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02	EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) With the Unit at 12% power it was discovered that the steam flow transmitters
03	(FI-474,475,484,485,494, and 495) were isolated, this is contrary to T.S3.7.B and is
04	reportable per T.S6.2.a.(2). The other protection features which would have provided
0 5	protection against this accident were operable. Therefore, the health and safety of
06	the public were not affected.
0 7	
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09 78	$\begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \text{SYSTEM} \\ \text{CODE} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{CODE} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{CODE} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{CODE} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{COMPONENT CODE} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} $ \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \\ \\ \\
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10	The transmitters had been isolated during the Containment Integrated Leak Rate test
11	(Type A testing). The transmitters were inadvertantly left in this condition until
12	discovered during the startup.
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7 8	Image: Second
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1 8	PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 8	11 12 80 DSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
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	PUBLICITY SUED DESCRIPTION 45 NRC USE ONLY
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	NAME OF PREPARER J. L. Wilson PHONE: (804) 357-3184

ATTACHMENT 1 (PAGE 1 OF SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO: 50-281 REPORT NO: 80-011/01T-0 EVENT DATE: 08-19-80

TITLE OF EVENT: ISOLATION OF STEAM FLOW TRANSMITTERS

1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

With the unit at 12% power, it was discovered that the steam flow transmitter (FI-474, 475, 484, 485, 494, and 495) were isolated. This is contrary to T.S. 3.7.B and is reportable per T.S. 6.2.a.(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES:

With these transmitters isolated, there was no steam line flow indication or high steam flow protection signal. High steam flow would initiate a safety injection in coincidence with low steam line pressure or low primary coolant temperature if a main steam line break occurred downstream of the non-return valves and trip valves. The other independent protection features which would have provided protection against this accident were operable. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE:

The transmitters had been isolated during the Containment Integrated Leak Rate test (Type A testing). The transmitters were inadvertently left in this condition until discovered during the startup.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate action was to place all the associated bistables in the trip mode.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The Instrument Technicians placed the transmitters back in service and the Instrument Supervisors will review the protection instrumentation prior to startup.

6. FUTURE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Following the Unit No. 1 steam generator replacement outage, all safeguards instrumentation will be verified for proper valve lineup subsequent to the Type A test and prior to unit startup.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

None