

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

11:20 P.M.
DEC 19 1980

December 17, 1980

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


Serial No. 971
NO/RMT:ms
Docket Nos. 50-280
50-281
License Nos. DPR-32
DPR-37

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

We have reviewed your letter of November 25, 1980 in reference to the inspection conducted at Surry Power Station on September 2 through October 3, 1980 and reported in IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-280/80-39 and 50-281/80-43. Our responses to the specific infractions are attached.

We have determined that no proprietary information is contained in the reports. Accordingly, the Virginia Electric and Power Company has no objection to these inspection reports being made a matter of public disclosure.

Very truly yours,


B. R. Sylvia
Manager - Nuclear
Operations and Maintenance

Attachment

cc: Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 1
Division of Licensing

8101160696

SURRY POWER STATION
RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION
REPORTED IN APPENDIX A OF
IE REPORT 50-280/80-39 AND 50-281/80-43

NRC COMMENTS:

- A. As required by 10 CFR 50.59 and Section 14 of the VEPCO NPS QA Manual, the licensee may make changes to the facility as described in the FSAR, provided that records of these changes are maintained and include a written safety evaluation which determined that the change does not involve an unreviewed safety question. In addition, Section 14 of the QA Manual requires the maintenance of the Jumper Log Book and forms, listing the status of each installed jumper or temporary modification for jumpers not installed by an approved procedure.

Contrary to the above, on September 12, 1980 the inspector observed that the Unit 2 Safeguards Valve Pit Sump piping had been modified by the installation of jumper hose on the piping valve 2-DA-43, and no record, safety evaluation, procedure, or jumper log entry for the installation has been completed. The jumper, with 2-DA-43 open, apparently led to the inadvertent diversion of Unit 1 and 2 containment sump water into the Unit 2 Safeguards Building Valve Pit (basement), where several feet of radioactive standing water was observed.

This is an infraction and applies to Unit 2.

RESPONSE:

The item is correct as stated. The jumper discussed above is a hose from the discharge of a temporary sump pump. This was installed due to failures of both installed sump pumps. All water transfers were within the enclosed building. A jumper had been issued and implemented in January of 1980 to accomplish the job of pumping the valve pit. A new temporary pump was installed in September; however, the jumper log was not amended. During reviews of the log it was assumed the jumper was installed as originally approved.

1. Corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved:

The out of date jumper log was terminated and a new jumper log was issued to reflect the existing conditions. The discharge hose was moved to a floor drain which directs water to the Liquid Waste System. The standing water was pumped and processed. Maintenance has been completed on the installed pumps and the system returned to its proper configuration.

2. Corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further non-compliance:

Operational personnel were instructed as to the requirements of jumpers. This includes proper notification, logging, and documentation.

3. The date when full compliance will be achieved:

Full compliance has been achieved.

NRC COMMENT:

- B. As required by Technical Specification 3.10.A.1, the containment equipment door (hatch) shall be properly closed during refueling conditions.

Contrary to the above, on September 24, 1980 the inspector observed that the Unit 1 containment escape hatch was not installed in the equipment door and the blank metal flange installed on the equipment door to substitute for the escape hatch was not properly sealed during refueling operations.

This is an infraction and applies to Unit 1.

RESPONSE:

This is correct as stated. The intent of containment integrity is to establish a gas-tight envelope during fuel movement operations. The containment was in a sub-atmospheric condition at all times with only exhaust ventilation equipment in operation.

1. Corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved:

When the situation was identified, refueling was stopped until the door was sealed temporarily to establish a gas-tight seal.

2. Corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further non-compliance:

A more permanent sealing was installed during a period when no fuel movement was in progress. The refueling procedure has been revised to insure this hatch is properly sealed prior to fuel movement.

3. The date when full compliance will be achieved:

Full compliance has been achieved.