IRC FOF 7-77)	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
	CONTROL BLOCK:
0 1	V A S P S 2 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 5 B LICENSEE CODE 12 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 25 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58 5
	REPORT L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 7 0 8 2 8 8 0 6 0 9 2 6 8 0 9 SOLECE 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 59 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 50
0 2	EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
0 3	closed. This is contrary to T.S3.8.A.1 and is reportable per T.S6.6.2.b.(2). The
0 4	inside trip valve, TV-SS-200A, was operable and would have closed if needed for
0 5	Containment Isolation, therefore the health and safety of the general public were
0 6	not affected.
0 7	
018	
	SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE SUBCODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE
, s	Image: Secure transmission Secure transmission Occurrence report Report Secure transmission 10 LER RO EVENT YEAR SECURE TRO OCCURRENCE REPORT REPORT 10 REPORT 0 2 4 0 3 L 10 L1 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
,	ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT NPRD4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER A 18 Z 19 Z 20 Z 20 Z 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10	CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (2) The valve would not remain closed because of a failed limit switch which was replaced.
11	
1 2	
1 3	
	9
15	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$
	CTIVITY CONTENT ELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) Z (32) Z (32) NA 9 10 11 44 45
17	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMEER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)
1 3	
7 B	9 11 12 LOSS OF OF DAMAGE TO FACILITY (3) TYPE DESCRIPTION Z (2) NA
, 2	9 10 PUBLICITY SSUED _ DESCRIPTION (45) NRC USE ONLY
20	
οv	LUUL MOCK J. L. Wilson PHONE: (804) 357-3184

ATTACHMENT 1 SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 2 DOCKET NO: 50-281 REPORT NO: 80-024/03L-0 EVENT DATE: 08-28-80

TITLE OF REPORT: TRIP VALVE TV-SS-200B FAILURE

1. Description of Event:

With the unit at intermediate shutdown it was found that TV-SS-200B would not close and remain closed when the control switch was released. This is contrary to T.S.-3.8.A.1 and is reportable per T.S.-6.6.2.b(2).

2. Probable Consequences:

If isolation of this line had been required, the inside trip valve (TV-SS-200A) would have closed. Containment integrity would therefore have been maintained and the health and safety of the general public were not affected.

3. Cause:

The valve would not remain closed because the close limit switch had failed.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

The immediate corrective action was to close the inside trip valve and have the manual isolation valve closed.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action:

The Electricians subsequently replaced the limit switch and returned the valve to operable status.

6. Future Corrective Action:

None

7. Generic Implications:

None