NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | VASPS2 (2) | 00-00000-00 (3) | 41111 (4) | (5)
LICENSEE CODE (9–14) | LICENSE NUMBER (15–25) | LICENSE TYPE (26–30) | CAT (57–58)

CON'T
01 | REPORT SOURCE L (6) | 05000281 (7) | 081580 (8) | 091280 (9)
DOCKET NUMBER (61–68) | EVENT DATE (69–74) | REPORT DATE (75–80)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 During startup testing, with Surry Unit No. 2 critical at 0% power, a boric acid concen-
03 tration of 13.8% was reported in 1-CH-TK-1C and 2-SI-TK-2. This is less conservative
04 with respect to the requirements of T.S. 3.2.B.3 and T.S. 3.3.A.3 and is reportable per
05 T.S. 6.6.2.b.(2). All required flow paths remained operable and had the required capa-
06 bility for reactor control. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not
07 affected.
08

09 SYSTEM CODE SH (11) | CAUSE CODE A (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE A (13) | COMPONENT CODE ZZZZZZ (14) | COMP. SUBCODE Z (15) | VALVE SUBCODE Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: EVENT YEAR 80 | — | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 013 | / | OCCURRENCE CODE 03 | REPORT TYPE L | — | REVISION NO. 0

ACTION TAKEN H (18) | FUTURE ACTION Z (19) | EFFECT ON PLANT Z (20) | SHUTDOWN METHOD Z (21) | HOURS (22) 0000 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y (23) | NPRD-4 FORM-SUB. N (24) | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER Z (25) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER Z999 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The cause is determined to be due to pumping the Boric Acid from Boron Evaporator Bottoms
11 Tank (1-BR-TK-5) to Boric Acid Storage Tank (1-CH-TK-1C) without sampling. The correc-
12 tive action was to reinstruct the operators to use approved procedures.
13
14

15 FACILITY STATUS C (28) | % POWER 000 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30) NA | METHOD OF DISCOVERY B (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) Routine Chemistry sampling

16 ACTIVITY RELEASED Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) NA | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) NA

17 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES: NUMBER 000 (37) | TYPE Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39) NA

18 PERSONNEL INJURIES: NUMBER 000 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41) NA

19 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY: TYPE Z (42) | DESCRIPTION (43) NA

20 PUBLICITY: ISSUED N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45) NA

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GPO 917-926

ATTACHMENT I (PAGE 1 OF 1)
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET NO: 50-281
REPORT NO: 80-013/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 08-15-80

TITLE OF REPORT: EXCESSIVE BORIC ACID CONCENTRATION IN BORON INJECTION TANK

1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

During startup testing with Surry Unit No. 2 critical at 0% power, a Boric Acid concentration of 13.8% was reported in 1-CH-TK-1C and 2-SI-TK-2. The allowable Technical Specification Range is 11.5-13%.

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES/STATUS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEMS:

1-CH-TK-1C and 2-SI-TK-2 provide boric acid for reactor control for Unit No. 2. All required flow paths remained operable. Adequate capability for reactor control was available at all times. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE OF THE EVENT:

The cause of the event is determined to be operator error. The contents of the Boron Evaporator Bottoms Tank (1-BR-TK-5) were pumped into Boric Acid Storage Tank 1-CH-TK-1C without sampling.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The reactor was taken subcritical and the tanks were diluted to bring the concentration of boric acid within specifications. Operators were reinstructed to use approved procedures.

5. SCHEDULED CORRECTIVE ACTION:

None required.

6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

Administrative controls have been established to minimize recurrence.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

None