

ATTACHMENT 1
SURREY POWER STATION, UNIT 1
DOCKET NO: 50-280
REPORT NO: 80-068/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 09-24-80

TITLE OF EVENT: 1-SW-P-5C-5D FAILURE

1. Description of Event:

On 9-23-80, with refueling in progress, a service water flush of the Recirculation Spray heat exchangers was being conducted. The RSHX radiation monitoring sample pumps (1-SW-P-5A, 5B, 5C, and 5D) were manually started. 1-SW-P-5C & 5D were found to be inoperable. Initial investigation revealed that 1-SW-P-5D was drawing locked rotor current and that the motor overload heaters for 1-SW-P-5C had been removed. The overload heaters were replaced. 1-SW-P-5C subsequently drew locked rotor current.

This reportable per Technical Specification 6.6.2.b(4).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Equipment:

The Recirc Spray Service Water Radiation Monitoring system, of which these pumps are part, performs two functions 1) detection of outleakage of RS fluid to the service water system 2) identification of the leaking RS heat exchanger. The RS service water system discharges to the circulating water discharge tunnel. The discharge tunnel radiation monitor will also detect outleakage. The FSAR assumes only 2 of 4 RS subsystems to be operable, thereby allowing the isolation of RS subsystems (one at a time) to identify the leaking heat exchanger. Therefore the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. Cause of Occurance:

The pump seals and impeller were found to be corroded thereby preventing the pump shaft from rotating.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

Since the unit was defueled, the immediate corrective action was to issue a maintenance request for the repair of the pumps.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action:

Pump 5C and 5D will be repaired and tested prior to the startup of this unit. In addition, pumps 5A and 5B will be inspected and retested.

6. Action taken to Prevent Recurrence:

The Recirc Spray Service Water Radiation Monitoring sample pumps will be flow tested and preventative maintenance will be performed each refueling outage.

7. Generic Implications:

None

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

[0][1] V A S P S 2 [2] 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 [3] 4 1 1 1 1 [4] [] [5]

CON'T [0][1] L [6] 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 [7] 0 9 2 4 8 0 [8] 1 0 2 3 8 0 [9]

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
With the Unit at full power the charging pump service water pump, 2-SW-P-10A, would not develop the proper discharge head. Pump 2-SW-P-10B was operable and supplied the required cooling water. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected. This event is contrary to T.S.-3.3.A.8.b. and is reportable per T.S.-6.6.2.b.(2).

[0][9] W A [11] X [12] Z [13] P U M P X X [14] B [15] Z [16]
[17] 8 0 [21] [22] [23] 0 1 8 [24] [25] 0 3 [26] L [27] 0 [28]
[29] B [30] Z [31] Z [32] [33] [34] [35] Z [36] [37] [38] [39] Y [40] N [41] A [42] I 0 7 5 [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50]

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
[1][0] The pump would not develop the proper head because of build up of material that had been entrained in the suction side of the pump. The pump was inspected, cleaned, tested.

FACILITY STATUS [1][5] E [28] 1 0 0 [29] NA [30] A [31] Operational Event [32]
ACTIVITY CONTENT [1][6] Z [33] Z [34] NA [35] NA [36]
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES [1][7] 0 0 0 [37] Z [38] NA [39]
PERSONNEL INJURIES [1][8] 0 0 0 [40] NA [41]
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY [1][9] Z [42] NA [43]
PUBLICITY ISSUED [2][0] N [44] NA [45]

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ATTACHMENT 1
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 2
DOCKET NO: 50-281
REPORT NO: 80-018/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 09-24-80

TITLE OF EVENT 2-SW-P-10A MALFUNCTION

1. Description of Event:

With the unit at full power, the charging pump service water pumps, 2-SW-P-10A, would not develop the proper discharge pressure. This contrary to T.S.-3.3.A.8.b. and is reportable per T.S.-6.6.2.b(2).

2. Probable Consequences of Occurrence:

The charging pump service water pumps supply cooling water to the charging pump intermediate seal and lube oil coolers. The "B" pump was operable. Therefore the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. Cause of Occurrence:

The reduced capacity of 2-SW-P-10A was caused by the accumulation of sediments and suspended material in the suction side of the pump.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

The immediate corrective action was to inspect and clean the pump suction strainer. This action was followed by submitting an MR to have the pump inspected and repaired if necessary.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action:

The subsequent corrective action was to disassemble, inspect, and clean the pump. The pump was subsequently verified operable.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

No additional actions deemed necessary

7. Generic Implications:

None