FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

BRANCH CHIEF:	Ziemann		
W/3 CYS FOR ACTION			
LIC. ASST.:	Diggs		
W/ 1 CYS			
ACRS 16 CYS ~~HOLDING~~/SENT	As. CAT B		

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

REG FILE					
NRC PDR					
I & E (2)					
MIPC					
SCHROEDER/IPPOLITO					
HOUSTON					
NOVAK/CHECK					
GRIMES					
CASE					
BUTLER					
HANAUER					
TEDESCO/MACCARY					
EISENHUT					
BAER					
SHAO					
VOLLMER/BUNCH					
KREGER/J. COLLINS					

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

LPDR: Ft Pierce, Fla			
TIC:			
NSIC:			

CONTROL NUMBER

335
A04

770750205

NRC FORM 195 (2-76)

NRC FORM 195 (2-76)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL

DOCKET NUMBER: 50-335

FILE NUMBER:

TO: Mr. Norman C. Moseley

FROM: Florida Power & Light Company, Miami, Florida, A. D. Schmidt

DATE OF DOCUMENT: 2/25/77

DATE RECEIVED: 3/14/77

☒ LETTER ☒ ORIGINAL ☐ COPY ☐ NOTORIZED ☒ UNCLASSIFIED

PROP

INPUT FORM

NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED: One signed

DESCRIPTION

Ltr. trans the following:

ENCLOSURE

Licensee Event Report (RO 50-335-77-5) on 1/25/77 concerning the two MFP discharge valves not reopening after closing on a Main Steam Isolation Signal.....

(1-P) (2-P)

ACKNOWLEDGED

DO NOT REMOVE

PLANT NAME:

St. Lucie Unit No. 1

RJL

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

SAFETY		ENVIRO	
ASSIGNED AD:		ASSIGNED AD:	
BRANCH CHIEF:		BRANCH CHIEF:	
PROJECT MANAGER:		PROJECT MANAGER:	
LIC. ASST. :		LIC. ASST. :	

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

REG FILE	SYSTEMS SAFETY	PLANT SYSTEMS	SITE SAFETY &
NRC PDR	HEINEMAN	TEDESCO	ENVIRO ANALYSIS
I & E	SCHROEDER	BENAROYA	DENTON & MULLER
OELD		LAINAS	
GOSSICK & STAFF	ENGINEERING	IPPOLITO	ENVIRO TECH.
MIPC	MACARRY	KIRKWOOD	ERNST
CASE	BOSNAK		BALLARD
HANAUER	SIHWEIL	OPERATING REACTORS	YOUNGBLOOD
HARLESS	PAWLICKI	STELLO	
			SITE TECH.
PROJECT MANAGEMENT	REACTOR SAFETY	OPERATING TECH.	GAMMILL
BOYD	ROSS	EISENHUT	STEPP
P. COLLINS	NOVAK	SHAO	HULMAN
HOUSTON	ROSZTOCZY	BAER	
PETERSON	CHECK	BUTLER	SITE ANALYSIS
MELTZ		GRIMES	VOLLMER
HELTEMES	AT & I		BUNCH
SKOVHOLT	SALTZMAN		J. COLLINS
	RUTBERG		KREGER

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

			CONTROL NUMBER
LPDR:	NAT. LAB:	BROOKHAVEN NAT. LAB.	
TIC:	REG V.IE	ULRIKSON (ORNL)	
NSIC:	LA PDR		
ASLB:	CONSULTANTS:		770750205
ACRS CYS HOLDING/SENT			

NRC FORM 195 (2-76)

P.O. BOX 3100 MIAMI, FLORIDA 33101

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

February 25, 1977

PRN-LI-77-43

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director, Region II
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
230 Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 1217
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Moseley:

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 335-77-8
ST. LUCIE UNIT 1
DATE OF OCCURRENCE: JANUARY 25, 1977

MSIS CIRCUIT

The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide 30-day notification of the subject occurrence.

Very truly yours,

A. D. Schmidt
Vice President
Power Resources

MAS/cmp

Attachment

cc: Robert Lowenstein, Esquire
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30)
Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3)

2629

7707500205

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [ ] (1–6)

(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

	LICENSEE NAME	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	EVENT TYPE
01	FLSLS1	00-00-00-00	41111	03
(7–8)	(9–14)	(15–25)	(26–30)	(31–32)

	CATEGORY	REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE
01 CON'T		L	L	050-0335	012577	022577
(7–8)	(57–58)	(59)	(60)	(61–68)	(69–74)	(75–80)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 During a review of the Main Feed Pump (MFP) control circuitry which had been undertaken
03 due to spurious pump trips, it was determined that the two MFP discharge valves could
04 reopen (cycle) after closing on a Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS) under the follow-
05 ing conditions: (1) MFP continues to run, (2) a Safety Injection Actuation Signal
06 (SIAS) is NOT present. Upon reaching full open, the valves would close if a MSIS were

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE	PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	VIOLATION
07	CD	B	ZZZZZZ	Z	Z999	N
(7–8)	(9–10)	(11)	(12–17)	(43)	(44–47)	(48)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 The as-built control circuitry did not fully meet the design intent. On January 25,
09 1977, after Plant Facility Review Group and Company Nuclear Review Board approval, a
10 control circuit lead was lifted for each valve to ensure that the valves would remain

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
11	B	080	NA	c	NA
(7–8)	(9)	(10–12)	(13–44)	(45)	(46–80)

	FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE
12	Z	Z	NA	NA
(7–8)	(9)	(10)	(11–44)	(45–80)

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
13	000	Z	NA
(7–8)	(9–11)	(12)	(13–80)

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
14	000	NA
(7–8)	(9–11)	(12–80)

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

15 Since these valves are redundant backups to the Main Feed Block Valves and since a Main

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
16	Z	NA
(7–8)	(9)	(10–80)

PUBLICITY

17 NA

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 See Page 2 for continuation of Event Description, Cause Description, and Probable
19 Consequences.

NAME: M. A. Schoppman PHONE: 305/552-3779

Event Description (continued)

still present. This was the second occurrence of this type involving a safeguards (ESFAS) design problem (see LER 335-76-3 dated March 18, 1976), however, the first occurrence involved ESFAS response on loss of power, and the two events are not considered to be generically related. (335-77-5).

Cause Description (continued)

closed when required. This interim fix was determined not to involve an unreviewed safety question per 10 CFR 50.59 as it implemented the original design intent of the Final Safety Analysis Report and did not affect any other accident analysis. Final corrective action was to permanently modify the circuits in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 to meet the design intent. (335-77-5)

Probable Consequences (continued)

Steam line rupture would most likely initiate SIAS as well as MSIS, the probability of the valves not remaining closed was low.