



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236

Nuclear Business Unit

APR 08 1996

LR-N96094

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20005

Dear Sir:

LER 272/96-004-00
SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT 1
LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272

This Licensee Event Report entitled "Containment Isolation Valve Missed Technical Specification Surveillance" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations, 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B).

Sincerely,

Clay Warren
General Manager -
Salem Operations

Attachment

SORC Mtg. 96-041

DWD/

C: Distribution
LER File 3.7

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The power is in your hands.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-8 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)
Salem Generating Station - Unit No. 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)
05000272

PAGE (3)
1 OF 4

TITLE (4)
Containment Isolation Valve Missed Technical Specification Surveillance

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
03	07	96	96	004	00	04	08	96	SALEM - UNIT 2	05000311
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

OPERATING MODE (9)	POWER LEVEL (10)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)							
N/A	0	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Dave Dodson, Station Licensing Engineer	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 609-339-1282
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO						

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On March 7, 1996, it was identified that the requirements of Technical Specification 4.6.1.1 were not fully implemented at Units 1 and 2. Specifically, the monthly surveillance procedure that has been used to implement Technical Specification 4.6.1.1 did not direct position verification of the Refueling Canal Supply and Discharge Containment Isolation Valves. This condition has existed since at least 1986.

The apparent cause of this occurrence is attributed to a lack of adequate controls for the development and maintenance of Technical Specification surveillance procedures. This weakness was previously identified in LER 311/95-008. Corrective actions as stated in this previous LER are still in progress, and will include verification of the adequacy of all Technical Specification surveillance procedures, with limited exceptions, and verification that controls are in place to maintain the adequacy of the procedures.

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 73(a)(2)(i)(B), any condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

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Salem Generating Station - Unit 1	05000 05000272	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 OF 4
		96	- 04	- 00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor
Waste Disposal Liquid System (WL)

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Discovery Date: March 7, 1996

Event Dates: The failure to perform adequate, documented verification of the referenced containment isolation valves occurred during each required surveillance interval, possibly since initial licensing, with the plants in Modes 1 through 4.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

At the time of identification, Salem Units 1 and 2 were shutdown and defueled. The Technical Specification surveillance Mode applicability is 1 through 4.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

Technical Specification 4.6.1.1 states, "Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated at least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except as provided in Table 3.6-1 of Specification 3.6.3.1, and all equipment hatches are closed and sealed."

In response to questions raised during the NRC Restart Assessment Team Inspection at Hope Creek, Salem Station initiated a review of its procedure for containment isolation valve position verification. The review identified four valves (1WL190, 1WL191, 2WL190, and 2WL191) that were not included in the monthly (31 day) Containment Isolation Valves surveillance procedure. A random sampling of historical records showed that the valves had been missing from the surveillance tests at both units since at least 1986. The valves have been listed in Table 3.6-1 of the Unit 1 and 2 Technical Specifications since the licenses were issued.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The apparent cause of this occurrence is attributed to a lack of adequate controls for the development and maintenance of Technical Specification surveillance procedures. This weakness was previously identified in LER 311/95-008.

PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES

A review of LERs for Salem Units 1 and 2 identified the following two LERs issued in the last two years relating to missed Technical Specification surveillances due to procedural deficiencies:

LER 272/94-008 "Quarterly Channel Functional Testing of Position Indication For Power Operated Relief Valves Missed On Both Units" identified an occurrence where a procedure was revised in response to Generic Letter 90-06 without a revision to Technical Specifications which resulted in missed surveillance testing of Power Operated Relief Valves while in Modes 1 and 2.

LER 311/95-008 "Technical Specifications 4.9.9 Missed Isolation Testing" identified that the surveillance testing performed, prior to core alterations, for the Containment Purge and Pressure-Vacuum Relief isolation system did not confirm the manually initiated isolation function as required by Technical Specifications 4.9.9.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

Administrative controls such as post outage valve lineup checks would likely have ensured that the valves were properly shut prior to power operations following an outage. Additionally, the monthly surveillance procedures did include position verification of the outside Containment Refueling Canal Supply and Discharge isolation valves (1SF22, 1SF36, 2SF22, and 2SF36). Thus there were no safety consequences associated with this condition since containment integrity would not have been affected in the unlikely event of an accident. Based on the above, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- 1) A review is being performed to ensure that all containment isolation valves are included, as required, in the periodic position verification surveillance tests. This review will be complete prior to restart of the affected units.
- 2) 1WL190, 1WL191, 2WL190, and 2WL191 will be added to the appropriate monthly surveillance procedures prior to the affected units' core reload.
- 3) A Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Project (TSSIP) has been initiated for Salem Units 1 and 2. The scope and content of the TSSIP program was described previously in LER 311/95-008-00. The TSSIP review is expected to be complete by December 31, 1997.