VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
Surry Power Station
P. O. Box 315
Surry, Virginia 23883

August 12, 1989

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
016 Phillips Building
Washington, D.C. 20555

Serial No.: 89-029
Docket No.: 50-280
50-281
License No.: DPR-32
DPR-37

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Units 1 and 2.

REPORT NUMBER

89-028-00

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be reviewed by Safety Evaluation and Control.

Very truly yours,

M. R. Kansler
Station Manager

Enclosure

cc: Regional Administrator
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

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NRC FORM 366 (6-89)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 4/30/92

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4) EDG Underground Fuel Oil Tanks Access Plugs Removed With No Administrative Control Due to Inadequate Procedure

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 7	1 3	8 9	8 9	0 2 8	0 0	0 8	1 2	8 9		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 6 5	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
M. R. Kansler, Station Manager	AREA CODE 8 0 4 — 3 5 7 - 3 1 8 4

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On July 13, 1989 at 1500 hours, with Unit 1 at 65% power and Unit 2 in cold shutdown, an operator discovered the access plug removed from the entrance to each of the two underground fuel oil tanks (EIIS-TK). The plugs had been removed earlier that day at 0900 hours to permit testing of the fuel oil tanks. With the plugs removed, both underground fuel oil (EIIS-TK) tanks were considered technically inoperable due to degraded missile protection. This condition is contrary to Technical Specification 3.16.A.1. The fuel oil sample procedure did not provide guidance for establishing administrative control when removing the access plugs. The access plugs were reinstalled upon discovery. The sample procedure will be revised to provide specific instructions regarding administrative control requirements when removing the underground fuel oil tank access plugs.

1.0 Description of the Event

On July 13, 1989 at 1500 hours, with Unit 1 at 65% power and Unit 2 in cold shutdown, an operator discovered the access plug was removed from the entrance to each of the two underground fuel oil tanks (EIIS-TK). These access plugs provide missile protection for the manway opening to the underground tanks which are used to supply fuel oil to the plant's three emergency diesel generators (EIIS-DG). With the plugs removed, both tanks were considered technically inoperable due to degraded missile protection. This condition is contrary to Technical Specifications 3.16.A.1. A chemistry technician had the plugs removed to allow sampling of the fuel oil tanks, and was unaware that administrative control of the plugs was required while they were removed. A plug was briefly removed the previous day to obtain a sample but was reinstalled due to undesirable sample conditions.

2.0 Safety Consequences and Implications

Missile protection is provided for the underground fuel oil tanks to prevent damage resulting from missiles generated by a tornado or strong winds. The probability of one of these missiles passing through the opening and damaging the tank was low due to the dimensions of the opening, three feet by three feet, and a geometry that limits the angle of attack of any missile to within a few degrees of vertical. Personnel were also locally available during the time the plug was removed to reinstall the plug if necessary. In addition, the abnormal procedure for severe weather requires operators to walk down outside areas upon the issuance of a tornado or hurricane watch for the area. This requirement minimizes the likelihood that the missile protection plugs would have remained removed during severe weather. Therefore, the consequences of the plugs being removed were minimal and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3.0 Cause

The missile protection plugs were removed at the direction of a chemistry technician who was performing

a surveillance test for biological contaminants in the fuel oil. The chemistry technician was unaware that administrative control of the plugs was required while the plugs were removed. The administrative control would have ensured the plugs were reinstalled upon the issuance of a tornado or hurricane watch.

Additionally, the sample procedure did not provide guidance on removing the access plugs.

4.0 Immediate Corrective Action(s)

The access plugs were reinstalled immediately upon discovery.

5.0 Additional Corrective Action(s)

None.

6.0 Action(s) Taken to Prevent Recurrence

The fuel oil sample procedure will be changed to provide specific instructions regarding the underground fuel oil tank access plugs. The procedure will direct that only one plug may be removed at a time and that administrative control of the plug must be established.

A memorandum was issued from the station manager to station personnel. The memo instructed that shift supervisor approval is required prior to moving any missile protection device.

7.0 Similar Events

None.

8.0 Manufacturer/Model Number(s)

Not applicable.