NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Line	Field	Value
0 1	LICENSEE CODE (2)	V A S P S 2
	LICENSE NUMBER (3)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0
	LICENSE TYPE (4)	4 1 1 1 1
	CAT (5)	
CON'T 0 1	REPORT SOURCE (6)	L
	DOCKET NUMBER (7)	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1
	EVENT DATE (8)	0 8 1 6 8 0
	REPORT DATE (9)	0 9 1 2 8 0

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 Unit #2 was critical at 0% power. Operating personnel were pressurizing the accumulator
0 3 tanks. After pressurization, the level indicator for 'B' SI accumulator indicated a
0 4 high level of 61%, exceeding the T.S. maximum of 58.3%. This event is contrary to T.S.
0 5 3.3.A.2 and is reportable as per T.S. 6.6.2.b.(2). The redundant accumulators were
0 6 available, therefore the safety and health of the public were not affected.
0 7
0 8

0 9		
SYSTEM CODE (11)		S H
CAUSE CODE (12)		X
CAUSE SUBCODE (13)		Z
COMPONENT CODE (14)		Z Z Z Z Z Z
COMP. SUBCODE (15)		Z
VALVE SUBCODE (16)		Z

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
8 0	—	0 1 5	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN (18)	FUTURE ACTION (19)	EFFECT ON PLANT (20)	SHUTDOWN METHOD (21)	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED (23)	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. (24)	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER (25)	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26)
X	Z	A	A	0 0 0 4	Y	N	Z	Z 9 9 9

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Water was drained from the tank to get the level within the Technical Specifications.
1 1 Subsequent to this event, it was determined that condensation in the dry reference leg
1 2 and high pressure from the nitrogen feed line caused the instrument to read high. The
1 3 reference leg has been drained and the nitrogen pressure re-routed to reduce instrument
1 4 shock from the high pressure line.

Line	Field	Value
1 5	FACILITY STATUS (28)	B
	% POWER (29)	0 0 0
	OTHER STATUS (30)	NA
	METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31)	B
	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)	Operator observation
1 6	ACTIVITY RELEASED (33)	Z
	CONTENT OF RELEASE (34)	Z
	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	NA
	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)	NA
1 7	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER (37)	0 0 0
	TYPE (38)	Z
	DESCRIPTION (39)	NA
1 8	PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER (40)	0 0 0
	DESCRIPTION (41)	NA
1 9	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE (42)	Z
	DESCRIPTION (43)	NA
2 0	PUBLICITY ISSUED (44)	N
	DESCRIPTION (45)	NA

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NRC USE ONLY

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GPO 917-926

ATTACHMENT 1
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 2
DOCKET NO: 50-281
REPORT NO: 80-015/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 08-16-80

TITLE OF REPORT: HIGH LEVEL ON ACCUMULATOR TANK 2-SI-TK-B

1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

Unit No. 2 was at critical at 0% power conducting low power physics testing. The operator was pressurizing the accumulator tanks during startup testing. The indicated level of accumulator 2-SI-TK-B increased when the tank was pressurized. After pressurization, the level indicators showed a level of 61%, exceeding the Technical Specifications maximum level outlined in 3.3.A.2 of 58.3%. After four hours, the level was still higher than the T.S. level, requiring that a reactor shutdown be initiated. Two minutes later, the level was within the T.S. limit and the reactor was brought back to critical status. This event is reportable in accordance with Technical Specifications 6.6.2.b.(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES AND STATUS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEMS:

Two accumulators were operable at all times during the event. This is the minimum number assumed by the safety analysis. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE OF EVENT:

The higher reading was caused by condensation in the dry reference legs. In addition, the reference leg piping taps directly into the nitrogen feed line, causing fluctuations in the level indication.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate corrective action was to drain water from the accumulator tank to lower the level.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The reference legs were drained of condensation. The valve from the nitrogen feed line was closed and the valve on the upper level tap on the tank was opened to reduce the effects of nitrogen charging by allowing the large accumulator nitrogen volume to act as a cushion.

6. ACTIONS TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

None required.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

There are no generic implications.