



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-280/79-31 and 50-281/79-49

Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company
 Richmond, Virginia 23261

Facility Name: Surry Units 1 and 2

Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281

License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37

Inspection at Surry Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2 near Surry, Virginia

Inspector: *[Signature]* June 26, 1979
 D. J. ~~Burke~~ Date Signed

Approved by: *[Signature]* June 26, 1979
 P. J. Kellogg, Actions Section Chief, RONS Branch Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on April 30 through June 1, 1979

Areas Inspected

This routine inspection by the resident inspector involved 90 inspector-hours on-site in the areas of plant operations and maintenance, including the Unit 2 steam generator replacement outage work, and followup on previously identified items.

Results

Of the three areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7908150533

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)

- *W. L. Stewart, Station Manager
- *J. L. Wilson, Superintendent Operations
- *T. A. Peebles, Superintendent, Technical Services
- *R. F. Saunders, Superintendent Maintenance
- *R. M. Smith, Supervisor, Health Physics
- *R. L. Baldwin, Supervisor, Administrative Services
- G. Kane, Operating Supervisor
- *F. L. Rentz, Resident QC Engineer

Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included control room operators, shift supervisors, QC, engineering, HP, plant maintenance, security and administrative personnel.

*Attended exit interview.

2. Management Interviews

The scope and findings were summarized on a weekly basis with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Noncompliance (280/79-15-01): Failure to Follow Annunciator Alarm Procedure 1A-62. The inspector verified that the operators were reinstructed to log important alarms and events and to provide more detailed shift turnovers. Annunciator alarm procedure 1A-62 has been revised.

(Closed) Noncompliance (280/79-15-02) Unsealed and Unattended Fire Barrier Penetrations. The inspector verified that the penetrations were sealed, that personnel were reinstructed on the procedure requirements, and that additional administrative controls were established for these activities.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Unit 2 Steam Generator Replacement Activities

The inspector reviewed certain U-2 SG replacement and associated activities to verify that the activities were performed in accordance with the Steam

Generator Repair Program (SGRP) and the Engineering Task Assignment (ETA) procedures.

Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified.

The review included the following activities:

- a. The removal of steam generator "C" from containment to the storage facility on May 6, 1979, and the subsequent removal of SG "B" and "A". Before lifting the SG, the lift rig was examined and load tested to verify crane/rig operability.
- b. The review of plant chemistry records indicated unusual volumes of low pH radioactive solutions in the Unit 2 containment sump and the liquid waste systems on April 16, 1979, and a few days afterwards the source of the solutions was determined to be the Chem-Nuclear Systems decontamination process for the reactor coolant system (RCS) piping. The process acidic rinse water was apparently released to the Unit 2 floor drain and sump, and the radwaste system. Inspections and samples indicated that the solution was not introduced into the containment recirculation sump, which was isolated. The rinse water was retrieved and is being stored in barrels for processing. The licensee stated that additional controls would be established on the decontamination process with revision of the operating procedure attachment to the ETA and that systems exposed to the acidic solution would be reviewed to verify no deterioration is expected to occur. Chemical certification records on the phosphoric and nitric acids used are being sent to the station to be included in the documentation records. When completed, the procedures, reviews, and records will be inspected (Open item 281/79-49-01).
- c. The inspector reviewed records and the corrective actions concerning the release of several gallons of contaminated water from U-2 RWST to the Unit 2 Steam Safeguards Building. Some of the water was released to the pad area outside the building entrance. Immediate corrective action was taken to restrict and cleanup the affected areas. The leaking valve which led to the release through a vent is being repaired.

6. Unit 1 Operations

Surry Unit 1 has been shutdown since March 15, 1979, following the issuance of the NRC Order to Show Cause concerning the potential piping stress analyses deficiencies. The inspector toured the control room and certain Unit 1 plant areas to verify that the shutdown operations were in accordance with the Technical Specifications and facility procedures. Plant logs and records were also reviewed. Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified. Specific areas of inspection included:

- a. Followup on a plugged boric acid line to the RCS; alternate boration lines were available as required by TS 3.2.A.

- b. Followup on the boric acid filters on the boric acid flat beneath the boric acid tanks in the auxiliary building. Although lead shielding was installed on the filters, radiation fields of up to 500 MR/hr were observed in the restricted area near the filters. The licensee is evaluating the filter change history to determine if more frequent filter changeout can reduce the radiation levels (Open item 280/79-31-01).
- c. The inspector reviewed periodic test 15, "Steam Generator Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps", which is performed monthly, to verify that the FW pump discharge isolation valves are properly restored following recirculation flow testing of the pumps. Normal valve line-up is restored and verified in PT 15.
- d. The inspector verified that the reactor control rooms were adequately staffed.

7. New Fuel Assembly Damage

On May 7, 1979, while conducting routine inspections of the new fuel for Unit 2, the licensee discovered that impure sodium hydroxide had been poured onto 62 of 64 new fuel assemblies stored in the fuel building. The FBI is currently conducting an investigation of the incident, and inspections by NRC Security Inspectors are in progress. The licensee and site security personnel have implemented increased security and access control measures for the fuel building. The new fuel assemblies are being returned to Westinghouse for examination and repair as necessary.

8. Annual Site Emergency Drill

On June 1, 1979, the inspector and D. J. Perrotti of Region II witnessed the annual site emergency drill. On and off-site personnel and agencies were appropriately notified. Changes to the EPIP's are being made by the licensee as a result of certain deficiencies identified by the licensee during the drill. Additional discussion on the drill is available in IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-280/79-27 and 50-281/79-44.