

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (1)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

1	V	A	S	P	S	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4		5				
8	9	LICENSEE CODE				14	15	LICENSE NUMBER								25	26	LICENSE TYPE				30	57	CAT		58				

1	L	0	5	0	0	0	2	8	1	7	0	1	1	4	8	1	8	0	2	1	3	8	1	9
8	60	61	DOCKET NUMBER					68	69	EVENT DATE				74	75	REPORT DATE				80				

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

2 With Unit No. 2 at 100% power, PT-27 (heat tracing) revealed that amp readings for Panels 3 8 and 9, circuits 20C were below the acceptance criteria stipulated in the PT, there- 4 fore, the BIT recirc was declared inoperative. This event is contrary to TS 3.3.A.3 but 5 permitted by T.S.3.3.B.10. This event is reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b(2). The health and 6 safety of the public were not affected.

9	S	H	11	E	12	A	13	H	E	A	T	E	R	14	Z	15	Z	16
9	10	11	12	13	18	19	20											

17	8	1	0	0	7	0	3	L	0	0	0	0	0	Y	N	L	T	1	8	5	26
21	22	23	24	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	40	41	42	43	44	47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The loss of heat tracing was due to excessive temperatures breaking down the insulation. 11 The defective heat tracing was replaced and tested within 2 hrs. A design change has 12 been initiated to change the manner by which these borated lines are heat traced.

5	E	1	0	0	29	N/A	30	B	31	Routine Test	32
8	9	10	12	13	44	45	46	80			

6	Z	Z	N/A	35	N/A	36
8	9	10	11	44	45	80

7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	N/A	39
8	9	11	12	13	80			

8	0	0	0	40	N/A	41
8	9	11	12	80		

9	Z	N/A	43	
8	9	11	12	80

9	N	N/A	45	8102200542	44
8	9	10	80		

ATTACHMENT I

SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 2

DOCKET NO: 50-281

REPORT NO: 81-007/03L-0

EVENT DATE: 01-14-81

EVENT TITLE: BIT RECIRC INOPERATIVE DUE TO HEAT TRACING FAILURE

1. DESCRIPTION of EVENT:

With Unit Two at 100% power, PT-27C revealed that amp readings for circuit 20C in Panels 8 and 9 were below the acceptance criteria stipulated in the PT.

The heat tracing circuits are intended to maintain a fluid temperature above that needed for flow. Since both channels of heat tracing were inoperable, the Boron Injection Tank recirc. was declared inoperable. This event is contrary to T.S. 3.3.A.3, but permitted by T.S.3.3.B.10 for a period of 2 hrs.

This event is reportable per T.S. 6.6.2.b.(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES and STATUS of REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT:

Continuous recirculation between the Boron Injection Tank and Boric Acid Tank ensures that the Boron Injection Tank is full of concentrated boric acid at all times.

Continuous BIT recirc flow was verified, no operations that would have diluted the BIT were conducted and the heat tracing was repaired within the 2 hour Tech. Spec. limit (1 hr. and 43 min.). Therefore the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE:

The heat tracing tapes were inoperative due to insulation failure resulting from excessive heat.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate corrective action was to verify recirc flow and initiate repairs of the heat tracing.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The defective heat tracing tape was replaced and tested within the 2 hr. time span specified by Technical Specifications.

6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

No additional actions were deemed necessary.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

A task force has reviewed the total spectrum of the Heat Tracing system and a Design Change is being prepared as a result of the Task Force study. Long lead items are being procured.