

MAINE YANKEE

321 Old Ferry Road, Wiscasset, Maine 04578

April 2, 2018

OMY-18-013

Re: 10 CFR 72.48(d)(2)

10 CFR 72.4

ATTN: Document Control Desk
Director, Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
Maine Yankee Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
NRC License No. DPR-36 (NRC Docket No. 50-309)

72-030

Subject: 10 CFR 72.48 Biennial Report

In accordance with 10 CFR 72.48(d)(2), Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (Maine Yankee) is required to submit to the NRC a brief description of any changes, tests or experiments made pursuant to 10 CFR 72.48(c), including a summary of the evaluation of each. This report covers the period from April 1, 2016 to March 31, 2018. During this time frame, a 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation was conducted pursuant to 10 CFR 72.48(c). The following is a summary of that evaluation:

72.48 Evaluation # 17-01

This activity installs stainless steel corrosion specimens in the inlet and outlet vents of four Vertical Concrete Casks at Maine Yankee to determine the susceptibility of canister materials to Chloride Induced Stress Corrosion Cracking (CISCC). These specimens are not described in the NAC-UMS Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Therefore, they are not part of the original dry fuel storage system configuration. This activity: 1) Is bounded by both seismic and tornado design basis accidents; 2) Involves partial blockage that is well below the 50% air inlet blockage analyzed for the Off Normal Event; and 3) Is bounded by an approved NAC evaluation of installation of a larger vent obstruction not installed at Maine Yankee. Therefore, both the heat removal design function and design basis accident scenarios are not invalidated by placing these specimens in the inlet and outlet vents and the proposed action remains bounded by the design and licensing bases. The 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluation establishes that this activity does not result in:

- More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the NAC-UMS FSAR.
- More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a system, structure, or component (SSC) important to safety previously evaluated in the NAC-UMS FSAR.
- More than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the NAC-UMS FSAR.


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- More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of a SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the NAC-UMS FSAR.
- Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the NAC-UMS FSAR.
- Create a possibility for a malfunction of a SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the NAC-UMS FSAR.
- A design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the NAC-UMS FSAR being exceeded or altered.
- A departure from a method of evaluation described in the NAC-UMS FSAR used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses.

This letter contains no commitments.

If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please do not hesitate to contact me at (207) 882-1303.

Respectfully,



J. Stanley Brown, P.E.
ISFSI Manager

cc: D. Lew, Acting NRC Region I Administrator
R. Powell, Chief, Decommissioning Branch, NRC, Region I
J. Nguyen, NRC Project Manager
P. J. Dostie, SNSI, State of Maine
J. Hyland, State of Maine