

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

Surry Power Station
P. O. Box 315
Surry, Virginia 23883

July 20, 1989

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
016 Phillips Building
Washington, D.C. 20555

Serial No.: 89-026
Docket Nos.: 50-280
50-281
License Nos. DPR-32
DPR-37

Gentlemen:


Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Units 1 and 2.

REPORT NUMBER

89-025-00

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be reviewed by Safety Evaluation and Control.

Very truly yours,



M. R. Kansler
Station Manager

Enclosure

cc: Regional Administrator
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3
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TITLE (4) Unplanned ESF Actuation, Auxiliary Vent Dampers Realigned,
During Performance of ST-260 Due to Improper Jumper Installation

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)					
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES					
0	6	2	8	9	8	9	0	2	0	5	0	0	0	0
0	6	2	8	9	8	9	0	7	0	5	0	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (8) N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.38(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.38(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract Below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)								

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)		TELEPHONE NUMBER	
NAME M. R. Kansler, Station Manager	AREA CODE 8 0 4	3 5 7	- 3 1 8 4

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)			EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO					

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On June 22, 1989 at 1131 hours, with Units 1 and 2 at cold shutdown, a fault occurred on the 120 volt vital bus I-1, circuit 19, during the performance of a special test. The fault tripped the circuit's supply breaker which resulted in the closure of the fuel building non-filtered exhaust damper (AOD-VS-101A) and closure of the ventilation vent stack isolation damper (AOD-VS-112A). This event was reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a four hour non-emergency report as an unplanned actuation of an Engineered Safety Features component per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)ii. The fault was caused by a jumper installed to facilitate performance of the test. One lead of the jumper had contacted a neutral terminal in the circuit creating the fault. The jumper was removed and placed in a new location, and the test was satisfactorily completed. The person who installed the jumper was reminded of the need to exercise caution when installing jumpers to ensure their proper installation.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0 8 9	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3) 2 OF 0 3
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
		0 2 5	0 0		

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 305A's) (17)

1.0 Description of the Event

On June 22, 1989 at 1131 hours, with Units 1 and 2 at cold shutdown, a fault occurred on the 120 volt vital bus I-1, circuit 19, during the performance of a special test (Verification of Power Supply for Safety Related Ventilation Components). The fault tripped the circuit's supply breaker (EIIS-BKR) which resulted in the closure of the fuel building non-filtered exhaust damper (AOD-VS-101A) (EIIS-DMP) and closure of the ventilation vent stack isolation damper (AOD-VS-112A). These dampers are required to close upon the initiation of an Engineered Safety Features (ESF) (EIIS-JE) signal. This event was reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a four hour non-emergency report as an unplanned actuation of an ESF component per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)ii.

2.0 Safety Consequences and Implications

The subject dampers are designed to close on an ESF signal to prevent the possible spread of radioactive contamination through the exhaust header to the atmosphere. No actual ESF signal was present, and the dampers operated as designed. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3.0 Cause

The cause of the event was personnel error. Performance of the special test required testing personnel to remove a fuse in Vital Bus I-1, circuit 19, across two relay contacts in the circuit. The terminal screws for the relay contact points and other terminal screws on the relay are in close proximity to one another. When the jumper was placed on the designated terminal screws one end of the jumper came in contact with an adjacent screw connected to the neutral side of the circuit. This was not noticed when the jumper was installed. When the fuse was replaced per the test procedure, test personnel noted an arc between the fuse and fuse holder and the circuit breaker tripped. This resulted in the de-energization of the solenoid operated valve

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR 8 9	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 0 2 5	REVISION NUMBER 0 0 0	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 3884's) (17)

(EIIS-PSV) SOV-VS-105A and pressure switch PS-VS-105A (EIIS-PS). De-energization of these components resulted in the closure of dampers AOD-VS-105A and AOD-VS-112A.

4.0 Immediate Corrective Action(s)

Test personnel immediately removed the fuse and jumper, halted performance of the test, and initiated an investigation to determine the cause of the fault.

5.0 Additional Corrective Action(s)

Testing personnel determined the most probable cause of the fault was the jumper contacting the adjacent neutral terminal. Operations and test personnel verified that the components powered from circuit 19 were in the proper position for the de-energized condition. The jumper was placed in a location less susceptible to inadvertent contact with other terminal points and the test was satisfactorily completed.

6.0 Action(s) Taken to Prevent Recurrence

The event was discussed with the person who installed the jumper as well as the remaining test personnel in the group. The need to exercise extra caution when installing jumpers to ensure their proper installation was reemphasized.

7.0 Similar Events

Unit 2 LER 84-014, Unit 2 LER 86-009. Improper jumper placement contributed to the initiation of Auxiliary Feedwater flow in the first event and a reactor trip in the second. A specific relay replacement procedure was revised in the former event, and personnel were re-instructed in the latter. These corrective actions would not have prevented this incident.

8.0 Manufacturer/Model Number(s)

N/A