NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [ ] (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | LICENSEE CODE: V A S P S 1 (2) | LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | CAT (5)

CON'T 01 | REPORT SOURCE: L (6) | DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0 (7) | EVENT DATE: 0 2 0 2 8 0 (8) | REPORT DATE: 0 2 2 9 8 0 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 While performing PT-27D, the amperage readings for circuit 25A (Boron Injection Tank
03 Recirc Return Line to the Boric Acid Tanks) panels 1 and 2 were below the acceptance
04 criteria stipulated in the PT. Since repairs to the tape were not completed within
05 the allowable 2 hrs. (actual repair duration - 2 hrs. 5 min.), unit rampdown was
06 commenced as per T.S.3.3.B.10. This event is reportable in accordance with T.S.
07 6.6.2.b.2. The temperature, volume, and concentration of the BIT were verified
08 within specifications, therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

09 | SYSTEM CODE: S H (11) | CAUSE CODE: E (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE: A (13) | COMPONENT CODE: H E A T E R (14) | COMP. SUBCODE: Z (15) | VALVE SUBCODE: Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | EVENT YEAR: 8 0 | — | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 0 1 2 | / | OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 3 | REPORT TYPE: L | — | REVISION NO.: 0

ACTION TAKEN: A (18) | FUTURE ACTION: Z (19) | EFFECT ON PLANT: Z (20) | SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z (21) | HOURS (22): 0 0 0 0 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y (23) | NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: N (24) | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: A (25) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: C 1 1 6 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 Borated water had penetrated the tape in the area where the pipe penetrates the Boric
11 Acid Flat floor, causing the degraded amp readings. The water had accumulated at that
12 point from previous maintenance on the Flat. A Maintenance Report was initiated and
13 the section of tape replaced. The borated water accumulation in the penetration area
14 was cleaned up.

15 | FACILITY STATUS: E (28) | % POWER: 1 0 0 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30): NA | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: B (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32): During Periodic Testing

16 | ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35): NA | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36): NA

17 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER: 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE: Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39): NA

18 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER: 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41): NA

19 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) TYPE: Z (42) | DESCRIPTION: NA

20 | PUBLICITY ISSUED: N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45): NA

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GPO 917-926

Attachment (Page 1 of 1)
Surry Power Station, Unit 1
Docket No. 50-280
Report No. 80-012/03L-0
Event Date: 02-02-80
Title of Report: Heat Tracing Circuit Low Amperage

1. Description of Event:

While performing PT-27D, the amperage readings for circuit 25A (Boron Injection Tank Recirc Return Line to the Boric Acid Tanks) panels 1 and 2 were below the acceptance criteria stipulated in the PT. Since repairs to the tape were not completed within the allowable 2 hrs. (actual repair duration - 2 hrs. 5 min.), unit rampdown was commenced as per T.S. 3.3.B.10. This event is reportable in accordance with T.S. 6.6.2.b.2.

2. Probable Consequences & Status of Redundant Systems:

Although the heat tracing circuit was declared inoperable in accordance with the PT, the concentration, volume, and temperature of the BIT were verified to be within the setpoints stipulated in Tech. Specs. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. Cause:

Borated water had penetrated the tape in the area where the pipe penetrates the Boric Acid Flat floor, causing the degraded amp readings. The water had accumulated at that point from previous maintenance on the flat.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

A Maintenance Report was initiated and the suction tape replaced. The borated water accumulation in the penetration area was cleaned up.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action:

Since the subject circuit is continuously monitored, no subsequent action is required.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

The existing tape was replaced with a better grade tape which will eliminate future failures of a similar nature.

7. Generic Implications:

A task force has been established to study the total spectrum of the heat tracing system in an attempt to discern present problems and recommend solutions which will eliminate the failures experienced. While this study is in progress, a new type of heat tracing tape is being used which has thus far proven resistant to failure.