

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | V A S P S | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | _____ | 5

8 9 | LICENSEE CODE 14 15 | LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 | LICENSE TYPE 30 57 | CAT 58 80

0 1 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 9 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 6 | 8 | 0 | 9

8 9 | DOCKET NUMBER 60 61 68 69 | EVENT DATE 74 75 | REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | During testing of Unit #2 air ejector divert valve, TV-SV-202, it was discovered that

0 3 | the maximum operating air differential pressure exceeded the rating of the ASCO solenoid

0 4 | valve installed. This event is contrary to the basis for T.S. 3.1.D.4 and is reportable

0 5 | as per T.S. 6.6.2.b.(3). Periodic Tests performed previously have indicated that the

0 6 | valves functioned properly. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not

0 7 | affected.

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE | S | D | 11 | CAUSE CODE | B | 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE | A | 13 | COMPONENT CODE | V | A | L | V | O | P | 14 | COMP. SUBCODE | H | 15 | VALVE SUBCODE | G | 16

8 9 | 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20

17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | 8 | 0 | 21 22 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 0 | 3 | 2 | 24 26 | OCCURRENCE CODE | 0 | 3 | 28 29 | REPORT TYPE | L | 30 31 | REVISION NO. | 0 | 32

33 34 | ACTION TAKEN | F | 18 | C | 19 | FUTURE ACTION | EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | 20 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | 21 | HOURS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | 23 | NFRD-4 FORM SUB. | N | 24 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | A | 25 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | A | 6 | 1 | 0 | 26

35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | TV-SV-102/202 are normally closed and are energized to open and divert the air ejector

1 1 | discharge from the atmosphere to the containment. Present valves were installed under

1 2 | original station design criteria. The valves will be replaced with the proper sized

1 3 | valve and verified operational.

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS | E | 28 | % POWER | 1 | 0 | 0 | 29 | OTHER STATUS | NA | 30 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | C | 31 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | Start-up personnel | 32

8 9 | 10 12 13 44 45 46 80

1 6 | ACTIVITY CONTENT | Z | 33 | RELEASED OF RELEASE | Z | 34 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | NA | 35 | LOCATION OF RELEASE | NA | 36

8 9 | 10 11 44 45 80

1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | TYPE | Z | 38 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 39

8 9 | 11 12 13 80

1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 41

8 9 | 11 12 80

1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY | Z | 42 | TYPE | DESCRIPTION | NA | 43

8 9 | 10 80

2 0 | PUBLICITY | N | 44 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 45

8 9 | 10 80

DOCKET NO: 50-280

REPORT NO: 80-032/03L-0

EVENT DATE: 5-29-80

TITLE OF EVENT: TRIP VALVES TV-SV-102/202 UNDER-RATED

1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

During testing of Unit #2 air ejector divert valve (TV-SV-202), it was discovered that the ASCO solenoid valve in use was under-rated for the control air pressure supplied. This trip valve is normally closed and opens on a divert signal from the air ejector radiation monitor. This event is contrary to the basis for T.S. 3.1.D.4 and is reportable as per T.S. 6.6.2.b.(3).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES AND STATUS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEMS:

TV-SV-102/202 is designed to divert the condenser air ejector air discharge to the containment on a high radiation signal. Previous tests (PT-26.2) indicate that the valve(s) have always functioned correctly to divert to the containment on high radiation even though the valves are under-rated for the air pressure differential supplied. Should the solenoid valve fail, the trip valve would fail, in the closed position, which is conservative for containment isolation. The health and safety of the general public were not affected.

3. CAUSE:

Trip valve(s) TV-SV-102/202 solenoids are manufactured by Automatic Switch Company (ASCO) with a maximum air pressure differential rating of 20 PSI for ASCO Model 8320A12. The regulated air supply to this valve is maintained at 30 PSIG. The valve was installed as per original design criteria.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate corrective action was to verify the operability of the trip valves.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The solenoid valves will be replaced with the correct model upon receipt of valves on site.

6. ACTIONS TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

None

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

There are no generic implications as a result of this event.