

NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL

TO: Mr. N. C. Moseley

FROM: Florida Power & Light Co. Miami, Fla. 33101 A.D. Schmidt

FILE NUMBER

DATE OF DOCUMENT 2-25-77

DATE RECEIVED 3-17-77

LETTER NOTORIZED ORIGINAL UNCLASSIFIED COPY

PROP INPUT FORM

NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED 1 cc

DESCRIPTION: Ltr trans the following: (1P)

ACKNOWLEDGED

DO NOT REMOVE

PLANT NAME: St. Lucie Unit 1

DHL

ENCLOSURE Lic. Event Report 77-5 occurring on 1-25-77 re. failure of two MFP discharge valves due to as-built control circuitry did not fully meet the design intent.... (1P)

(1 cy encl rec'd)

40 REPRO.

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

BRANCH CHIEF:	<i>Ziemann</i>
W/3 CYS FOR ACTION	
LIC. ASST.:	<i>Diggs</i>
W/1 CYS	
ACRS /6 CYS HOLDING/SENT	<i>AS CAT B</i>

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION


<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REG FILE				
NRC PDR				
I & E (2):				
MIPC				
SCHROEDER/IPPOLITO				
HOUSTON				
NOVAK/CHECK				
GRIMES				
CASE				
BUTLER				
HANAUER				
TEDESCO/MACCARY				
EISENHUT				
BAER				
SHAO				
VOLLMER/BUNCH				
KREGER/J. COLLINS				

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

LPDR: <i>P + Pierce, Fla</i>			
TIC:			
NSIC:			

CONTROL NUMBER

335
A04
770770344
60



February 25, 1977

PRN-LI-77-43

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director, Region II
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
230 Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 1217
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

Dear Mr. Moseley:

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 335-77-5
ST. LUCIE UNIT 1
DATE OF OCCURRENCE: JANUARY 25, 1977

MSIS CIRCUIT

The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide 30-day notification of the subject occurrence.


Very truly yours,

A. D. Schmidt
A. D. Schmidt
Vice President
Power Resources

MAS/cmp

Attachment

cc: Robert Lowenstein, Esquire
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30)
Director, Office of Management Information and
Program Control (3)



Event Description (continued)

still present. This was the second occurrence of this type involving a safeguards (ESFAS) design problem (see LER 335-76-3 dated March 18, 1976), however, the first occurrence involved ESFAS response on loss of power, and the two events are not considered to be generically related. (335-77-5).

Cause Description (continued)

closed when required. This interim fix was determined not to involve an unreviewed safety question per 10 CFR 50.59 as it implemented the original design intent of the Final Safety Analysis Report and did not affect any other accident analysis. Final corrective action was to permanently modify the circuits in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 to meet the design intent. (335-77-5)

Probable Consequences (continued)

Steam line rupture would most likely initiate SIAS as well as MSIS, the probability of the valves not remaining closed was low.

