VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND VIRGINIA 23261 May 23, 1979

Mr. James F. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Muclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 398
PO/FHT: baw
Docket No. 50-280
50-281
License No. DPR-32
DPR-37

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, and IE Bulletin 79-01, Environmental Qualification of Class IE Equipment, the Virginia Electric and Fower Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Surry Unit No. 1.

Report No. LER 79-018/01T-0

Applicable Reporting Requirement IE Bulletin 79-01 and T.S. 6.6.2.a.(9)

This report has been reviewed by the Station Muclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Muclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,

C. M. Stallings
Vice President-Power Supply
and Production Operations

Enclosures (3 copies)

cc: Hr. John G. Davis, Acting Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Mr. William G. McDonald, Director (3 copies)
Office of Management Information
and Program Control

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(Attachment, page 1 of 1)

Surry Power Station, Unit 1, 2

Docket No: 50-280, 281
Report No: 79-018/01T-0
Event Date: 05-09-79

Environmentally Unqualified Solenoid Valve (SOV-BD-100A, B, C and 200A, B, C)

1. Description of Event:

The Architect Engineer has identified a solenoid valve, Model #8320A102, manufactured by Automatic Switch Company, as being environmentally unqualified for the conditions stated in I.E. Bulletin No. 79-01. Six valves were identified, three in each of Surry Units 1 and 2.

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Systems:

The solenoid valve could fail to function properly following a Loss of Coolant Accident. These valves control the admission and venting of operating air for the containment trip valves on steam generator blowdown lines. The fully redundant outside containment trip valves would have provided containment isolation, if required. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. Cause:

The solenoid valves, Model \$8320A102, were identified as being similar to another solenoid valve that failed environmental testing.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

A search was initiated to locate environmentally qualified solenoid valves.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action:

The subsequent corrective action will be the replacement of the present solenoid valves with environmentally qualified solenoid valves.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

No additional actions are deemed necessary. The solenoid valves are being replaced.

7. Generic Implications:

Environmental qualifications of other electrical components will be addressed in the response to IE Bulletin No. 79-01.