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Nuclear Business Unit

FEB 13 1997

LR-N97094

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

**LER 311/97-001-00
SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT 2
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-75
DOCKET NO. 50-311**

Gentlemen:

This Licensee Event Report entitled "Inadequate Surveillance for PORV Accumulator Discharge Check Valves" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (i) (B).

Sincerely,

David F. Garchow
General Manager
Salem Operations

Attachment

DVH

C Distribution
LER File 3.7

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The power is in your hands.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000311	PAGE (3) 1 OF 3
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TITLE (4)
INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE FOR PORV ACCUMULATOR DISCHARGE CHECK VALVES

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
01	15	97	97	001	00	02	13	97		05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

OPERATING MODE (9) 5	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 000	20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)			
	20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)			
	20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		73.71			
	20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)				OTHER	
	20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)				Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	
	20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)					

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Dennis V. Hassler, LER Coordinator	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 609-339-1989
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO						

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On January 15, 1997 a review determined that the surveillance of the Salem Unit 2 check valves for the pressurizer over-pressure system had not been performed correctly in December 1994 and in January 1997. The testing was being performed with a reduced differential pressure rather than the maximum differential pressure as required by the ASME code. In accordance with the provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.3, a correct surveillance was completed on January 16, 1997. The Salem Unit 1 surveillance for the check valves was performed correctly in the past and was not affected by this occurrence.

The cause of this occurrence was the failure of the procedure writers and reviewers to identify that the procedure testing method did not meet the requirements of the ASME code. Corrective actions include a satisfactory retest of the valves and a procedure revision.

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), any condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1	05000311	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 OF 3
		97	- 001	- 00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor

Control Air System {LE/-}*

Reactor Coolant System {AB/-}

* Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CC}

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

At the time of occurrence, Salem Unit 2 was in Mode 5.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On January 15, 1997 a review determined that the surveillance of the Salem Unit 2 check valves {AB/PDVC} for the pressurizer over-pressure system had not been performed correctly in December, 1994 and in January, 1997. In accordance with the provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.3, the surveillance was performed correctly on January 16, 1997. The Salem Unit 1 surveillance for the check valves was performed correctly in the past and was not affected by this occurrence.

ASME Section XI, subsection IWV requirements for leak testing Category A valves requires a maximum differential pressure to be applied across the tested valve. The pressure test values for these valves was changed from performing a functional differential pressure test to a reduced differential pressure test in response to industry concerns about a gradual loss of control air versus a catastrophic loss of control air. In December, 1994 responsibility for the testing of these valves was changed from the Operations Department to the Inservice Inspection Test Group. A new test procedure was developed based on a gradual loss of system air pressure. This was at the time considered to be a conservative testing method.

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The cause of this occurrence was personnel error in that the procedure writers and reviewers failed to identify that the testing method did not meet the requirements of the ASME code.

PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES

In the past two years there have been two LERs, 272/95-018-01 and 272/96-005-09, that addressed an Inservice Testing (IST) issue. The corrective actions in LER 272/95-018-01 did not identify the discrepancies for the check valves for the pressurizer over-pressure system. The IST issue in LER 272/96-005-09 was recently identified and the corrective actions are specific to the issue in that LER.

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		97	- 001	- 00	

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SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

There were no safety consequences associated with this occurrence. Satisfactory testing of the valves upon identification of the incorrect test was completed on January 16, 1997. The Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) accumulators are designed to provide volume adequate to cycle the PORVs. Failure of the PORV accumulator check valves may result in a lower volume than required to adequately cycle the PORVs. The PORVs are designed to limit pressurizer pressure below the high reactor trip setpoint, however they fail closed on a loss of air supply. The PORVs have adequate stroking capability using accumulator air to perform their function following a loss of control air. However, minor leakage of air through the check valves has been evaluated as inconsequential (as contained in LCR S97-03).

The health and safety of the public was not affected.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. The PORV accumulator check valves were satisfactorily tested on January 16, 1997.
2. A review determined that other ASME Section XI, Category A valves in the IST Program that were being tested in the same manner meet Code requirements.
3. The test procedure will be revised to include a test method that includes testing at low and high differential pressure in accordance with Code requirements by May 2, 1997.
4. Personnel involved with the occurrence were held accountable for their actions in accordance with PSE&G's disciplinary policy.