



UNITED STATES  
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
 REGION II  
 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100  
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-280/79-20 and 50-281/79-31

Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company  
 Richmond, Virginia 23261

Facility Name: Surry Units 1 and 2

Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281

License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37

Inspection at Surry, Virginia

Inspector: *D. J. Burke* 5/18/79  
 D. J. Burke Date Signed

Approved by: *F. S. Cantrell* 5/19/79  
 F. S. Cantrell, Acting Chief, RONS Branch Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on March 19 through April 27, 1979

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved 115 inspector-hours on-site in the areas of plant operations, plant physical protection barriers, plant maintenance, including the Unit 2 steam generator replacement outage work, radiation protection, and followup of Licensee Event Reports and IE Bulletin 79-06A.

Results

Of the six areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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## DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

#### Licensee Employees

#### Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)

W. L. Stewart, Station Manager  
A. L. Parrish, Project Manager, SGRP  
\*J. L. Wilson, Superintendent Operations  
\*T. A. Peebles, Superintendent - Technical Services  
\*R. F. Saunders, Superintendent Maintenance  
\*R. M. Smith, Supervisor, Health Physics  
\*R. L. Baldwin, Supervisor, Administrative Services  
G. Kane, Operating Supervisor  
\*F. L. Rentz, Resident QC Engineer

Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included control room operators, shift supervisors, QC, engineering, HP, plant maintenance, security and administrative personnel.

#### Other Organizations

#### Commonwealth of Virginia Bureau of Occupational Health

A. C. McNeer, Radiation Specialist

#### Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Labor and Industry

G. L. Weaver, Industrial Safety Representative

\*Attended exit interview.

### 2. Management Interviews

The scope and findings were summarized on a weekly basis with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The individual radiation overexposure occurrence of April 14, 1979, is covered in a separate inspection report.

### 3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

### 4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Review of Reportable Occurrences

The inspector reviewed the Reportable Occurrence (RO) reports listed below to ascertain that NRC reporting requirements were being met and to determine the appropriateness of corrective action taken and planned. Certain Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed in greater detail to verify corrective action and determine compliance with the Technical Specifications and other regulatory requirements. The review included examination of log books, internal correspondence and records, review of SNSOC meeting minutes, and discussions with various staff members.

Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

- a. LER 280/79-02 concerned an inoperable electrical penetration seal between the turbine building and the emergency switchgear room; the penetration was immediately resealed and verified operable by local leak testing. This LER is closed.
- b. LER 280/79-03 addressed the main steam flow instrumentation calibration error which was the result of a setpoint change due to increased steam generator tube plugging. The error was less than 2% up to 20% of full load, but the instrumentation was accurate between 20% and 110%. A 2% conservative bias is being incorporated into the setpoint to accommodate slight instrument errors or drift. This item is closed.
- c. LER 280/79-05 concerned the malfunction of radiation monitor recorder RR-175. Although the recorder stopped printing until the seized gear shaft bushing was repaired, the radiation monitors were operable and were monitored by the operating staff. This LER is closed.
- d. LER 280/79-06 concerned the discovery of an unsealed fire barrier and an untested penetration seal in the control room envelope. The inspector verified that the fire barrier conduits were sealed and that the penetration seals were acceptably tested. This LER is closed.
- e. LER 281/79-01 addressed the inability to leak test the containment personnel access hatch after use (72 hours), due to mechanical problems with the inner door. The outer door was sealed and administratively controlled to prevent opening, which insured containment integrity. The door was subsequently repaired. This item is closed.
- f. LER 281/79-02 addressed the drift which occurred in pressurizer pressure channel I instrumentation and caused the channel to read some 5 psi high. The pressure transmitter was replaced and the channel returned to normal; the protective instrumentation trips were also returned to normal modes. This LER is closed.

- g. LER 281/79-03 concerned the failure to perform the "after entry" leak test on the containment equipment hatch airlock within 72 hours. The leak rate test was performed satisfactorily four hours after the 72. This item is closed.
- h. LER 281/79-04 addressed the conservative drift in seven of the main steam safety valve setpoints found during periodic testing; the maximum deviation was 7%. The remainder of the 15 valves were within the + 3% as required, and all valves were reset as required. This item is closed.
- i. LER 281/79-05 addressed the failure of service water valve 203C to cycle electrically during shutdown testing. The valve was repaired and bench-tested; post-installation testing is planned. This item is closed.
- j. LER 281/79-06 addressed the failure of service water valve 203D to cycle during the same periodic test (8.5A). The valve was repaired. This item is closed.
- k. LER 281/79-07 concerned the failure of ventilation damper 103A to close during the SI initiation functional test. Subsequently, the damper operated properly. This item is closed.
- l. LER 281/79-09 concerned the discovery that three hydraulic snubbers were not specified on periodic test 39A-1 and 39B-1 for visually inspecting the snubbers. The snubbers were inspected and determined operable, and were added to the PT's. This item is closed.

6. IE Bulletin No. 79-06A

The inspector verified that the licensee received IE Bulletin 79-06A, which identifies actions to be taken by Westinghouse pressurized water reactors as a result of the Three Mile Island Unit 2 incident. The licensee's response to the Bulletin is being evaluated. The inspector, along with the other NRC personnel, participated in the review and discussions conducted at the site on the incident and the IE Bulletins associated with the TMI events. Surry Unit 1 remains shutdown pending pipe stress analysis resolution and Unit 2 is in the midst of the steam generator replacement project.

7. Plant Maintenance

The inspector reviewed certain Unit 1 and 2 plant maintenance to verify that work was performed in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the applicable procedures. Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified. The licensee stated that certain SGRP procedures would be revised to include stay times and other precautions appropriate to reduce the potential for heat exhaustion when working in or around equipment enclosed by contamination control tents.

8. Plant Operations

The inspector toured the Unit 1 and 2 control rooms and certain plant areas to observe that monitoring equipment and plant instrumentation was functioning as required, and that the facility operations were in accordance with the Technical Specifications. Plant logs and records were also reviewed. Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

The inspector verified that the licensee had a contingency plan for adequately staffing the site in case the negotiations between the IBEW and VEPCO were interrupted.

9. Plant Physical Protection

The inspector verified the following by observation:

- a. Gates and doors in protected and vital area barriers were closed and locked when not attended.
- b. Isolation zones described in the physical security plans were not compromised or obstructed.
- c. Personnel were properly identified, searched, authorized, badged and escorted as necessary for plant access control.

10. Meeting with Surry County Board of Supervisors

The inspector and R. C. Lewis, Acting Chief, RONS Branch met with the Surry County Board of Supervisors on April 19, 1976. The meeting was attended by the six supervisors and about twenty local residents. Issues discussed included NRC/IE related activities, the Resident Inspector Program, and activities occurring at the plant and the current plant status. NRC personnel responded to questions from the supervisors and the local residents.