

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
Surry Power Station
P. O. Box 315
Surry, Virginia 23883

June 07, 1989

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
016 Phillips Building
Washington, D.C. 20555

Serial No.: 89-018
Docket No.: 50-280
50-281
License No.: DPR-32
DPR-37

Gentlemen:


Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Units 1 & 2.

REPORT NUMBER

89-017-00

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be reviewed by Safety Evaluation and Control.

Very truly yours,



M. R. Kansler
Station Manager

Enclosure

cc: Regional Administrator
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

8906140145 890607
PDR ADOCK 05000280
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) SURRY POWER STATION, UNITS 1 & 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3
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TITLE (4) **Failure To Sample SW From CC Heat Exchangers Within 12 Hours Due To Personnel Error**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 5	0 8	8 9	8 9	0 1	7 0	0 6	0 7	8 9		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) **N**

POWER LEVEL (10) **0 0 0**

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(e)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME M. R. Kansler, Station Manager	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE: 8 0 4 NUMBER: 3 5 7 1 3 1 1 8 4

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (18)

On May 8, 1989 with Unit 1 and Unit 2 at cold shutdown, it was discovered that on May 5 the Technical Specification for sampling the Service Water (SW) from the 'A' and 'B' Component Cooling (CC) heat exchangers had not been satisfactorily performed within the specified time interval. Technical Specification Table 3.7-5(a) requires that SW effluent from the CC heat exchangers be sampled and analyzed for radioactive contamination every 12 hours whenever the SW radiation monitors are out of service. A Health Physics (HP) technician failed to satisfactorily complete the computer analysis on the samples taken on May 5 prior to discarding them. Subsequent analyses on additional samples were within acceptable limits. The individual involved in this event has been reinstructed in the performance of the applicable procedure, and the event has been discussed with the remaining HP count room personnel.

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

1.0 Description of the Event

On May 8, 1989 with Unit 1 and Unit 2 at cold shutdown, it was discovered that on May 5 the Technical Specification requirement for sampling the Service Water (SW) {EIIS-BI} from the 'A' and 'B' Component Cooling (CC) {EIIS-CC} heat exchangers had not been satisfactorily performed within the specified time interval. Technical Specification Table 3.7-5(a) requires that the SW effluent from the CC heat exchangers {EIIS-HX} be sampled and analyzed for radioactive contamination every 12 hours whenever the SW radiation monitors are out of service. On May 5 the 'A' and 'B' CC heat exchangers were placed in service at 0612 hours and removed from service at 2000 hours and 1550 hours respectively. Service water samples were taken from each heat exchanger at 1530 hours. However, a health physics technician failed to satisfactorily complete the computer analysis on the samples prior to discarding them. Subsequent analyses on additional samples were completed on May 5 at 2030 hours and May 6 at 1415 hours for the 'A' and 'B' heat exchangers, respectively and were within acceptable limits.

2.0 Safety Consequences and Implications

The component cooling system is an intermediate cooling system which serves both reactor units. It transfers heat from heat exchangers containing reactor coolant, as well as other radioactive liquids, to the service water system. A conservative calculation was performed estimating the amount of radioactive release using the samples taken prior to and subsequent to this event. The 'B' heat exchanger had no detectable release and the 'A' heat exchanger had less than one tenth of one percent of the Technical Specification limit. In addition, no increase was observed in the circulating water {EIIS-KE} discharge radiation monitor. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3.0 Cause

The service water contamination analysis procedure consists of three steps: (1) place sample in detector, (2) erase old data and start new data acquisition, and (3) enter time and type of sample for

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

the computer to produce a data sheet on the sample. In this event, the technician performing the procedure neglected to perform step 2. As a result, step 3 was performed on the data from previous samples in the computer memory and the proper analyses of the new samples were not obtained. The technician also neglected to perform a proper review of the data sheet produced by the computer and therefore did not realize his error.

4.0 Immediate Corrective Action(s)

The analyses for samples taken after May 5 were verified to be accurate, complete and within acceptable limits.

5.0 Additional Corrective Action(s)

None required.

6.0 Action(s) Taken to Prevent Recurrence

- 1) The individual involved in this event has been re-instructed in the performance of the applicable procedure. The event has been discussed with the remaining HP count room personnel.
- 2) A scope of work has been generated to replace the out-of-service SW radiation monitors for the CC heat exchangers.

7.0 Similar Events

LER 88-027 was a similar event.

8.0 Manufacturer/Model Numbers

N/A