NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Line	Field	Value
01	LICENSEE CODE (2)	V A S P S 2
	LICENSE NUMBER (3)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0
	LICENSE TYPE (4)	4 1 1 1 1
	CAT (5)	
CON'T 01	REPORT SOURCE (6)	L
	DOCKET NUMBER (7)	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1
	EVENT DATE (8)	0 5 2 7 8 0
	REPORT DATE (9)	0 6 2 3 8 0

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 During depressurization of Containment No. 2 following the Type "A" test, the pressuri-

03 zer level exceeded 33% without overpressure mitigation protection. This is contrary to

04 Technical Specification 3.1.G.2.b.(1). The Reactor Coolant system was vented and never

05 in a solid condition. No pressure increases were indicated on the pressurizer pressure

06 indication. The Reactor Coolant pressure never exceeded the Type "A" test pressure.

07 Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

08

Line 09	Value
SYSTEM CODE (11)	C A
CAUSE CODE (12)	X
CAUSE SUBCODE (13)	Z
COMPONENT CODE (14)	Z Z Z Z Z Z
COMP. SUBCODE (15)	Z
VALVE SUBCODE (16)	Z

LER/RO REPORT NUMBER (17)	Value
EVENT YEAR	8 0
23	—
SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	0 0 6
27	/
OCCURRENCE CODE	0 3
REPORT TYPE	L
31	—
REVISION NO.	0

Field	Value
ACTION TAKEN (18)	X
FUTURE ACTION (19)	Z
EFFECT ON PLANT (20)	Z
SHUTDOWN METHOD (21)	Z
HOURS (22)	0 0 0 0
ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED (23)	Y
NPRD-4 FORM SUB. (24)	N
PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER (25)	Z
COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26)	Z 9 9 9

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 During pressurization, water was added to the Primary system to maintain the pressuri-

11 zer level indication. During depressurization, the pressurizer level increased and ex-

12 ceeded 33%. There were no available systems capable of overpressurizing the Reactor

13 Coolant system, and the RCS was drained to a pressurizer level of less than 33% as

14 soon as possible.

Line	Field	Value
15	FACILITY STATUS (28)	G
	% POWER (29)	0 0 0
	OTHER STATUS (30)	NA
	METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31)	A
	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)	Operator observation
16	ACTIVITY RELEASED (33)	Z
	CONTENT OF RELEASE (34)	Z
	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	NA
	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)	NA
17	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER (37)	0 0 0
	TYPE (38)	Z
	DESCRIPTION (39)	NA
18	PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER (40)	0 0 0
	DESCRIPTION (41)	NA
19	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE (42)	Z
	DESCRIPTION (43)	NA
20	PUBLICITY ISSUED (44)	N
	DESCRIPTION (45)	NA

NRC USE ONLY

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ATTACHMENT (PAGE 1 OF 1)
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 2
DOCKET NO: 50-281
REPORT NO: 80-006/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 5-27-80
TITLE OF REPORT: PRESSURIZER LEVEL EXCEEDED

1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

During depressurization of Containment No. 2 following the Type "A" test, the pressurizer level exceeded the 33% without overpressure mitigation protection as specified in Technical Specifications 3.1.G.2.b.(1). The event is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.6.2.b.(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES AND STATUS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEMS:

The Reactor Coolant system was vented as dictated by the procedure for the Type "A" test, thru 2-RC-138 and the reactor coolant stand pipe. The Reactor Coolant system never reached a solid condition, and no pressure increases were indicated on pressurizer pressure indication. Throughout the Type "A" test and depressurization, the reactor coolant pressure never exceeded the Type "A" test pressure, and therefore, there were no consequences as a result of this event, and neither the health nor safety of the public were affected.

3. CAUSE:

During containment pressurization for Type "A" test with the Reactor Coolant system vented, it was necessary to add water to the Primary system for the purpose of maintaining the pressurizer level indication. During depressurization, the pressurizer level increased and exceeded 33% as a result of the additional water added to the system.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

There were no available systems capable of overpressurizing the primary in that all charging pumps were secured in their pull to lock position, the RHR inlet series valves were open and their respective breakers locked open. The safety injection accumulators were vented to the atmosphere with the discharge valves shut and the breakers locked open. As soon as access was available to Containment No. 2, the RCS was drained to a pressurizer level of less than 33%.

5. SCHEDULED CORRECTIVE ACTION:

None required.

6. ACTIONS TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

None required.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

None