

50-335

NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL

FILE NUMBER  
INCIDENT REPORT

TO: Mr Moseley

FROM: Florida Pwr & Light Co  
Miami, Fla  
A D Schmidt

DATE OF DOCUMENT  
6-18-76

DATE RECEIVED 7-6-76

LETTER  
 ORIGINAL  
 COPY

NOTORIZED  
 UNCLASSIFIED

PROP

INPUT FORM

NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED  
no originals rec'd  
*note/digitized*

DESCRIPTION

Ltr trans the following:

ENCLOSURE

Licensee Event Report (RO#76-28) on 6-4-76 concerning failure of hydrogen sampling sampling system isolation valves.....

PLANT NAME: St Lucie #1

NOTE: IF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS INVOLVED SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J. COLLINS

SAFETY

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

ENVIRO 7-6-76 ehf

BRANCH CHIEF: *Tiemann*  
W/3 CYS FOR ACTION  
LIC. ASST.: *Diggs*  
W/1 CYS  
ACRS 16 CYS HOLDING/SENT TO LA

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

REG FILE  
NRC PDR  
I & E (2)  
MIPC  
SCHROEDER/IPPOLITO  
HOUSTON  
NOVAK/CHECK  
GRIMES  
CASE  
BUTLER  
HANAUER  
TEDESCO/MACCARY  
EISENHUT  
BAER  
SHAO  
VOLLNER/BUNCH  
KREGER/J. COLLINS

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

LPR: Ft Pierce, Fla  
TIC:  
NSIC:

CONTROL NUMBER

6720

Mr. Hoseney

Florida Power & Light Co  
Miami, Fla  
A D Schmidt

6-18-76  
7-6-76


no originalis rec'd  
7/11/76

Let trans the following:

Licensee Event Report (ER-76-28) on 6-18-76  
concerning failure of hydrogen sampling  
sampling system isolation valves.....

21 Incie 21

7-6-76 ghr



FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

June 18, 1976  
PRN-LI-76-150

10-885

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director, Region II  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
230 Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 818  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Dear Mr. Moseley:

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 335-76-28  
ST. LUCIE UNIT 1  
DATE OF OCCURRENCE: JUNE 4, 1976

HYDROGEN SAMPLING SYSTEM  
ISOLATION VALVES

The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide prompt notification of the subject occurrence.

Very truly yours,

A. D. Schmidt  
Vice President  
Power Resources

MAS/ao

Attachment

cc: Jack R. Newman, Esquire  
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (40)  
Director, Office of Management Information and  
Program Control (3)

8726



100-100000

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 

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(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSEE NAME														LICENSE NUMBER												LICENSE TYPE						EVENT TYPE	
01	F	L	S	L	S	1	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	4	1	1	1	1	0	1									
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32								
01		CONT		CATEGORY		REPORT TYPE		REPORT SOURCE		DOCKET NUMBER						EVENT DATE			REPORT DATE														
01	57	58	T	L	0	5	0	-	0	3	3	5	0	6	0	4	7	6	0	6	1	8	7	6									
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32								

## EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 | Review of the testing proposed for Unit 2 hydrogen sampling system isola-  
03 | tion valves led to an examination of the purchase order for the identical  
04 | Unit 1 valves. Unit 1 FSAR Section 3.11 classifies these valves as  
05 | environmental category 1A. However, it has been determined that the  
06 | Unit 1 valves have not been type tested for the proposed environment in

SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		COMPONENT CODE				PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER			VIOLATION		
07	S	E	A	V	A	L	V	E	X	A	X	9	9	9	N
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22

## CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 | Unit 1 hydrogen sampling system isolation valves were not tested for  
09 | category 1A environmental conditions in accordance with IEEE-323(1971)  
10 | because the requirement to do so was not specified in the purchase order.

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION					
11	B	0	5	0	N/A	d	Purchase order review						
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED		CONTENT OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY				LOCATION OF RELEASE					
12	Z	Z	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20

## PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION									
13	0	0	0	Z	N/A								
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20

## PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER		DESCRIPTION											
14	0	0	0	N/A									
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20

## PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

15		N/A											
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20

## LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE		DESCRIPTION											
16	Z	N/A											
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20

## PUBLICITY

17		N/A											
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20

## ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 | See page two (2) for continuation of Event Description.

19 | Component Manufacturer - Circle Seal Corporation

NAME: M. A. SCHOPPMAN

PHONE: 305/552-3779


Event Description (Continued)

accordance with IEEE-323(1971) because the requirement to do so was not specified in the purchase order. As an interim corrective action, administrative guidelines have been written to inform appropriate personnel of the action to be taken if the valves will not operate under post-accident conditions. Operations personnel have been informed that they should actuate the hydrogen recombiners if a containment hydrogen sample cannot be taken. Based on FSAR hydrogen generation analysis for the existing plant design, the operator has 45 days to actuate either hydrogen recombiner before the hydrogen concentration reaches 4%. An investigation of possible long-term corrective action is being conducted and a follow-up report will be submitted upon completion of the investigation. This was the first occurrence of this type (335-76-28).



June 18, 1976  
PRN-LI-76-150

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director, Region II  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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Director, Office of Management Information and  
Program Control (3)

6797


A04

JUN 21 10 30 AM '76

COMMUNICATIONS  
SECTION  
ATLANTA, GA.







Event Description (Continued)

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