NRC FORM 366 (6-1998) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
SURRY POWER STATION , Unit 1	05000 – 280	1 OF 4

TITLE (4)

Failure to Terminate Access Results in Unauthorized Protected Area Entry

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
									Surry Unit 2	05000 -- 281
11	05	1998	1998	– S01	– 00	12	04	1998	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	N
POWER LEVEL (10)	0%

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)

	20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)
	20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)
	20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)	X	73.71
	20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER
	20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
	20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
E. S. Grecheck, Site Vice President	(757) 365-2000

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)			EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On June 22, 1998, based upon the request of the employee's company, clearance for unescorted access was revoked for a Freeze Seal employee by a Corporate Nuclear Access Specialist. The revocation of the individual's clearance did not result in the deactivation of the individual's station access badge. The failure to deactivate the station access badge was due to a human error. A contributing factor was the design interface between the computer systems that maintain the information on a worker's access authorization and the station access control computer systems. If clearance is revoked, station personnel must manually deactivate the access badge in the access control computers.

On August 11, 1998, at 1149 hours, with Units 1 and 2 at 100% power, the Freeze Seal employee entered the protected area (PA) to retrieve company equipment left from a previous job. At 1159 hours, the individual exited the PA. On November 4, 1998, a Freeze Seal representative called to re-establish clearance for the same Freeze Seal employee. A review determined that his badge was still active and the individual entered the PA once after his company requested revocation of clearance in June. A station deviation report was filed and a 1-hour report was issued in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1) due to an actual entry of an unauthorized person into the PA. A root cause evaluation was initiated. Station badges are now deactivated before clearance is revoked and the processes for badge deactivations have been strengthened. The report is being submitted as required by 10 CFR 73.71(d).

1.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT

On June 22, 1998, Nuclear Access Services (NAS/Corporate) received a letter from the Vice President Administration, Freeze Seal Incorporated (contractor), indicating that an employee of their company no longer required clearance for Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) nuclear facilities. A Nuclear Access Specialist processed the favorable termination request by revoking the individual's clearance in the Corporate Security Information System (CSIS) database. On June 23, 1998, at 0050 hours, a Daily Clearances Processing Report for June 22, 1998, was generated by the CSIS computer and printed at the station. The report listed all the clearance revocations processed on the referenced date, including the Freeze Seal employee.

To complete the normal processing of favorable termination requests, the badging coordinator at the station reviewed the above report on June 23, 1998. Security badges for the individuals listed on the report were deactivated in the station's access control computer systems (Sentracon computer, Hand Geometry Unit system, and Badge Management System). The station badge coordinator, however, failed to deactivate the badge for the Freeze Seal employee. Verification of the badge deactivation process was performed on June 24, 1998, by reviewing a Badge Activation/Deactivation Report generated by the CSIS computer for work completed on June 23, 1998. The report was compared to individual badge data sheets which maintain a history on each badge. This verification was inadequate because no badge data sheets were pulled and edited for the Freeze Seal employee.

On August 11, 1998, the same Freeze Seal employee was sent to the station to retrieve company equipment left from a previous job. He verified with the badging coordinator that his badge was still active and at 1149 hours, with Units 1 and 2 at 100% power, the Freeze Seal employee entered the protected area (PA). At 1159 hours, the same individual exited the PA.

On November 4, 1998, a Freeze Seal representative called NAS to determine the procedure for re-establishing clearance for the Freeze Seal employee for whom Freeze Seal had requested revocation of access authorization on June 22, 1998. It was discovered during the review for re-instatement, that the CSIS database indicated that the individual's badge was still active. Station security was notified by NAS and the Security Shift Leader verified that the Freeze Seal employee's badge was still active in the station's access control computer systems. The badge was then deactivated on November 4, 1998 at 1700 hours.

On November 5, 1998, a search was performed on the access history of the Freeze Seal

employee. The search determined that the individual entered the PA once since June 22, 1998. A deviation report was submitted to document the event. After review of reportability requirements, a 1-hour report was issued at 1831 hours on November 5, 1998, in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1) due to an actual entry of an unauthorized person into the protected area.

2.0 SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

The request and subsequent revocation of the Freeze Seal employee's clearance was considered a favorable termination. The duration of entry into the PA was limited to 10 minutes on August 11, 1998. There was no "intrusion" into the protected area by an unauthorized individual. There was no malevolent attempt to access the protected area. This event posed no potential to endanger the public health and safety or national security, as indicated by the examples provided in Regulatory Guide 5.62, revision 1.

A review of the Freeze Seal employee's current qualification indicated that after completion of a routine Fitness for Duty screening, full re-instatement of access to the station would have been authorized.

3.0 CAUSE

The cause of the event was human error. The station badging coordinator failed to deactivate the individual's badge when the Daily Clearance Processing Report for June 22, 1998 was reviewed and processed at the station on June 23, 1998. In addition, the process used to verify completeness, accuracy, and error detection for the clearances that were issued or revoked by the Corporate NAS staff was inadequate. The Badge Activation/Deactivation Report generated by the CSIS computer for work completed on June 23, 1998 was compared to the individual badge data sheets, which maintain a history on each badge. Since the Freeze Seal employee's revocation of clearance was missed on June 23, 1998, his badge data sheet was not pulled for review and deactivation of his badge did not appear on the Badge Activation/Deactivation Report generated on June 24, 1998.

Contributing to the event was the design interface between the computer systems that maintain the information on worker's clearance and the station access control computer systems. If a clearance is revoked in the CSIS computer, badge deactivation at the station requires manual input for three computer systems.

4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)

The station on-duty security shift was notified by NAS and the Freeze Seal employee's badge was verified to be active. The badge was removed from the station's access control computer systems on November 4, 1998 at 1700 hours.

A review was conducted to determine if the individual had entered the protected area with revoked clearance. When the review identified that the individual had entered the PA one time after his clearance was revoked, a station deviation report was submitted on November 5, 1998.

5.0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

A review was conducted to determine if there were other individuals with active badges but without a clearance. The review concluded that this was an isolated event and there were no other individuals with active badges and revoked clearances.

A root cause evaluation (RCE) was initiated.

Before revoking clearance for unescorted access, the NAS staff has been directed to review the CSIS to determine if the individual has an active badge at the station. If the badge is active in the CSIS computer, NAS will notify the station badge coordinator to deactivate the badge before NAS will revoke the clearance.

To verify completeness and accuracy of badge activation/deactivation, the station badging coordinator and the shift badging personnel have been directed to review the access authorization list generated from the station's access control computer system with the Daily Clearance Processing Report. This will ensure that revoked clearances listed on the Daily Clearance Processing Report do not have active badges in the station's access control computer.

6.0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

The above corrective actions will strengthen the barriers to prevent a recurrence of this event. Recommendations from the RCE, deemed necessary to prevent recurrence, will be implemented when the evaluation is complete.

7.0 SIMILAR EVENTS

None