolerance Limits and for Variables Sampling Plans," Sandia Corporation, SCR-607, March 1963, ADAMS Accession No. ML14031A495.

<sup>7</sup> M. G. Natrella, "Experimental Statistics," National Bureau of Standards, National Bureau of Standards Handbook 91, August 1963.

1  
2 As discussed by Piepel and Cuta<sup>8</sup> for DNBR correlations, the acceptability of this approach is  
3 predicated on a variety of assumptions, including the assumptions that the correlation data  
4 comes from a common population and that the correlation's population is distributed normally.  
5 These assumptions are typically addressed generically when a critical power or critical heat flux  
6 correlation is reviewed by the NRC staff, who may apply penalties to the correlation to account  
7 for any issues identified. In its response to an RAI, the TSTF states that such penalties applied  
8 during the NRC's review of the critical power correlation would be imposed on the mean or  
9 standard deviation used in the calculating the  $MCPR_{95/95}$  (ADAMS Accession  
10 No. ML18149A320). These penalties would also continue to be imposed in the determination of  
11 the  $MCPR_{99.9\%}$ , along with any other penalties associated with the process of (or other inputs  
12 used in) determining the  $MCPR_{99.9\%}$  (e.g., penalties applied to the  $MCPR_{99.9\%}$  SL for operation in  
13 the Maximum Extended Load Limit Line Analysis Plus (MELLLA+) operating domain).  
14

15 The NRC staff finds the definition of the  $MCPR_{95/95}$  will appropriately establish a 95/95 upper  
16 tolerance limit on the critical power correlation and that any issues in the underlying correlation  
17 will be addressed through penalties on the correlation mean and standard deviation, as  
18 necessary. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the  $MCPR_{95/95}$  definition, as proposed,  
19 establishes an acceptable fuel design limit and is acceptable.  
20

### 21 3.3 Determination of Revised MCPR SL for Mixed Cores

22

23 The TSTF proposed that a core containing a variety of fuel types would evaluate the  $MCPR_{95/95}$   
24 for all of the fresh and once-burnt fuel in the core and apply the most limiting (i.e., the largest)  
25 value of  $MCPR_{95/95}$  for each of the applicable fuel types as the MCPR SL. As stated in  
26 Section 3.1 of the TSTF traveler, this is because bundles that are twice-burnt or more at the  
27 beginning of the cycle have significant MCPR margin relative to the fresh and once-burnt fuel.  
28 In its response to an RAI (ADAMS Accession No. ML18149A320), the TSTF provided additional  
29 justification for this assertion. The justification is that the MCPR for twice-burnt and greater fuel  
30 is far enough from the MCPR for the limiting bundle that its probability of boiling transition is  
31 very small compared to the limiting bundle and it can be neglected in determining the SL.  
32 Results of a study provided in the RAI response indicate that this is the case even for fuel  
33 operated on short (12-month) reload cycles. As discussed in the RAI, twice-burnt or greater fuel  
34 bundles are included in the cycle-specific evaluation of the  $MCPR_{99.9\%}$  and the MCPR OL. If a  
35 twice-burnt or greater fuel bundle is found to be limiting, it would be governed by the MCPR OL,  
36 which will always be more restrictive than both the  $MCPR_{95/95}$  and the  $MCPR_{99.9\%}$ . The NRC  
37 staff found this justification to be appropriate and determined that it is acceptable to determine  
38 the  $MCPR_{95/95}$  SL for the core based on the most limiting value of the  $MCPR_{95/95}$  for the fresh  
39 and once-burnt fuel in the core.  
40

41 The NRC staff reviewed the information furnished by the TSTF and determined that the process  
42 for establishing the revised MCPR SL for mixed cores ensures that the limiting fuel types in the  
43 core will be evaluated and the limiting  $MCPR_{99.9\%}$  will be appropriately applied as the SL. The  
44 NRC staff therefore found this process to be acceptable.  
45

46 The size, mean, and standard deviation of the ECPR database may need to be provided by a  
47 fuel vendor to determine the  $MCPR_{95/95}$  for a legacy fuel type. The value of  $\kappa$  depends on the  
48 number of samples ( $N_i$ ) in the critical power database. If the number of data points in the

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<sup>8</sup> G. F. Piepel and J. M. Cuta, "Statistical Concepts and Techniques for Developing, Evaluating, and Validating CHF Models and Corresponding Fuel Design Limits," SKI Technical Report, 93:46, 1993.

1 database is not supplied by the vendor, the TSTF response to an RAI stated that a value of  $\kappa =$   
2 1.8 would be imposed on the  $\text{MCPR}_{95/95}$  determination, on the basis that any database used to  
3 develop a critical power correlation will need at least 500 points to be acceptable.<sup>9</sup> The limiting  
4 value from either the new or legacy fuel would then be applied as the SL. The NRC staff finds  
5 that there are potential circumstances where the number of data points used in determining the  
6 correlation's uncertainty may not correspond to a  $\kappa$  value of 1.8; for example, future correlations  
7 may need fewer data points, or the subset of data used to determine a correlation's uncertainty  
8 may be smaller than the full correlation database. Therefore, the NRC staff determined that a  $\kappa$   
9 value of 1.8 for legacy fuel types where the number of data points  $N$  is not provided may not be  
10 acceptable, and the  $\kappa$  used in determining the  $\text{MCPR}_{95/95}$  must be justified to be appropriate or  
11 conservative for the fuel type and correlation in question. This determination does not affect the  
12 overall acceptability of the process for determining the  $\text{MCPR}_{95/95}$  for a mix of fuel types as  
13 discussed above. The NRC staff also notes that, as stated in Section 1.0 of this SE, this STS  
14 change is only available to licensees through the CLIP when using the fuel bundle types  
15 specified in Table 1 of the traveler. Therefore, the use of legacy fuels, for which this  
16 determination would be relevant, is outside the scope of a CLIP application.

### 17 18 3.4 Relationship Between MCPR Safety and Operating Limits

19  
20 In its response to an RAI, the TSTF discussed that  $\text{MCPR}_{99.9\%}$  is expected to always be greater  
21 than the  $\text{MCPR}_{95/95}$  for two reasons. First, because the  $\text{MCPR}_{99.9\%}$  includes uncertainties not  
22 factored into the  $\text{MCPR}_{95/95}$ , and second, because the 99.9 percent probability basis for  
23 determining the  $\text{MCPR}_{99.9\%}$  is more conservative than the 95 percent probability at a 95 percent  
24 confidence level used in determining the  $\text{MCPR}_{95/95}$ . The level of conservatism in the  $\text{MCPR}_{95/95}$   
25 SL is appropriate because the lead fuel rod in the core (i.e., the limiting fuel rod with respect to  
26 MCPR) is used to evaluate whether any fuel rods in the core are susceptible to boiling  
27 transition, which is also discussed in the TSTF RAI response (i.e., RAI 2(a) (ADAMS Accession  
28 No. ML18149A320)). This is consistent with evaluations performed for PWRs using a 95/95  
29 upper tolerance limit on the correlation uncertainty as an SL.

30  
31 The TSTF traveler proposed that the MCPR OL defined in LCO 3.2.2 would continue to be  
32 evaluated using the  $\text{MCPR}_{99.9\%}$  as an input. The  $\text{MCPR}_{99.9\%}$  will continue to be evaluated in the  
33 same way as it is currently, using the whole core. The TSTF traveler also changes TS 5.6.3, to  
34 require the cycle-specific value of the  $\text{MCPR}_{99.9\%}$  to be included in the COLR. The methods  
35 supporting the inclusion of the  $\text{MCPR}_{99.9\%}$  must also therefore be included in the list of COLR  
36 references contained in TS 5.6.3.b.<sup>10</sup> The changes to TS 5.6.3.b help to ensure that the  
37 uncertainties being removed from the MCPR SL are still included as part of the MCPR OL and  
38 will continue to appropriately inform plant operation.

39  
40 The NRC staff therefore determined that the changes proposed by the TSTF will retain an  
41 adequate level of conservatism in the MCPR SL in TS 2.1.1.2 while appropriately ensuring that  
42 plant- and cycle-specific uncertainties will be retained in the MCPR OL. The NRC staff notes  
43 that the  $\text{MCPR}_{95/95}$  represents a hard floor on the value of the  $\text{MCPR}_{99.9\%}$ , which should always

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<sup>9</sup> The NRC staff notes that a  $\kappa$  value of 1.8 corresponds to  $N = 300$  data points, as provided in Table T-11b of NUREG-1475, "Applying Statistics," Revision 1, March 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11102A076). This is more conservative than the  $\kappa$  for  $N = 500$  data points, which would be 1.763.

<sup>10</sup> The MCPR OL is already a COLR parameter and as such, the methodology to calculate it should already be included in TS 5.6.3.b. In current BWR methodologies for all major U.S. fuel suppliers, the MCPR SL (i.e., the  $\text{MCPR}_{99.9\%}$ ) is calculated using the same methodology as the MCPR OL. Should this change, because the  $\text{MCPR}_{99.9\%}$  and the MCPR OL are both COLR parameters, both methodologies would need to be included in TS 5.6.3.b.



1 be higher since it accounts for numerous uncertainties that are not included in the MCPR<sub>95/95</sub> (as  
2 discussed in Section 3.1 of traveler TSTF-564, Revision 1, and the TSTF's response to RAI 7).  
3

### 4 3.5 Implementation of the Revised MCPR SL in the TS

5

6 The value reported in TS 2.1.1.2 will be the value calculated using Equation 1 from traveler  
7 TSTF-564, Revision 1, at a precision of two digits past the decimal point with the hundreds digit  
8 rounded up. This is consistent with the current practice for PWR DNBR SLs and is acceptable  
9 to the NRC staff. As previously discussed, the value of the MCPR OL provided in LCO 3.2.2 will  
10 continue to be reported in the COLR. The COLR will be required to contain the cycle-specific  
11 MCPR<sub>99.9%</sub> value and TS 5.6.3.b will continue to reference appropriate NRC-approved  
12 methodologies for determination of the MCPR<sub>99.9%</sub> and the MCPR OL.  
13

14 Traveler TSTF-564, Revision 1, added new language to the TS 2.1.1 Bases to provide the basis  
15 for the redefined MCPR SL. In its response to an RAI, the TSTF revised the TS Bases to  
16 specify the fuel type on which the SL is based. Though the traveler is intended to be applicable  
17 to all types of fuel, the existing STS bases only discuss certain fuel vendors. As discussed in  
18 RAI responses to RAIs 1, 10, and 12, the TSTF proposed changes to the STS bases for issues  
19 directly related to the implementation of the revised MCPR SL.  
20

21 The NRC staff reviewed the proposed TS and Bases changes and found that the TSTF  
22 appropriately implemented the revised MCPR SL, as discussed in the proposed TSTF-564,  
23 Revision 1 traveler.  
24

### 25 4.0 CONCLUSION

26

27 The NRC staff reviewed traveler TSTF-564, Revision 1, which proposed changes to  
28 NUREG-1433 and NUREG-1434. The NRC staff determined that the proposed definition of the  
29 MCPR SL in TS 2.1.1.2 was acceptably modified and will be calculated in a manner consistent  
30 with the new definition. Under the new definition, the MCPR SL will continue to protect the fuel  
31 cladding against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity by preventing the onset of boiling  
32 transition, thereby fulfilling the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(1) for SLs. The MCPR OL in  
33 LCO 3.2.2 remains unchanged and will continue to meet the requirements of  
34 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2) (and GDC 10 or the equivalent plant-specific design criterion) by ensuring  
35 that no fuel damage results during normal operation and AOOs. The NRC staff determined that  
36 the changes to TS 5.6.3 proposed in the traveler are acceptable; upon adoption of the revised  
37 MCPR SL, the COLR will be required to contain the MCPR<sub>99.9%</sub>, supporting the determination of  
38 the MCPR OL using current methodologies.  
39

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