

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 6 (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 58 80  
0 1 V A S P S 2 (2) 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) 4 1 1 1 1 (4) (5)  
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

CON'T

7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80  
0 1 REPORT SOURCE (6) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 (7) 0 9 2 6 8 0 (8) 1 0 2 4 8 0 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 On September 26, 1980, with the unit at 100% power, a reduction in service water  
0 3 pressure to the charging pumps was experienced. Investigation indicated a missing  
0 4 check valve disk for 2-SW-113, on the discharge of 2-SW-P-10A. If the pump had not been  
0 5 isolated, a reduction in cooling water flow would have occurred. This is contrary to  
0 6 T.S.3.3.A.8.b and is reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b.(2). The temporary modification  
0 7 (missing disk) was not documented. This is contrary to T.S.6.4.D and is reportable  
0 8 per T.S.6.6.2.b(3). The health and safety of the public were not affected. 80

7 8 9 11 12 13 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47  
0 9 S W (11) E (12) Z (13) V A L V E X (14) C (15) A (16)  
17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER (18) H (19) Z (20) Z (21) 0 0 0 0 (22) Y (23) N (24) A (25) P 3 0 5 (26)  
EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.  
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The cause of the event was a missing valve disk for 2-SW-113. The "A" pump was  
1 1 isolated thereby allowing the "B" pump to perform its intended function. The check  
1 2 valve, 2-SW-113, was subsequently replaced.  
1 3

7 8 9 10 12 13 14 44 45 46 44 45 44 80  
1 5 FACILITY STATUS (28) 1 0 0 (29) NA (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) A (32) Operator Observation  
ACTIVITY RELEASED OF RELEASE (33) Z (34) Z (35) NA (36) LOCATION OF RELEASE  
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES (37) 0 0 0 (38) Z (39) NA  
PERSONNEL INJURIES (40) 0 0 0 (41) NA  
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (42) Z (43) NA  
PUBLCITY ISSUED (44) N (45) NA (46)  
NRC USE ONLY

ATTACHMENT 1  
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 2  
DOCKET NO: 50-281  
REPORT NO: 80-028/03L-0  
EVENT DATE: 09-26-80

TITLE OF REPORT: INOPERABLE CHECK VALVE 2-SW-113

1. Description of Event:

On September 26, 1980, with the unit operating a steady state power level of 100%, a reduction in service water pressure to the charging pumps was experienced. This reduced pressure condition existed only when 2-SW-P-10B was operating. Subsequent troubleshooting indicated that the discharge check valve, 2-SW-113, on the non-operating redundant pump (2-SW-P-10A) was open. This is contrary to Technical Specification 3.3.A.8.b and is reportable per Technical Specification 6.6.2.b(2). While investigating the event, it became apparent that 2-SW-P-10B may have been operated in degraded mode without proper administrative measures in place. Specifically, the internals for check valve 2-SW-113 were removed and documentation of this temporary modification was not performed. This is contrary to Technical Specification 6.4.D and is reportable per Technical Specification 6.6.2.b(3). When this modification was performed, cannot be determined. However, both pumps were proven operable, utilizing PT-18.8, on September 6, 1980.

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Equipment:

The charging pump service water pumps supply cooling water to the charging pump intermediate seal and lube oil coolers. With the "A" pump's discharge isolated, 2-SW-P-10B was operable and was performing its intended function. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. Cause of Occurrence:

The cause of the event was a missing valve disk for 2-SW-113. Investigation revealed that the valve disk was removed during a previous maintenance activity. Documentation of the previous maintenance was not performed.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

The immediate corrective action was to close the discharge valve for pump "A". This allowed 2-SW-P-10B to function as designed. A maintenance request was issued to repair 2-SW-113.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action:

Check valve 2-SW-113 was replaced and tested.

6. Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence:

Operation and maintenance personnel have been reinstructed in the proper method of performance of work on Safety-Related systems.

7. Generic Implications:

None