

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos.: 50-280/79-21 and 50-281/79-32

Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, Virginia 23261

Facility Name: Surry Power Station

Docket Nos.: 50-280 and 50-281

License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37

Inspection at Surry Power Station, Surry, Virginia

Inspector: S. Ewal Appr6ved AS, Acting Section Chief, FF&MS Branch

Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on May 7-11, 14-15, 1979

Areas Inspected

This routine unannounced inspection involved 58 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of radiation protection including licensee audits, portable instrument and dosimeter calibrations, facility tours, and concerns expressed by workers.

Results

No apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7907800028

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

*W. L. Stewart, Station Manager

*T. A. Peebles, Superintendant Technical Services

*R. M. Smith, Health Physics Supervisor

*A. L. Parrish, III, SGRP Project Manager

P. P. Nottingham, IV, SGRP, Assistant Supervisor Health Physics

C. E. Foltz, Assistant Supervisor, Health Physics

M. R. Beckham, Assistant Supervisor, Health Physics

H. F. McCallum, Assistant Supervisor, Health Physics

S. Sarver, System Health Physicist

*G. E. Kane, Operating Supervisor

Other licensee employees contacted included 12 technicians, three operatores, three security force members, and three office personnel.

NRC Resident Inspector

*D. L. Burke

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 11 and 15, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

ŝ

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 8.

5. Licensee Audits

The licensee is required by Section 18.5 of the Station Quality Assurance Manual to conduct a yearly audit of the Health Physics Program. The inspector reviewed Audit Report No. 579-3, conducted April 20, 1979, and noted no discrepancies were identified in the audit report.



6. Portable Instruments

125

 ϕ_{1} is a set of the second set of the second seco

- a. The inspector reviewed revisions to portable instrument calibration procedures and selected five instruments and one air sampler ready for use and reviewed calibration records for the period April 10, 1978 through May 11, 1979. The inspector also verified current calibration stickers on equipment at seven frisking stations. The inspector noted records of an instrument response to known radiation levels not yet filed with the individual instrument records. The inspector had no questions relating to portable instrument calibrations.
- b. The inspector reviewed source and drift check records of pocket dosimeters for the previous six months. The inspector verified acceptance criteria on dosimeter performance are being properly implemented and are consistent with Regulatory Guide 8.4. The inspector selected four low range (200 mrem) and three high range (1000 mrem) dosimeters from the ready to issue bins and verified source and drift checks had been performed within the previous six months. The inspector had no questions relative to pocket dosimeter source and drift checks.

7. Procedures

- a. The inspector reviewed revisions to station health physics procedures approved during the period May 1978 through April 1979. Most of the revisions dealt with instrument calibrations. The inspector verified all procedures had been reviewed and approved as per Technical Specification 6.4.E and had no questions relative to station health physics procedures.
- b. The licensee has issued a separate SGRP Health Physics Manual and Procedures specific to the SGRP. The inspector has reviewed these procedures as they were developed. The basic manual was approved March 29, 1978 and revisions and additions through March 16, 1979 have been examined. The inspector had no questions relative to the manual at this time.

8. Facility Tours

a. The inspector toured the Auxiliary Building, Fuel Building, Decon Building, Unit 2 Containment, Hot Machine Shop and the outside areas of the Radiation Controlled Area (RCA). The inspector performed independent radiation level surveys and found no unposted areas. During these tours, the inspector observed preparations for lifting the B Steam Generator and reactor coolant pipe decontamination operations. The inspector observed removal and storage operations for the B and A steam generators. During tours of the hot machine shop, the inspector observed weld preparation work on a section of reactor coolant pipe. During tours of the turbine building and outside RCA, the inspector noted a door exiting the turbine building, just past the emergency diesel generators, was not posted as an entrance to the RCA. Pocket and TLD dosimetry is required prior to entry to the RCA. The door gave access between two security fences and, prior to entering the RCA proper, an individual would be required to pass a security guard. An Assistant Supervisor of Health Physics stated he would assure the posted guard was aware of his responsibility for controlling RCA access and also established a frisking station for workers entering the turbine building from this area. The inspector had no other questions relative to the above items.

- b. During a tour of the fuel building, the inspector noted a hand hole had been cut in the trap door that provided access to a pipe tunnel between the Auxiliary Building, Fuel Building, P.G. Pumphouse and Decon Building. This was the same trap door discussed in RII Report Nos. 50-280/79-9 and 50-281/79-10, Details paragraph 9.f. The trap door was properly posted as accessing areas with radiation levels in excess of 1 rem/hr. Even though the trap door was locked, the hand hole would allow an individual to reach under the floor plate and remove the nut and bolt securing the door's hasp. The inspector removed the hasp in approximately 15 seconds and noted the door had been tack welded closed.
- c. The inspector discussed the trap door with health physics and operations representatives and was told the trap door had been welded closed within the last few days. Operations representatives stated the hand hole had been cut in the trap door to allow personnel entering the pipe tunnel to lock the door behind them and provide egress capability as required by 10 CFR 20.203(c)(3). The inspector reviewed Maintenance Report (MR) No. 0902160801 indicating the hole was cut February 20, 1979. The MR also indicated a Flame Permit was obtained and the work performed under the standing Radiation Work Permit for general access to the Fuel Building.
- d. The inspector expressed concern over the adequacy of the lock with the hand hole, to prevent unauthorized access to the high radiation areas. The inspector acknowledged licensee comments that the trap door was locked and a deliberate action was required to defeat the lock. The inspector also expressed concern that the hole had been cut without a special RWP in that contamination levels were in excess of 30,000 dpm/100 cm. Discussions with licensee representatives revealed the decision as to applicability of the standing RWP versus generating a special RWP is made by the particular group foreman. The inspector stated that the issue of RWP applicability and adequacy of the lock would be unresolved (280/79-21-01; 281/79-32-01) pending further review by the inspector.