

ATTACHMENT 1

Proposed Technical Specification Changes

Surry Power Station
Units 1 and 2

8704290213 870423
PDR ADOCK 05000280
PDR

TABLE 3.7-6

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE</u>
1. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate	1 per S/G	1 per S/G
2. Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor		
a. Reactor Vessel Coolant Level Monitor	2	1
b. Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor	2	1
c. Core Exit Thermocouples	2 (Note 2)	1 (Note 2)
3. PORV Position Indicator (Primary Detector)	1/valve	1/valve
4. PORV Position Indicator (Backup Detector)	1/valve	0
5. PORV Block Valve Position Indicator	1/valve	1/valve
6. Safety Valve Position Indicator (Primary Detector)	1/valve	1/valve
7. Safety Valve Position Indicator (Backup Detector)	1/valve	0
8. Containment Pressure	2	1
9. Containment Water Level (Narrow Range)	2	1
10. Containment Water Level (Wide Range)	2	1
11. Containment High Range Radiation Monitor	2	1 (Note 1, b and c only)
12. Process Vent High Range Effluent Monitor	2	2 (Note 1, a, b, and c)
13. Ventilation Vent High Range Effluent Monitor	2	2 (Note 1, a, b, and c)
14. Main Steam High Range Radiation Monitors (Units 1 and 2)	3	3 (Note 1, a, b, and c)
15. Aux. Feed Pump Steam Turbine Exhaust Radiation Monitor	1	1 (Note 1, a, b, and c)

Note 1: With the number of operable channels less than required by the Minimum Channels Operable requirements

- Initiate the preplanned alternate method of monitoring the appropriate parameter(s), within 72 hours
- Either restore the inoperable channel to operable status within 7 days of the event, or
- Prepare and submit a Special Report to the commission pursuant to specification 6.2 within 30 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to operable.

Note 2: A minimum of 2 core exit thermocouples per quadrant is required for the channel to be operable.

TABLE 4.1-2

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>
1. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate	P	R
2. Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor	M	R
3. PORV Position Indicator (Primary Detector)	M	R
4. PORV Position Indicator (Backup Detector)	M	R
5. PORV Block Valve Position Indicator	M	R
6. Safety Valve Position Indicator	M	R
7. Safety Valve Position Indicator (Backup Detector)	M	R
8. Containment Pressure	M	R
9. Containment Water Level (Narrow Range)	M	R
10. Containment Water Level (Wide Range)	M	R

M = Monthly

P = Prior to each startup if not done within the previous week

R = Refueling

ATTACHMENT 2

Discussion
of
Change

Surry Power Station
Units 1 and 2

Discussion

In accordance with the requirements of NUREG-0737 Item II.F.2, "Instrumentation for Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling," Surry Units 1 and 2 have recently completed the installation of an Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor (ICCM). The ICCM is a consolidated system comprised of the Reactor Vessel Level Indicating System (RVLIS), the Subcooling Margin Monitor (SMM), and the Core Exit Thermocouple (CET) systems. During the 1986 refueling outages, the core exit thermocouples were upgraded in both Units 1 and 2. Upon completion of that upgrade, we are submitting this proposed change to the Technical Specifications to include the CET system in Table 3.7-6, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, and Table 4.1-2, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements.

As discussed above, the CET system has been consolidated into the ICCM. Technical Specification Table 3.7-6 has been revised to show this system consolidation by adding the CET along with the already present SMM and RVLIS as subsections under the ICCM. Technical Specification Table 4.1-2 has been revised to delete the individual surveillance requirements of the SMM and RVLIS but then add the requirement for the consolidated ICCM.

10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation

The proposed change to the Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Tables has been determined not to pose an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59. The basis for this determination is as follows:

- A. The probability of occurrence or the consequence of any accidents or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the updated Safety Analysis Report is not increased. The operability requirements and the surveillance requirements for the accident monitoring instrumentation have not been decreased by this change.

- B. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated in the safety analyses report is not created. The proposed change does not involve any alterations to plant equipment or procedures which would introduce any new or unique operational modes or accident precursors.

- C. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification is not reduced by the proposed change since the results of the accident analyses performed in the UFSAR will continue to bound operation.

10 CFR 50.92 Significant Hazards Consideration Analysis

It has also been determined that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined in 10 CFR 50.92. This determination was based on the foregoing 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation.

Specifically, the change does not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated. The proposed change does not decrease the operability requirements or surveillance requirements for the Accident Monitoring Instrumentation. The current safety analysis remains bounding.
2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident than previously evaluated. The proposed change does not involve any alterations to plant equipment or procedures which would introduce any new or unique operational modes or accident precursors.
3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The current UFSAR analyses remain bounding, and there is no reduction in the margin of safety.