

Public Service
Electric and Gas
Company

Louis F. Storz

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 609-339-5700

Senior Vice President - Nuclear Operations

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LR-N96204

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Washington, DC 20555

**SUPPLEMENT TO REQUEST FOR CHANGE TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM
SALEM GENERATING STATION NOS. 1 AND 2
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-70 AND DPR-75
DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311**

Gentlemen:

This supplement is being submitted by Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (PSE&G) to provide additional information concerning the requested change to Salem Generating Station's Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System Technical Specification (TS) dated June 10, 1996 (ref. PSE&G letter LR-N96154). In that submittal, PSE&G stated that certain confirmatory information had yet to be obtained and would be submitted at a later date. This letter is a followup to the original submittal and addresses the revised radiation detector setpoints, filter testing air flow values, and the ability to shut down both Salem Units should a fire occur in the common control area.

As part of the Control Room ventilation modification, PSE&G is upgrading the existing Radiation Monitoring System (RMS). The submitted change request discusses the two channels that are being installed in each normal outside air intake duct which will initiate both Unit 1 and Unit 2 trains of Control Room ventilation into the emergency mode of operation upon receipt of a high radiation signal. Sensitivity values of the new monitors have been recently received and incorporated into the new process setpoint determination for emergency system actuation. The revised setpoint, 2.48×10^3 cpm, is provided in the attached marked up TS pages and should be used in place of the previously submitted value, 1.06×10^3 cpm.

In addition, the Bases section for the RMS is being clarified to reflect the Unit 1 and Unit 2 RMS channel configuration more appropriately. In the revised design, a digital radiation monitor (R1B), located in each Salem Unit's Control Room equipment rack area, provides for a detector in each unit's

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normal air intake duct to monitor for radiological ingress (refer to Figure 1 attached). Thus, emergency actuation remains available from a detector in either intake should a monitor fail. In this instance, the seven day action statement proposed would be applicable.

A review of the previously submitted evaluation in accordance with the three standards set forth in 10CFR50.92 has been performed and concluded that no change is necessary as a result of the revised pages and the conclusion of no significant hazards consideration remains valid.

PSE&G also stated in the submitted change request that the air flow requirements for filter testing has been revised to 8000 cfm $\pm 10\%$ from 7410 cfm $\pm 10\%$, but needed confirmation on the ability for the Chilled Water System to maintain temperatures at $\leq 85^\circ\text{F}$ within the specified flow range. A Chilled Water System review, including testing, is presently being performed as part of the Salem outage. At this time, the analyses have not been completed to determine if the stated range is acceptable. It is anticipated that this review will be completed by September 13, 1996.

Recently, the Staff questioned the ability to safely shut down both Salem Units simultaneously from outside the Control Room should a fire inside the common control area necessitate evacuation. The Control Room layout modification, which changes the internal design of the Control Room including removal of the walls between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Rooms, was developed separately from the ventilation modification and was determined to be consistent with the previous Appendix R position pertaining to remote shutdown capability of the Salem Units.

Though walls separated the Control Room in the previous design, the area was considered a common fire area. Therefore, a dual unit shutdown from outside the Control Room was reviewed for the previous configuration. In letter NLR-N88070, dated July 15, 1988, PSE&G informed the NRC that shutdown of both plants could be safely accomplished from outside the control room under the postulated fire conditions. The Staff's acceptance of this position is discussed in NRC letter dated July 20, 1989, (TAC Nos. 53539/53540).

Lastly, PSE&G would like to clarify a statement contained in the NRC's meeting summary dated July 10, 1996, pertaining to the June 26, 1996 meeting that was held to discuss the Control Room ventilation system (ref. TAC Nos. M95691 and M95692). That document states that the new design is single failure proof.

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
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Though the modifications that are being made to the system enhance the single failure capability of the system through the addition of dampers, redundant controls and circuitry modifications, the new design did not eliminate all single failure vulnerabilities. Those dampers that are required to change position and do not have redundancy within each train are discussed in the June 10, 1996 submittal.

Should you have any questions regarding this supplement, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,



Affidavit
Attachment

C Mr. H. J. Miller, Administrator - Region I
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Mr. L. Olshan, Licensing Project Manager - Salem
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One White Flint North
11555 Rockville Pike
Mail Stop 14E21
Rockville, MD 20852

Mr. C. Marschall (X24)
USNRC Senior Resident Inspector

Mr. K. Tosch, Manager IV
Bureau of Nuclear Engineering
33 Arctic Parkway
CN 415
Trenton, NJ 08625

