

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) <b>Surry Power Station, Unit 1</b>	DOCKET NUMBER (2) <b>0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0</b>	PAGE (3) <b>1 OF 0 3</b>
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TITLE (4)  
**Containment Isolation Valve Inoperable Due To Mechanical Binding of Valve Operator**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
11	12	87	87	031	00	12	11	87			0 5 0 0 0
											0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) <b>N</b>	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) <b>1100</b>	20.402(b)	20.405(e)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)					
	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.38(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)					
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.38(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)					
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(x)							

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME <b>D. L. Benson, Station Manager</b>	TELEPHONE NUMBER <b>8 0 4 3 5 7 - 3 1 8 4</b>
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)  NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On November 12, 1987 at 1720 hours, Unit 1 was at 100% power. During the periodic test for containment trip valves, it was observed that the containment instrument air {EIIS-LD} isolation trip valve (1-IA-TV-100) {EIIS-ISV} would not close fully on demand. Failure of the trip valve to close is contrary to the Technical Specification definition of containment integrity which requires that all automatic containment isolation valves are operable or are locked closed under administrative control. An operator was dispatched to the valve, and at 1800 hours was able to free the valve operator. A satisfactory stroke test of the valve was performed. The valve operator was determined to be mechanically bound by its air solenoid {EIIS-SOL} electrical connection. The electrical connection to the solenoid rotated into a position which blocked the downward movement of the external part of the valve operator.

An inspection was performed of similar valves on both Units 1 and 2. No similar configuration was found. An engineering work request has been initiated to secure the air solenoid to prevent movement.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8   7   -	0   3   1	-   0   0	0   2	OF	0   3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

1.0 Description of the Event

On November 12, 1987 at 1720 hours, Unit 1 was at 100% power. During the periodic test for containment trip valves, it was observed that the containment instrument air {EIIS-LD} isolation trip valve (1-IA-TV-100) {EIIS-ISV} would not close fully on demand. Failure of the trip valve to close is contrary to the Technical Specification definition of containment integrity which requires that all automatic containment isolation valves are operable or are locked closed under administrative control. An operator was dispatched to the valve, and at 1800 hours was able to free the valve operator. A satisfactory stroke test of the valve was performed.

2.0 Safety Consequences and Implications

The containment instrument air check valve {EIIS-V} and trip valve provide containment isolation in the event of a loss of coolant accident. The check valve, which is redundant to the trip valve, remained operable and capable of performing the containment isolation function. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3.0 Cause

The valve operator was determined to be mechanically bound by its air solenoid {EIIS-SOL} electrical connection. The electrical connection to the solenoid rotated into a position which blocked the downward movement of the external part of the valve operator.

4.0 Immediate Corrective Action

The electrical connection was rotated back to its original position.

5.0 Additional Corrective Action

An inspection was performed of similar valves on both Units 1 and 2. No similar configuration was found.

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			0 3 1	0 0	0 3	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

6.0 Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

An engineering work request has been initiated to secure the air solenoid to prevent movement.

7.0 Similar Events

None.

8.0 Manufacturer/Model Number

1-IA-TV-100 Masoneilan/Series 3500.

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY  
Surry Power Station  
P. O. Box 315  
Surry, Virginia 23883

December 11, 1987

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
016 Phillips Building  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Serial No.: 87-036  
Docket No.: 50-280  
Licensee No.: DPR-32

Gentlemen:


Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Surry Unit 1.

REPORT NUMBER

87-031-00

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be reviewed by Safety Evaluation and Control.

Very truly yours,



for

David L. Benson  
Station Manager

Enclosure

cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace  
Regional Administrator  
Suite 2900  
101 Marietta Street, NW  
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

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