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REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 9001080281 DOC. DATE: 89/12/28 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: 50-281 Surry Power Station, Unit 2, Virginia Electric & Power 05000281
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 KANSLER, M.R. Virginia Power (Virginia Electric & Power Co.)
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 88-001-02: on 880127, improper admin control of
 containment isolation valves due to personnel error.
W/8 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 4
 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES: 1cy NMSS/FCAF/PM. 05000281

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	ACRS WYLIE	1 1	AEOD/DOA	1 1
	AEOD/DSP/TPAB	1 1	AEOD/ROAB/DSP	2 2
	DEDRO	1 1	NRR/DET/ECMB 9H	1 1
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	NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11	1 1	NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10	1 1
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	NUDOCS-ABSTRACT	1 1	REG FILE 02	1 1
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EXTERNAL:	EG&G WILLIAMS, S	4 4	L ST LOBBY WARD	1 1
	LPDR	1 1	NRC PDR	1 1
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AO-4

December 28, 1989

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Serial No.: 88-001B
Docket No.: 50-281
License No.: DPR-37

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following updated Licensee Event Report for Unit 2.

REPORT NUMBER

88-001-02

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be reviewed by Corporate Nuclear Safety.

Very truly yours,



M. R. Kansler
Station Manager

Enclosure

cc: Regional Administrator
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

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NRC Form 366 (9-83) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) **Surry Power Station, Unit 2** DOCKET NUMBER (2) **05000281** PAGE (3) **1 OF 03**

TITLE (4) **Improper Administrative Control of Containment Isolation Valves Due to Personnel Error**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
01	27	88	88	001	02	12	28	89			05000
											05000

OPERATING MODE (9) **N** THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

POWER LEVEL (10) 100	20.402(b)	20.406(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
	20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME **M. R. Kansler, Station Manager** TELEPHONE NUMBER **804 357-3184**

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
X	JM	ISV	T120	Y					
X	JM	ISV	A609	Y					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On January 27, 1988, with Unit 2 at 100% power, it was determined at 1944 hours that leakage through containment isolation valves TV-SS-201A and TV-SS-201B (pressurizer vapor space sample) (EIIIS-JM ISV) was greater than the ASME Section XI specification. The valves were declared inoperable at that time. The valves were maintained closed and placed under administrative control at 2241 hours by lifting a lead on TV-SS-201A (a solenoid operated valve) and by lifting a lead and isolating instrument air to TV-SS-201B (an air operated valve). However, on February 2, 1988 at 2225 hours, it was discovered that the wrong leads had been lifted for the trip valves, and that TV-SS-201A had not been properly administratively controlled. The correct leads were lifted at 2324 hours, and the trip valves were verified to be properly controlled. Electricians have been instructed as to which are the proper leads to lift to disable these valves. The leakage through the valves has been attributed to impurities in the system. TV-SS-201A was replaced and TV-SS-201B was repaired.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Surry Power Station, Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 8 8	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
			0 0 1	0 2	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

1.0 Description of the Event

On January 27, 1988, with Unit 2 at 100% power, it was determined at 1944 hours that leakage through containment isolation valves TV-SS-201A and TV-SS-201B (pressurizer vapor space sample) (EIIS-JM ISV) was greater than the ASME Section XI specification. The valves were declared inoperable at that time. Technical Specifications require administrative control of inoperable automatic containment isolation valves. The valves were maintained closed and placed under administrative control at 2241 hours by lifting a lead on TV-SS-201A (a solenoid operated valve) and by lifting a lead and isolating instrument air to TV-SS-201B (an air operated valve). Also, the manual isolation valve downstream of the penetration, 1-SS-113, was closed under administrative control. However, on February 2, 1988 at 2225 hours, it was discovered that the wrong leads had been lifted for the trip valves, and that TV-SS-201A had not been properly administratively controlled. Since air was isolated to TV-SS-201B, it was effectively administratively controlled. The correct leads were lifted at 2324 hours, and the trip valves were verified to be properly controlled.

2.0 Safety Consequences and Implications

The pressurizer vapor space sample system trip valves provide containment isolation in the event of a loss of coolant accident. Although the leakage through the trip valves exceeded the ASME Section XI allowable leakage for operable containment isolation valves, the leakage was well within the total allowable leakage for containment integrity. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3.0 Cause

Electrical maintenance personnel misinterpreted the electrical sketches and lifted the wrong leads when attempting to disable the trip valves.

Maintenance engineering has determined that the subject valves are susceptible to leakage due to the entrapment of system impurities in the valve internals.

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		8 8	- 0 0 1	- 0 2	0 3	OF	0 3

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and pitting of the internals caused by the impurities. Pitting of the valve disc was the cause of leakage through TV-SS-201B. Valve TV-SS-201A could not be disassembled, however, it is suspected that the leakage was due to small system impurities trapped under the valve seat.

4.0 Immediate Corrective Action(s)

When it was discovered that the wrong leads had been lifted, the electricians lifted the proper leads and reconnected the leads that had been lifted incorrectly. Operations then verified that the trip valves could not be opened.

5.0 Additional Corrective Action(s)

TV-SS-201A was replaced and TV-SS-201B was repaired and reinstalled and both valves were tested satisfactorily.

6.0 Action(s) Taken to Prevent Recurrence

Electricians have been instructed as to which are the proper leads to lift to disable these valves.

The present foreign material exclusion controls which were enhanced in 1989 and system cleanliness requirements are considered adequate to prevent impurity induced leakage.

7.0 Similar Events

None.

8.0 Manufacturer/Model Number(s)

TV-SS-201A Rock/86V-001
TV-SS-201B Asco/Kx2063803RF