

# UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II

101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-280/79-50 and 50-281/79-70

Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company

Richmond, Virginia 23261

Facility Name: Surry Nuclear Plant

Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281

License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37

Inspection at Surry Site near Williamsburg, Virginia

Inspector: UK MMM B. R. Growley

Date Signed

Approved by: Mithal

A. R. Herdt, Section Chief, RCES Branch

Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on August 27-29,1979

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved 20 inspector-hours onsite in the area of steam generator feedwater line radiography (RT) and repair.

Results

In the one area inspected, one item of noncompliance was found (Failure to follow radiography procedure-Paragraph 5).

#### DETAILS

#### 1. Persons Contacted

### Licensee Employees

- ★W. L. Stewart, Station Manager
- \*T. A. Peebles, Superintendent of Technical Services
- \*R. F. Saunders, Maintenance Superintendent
- \*J. P. Maciejewski, Engineering Supervisor (NDT)
- \*F. L. Rentz, Resident QC Engineer
- \*E. P. Dewandel, Staff Assistant
- T. W. Brombach, NDE Foreman
- M. W. Kight, Welding Foreman

Other licensee employees contacted included two construction craftsmen, two security force members and various office personnel.

NRC Resident Inspector

\*D. J. Burke

\*Attended exit interview.

#### 2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 29, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The noncompliance of paragraph 5.a. was discussed and the licensee stated that an independent review was being made of all radiographs and reradiography would be performed where necessary.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. IE Bulletins (IEB)

(Open) IEB 79-13, Cracking in Feedwater System Piping, Units 1 and 2. The inspector performed a followup inspection of radiography and subsequent weld repairs which were performed to meet the Bulletin requirements. The inspection consisted of the following:

#### a. RT Film Review

Radiography was performed in accordance with VEPCO Procedure NDT-10.1, "Radiographic Inspection of Pipe and Plate Welds" except that evaluation was to the 1977 Edition of ASME, Section III, Subsection NC, paragraph NC-5000 to the 2T quality level.

#### Unit 1

At the time of the film review all radiography had been completed. However, welds 3 and 4 on line 14"WFD-17 had been cut out to replace an elbow which had a base material defect detected during repair of weld 4. RT film for the following welds; which included the new welds made to replace the cracked reducer, all repair welds, and a sample of other welds; were reviewed:

Loop	A	Weld Weld Weld Weld Weld	19 15* 2
Loop	В	Weld Weld Weld Weld Weld	12 10* 5*
Loop	C	Weld Weld Weld Weld Weld Weld Weld Weld	15 5 6 9 11* 13* 14 3*

During review of the above film, the inspector noted that for the welds noted with an asterisk the film density in the area of interest was more than 30 percent darker than the density through the penetrameter. Paragraph 7.12.1.1 of VEPCO procedure NDT-10.1 states in part, "If the density of the radiograph anywhere through the area of interest varies by more than minus 15, plus 30 percent then an additional penetrameter shall be used for each exceptional area or areas . . ." This failure to follow procedure is considered to be noncompliance with section 6.4.D of the Surry Power Station Technical Specifications and is identified as item number 280/79-50-01, "Failure to Follow Radiography Procedure".

#### Unit 2

The RT effort on Unit 2 had just started. The following Loop A film were reviewed:

Weld 9 Weld 6 Weld 7 Weld 5

Welds 6 and 9 were acceptable. Welds 5 and 7 were rejected for porosity.

## b. Observation of Welding (Unit 1)

The inspector observed in-process welding on welds 3A and 4A (replacement welds for 3 and 4) of Loop "A". These welds were being made to replace the defective elbow (see paragraph 5a. above). In addition to observing the in-process welding, the "Weld Traveler", "Corrective Maintenance Procedure" MMP-C-G-077, and applicable "Welding Operator Qualifications Tests" were reviewed. The welding was being accomplished in accordance with specification USAS B31.1.0, 1967 Edition.

Within the areas inspected, one item of noncompliance as noted in paragraph 5a. above was identified.