



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

JAN 31 1980

In Reply Refer To:

RII:JPO

50-338, 50-339

50-404, 50-405

50-280, 50-281


Virginia Electric and Power Company
Attn: W. L. Proffitt
Senior Vice President,
Power

P. O. Box 26666
Richmond, Virginia 23261

Gentlemen:

This Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a possible significant matter. It is expected that recipients will review the information for possible applicability to their facilities. No specific action or response is requested at this time. If further NRC evaluations so indicate, an IE Circular or Bulletin will be issued to recommend or request specific licensee actions. If you have questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

Sincerely,


for James P. O'Reilly
Director

Enclosures:

1. IE Information Notice
No. 80-03
2. List of IE Information
Notices Recently Issued

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for
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JAN 31 1980

Virginia Electric and
Power Company

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

SSINS No.: 6870
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January 31, 1980

IE Information Notice No. 80-03

MAIN TURBINE ELECTROHYDRAULIC CONTROL SYSTEM

Description of Circumstances:

On September 6, 1979, while performing a routine startup of the Trojan Nuclear Plant, a speed control problem was encountered during warmup of the General Electric turbine and increase of turbine speed to normal operating speed (1800 RPM). Technicians were notified and troubleshooting in accordance with the technical manual* was commenced to resolve the apparent oscillation between the primary and backup speed control circuits which was hindering normal turbine startup operations. The technical manual indicates that it is permissible to remove either the primary or backup low value gate circuits which contain speed and acceleration error amplifiers. Upon removal of the primary low value gate circuit card, the backup card amplifiers, coming from a saturated condition, became the controlling circuit. During the shift in control circuits (primary to backup), the speed/acceleration error signal went to maximum which resulted in a full open signal to the turbine control valves. Under existing plant conditions this appeared to the safety injection system as a major steam break downstream of the main steam isolation valves which resulted in a safety injection system actuation and reactor trip.

The Electrohydraulic Control System (EHC) technical manual indicated that slight load changes are likely when a low value gate card is removed. The effect on an unloaded turbine appears to be much more significant and tests conducted by Trojan personnel indicate that the transient is initiated whether the turbine is at a set speed or in an acceleration mode to a set speed. Discussions with General Electric personnel by the licensee have been initiated in an attempt to verify the phenomenon observed and, if applicable, alert other facilities which operate a turbine with a MK 1 EHC System regarding the potential operation of the control valves when troubleshooting the speed control unit in accordance with existing instructions.

*GEK Instruction Book 11381-D, "Speed Control Unit", Maintenance Section, Page 4.

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IE Information Notice No. 80-03
January 31, 1980

Enclosure

RECENTLY ISSUED
IE INFORMATION NOTICES

| Information Notice No. | Subject | Date Issued | Issued To |
|------------------------|---|-------------|---|
| 80-03 | Main Turbine Electrohydraulic Control System | 1/31/80 | All holders of power reactor Operating Licenses and Construction Permits |
| 80-02 | 8X8R Water Rod Lower End Plug Wear | 1/25/80 | All BWR Facilities holder power reactor OLs or CPs |
| 80-01 | Fuel Handling Events | 1/4/80 | All holders of power reactor OLs and CPs |
| 79-37 | Cracking in Low Pressure Turbine Discs | 12/28/79 | All power reactor OLs and CPs |
| 79-36 | Computer Code Defect in Stress Analysis of Piping Elbow | 12/31/79 | All power reactor OLs and CPs |
| 79-35 | Control of Maintenance and Essential Equipment | 12/31/79 | All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP |
| 79-34 | Inadequate Design of Safety-Related Heat Exchangers | 12/27/79 | All holders of power reactor OLs and CPs |
| 79-33 | Improper Closure of Primary Containment Access Hatches | 12/21/79 | All power reactor facilities holding OLs and CPs |
| 79-32 | Separation of Electrical Cables for HPCI and ADS | 12/21/79 | All power reactor facilities holding OLs and CPs |
| 79-31 | Use of Incorrect Amplified Response Spectra (ARS) | 12/13/79 | All holders of power reactor OLs and CPs |
| 79-30 | Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance, 10 CFR Part 21. | 12/6/79 | All power reactor facilities holding OLs and CPs and vendors inspected by LCVIP |
| 79-29 | Loss of NonSafety-Related Reactor Coolant System Instrumentation During Operation | 11/16/79 | All power reactor facilities holding OLs or CPs |