NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
UPDATED REPORT

PREVIOUS REPORT DATE 12-21-79

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1	LICENSEE CODE: V A S P S 1 (2) LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4) CAT (5)
CON'T 0 1	REPORT SOURCE: L (6) DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0 (7) EVENT DATE: 1 1 2 7 7 9 (8) REPORT DATE: 1 2 2 1 7 9 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2	During normal operation, routine surveillance revealed the failure of heat tracing
0 3	circuit 2B (Panel 8), Unit #1 suction piping to Boric Acid Transfer Pump, 1-CH-P-2A.
0 4	This is a degraded mode of operation permitted by T.S. 3.3.B.5. and is reportable as
0 5	per T.S. 6.6.2.b.(2). Since the temperature of the affected lines was maintained as
0 6	required, the redundant circuit was operable and two flow paths for boric acid to the
0 7	reactor were available, the health and safety of the public were not affected.
0 8	

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
0 9	S H (11)	E (12)	A (13)	H E A T E R (14)	Z (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	7 9	—	0 3 5	/	0 3	X	—	1

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
A (18)	Z (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	A (25)	C 2 6 8 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0	A review of the heat tracing circuit showed that failure was caused by water damage to
1 1	the heat tracing circuit. The corrective action implemented was to replace the heat
1 2	tape and initiate a maintenance request to repair the water leak.
1 3	
1 4	

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
1 5	E (28)	0 0 0 (29)	NA	B (31)	Operator Observation

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
1 8	0 0 0 (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1 9	Z (42)	NA

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
2 0	N (44)	NA	

8002070 297

NAME OF PREPARER W. L. Stewart PHONE: (804)357-3184

GPO 917-926

(UPDATE REPORT)

ATTACHMENT (PAGE 1 OF 1)
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 1
DOCKET NO: 50-280
REPORT NO: 79-035/03X-1
EVENT DATE: 11/27/79
TITLE OF REPORT: Low Current On Heat Tracing

1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

With the unit in normal operation at rated power, operator surveillance found that Heat Tracing Circuit 2B (Panel 8) was operating at less than the current specified in the surveillance document. Low temperature alarms were indicated.

Investigation for faulty heat tracing tape was initiated on the affected circuit. Faults were found on Circuit 2B (Panel 8) "2A" Boric Acid Transfer Pump suction and were identified as being the result of water penetration of the tape. The tape was replaced. The circuit current was then verified to be within specs. of the surveillance document, and a maintenance report was submitted to repair the leak.

This is a degraded mode of operation permitted by T.S. 3.3.B.5 and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.6.2.b.(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES AND STATUTS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEMS:

At all times during the event, the temperature of the affected lines was maintained as required. The redundant circuit was operable. There were at all times two operable flow paths for boric acid to the reactor. Therefore, the health and safety of the general public were not affected.

3. CAUSE:

The reduced currents were due to water penetration damage to the heat tracing tape on the affected circuit.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The problem was corrected immediately and no further action is required.

6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

Continuous surveillance is maintained on the Heat Tracing System. No additional action is considered necessary. A task force has been assembled to investigate the replacement of existing tape with water resistant tape. This investigation is in progress.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

In view of the number of failures of this heat tracing tape, a task force has been established to examine the heat tracing system and determine corrective action.