

ATTACHMENT 1

Supplemental
Technical Specification
Clarification of Intent

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TABLE 3.7-1 (Continued)

- ACTION 7.A. With the number of OPERABLE Channels equal to the Minimum Operable Channels, POWER OPERATION may proceed until performance of the next required CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hour.
- 7.B. With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than required by the Minimum Operable Channels requirement, be in Hot Shutdown within 6 hours.
- ACTION 8.A. With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours. In conditions of operation other than REACTOR CRITICAL or POWER OPERATIONS, with the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or open the reactor trip breakers within the next hour. However, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.1. provided the other channel is OPERABLE.
- ACTION 8.B. With one of the diverse trip features (undervoltage or shunt trip device) inoperable, restore it to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or declare the breaker inoperable and apply Action 8.A. The breaker shall not be bypassed while one of the diverse trip features is inoperable except for the time required for performing maintenance to restore the breaker to OPERABLE status.

TABLE 3.7-1 (Continued)

- ACTION 9. With one channel inoperable, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 6 hours or reduce THERMAL POWER to below the P-8, (Block of Low Reactor Coolant Pump Flow and Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position) setpoint, within the next 2 hours. Operation below P-8 may continue pursuant to ACTION 10.
- ACTION 10. With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, operation may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours.
- ACTION 11. With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 8 hours. In conditions of operation other than REACTOR CRITICAL or POWER OPERATIONS, with the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or open the reactor trip breakers within the next hour. However, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.1. provided the other channel is OPERABLE.
- ACTION 12. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the total number of channels, operation may continue provided the inoperable channels are placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours.

ATTACHMENT 2

Significant Hazards Review

50.92 Significant Hazards Review

The original significant hazards consideration remains valid. The supplemental changes provide clarification of the original change request.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92, we have reviewed the proposed supplemental Technical Specification changes and have concluded that this change does not involve a significant hazards consideration. Specifically:

- (1) The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report is not significantly increased by these proposed changes because the estimated change in the reactor protection system unavailability is very small as is the estimated reduction in core damage frequency coming from any inadvertent trips. These proposed supplemental changes do not alter the manner in which protection is afforded nor the manner in which limiting criteria are established;
- (2) The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a difference type than evaluated previously in the safety analysis report is not being created by this proposed supplemental because these proposed supplemental changes do not involve any alterations to the physical plant which introduce any new or unique operational modes or accident precursors; and
- (3) The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not significantly reduced by the proposed supplemental changes because the operability and performance of the reactor trip system and associated instrumentation is not affected by this proposed supplemental change.