NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: ☐☐☐☐☐☐ ① (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

	LICENSEE CODE		LICENSE NUMBER		LICENSE TYPE		CAT	
0 1	V A S P S 2	②	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0	③	4 1 1 1 1	④		⑤

CON'T	REPORT SOURCE		DOCKET NUMBER		EVENT DATE		REPORT DATE	
0 1	L	⑥	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1	⑦	0 2 0 5 7 9	⑧	0 3 0 2 7 9	⑨

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES ⑩

0 2 During the Safety Injection functional test on Unit #2, damper 1-VS-103A failed to
0 3 close on Train "A" Safety Injection initiation. This is contrary to T.S. 4.11.B,
0 4 valves-3, and is reportable per T.S. 6.6.2.b.(4). The health and safety of the public
0 5 were not affected.
0 6
0 7
0 8

	SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		CAUSE SUBCODE		COMPONENT CODE		COMP. SUBCODE		VALVE SUBCODE	
0 9	S G	⑪	E	⑫	B	⑬	V A L V E X	⑭	N	⑮	G	⑯

⑰ LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	7 9	—	0 0 7	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS ㉒	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	
Z	⑱	Z	⑲	Z	⑳	Z	㉑	0 0 0 0	Y	㉓	N	㉔	A	㉕	H 2 6 0	㉖

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ㉗

1 0 It is suspected that the damper failed to close because of a "hang-up" in the brake
1 1 mechanism holding the ventilation supply damper open against the closing spring. The
1 2 opening operation, following Train "A" initiation, cleared the "hang-up" and the
1 3 damper operated properly on subsequent operations.
1 4

	FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS ㉚	METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION ㉜
1 5	H	㉘	0 0 0	㉙	NA	B	㉛	Periodic Test Program

	ACTIVITY RELEASED		CONTENT OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY ㉟	LOCATION OF RELEASE ㊱
1 6	Z	㉝	Z	㉞	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION ㊴
1 7	0 0 0	㊲	Z	㊳	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER		DESCRIPTION ㊶
1 8	0 0 0	㊵	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY ㊸

	TYPE		DESCRIPTION
1 9	Z	㊷	NA

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED		DESCRIPTION ㊺	NRC USE ONLY
2 0	N	㊹	NA	

7903080244

NAME OF PREPARER W. L. Stewart PHONE: (804) 357-3184

Surry Power Station, Unit 2
Docket No: 50-281
Report No: 79-007/03L-0
Event Date: 2-5-79

MOV-VS-103A Did Not Close During Testing

1. Description of Event:

During the safety injection functional test on Unit #2, MOV-VS-103A failed to shut ventilation supply damper, 1-VS-103A, on Train "A" Safety Injection initiation.

This event is contrary to Technical Specification 4.11.B, valves-3, and is reportable in accordance with T.S. 6.6.2.b.(4).

2. Probable Consequences/Status of Redundant Systems:

During Train "B" Safety Injection functional test, MOV-VS-103A initiated closure of ventilation supply damper 1-VS-103A.

Failure of the damper to operate shut may have permitted unfiltered air to enter the control room in the event of an accident. However, administrative procedures and the redundant operable channel of the Safety Injection system would have precluded the above situation. The health and safety of the general public were not affected.

3. Cause:

It is suspected that the damper failed to close because of a "hang-up" in the brake mechanism holding the ventilation supply damper open against the closing spring. The opening operation, following Train "A" initiation, cleared the "hang-up" and the damper operated properly on subsequent operations.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

The immediate corrective action was to manually initiate closure of the ventilation supply damper. Operation was proper.

5. Scheduled Corrective Action:

Since this appears to be a random incident, a complete operational check will be conducted on the ventilation supply damper, 1-VS-103A, to ascertain more fully the cause of this sporadic malfunction.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

No additional action is considered necessary.

7. Generic Implications:

None