

USNRC REGION II
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

DEC 15 12:30

December 11, 1980

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


Serial No. 867A
NO/RMT:ycf
Docket Nos. 50-280
50-281
License Nos. DPR-32
DPR-37

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

In reference to our letter of November 17, 1980, Serial No. 867, in which we provided responses to IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-280/80-34 and 50-281/80-37. We are hereby forwarding the attached supplemental information.

Should you require any additional information, please contact this office.

Very truly yours,


B. R. Sylvia
Manager - Nuclear
Operations and Maintenance

Attachment

cc: Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 1
Division of licensing

8102050330

NRC COMMENT

- D. As required by 10 CFR 50.72 (a) (6), personnel errors or procedural inadequacies which, during normal operations, anticipated operational occurrences, or accident conditions, prevents or could prevent, by itself, the fulfillment of the safety function of those structures, systems, and components important to safety, must be reported to the NRC Operations Center by telephone as soon as possible and in all cases within one hour of the occurrence.

Contrary to the above, when the main steam flow instrumentation was found to be inoperable at 12:30 a.m. on August 19, 1980, the NRC Operations Center was not notified within one hour.

This is a deficiency.

VEPCO RESPONSE

The item is correct as stated.

Although this isolation "by itself" did not or could not prevent the fulfillment of a safety function, this fact was not fully evaluated and documented at the time of the incident. Due to the installation of Integral Flow Restrictors while the Surry Unit 2 steam generators were being replaced, the break flow area for the steam break accident was reduced from 4.6 ft² to 1.4 ft². This, along with the incident occurring early in core life assure that the FSAR licensing analysis results remain bounding with the main steam flow transmitters inoperable. Even though a thorough evaluation revealed that the one hour reporting requirement does not apply, it would have been prudent to have reported the incident promptly.

1. Corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved:

Investigations leading to the development of supplemental information has led to an increased awareness of the specific reporting requirements.

2. Corrective steps taken to avoid further noncompliance:

All applicable personnel will be reinstructed on the reporting requirements of 10CFR 50.72 (a).

3. The date when full compliance will be achieved:

Full compliance will be achieved before January 10, 1981.

KEC
NOV 19 1980

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

November 17, 1980

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
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
Serial No. 867
NO/FHT:ms
Docket Nos. 50-280
50-281
License Nos. DPR-32
DPR-37

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

We have reviewed your letter of October 17, 1980 in reference to the inspection conducted at Surry Power Station on July 7 through 29, 1980, and reported in IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-280/80-34 and 50-281/80-37. Our responses to the specific infractions are attached.

We have determined that no proprietary information is contained in the reports. Accordingly, the Virginia Electric and Power Company has no objection to these inspection reports being made a matter of public disclosure.

Very truly yours,


B. R. Sylvia
Manager - Nuclear
Operations and Maintenance

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