



December 8, 1977
L-77-367

Central Lic.

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250
251*

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
230 Peachtree Street, N. W., Suite 1217
Atlanta, GA 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Re: RII:JPO
50-335
50-250, 50-251

Florida Power & Light Company has reviewed IE Bulletins 77-05
and 77-05A and a response is attached.

Very truly yours,

J.A. De Mastroy
for

Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President

REU/MAS/lah

Attachment

cc: Robert Lowenstein, Esquire
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

AO 2
GD

ATTACHMENT

Re: RII:JPO
50-335
50-250, 50-251

Item 1

Determine whether your facility utilizes or plans to utilize electrical connector assemblies of the type tested by Sandia Laboratories, or any other similar type, in systems that are located inside containment, are subject to a LOCA environment and are required to be operable during a LOCA. (Bulletin 77-05)

Actions requested by Bulletin 77-05 should be expanded to include all connectors in safety systems which are required to function to mitigate an accident where the accident itself could adversely affect the ability of the system to perform its safety function. The examination is not to be limited to only LOCA's nor to areas only within containment. (Bulletin 77-05A)

Response 1

The Turkey Point facility does not use or plan to use electrical connector assemblies in safety related systems.

Based on a review of detail plans of instrument installations inside containment and a visual inspection of areas outside containment, we have determined that St. Lucie Unit 1 uses four (4) electrical connector assemblies in safety related systems. The connectors are installed on four radiation detectors inside containment. The detectors provide signals which are used to initiate containment isolation.

Item 2

If any such applications are identified, review the adequacy of qualification testing for the assemblies and submit the documentation for NRC review.

Response 2

We are in the process of acquiring documentation to support the adequacy of the radiation monitor system connectors. Following our review, we will issue a supplemental response to IE Bulletins 77-05 and 77-05A.

Item 3

If evidence is not available to support a conclusion of adequacy, submit your plans and programs toward qualifying existing equipment or your plans for replacing unqualified assemblies with qualified equipment.

Response 3

FSAR Section 3.11 specifies the environmental design categories for the containment radiation monitors. The service condition is the short term containment environment between the occurrence of a LOCA or a steamline break and initiation of containment isolation. Once containment isolation has been initiated, the mitigating function of the radiation monitors has been accomplished. During events which could produce an environment adverse to the radiation detector connectors, the radiation monitor signal leading to containment isolation is supplemented by redundant containment pressure instrumentation. Thus, the four connectors under consideration are not required to withstand an adverse containment environment for longer than a few minutes, and are supplemented by a diverse system.

Based on the above evaluation, the subject Bulletins may not be directly applicable to the radiation monitor connectors. However, if any followup action is identified pursuant to our document review, we will submit it with the supplemental response to IE Bulletins 77-05 and 77-05A.