| 7-77) | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT |
|---------------|--|
| | CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) |
| 0 1 8 | V A S P S 2 2 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5 57 CAT 58 |
| CON'T 0 1 | REPORT L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 7 0 1 0 6 8 1 8 0 1 3 0 8 1 9 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) |
| 0 2 | With Unit 2 operating steady state at 100% power, RM-CW-101,102; RM-VG-103, 104; |
| 0 3 | RM-SW-107 and RM-LW-108 liquid waste rad monitors failed low. This is contrary to T.S. |
| 0 4 | 4.9.C and is reportable as per T.S.6.6.2.b(4). Abnormal procedures were initiated |
| 0 5 | thereby terminating the releases in progress. Therefore the health and safety of the |
| 0 6 | public were not affected. |
| 0 7 | |
| -0- -8 7 8 | <u></u> |
| 0 9 | SYSTEM CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE M C 11 E 12 A 13 C K T B R K 14 C 15 Z 16 |
| | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. SEQUENTIAL REPORT TYPE NO. O 3 L O 0 3 J L O 0 3 J L O 0 0 3 J L O 0 0 3 J L O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |
| | ACTION FUTURE ON PLANT SHUTDOWN HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT MANUFACTURER ACTION FUTURE ON PLANT METHOD HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER ACTION FUTURE COMPONENT MANUFACTURER ACTION FUTURE ON PLANT METHOD HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER ACTION FUTURE COMPONENT MANUFACTURER ACTION ACTION ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER ACTION FUTURE ON PLANT METHOD HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER ACTION FUTURE COMPONENT MANUFACTURER ACTION ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER ACTION FUTURE COMPONENT MANUFACTURER ACTION ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER ACTION ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER ACTION ACTION ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER ACTION ACTION ACTION ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER ACTION ACT |
| 1 0 | A failed fuse was determined to have been the cause of loss of power to these radia- |
| 1 1 | tion monitors. Appropriate abnormal procedures were performed as required while the |
| 1 2 | fuse was replaced. |
| 11-31 | |
| 1 4 7 8 | 9 80 |
| 1 5 | FACILITY STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 Operator Observation. |
| 1 6 | 9 10 ACTIVITY CONTENT 12 13 44 45 46 RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE 36 Z 33 Z 34 N/A N/A |
| 7 8 | 9 10 11 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39) |
| 7 3 | 0 0 0 (37) Z (38) N/A 9 PERSONNEL INJURIES 30 |
| 1 3 | NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41) 0 0 0 0 0 N/A |
| 7 3 | 9 11 12 80 -UDSS*OF OR DAMAGE*TO FACILITY 43 TYPE DESCRIPTION |
| 7 3 | Z (42) N/A 9 10 PUBLICITY 30 |
| 2 0 | ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) NRC USE ONLY N/A |
| 7 8 | 9 10 |

'ATTACHMENT 1

SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO: 50-281

REPORT NO: 81-003/03L-0 EVENT DATE: 01-06-81

TITLE OF REPORT

RADIATION MONITORS FAILURE

1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

With Unit Two operating steady state at 100% power, RM-GW-101, 102 (process Vent Radiation Monitors); RM-VG-103, 104 (vent vent radiation monitors); RM-SW-107 (component cooling heat exchanger service water failed low. This is contrary to T.S.4.9.C and is reportable as per T.S.6.6.2.b(4).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES AND STATUS OF REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT:

An undetected failure of the radiation monitors could have resulted in an unmonitored release to the enviornment. No releases were in progress except the normal vent-vent and Process vent operation. Applicable abnormal procedures were initiated immediately, thereby terminating the releases in progress within a short time of the monitor failure. In addition, all releases were within Technical Specification Limits. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE:

The monitor failures were caused by a loss of power due to a failed fuse. The failure of the fuse appears to be end of normal life.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The failed fuse was replaced.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The radiation monitors were verified operable.

6. ACTIONS TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

Since procedures are available to cope with this type of failure, no additional action is deemed necessary.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATION:

None.