NRC FORM 195 (2-76)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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DOCKET NUMBER: 50-335

FILE NUMBER: INCIDENT REPORT

TO: N.C. Moseley

FROM: Flordia Power & Light Co.
Miami, Flodida
A.D. Schmidt

DATE OF DOCUMENT: 4-2-76

DATE RECEIVED: 4-15-76

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☐ NOTORIZED ☒ UNCLASSIFIED

PROP

INPUT FORM

NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED: 30

DESCRIPTION

Ltr. trans the following.....

ENCLOSURE

Reportable Occurrence # 76-1 Licensee Event Report on 3-3-76 Concerning the water level in the refueling cavity being below the top of the fuel transfer tube.....

(30 Cys. Received No Original)

ACKNOWLEDGED

DO NOT REMOVE

PLANT NAME: St. Lucie # 1

NOTE: IF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS INVOLVED SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J. COLLINS

SAFETY — FOR ACTION/INFORMATION — ENVIRO — SAB 4-19-76

BRANCH CHIEF:	Ziemann
W/3 CYS FOR ACTION	
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LPDR: Ft. Pierce, Flordia
TIC
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CONTROL NUMBER

3821

P.O. BOX 3100 MIAMI, FLORIDA 33101

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

April 2, 1976
PRN-LI-76-68

Regulatory File Cy

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director, Region II
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
230 Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 818
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Moseley:

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 335-76-1
ST LUCIE UNIT 1
DATE OF OCCURRENCE: MARCH 3, 1976
BREACH OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide 30-day notification of the subject occurrence.

Very truly yours,

for A. D. Schmidt
Vice President
Power Resources

MAS/jn

Attachment

cc: Jack R. Newman, Esquire
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30)
Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3)

3821

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [ ] (1–6) (PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSEE NAME	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	EVENT TYPE
01 FLSLS1 (9–14)	00–00000–00 (15–25)	4111 1 (26–30)	03 (31–32)

CONT	CATEGORY	REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE
01 (7–8)	· (57–58)	L (59)	L (60)	050–0335 (61–68)	030376 (69–74)	040276 (75–80)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 During initial core loading, the water level in the refueling cavity was
03 found to be approximately 2 inches below the top of the fuel transfer
04 tube. This was in conflict with the intent of Technical Specification
05 3.9.4 which requires that, during refueling operations, there be no
06 direct access from containment to the outside atmosphere which is

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE	PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	VIOLATION
07	FC (10)	F (11)	ZZZZZZ (12–17)	Z (43)	Z999 (44–47)	N (48)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 The exact cause of the occurrence has not been determined. However,
09 the water lost from the refueling cavity was traced to tanks in the
10 Equipment and Chemical Drain System and further investigation identified

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
11	B (9)	000 (10–12)	NA (13–44)	a (45)	Observation by operator (46–80)

	FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE
12	Z (9)	Z (10)	NA (11–44)	NA (45–80)

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
13	000 (9–11)	Z (12)	NA (13–80)

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
14	000 (9–11)	NA (12–80)

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

15 NA

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
16	Z (9)	NA (10–80)

PUBLICITY

17 NA

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 See page two for continuation of Event and Cause descriptions.

19

NAME: M. A. Schoppman PHONE: 305/552-3779

GPO 881-667

Event Description (continued)

incapable of automatic isolation. The immediate corrective action was to suspend core loading and restore the water level in the refueling cavity. Additional corrective action was to establish more frequent surveillance of the water level in the refueling cavity. This was the first occurrence of this type (335-76-1).

Cause Description (continued)

two probable causes of the water transfer. First, the refueling cavity water level may have been lowered during electrical checkout of the refueling canal sump pump motor. The sump pump was being tested concurrent with core loading and too much water may have been pumped from the refueling cavity to the Equipment and Chemical Drain System. Followup action was to place a clearance tag on the sump pump which prohibited use of the pump unless authorized by the Nuclear Plant Supervisor. Second, an incorrect valve lineup may have caused a gradual decrease in water level. However, since it was necessary to change the position of certain valves in order to restore the refueling cavity water level, it was not possible to verify that a valve lineup error had caused the occurrence. Followup action after restoring water level was to confirm that all valve lineups which could affect refueling cavity water level were correct for the operating condition then in effect.