

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (1)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

011 | V | A | S | P | S | 1 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | _____ | 5

011 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 7 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 0 | 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

012 | While Surry Unit No. 1 was shutdown, a routine walkdown revealed cracks in the
013 | concrete support for 1-RH-E-1A and 1-RH-E-1B. This is reportable in accordance
014 | with T.S. 6:6.2.b.(3). The health and safety of the public were not affected.
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019 | SYSTEM CODE | C | F | 11 | CAUSE CODE | B | 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE | A | 13 | COMPONENT CODE | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | 14 | COMP. SUBCODE | Z | 15 | VALVE SUBCODE | Z | 16

17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | 7 | 9 | EVENT YEAR | - | - | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 0 | 1 | 6 | OCCURRENCE CODE | 0 | 3 | REPORT TYPE | L | REVISION NO. | 0

18 | ACTION TAKEN | F | 19 | FUTURE ACTION | Z | 20 | EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | 21 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | 22 | HOURS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | 23 | NPRO-4 FORM SUB. | N | 24 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | Z | 25 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | Z | 19 | 19 | 19 | 26

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

110 | It has been determined that the cracks were caused due to thermal expansion of the
111 | heat exchanger. The cracks in the concrete structure were repaired and the heat
112 | exchanger supports will be modified to allow for thermal expansion. Evaluation of
113 | the heat exchanger supports is being performed by the Architect Engineer.
114 |

115 | FACILITY STATUS | X | 23 | % POWER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | OTHER STATUS | Other | 30 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | C | 31 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | Routine observation | 32

116 | ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED | Z | 33 | OF RELEASE | Z | 34 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | NA | 35 | LOCATION OF RELEASE | NA | 36

117 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | TYPE | Z | 38 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 39

118 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 41

119 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE | Z | 42 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 43

120 | PUBLICITY ISSUED | N | 44 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 45

NRC USE ONLY _____
213 | N | 44 | NA | 45

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GPO 017-928

(Attachment, page 1 of 1)
Surry Power Station, Unit No. 1
Docket No: 50-280
Report No: 79-016/03L-0
Event Date: 4/25/79

Title of Report: Residual Heat Removal System - Crack in Concrete Support for
1-RH-E-1A, 1B Heat Exchangers

1. Description of Event:

With Surry Unit No. 1 at cold shutdown, a routine walkdown revealed cracks in the concrete support for 1-RH-E-1A and 1-RH-E-1B heat exchangers.

A visual inspection of the Surry Unit No. 2 concrete supports was performed with satisfactory results.

The event constitutes a condition reportable in accordance with T.S. 6.6.2.b.(3).

2. Probable Consequences/Status of Redundant Systems:

The Residual Heat Removal System removes the residual and sensible heat from the core and reduces the temperature of the reactor coolant system during the second phase of unit cooldown.

The degradation of the supports did not have any direct safety implications because the system was capable of performing its intended function. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. Cause of Event:

It is believed that the cracks were caused by thermal expansion of the shell of the heat exchangers. An evaluation of the concrete supports is being performed by the Architect Engineers.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

Action was initiated to modify the supports to allow for thermal expansion of the heat exchanger shells. The cracks in the concrete structure were repaired.

5. Scheduled Corrective Action:

None required.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

No additional action is considered necessary.

7. Generic Implications:

None