							POW	28-06-	01
NRC Form 366 (9-83)		L		/ENT RE	PORT	(LER)	U.S. NUC A E	LEAR REGULATO PPROVED OMB N XPIRES: 8/31/88	RY COMMISSION IO. 3150-0104
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TITLE (4)	rry rower a	station, u		<u>-</u>		1.			
EDG A	Auto Start D		formance	of Mult	iple P	rocedures		ently	
MONTH DAY YEAR	YEAR SEQUE		MONTH DA	Y YEAR		FACILITY NAM		DOCKET NUMBER	(S)
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OPERATING	THIS REPORT IS SUE	MITTED PURSUAN	T TO THE REQUIR	EMENTS OF 1) CFR §: /(Check one or more o	f the following) (11)	<u>_</u>	······
MODE (9) N	20.402(Б)	Ļ	20.405(c)		X	50,73(a)(2)(iv)		73,71(Ь)	
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NAME			LICENSEE CONT.	ACT FOR THIS	LER (12)				3FB
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· ·	СОМ	PLETE ONE LINE P	OR EACH COMPON	IENT FAILURE	DESCRIBE	D IN THIS REPOR	T (13)		
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NRC Form 366A (9-83)	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION					
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)			
		YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION				
Surry Power Station, Unit 1	0 5 0 0 2 8 0		0 2 OF 0 3			
TEXT (# more space is required, use additional NRC Form 3664/s) (17)						

POW 28-06-01

1.0 Description of the Event

On May 23, 1988, at 1220 hours, with Unit 1 in a refueling outage and Unit 2 in a maintenance outage, during post maintenance testing of the number 3 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) {EIIS-DG}, the EDG automatically started. It had been decided to complete four procedures concurrently to return the diesel to service, to functionally test the diesel, and to perform Technical Specification periodic test procedures. This decision was based upon the desire to limit the number of starts on the diesel. The operator assigned to complete the procedures organized the four procedures in a logical sequence to minimize both the starts on the diesel engine and the performance of redundant requirements. One of the procedures required the "exercise-auto" switch for the diesel to be placed in the exercise position, but another procedure required the switch to be in the auto position. The operator started the procedure requiring the switch to be in the exercise position but, prior to completing the procedure, shifted to the procedure requiring the switch to be in the auto position. In this latter procedure, when the start initiating signal was injected, the diesel did not start.

The initiating signal jumper was removed and the operator and an electrician reviewed the procedure and the electrical drawings to determine the cause of the failure of the diesel to start. They determined that the aforementioned switch should have been in the auto position and informed the control room operator to position the switch to auto. When the switch was placed in auto, the diesel started. The operator and the electrician did not recognize that when the start signal was injected into the auto start circuit, the fast start relay closed and locked in. Placing the switch to auto completed the start circuit.

2.0 Safety Consequences and Implications

The number 3 EDG is designed to supply power to either the 1J emergency bus or 2J {EIIS-EK} emergency bus during undervoltage conditions. During this event, the number 3 EDG was fully capable of performing its intended function. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

ICENSEE EVENT RE	PORT (LER) TEXT CONTINU	U.S. NUCLEAR REG JATION APPROVED O EXPIRES: 8/31	GULATORY COMMISSION MB NO. 3150-0104 /88
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)
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Surry Power Station, Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0	8 8 - 0 1 3 - 0 0	0 3 OF 0 3
TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)			

3.0 Cause

The inadvertent auto start of the number 3 EDG was the result of performing multiple procedures concurrently without adequate review for conflicting requirements in the individual procedures.

4.0 Immediate Corrective Action(s)

Testing was suspended and the diesel was shut down to investigate the cause of the auto-start.

Notifications were made to the NRC and the NRC Resident Inspector.

5.0 Additional Corrective Action(s)

An investigation determined that the auto-start was due to the fast start relay {EIIS-RLY} closing and locking in when the start signal was injected into the circuit while the switch was in the exercise position. This caused the diesel to start when the switch was placed in auto. The testing of the circuit was then completed.

6.0 Action(s) Taken to Prevent Recurrence

A Human Performance Evaluation System (HPES) investigation was conducted. It concluded that the primary contributing factor was the performance of four procedures concurrently. As a result, this practice will be evaluated. Additional recommendations provided in the HPES report are also being addressed.

7.0 Similar Events

None.

8.0 Manufacturer/Model Number

N/A

POW 28-06-01

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

Surry Power Station P. O. Box 315 Surry, Virginia 23883

June 21, 1988

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission		Serial No.:	88-029
Document Control Desk		Docket No.:	50-280
016 Phillips Building			50-281
Washington, D.C. 20555	^	Licensee No.:	DPR-32
-			DPR-37

Gentlemen:

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Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Surry Unit 1.

REPORT NUMBER

88-013-00

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be reviewed by Safety Evaluation and Control.

Very truly yours,

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David L. Benson Station Manager

Enclosure

cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace Regional Administrator Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323