NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | V A S P S 2 (2) | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | (5)

LICENSEE CODE 9–14 | LICENSE NUMBER 15–25 | LICENSE TYPE 26–30 | CAT 57–58

CON'T

01 REPORT SOURCE L (6) | 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 (7) | 1 0 0 6 7 8 (8) | 1 0 3 1 7 8 (9)

60 | DOCKET NUMBER 61–68 | EVENT DATE 69–74 | REPORT DATE 75–80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 With unit at cold shutdown, snubbers 2-RH-HSS-20 and 2-WFPD-HSS-9 were found inoperable

03 on the end-of-interval inspection. The units were inoperable because of low fluid

04 level. This condition is contrary to T.S. 3.20.A and is reportable in accordance with

05 T.S. 6.6.2.b.(2). The health and safety of the public were not affected.

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	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
09	Z Z (11)	E (12)	B (13)	S U P O R T (14)	D (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	7 8	—	0 3 4	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
A (18)	B (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	Y (24)	A (25)	I 2 0 7 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The defective snubbers were dry because of leaking rod seals. The seals were EP materi-

11 al and had leaked due to mechanical damage to the seal. The inoperable snubbers

12 were replaced with shop spares.

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	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
15	G (28)	0 0 0 (29)	NA	B (31)	Required inspection

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
16	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
17	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
18	0 0 0 (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
19	Z (42)	NA

781108 0213

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
20	N (44)	NA	

NAME OF PREPARER T. L. Baucom PHONE: (804) 357-3184

Surry Power Station, Unit 2
Docket No: 050-0281
Report No: 78-034/03L-0
Event Date: 10-6-78

Snubber Inspection Results

1. Description of Event:

With the unit at cold shutdown, snubbers 2-RH-HSS-20 and 2-WFPD-HSS-9 were determined to be inoperable by the end-of-interval inspection. The snubbers had no detectable fluid level. This condition is contrary to Technical Specification 3.20.A and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.6.2.b.(2).

2. Probable Consequences of Event:

The consequences of an inoperable snubber is an increase in the probability of structural damage to piping as a result of seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads. Snubber protection is required only during a low probability of events, therefore, the total loss of suppressor fluid from 2-RH-HSS-20 and 2-WFPD-HSS-9 had no effect upon the health and safety of the general public.

3. Cause of Event:

The cause of the low fluid level was leaking rod seals on both snubbers. The seals were EP material and had suffered mechanical damage, rather than aging effects from radiation or heat.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

The failed snubbers were replaced with shop spares.

5. Scheduled Corrective Action:

No further corrective actions are scheduled at this time.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

Present intentions are to replace the "as found" inoperable snubbers with Q.C. accepted operable snubbers.

7. Generic Implications:

Leaking of snubber fluid is a problem, inherent to hydraulic systems, maintained within safe bounds by periodic inspection and routine maintenance. The loss of reservoir fluid, as in the case of hydraulic snubbers 2-RH-HSS-20 and 2-WFPD-HSS-9, is not considered a generic problem because of the infrequency of such occurrence at these snubber locations.