



PSEG

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236

Nuclear Business Unit

December 13, 1996

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Attn.: Document Control Desk

MONTHLY OPERATING REPORT
SALEM NO. 2
DOCKET NO: 50-311

In compliance with Section 6.9.1.6, Reporting Requirements for the Salem Technical Specifications, the original copy of the monthly operating report for the month of November is being sent to you.

Sincerely yours,

Hold for!
David F. Garchow
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RH:vl
Enclosures

C Mr. H. J. Miller
Regional Administrator USNRC, Region I
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19046

7612190195 761130
PDR ADOCK 05000311
R PDR

The power is in your hands.

OPERATING DATA REPORT

Completed by: Robert Phillips

Docket No: 50-311
 Date: 12/10/96
 Telephone: 339-2735

Operating Status

1.	Unit Name	<u>Salem No. 2</u>	<u>Notes</u>
2.	Reporting Period	<u>November 1996</u>	
3.	Licensed Thermal Power (MWT)	<u>3411</u>	
4.	Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe)	<u>1170</u>	
5.	Design Electrical Rating (Net MWe)	<u>1115</u>	
6.	Maximum Dependable Capacity (Gross MWe)	<u>1149</u>	
7.	Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe)	<u>1106</u>	
8.	If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (items 3 through 7) since Last Report, Give Reason <u>N/A</u>		

9. Power Level to Which Restricted, if any (Net MWe) N/A

10. Reasons for Restrictions, if any N/A

	<u>This Month</u>	<u>Year to Date</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>
11. Hours in Reporting Period	<u>720</u>	<u>8040</u>	<u>132673</u>
12. No. of Hrs. Rx. was Critical	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>78083.6</u>
13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hrs.	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
14. Hours Generator On-Line	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>75229.5</u>
15. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MWH)	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>187781005</u>
17. Gross Elec. Energy Generated (MWH)	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>78648898</u>
18. Net Elec. Energy Gen. (MWH)	<u>-3374</u>	<u>-34714</u>	<u>74706340</u>
19. Unit Service Factor	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>56.7</u>
20. Unit Availability Factor	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>56.7</u>
21. Unit Capacity Factor (using MDC Net)	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>50.9</u>
22. Unit Capacity Factor (using DER Net)	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>50.5</u>
23. Unit Forced Outage Rate	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>30.1</u>

24. Shutdowns scheduled over next 6 months (type, date and duration of each)
Refueling extension.

25. If shutdown at end of Report Period, Estimated Date of Startup:
Under review.

VERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL

Docket No.: 50-311
Unit Name: Salem #2
Date: 12/10/96
Telephone: 339-2735

Completed by: Robert Phillips

Month November 1996

Day Average Daily Power Level
(MWe-NET)

Day Average Daily Power Level
(MWe-NET)

1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
5 0
6 0
7 0
8 0
9 0
10 0
11 0
12 0
13 0
14 0
15 0
16 0

17 0
18 0
19 0
20 0
21 0
22 0
23 0
24 0
25 0
26 0
27 0
28 0
29 0
30 0
31 0

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS
MONTH: NOVEMBER 1996

DOCKET NO: 50-311
UNIT NAME: SALEM 2
CONTACT: R. HELLER
TELEPHONE: 609-339-5162

The following items were evaluated in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.59. The Station Operations Review Committee has reviewed and concurs with these evaluations.

ITEM	SUMMARY
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1. Design Change Packages (DCP)

- | | |
|---------------------|--|
| 2EC-3212, Pkg. 1 | "RMS Channel 2R41 Replacement" Rev. 0 - This DCP replaced the 2R41 plant vent system with a wide range noble gas monitoring and a particulate and iodine sampling system. The 2R41 monitor is a particulate (2R41A), iodine (2R41B) and low range noble gas (2R41C) monitoring system. Mid and high range noble gas monitoring is performed by 2R45B and 2R45C, respectively. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-073) |
| 2EC-3332, Pkg. 1 | "125VDC Battery Charger Replacement" Rev. 0 - This DCP replaced the existing six Exide 125VDC battery chargers with more efficient battery chargers. This DCP also replaced the 125VDC battery charger output cables and the 230VAC breaker reset. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-040) |
| 2EC-3338, Pkgs. 1-4 | "Add Time Delay Relay for Group Bus 2H Undervoltage Protection" Rev. 0 - This DCP seismically mounted a time delay relay in 2R12 relay rack. This time delay relay is wired in series with the existing NGV undervoltage relay and set to allow sufficient time delay to prevent spurious circuit actuation during 500 KV line faults. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-041) |
| 2EC-3363, Pkg. 1 | "28 VDC Circuit Breaker Replacement" Rev. 0 - This DCP replaced existing high resistance 28 VDC circuit breakers with larger capacity breakers. These breakers have a significantly smaller internal resistance which reduce voltage |

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS
MONTH: NOVEMBER 1996

DOCKET NO: 50-311
UNIT NAME: SALEM 2
CONTACT: R. HELLER
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(Cont'd)

ITEM	SUMMARY
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drop and hence, improve reliability. The replacement components enhance the reliability of the circuits and do not affect their operation. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-036)

2EC-3376, Pkg. 1

“Main Turbine Lube Oil Drain Piping Rework” Rev. 0 - This DCP modified the Main Turbine Lube Oil (MTLO) Evactor and Demister/Exhaust Hood oil drainage system by adding loop seals and a drain pot. This change also rerouted the Service Building Stairwell roof rain water drainage from discharging into the Delaware River to discharging into the skimmer tank. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-041)

2EC-3388, Pkg. 1

“High Energy Line Break Pressure Relief Path Modifications” Rev. 0 - This DCP implemented modifications which resolve the obstructions and degraded material conditions for the existing pressure relief path and, therefore, preclude the possibility of compartment pressurization beyond the design basis due to high energy line breaks. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-053)

2EC-3398, Pkg. 1

“No. 21 Chiller Condenser Service Water Modifications” Rev. 0 - This DCP: 1.) Replaced 21SW102 Fisher V notch ball valve with a valve acceptable for severe service; 2.) Deleted limit switches on 21SW102 abandoned in place previously by a DCP; 3.) Replaced obsolete freon pressure transmitter, controller and indicator with a new pneumatic controller/indicator; 4.) Replaced Chiller Condenser Recirculating pump 21CHE20 stuffing box and mechanical seal with a seal designed for this service; 5.) Deleted existing recirculation control valve 21SW93 and DP/Flow controls, and 6.) Revised Chiller Condenser Recirculating pump controls to start and stop the pump based on

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS
MONTH: NOVEMBER 1996

DOCKET NO: 50-311
UNIT NAME: SALEM 2
CONTACT: R. HELLER
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(Cont'd)

ITEM	SUMMARY
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chiller condenser inlet water temperature. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-043)

2EC-3398, Pkgs. 2 & 3 "Nos. 22 & 23 Chiller Condenser Service Water Modifications" Rev. 0 - This DCP: 1.) Replaced 22 & 23 SW102 Fisher V notch ball valve with a valve acceptable for severe service; 2.) Deleted limit switches on 22 & 23 SW102 abandoned in place previously by a DCP; 3.) Replaced obsolete freon pressure transmitter, controller and indicator with a new pneumatic controller/indicator; 4.) Replaced Chiller Condenser Recirculating pump 22 & 23 CHE20 stuffing box and mechanical seal with a seal designed for this service; 5.) Deleted existing recirculation control valve 22 & 23 SW93 and DP/Flow controls, and 6.) Revised Chiller Condenser Recirculating pump controls to start and stop the pump based on chiller condenser inlet water temperature. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-052)

2EC-3426, Pkg. 1 "Replacement of Degraded Pipe" Rev. 0 - This DCP replaced selected carbon steel fittings and pipe segments with chrome-moly alloy, stainless or carbon steel materials, and in some cases heavier wall materials. This DCP replaces calcium silicone insulation with removable blanket insulation on sections of pipe that are determined to be part of the ongoing monitoring program. The replacement of worn fittings and pipe segments restore the plant to its analyzed configuration. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-046)

2EC-3450, Pkg. 1 "Replacement of Hagan Isolators and Summatoms with NUS Modules" Rev. 0 - This DCP replaced Westinghouse - Hagan Model 110 Isolator 2PM55A with NUS Model OCA801 Signal Isolator and Westinghouse - Hagan Model 111 Summatoms 2PM455C, 2PM455E, and 2PM455G with

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS
MONTH: NOVEMBER 1996

DOCKET NO: 50-311
UNIT NAME: SALEM 2
CONTACT: R. HELLER
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(Cont'd)

ITEM	SUMMARY
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- NUS Model MTH801 Signal Summators in Loop 2PT-455, Channel I Pressurizer Protection and Control. This DCP makes no changes to the functional, operational or design requirements of any affected instrument loops in the Reactor Control and Protection System, including instrument ranges, setpoints and protection channel response times. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-045)
- 2EC-3470, Pkg. 1 "Steam Generator Blowdown Sampling Isolation Bypass" Rev. 0 - This DCP: 1.) Installed a keylock switch (position 2) and bypass mode indicator; 2.) Placed a label, with attached Bypass Key, near the keylock switch indicating the switch's function; 3.) Added a 28 VDC relay to change circuit configuration to provide bypass mode indication and energize the bypass circuitry. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-070)
- 2EC-3521, Pkg. 1 "Install Fuel Handling Building (FHB) Manual Volume Damper" Rev. 0 - This DCP installed a new manual damper downstream of the pressure relief damper 2VHE868 in the FHB. A remote operator and indicator were provided. The relief damper has been set to a new counterweight setting. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-054)
- 2EC-3522, Pkg. 1 "Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Enclosure Damper Modification" Rev. 0 - This DCP removed the ABS-6 damper and associated controls and installed two blowout panels in the enclosure wall between the pump room and the pipe alley. This DCP added an automatic damper and controls for the enclosure to return air back to the room cooler. This DCP also added two temperature switches to close dampers ABS-2, ABS-20, and ABS-4 on

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS
MONTH: NOVEMBER 1996

DOCKET NO: 50-311
UNIT NAME: SALEM 2
CONTACT: R. HELLER
TELEPHONE: 609-339-5162

(Cont'd)

ITEM	SUMMARY
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high TDAFP enclosure temperature. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-109)

2. Procedures

S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0010(Q)

“Temporary Revision - Spent Fuel Pool Manipulations” Rev. 0 - This change to the procedure permits fuel manipulations in the fuel pool concurrent with an ambient air temperature as low as 40° in the Elevation 78’ Electrical Penetration Area during Mode Undefined. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-160)

TS2.SE-SU.FHV-0001(Q)

“Fuel Handling Ventilation Temporary Operating Procedure For Full Flow Determination” Rev. 0 - This temporary procedure will allow the inlet guide vanes of the FHV exhaust fans to be manually positioned to the maximum open position, maximum exhaust flow measured through the HEPA and charcoal filters, and the actuators limit stops to be adjusted, as required, to ensure maximum allowable flow is less than 19,490 + 10% as required by Technical Specification 3.9.12. This will have no effect on FHV system except to ensure that the maximum achievable flow is restricted to the Technical Specification maximum. The Fuel Handling Building will be maintained at a negative pressure at all times during the performance of this procedure. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-155)

3. Safety Evaluations

CR 961105229

“DRSE 01 - Proceed with Mode Undefined Fuel Shuffle with Part 21 28V and 125V Control Relays Installed” - This evaluation covers the potential failure of 28 VDC and 125 VDC Struthers-Dunn style 255 relays during fuel shuffling in the Spent Fuel pool in Mode “undefined” and the impact

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS
MONTH: NOVEMBER 1996

DOCKET NO: 50-311
UNIT NAME: SALEM 2
CONTACT: R. HELLER
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(Cont'd)

ITEM	SUMMARY
	<p>of this failed condition on the proposed Mode "undefined" fuel movement/shuffling activities in the Spent Fuel Pool. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-161)</p>
CR-961120065	<p>"CRCA-03 - Fuel Handling Crane Load Lifting Arrangement" - This Safety Evaluation addressed changes to the fuel handling crane load lifting arrangement described in the Salem Unit 2 SER Supplement No. 4. Supplement No. 4 describes handling of the fuel assembly handling fixture and burnable poison rod assembly (BPRA) tool over the stored fuel assemblies. The load handling arrangement for the fuel handling crane differs from SER Supplement No. 4 as follows: 1.) A lifting sling is used between the hook and lifting tool (except, the fuel assembly lifting fixture is attached directly to the hook); 2.) A backup cable around the load block, attached to the lifting tool is not used, and 3.) There is a change to the weight of the BPRA tool listed in the SER. There are other components lighter than a fuel assembly that are also handled over the spent fuel pool, but not mentioned in the SER. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-167)</p>
DS1.8-0031	<p>"Minimum Neutron Count Rate on Source Range Instrumentation UFSAR Change " Rev. 1 - This evaluation is to justify changing the requirement for the minimum neutron count rate on source range instrumentation and account for other actions to demonstrate operability of the source range instrumentation. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-161)</p>
DS1.8-0010	<p>"PR 950501234, Rev. 1 - Vantage 5H Fuel Grid Mixing Vanes" - This safety evaluation (as originally presented) provided a use-as-is disposition to PR95051234 which</p>

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS
MONTH: NOVEMBER 1996

DOCKET NO: 50-311
UNIT NAME: SALEM 2
CONTACT: R. HELLER
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(Cont'd)

ITEM	SUMMARY
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documents the non-conforming condition which presently exists in the V5H Fuel loaded at Salem Units 1 and 2. This revision to the original safety evaluation removes the 1.9% DNBR penalty established to resolve the noted manufacturing deficiency. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-166)

DS2.8-0005

“NFS 96-285, Rev. 0 - Salem Unit 2 Cycle 10 Reload Safety Evaluation for Refueling and Operation in all Modes” - This safety evaluation for operation of Salem Unit 2 Cycle 10 in ALL MODES has been completed. The Small Break LOCA and Large Break LOCA analyses included the assumption that no STANDARD type fuel assemblies were to be utilized in the reload designs. However, the Salem Unit 2 Cycle 10 core will contain one Standard assembly. Therefore, in order to support the implementation of the LOCA analyses an evaluation was performed to include the Standard fuel. The Small Break and Large Break LOCA evaluations for the Standard assembly concluded that the Standard assembly will not be limiting in terms of Peak Cladding Temperature since the Standard assembly is at significantly lower power than the leading assembly. The specific safety evaluation performed by Westinghouse in conjunction with the Reload Safety Evaluation provides the basis to conclude that the reload core design for Salem Unit 2 Cycle 10 will not adversely affect plant safety and can be operated in all modes with no unreviewed safety questions, and with no Technical Specification changes. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-166)

UFSAR

“Revising UFSAR Table 5.5-2 “RHR System Failure Analysis” Addressing Recovery For Failure Of A RHR Suction Valve RH 1 Or RH 2 To Open” Rev. 0 - This evaluation addresses the FSAR revision to remove the erroneous FSAR information that a minimum flow indicator is installed in each RHR pump minimum flow line.

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS
MONTH: NOVEMBER 1996

DOCKET NO: 50-311
UNIT NAME: SALEM 2
CONTACT: R. HELLER
TELEPHONE: 609-339-5162

(Cont'd)

ITEM	SUMMARY
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Not having a local flow indication in each minimum flow recirculation line does not have any adverse effect on the systems ability to function as designed for normal or accident condition. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-156)

UFSAR

“FSAR 6.3.5/3 Revision for RHR Flow Indication” Rev. 0 - The UFSAR system failure analysis addresses an “improbable event” of RHR suction valve RH1 or 2 failing to open. It provides the detailed recovery action that takes several weeks. The best course of action would have to be chosen based on the nature of the equipment and/or recovery action, failures, impacts and the state of the plant along with resource availability. This proposal would revise the UFSAR Table 5.5-2 to reflect the procedural latitude available. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-156)

UFSAR

“Sections 3.1.4, 6.2.2, 6.3.1, and 9.4.1 - Concurrent LOCA/SSE (DBE) Design Requirements” - The purpose of this safety evaluation is to demonstrate that because certain structures, systems and components are conservatively designed to withstand the effects of simultaneous LOCA and SSE mechanical or structural loading does not imply that a concurrent LOCA/SSE is postulated as a design basis event. A simultaneous LOCA/SSE was never a Salem design basis because (1) the UFSAR accident analysis chapter (Chapter 15) does not state such an event is postulated (and in one case states it is not) (2) NRC documents make it clear that the Staff never intended this requirement and (3) the Salem design is consistent with the position that the two events are not postulated concurrently. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-158)

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS
MONTH: NOVEMBER 1996

DOCKET NO: 50-311
UNIT NAME: SALEM 2
CONTACT: R. HELLER
TELEPHONE: 609-339-5162

(Cont'd)

ITEM	SUMMARY
UFSAR	<p>“Removal of the Automatic CFCU Service Water Valve High Radiation Closure” - This change revises UFSAR statements with regard to CFCU service water isolation on high radiation. Presently, Unit 1 and Unit 2 CFCU isolation differs. Specifically, service water to the Unit 1 Containment Fan Coolers (CFCUs) is isolated on detection of service water high radiation if the service water isolation valves are in “AUTO” (references 3.4.1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 3.4.4 and 3.4.5). Service water to the Unit 2 CFCUs is not isolated on high service water radiation (references 3.4.1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 3.4.4 and 3.4.5). UFSAR section 6.3.2.11 and 9.4.4.2.8 presently state the CFCU service water valves close on high radiation. These UFSAR sections do not distinguish the Salem units. Also, UFSAR sections 6.3.2.11 and 9.4.4.2.8 conflict with UFSAR section 9.2.1.2. The sections are being revised to remove the automatic isolation feature from the UFSAR. No credit will be taken for this feature. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-155)</p>
UFSAR	<p>“Station Organization” - Changes to organization, maintenance realignment and title changes for Salem Projects Manager, Chemistry Manager and Radiation Protection Manager. Changes were made to provide a more responsible management structure which improves management focus on activities related to plant safety. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-158)</p>
UFSAR	<p>“DES-91-00365 - Removal of 2R12A and 2R12B High Range Detectors From UFSAR Table 11.4-2” - This change corrects the “Type of Detector” column in The UFSAR Table 11.4-2 to reflect the as built condition. The existing UFSAR description for channels 2R12A and 2R12B specify the types of detectors which are in use. There is no</p>

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS
MONTH: NOVEMBER 1996

DOCKET NO: 50-311
UNIT NAME: SALEM 2
CONTACT: R. HELLER
TELEPHONE: 609-339-5162

(Cont'd)

ITEM	SUMMARY
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reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-156)

SSAR-94-041

“Reanalysis of Inadvertent Safety Injection” - The Spurious Operation of the Safety Injection System (SIS) at Power occurs as a result of an inadvertent spurious actuation of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), which is caused by either an operator error or a false electrical actuating signal. The results of the Spurious Operation of the SIS at Power evaluation and analysis demonstrate that: 1.) Pressures in the reactor coolant and main steam systems are limited to less than 110% of the design values; 2.) Fuel cladding integrity is maintained, and 3.) A more serious fault would not result from the Spurious Operation of the SIS at Power event. The results of an analysis of Case 2 and an engineering evaluation show that a pressurizer PORV can be relied upon to limit the pressurizer pressure to a level that will not cause any of the pressurizer safety valves to open, and thereby preclude the possibility that one or more of these valves would generator more serious event by opening and failing to re-seat properly. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-158)

Salem Unit 2 RCCA

“Salem 2 Rod Cluster Control Assembly Corrosion Evaluation” - The proposal changes the facility as described in the SAR because it is anticipated, based on known recent experience at McGuire 2 and the observation of guide tubes on fuel assemblies in Salem 2 spent fuel pool (SFP), that the fifty-three(53) new RCCAs in the SFP will produce a superficial corrosive material. Based on this, the addition of this material would qualify as a change to the facility as described in the SAR. The root cause of this problem was identified as the use of non-passivated tubing and the nature of the ion-nitriding process which resulted in the RCCA rod cladding having a maximum of 1 u m on the surface that is susceptible to corrosion in SFP conditions. Iron-nitriding is a process that adds a nitrogen enriched layer, up to 25 u m,

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS
MONTH: NOVEMBER 1996

DOCKET NO: 50-311
UNIT NAME: SALEM 2
CONTACT: R. HELLER
TELEPHONE: 609-339-5162

(Cont'd)

ITEM	SUMMARY
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to the surface of the stainless steel control rods. The chemical samples taken at McGuire from the spent fuel pool, confirmed that the corrosion is some form of iron oxide. Chemistry sampling will be performed by PSE&G during the control rod insert change out operation to verify the material observed is the FE2 O3 corrosion. If it is shown to be a different material the RCCA vendor will be contacted for contingencies. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-169)

DR 961114088

“DR Use-As-Is - Fuel Handling Building Ventilation Low Distributing Flow” - This evaluation is to support a “Use-As-Is” disposition for DR 961114088 until the Fuel Handling Building System can be re-balanced to the design branch air flow values. UFSAR Section 9.4.3 refers to P&ID drawing 205322 sht. 1. This drawing delineates the required branch air flow values for the fuel building ventilation system. The latest available data indicates that the exhaust flows for the duct serving the overhead area above the fuel pool are approximately 20% too low. The imbalance occurs in a common area and all the exhaust will be through the HEPA and charcoal filters. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-163)

S-C-VAR-MDC-1518

“PSE&G Calculation - Post Accident Access to Vital Areas Review of Plant Shielding in Accordance with NUREG-0737, Item II.B.2” Rev. 0 - This evaluation identified two areas not previously identified as vital areas. The first area is the boric acid evaporator room, which contains manual valves that must be operated to place the post accident sampling system in operation and to isolate component cooling water to the boric acid evaporator. The second area is the electrical penetration area on elevation 78', which contains equipment that may require access for long term recovery or to reenergize the pressurizer heaters. There is

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS
MONTH: NOVEMBER 1996

DOCKET NO: 50-311
UNIT NAME: SALEM 2
CONTACT: R. HELLER
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(Cont'd)

ITEM	SUMMARY
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no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-166)

S96-181

“Regulatory Guide 1.97 changes for 1/2R4, 1/2R5, 1/2R9, 1/2R34” - This change removes the Charging Pump area radiation monitors, Fuel Handling Building Spent Fuel Pool Area radiation monitors, Fuel Handling Building area radiation monitors and Mechanical Penetration Area radiation monitors from the RG 1.97 program. This eliminates variable 19A from UFSAR table 7.5-4. The monitors will remain in the plant for area radiation monitoring but are not required for post accident monitoring. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-164)

S96-189

“RG 1.97 Changes: 1) Relaxed Environmental Qualification Requirements for RCS Accumulator; 2) Use Steam Generator Narrow Range Level as Primary Indication of Steam Generator Tube Rupture” - This change revises Accumulator Tank level and pressure to a RG 1.97 category 3 per letter to NRC (NLR-N92145) thereby changing the compliance level of this variable to 1. This change also removes the steam generator blowdown radiation monitor as the type A variable for detection of Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR). The Type A variable for SGTR is changed to Steam Generator Narrow Range Level with Steam Generator Wide Range level as the backup indication of SGTR. This change is based on Westinghouse report “Regulatory Guide 1.97, Type A instrumentation for a Steam Generator Tube Rupture Accident (PSBP 322234-01), Accumulator Tank Level & Pressure (Variable Ref. No. 22). There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-164)

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS
MONTH: NOVEMBER 1996

DOCKET NO: 50-311
UNIT NAME: SALEM 2
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(Cont'd)

ITEM	SUMMARY
S96-192	<p>“Temporary Modification 96-033 - Fuel Handling Building Temporary Heat” - This evaluation is to provide a temporary alternate source of heat for the Fuel Handling Building (FHB). Presently the Fuel Handling Building temperature is measured with a temperature switch in the supply air duct. If the temperature decreases below the alarm setpoint (40°F), a bezel alarm on 2CC1 will illuminate in the control room. The initial action directed to the operator in the alarm response procedure is to either control the heating water manually with the heating water control valve or to shutdown the FHB supply fan. When the supply fan is shut down, one of the two running exhaust fans is also stopped and the action statement for an inoperable Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System is entered. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-165)</p>
S96-34	<p>“DCP 2EC-3298, Pkg. 1, Rev. 2 - Switchgear and Penetration Area Ventilation System (SPAVS) Upgrade” - This Safety Evaluation is revised to incorporate the impact of balancing SPAVS area air flow rates during fall time frame when outside air temperatures are low. The original completion date for the project was June 1996 and the discussion regarding area temperatures were based on that time frame. Various sections are revised to discuss the basis for acceptance of lower than the minimum design temperatures. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-165)</p>
S/E FOR 1EE-0159	<p>“1EE-0159, Pkg. 3, Rev. 0, - Local Pressure Gauges - Seismic Mounting” - This modification involves mounting and documentation changes to the Control Air, Fuel Oil and Chilled Water Systems seismic Class I locally mounted pressure gauges. The work scope involves the replacement and rerouting of tubing, addition of seismic supports, addition of mounting hardware, identification tagging of the gauges and tubing lines, seismic analysis of new and existing gauge and</p>

10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS
MONTH: NOVEMBER 1996

DOCKET NO: 50-311
UNIT NAME: SALEM 2
CONTACT: R. HELLER
TELEPHONE: 609-339-5162

(Cont'd)

ITEM	SUMMARY
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tubing installations and documentation changes. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-168)

4. Test Plan

Startup System Test Plan

“Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System” - This outline details all Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System (FHV) testing planned for Salem Unit 2 restart (Refueling Outage 2R09). This plan includes testing required following implementation of restart scope design changes and performance of system corrective and planned maintenance work activities. This plan also includes system surveillance and special tests required for restart/power ascension, and additional test requirements identified during the System Readiness Review process. There is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. (SORC 96-157)

REFUELING INFORMATION
MONTH: NOVEMBER 1996

DOCKET NO: 50-311
UNIT NAME: SALEM 2
CONTACT: R. HELLER
TELEPHONE: 609-339-5162

MONTH: NOVEMBER 1996

1. Refueling information has changed from last month: YES . X . NO . . .

2. Scheduled date for next refueling: (currently in refueling)

Scheduled date for restart following refueling: (to be determined)

3. a. Will Technical Specification changes or other license amendments be required?

YES NO . X .

NOT DETERMINED TO DATE

b. Has the reload fuel design been reviewed by the Station Operating Review Committee?

YES . X . NO

If no, when is it scheduled?

5. Scheduled date(s) for submitting proposed licensing action: n/a

6. Important licensing considerations associated with refueling:

7. Number of Fuel Assemblies:

a. Incore 0
b. In Spent Fuel Storage 777

8. Present licensed spent fuel storage capacity: 1632

Future spent fuel storage capacity: 1632

9. Date of last refueling that can be discharged to the spent fuel pool assuming the present licensed capacity: March 2012

SALEM GENERATING STATION
MONTHLY OPERATING SUMMARY - UNIT 2
NOVEMBER 1996

SALEM UNIT NO. 2

The Unit remained shutdown for the entire period. According to commitments from PSE&G and a subsequent confirmatory action letter from the NRC, the Unit will remain shutdown pending completion of the following actions:

- Appropriately address long standing equipment reliability and operability issues
- After the work is completed, conduct a restart readiness review to determine for ourselves the ability of each Unit to operate in a safe, event free manner
- After the restart review, meet with the NRC and communicate the results of that review